2026-03-11 18:00:00
2026年3月8日，伊朗德黑兰的沙赫兰石油仓库发生火灾，美国和以色列的袭击导致该地区大量油罐车和车辆无法使用。这标志着全球能源市场最可怕的噩梦成真。多年来，能源交易者一直担心一场战争可能会封锁霍尔木兹海峡——这条狭窄的水道连接着波斯湾的石油储备与全球市场。在此次战争之前，每天约有三分之一的全球海上石油出口和五分之一的天然气运输都经过该海峡。伊朗一直拥有封锁该水道的能力，也多次发出威胁，但若真的这么做，会严重损害自身经济。因此，投资者一直将这种情况视为一种“尾部风险”——一种令人担忧但极不可能发生的假设。如今，这种假设已成为现实。因此，油价飙升，海湾国家的石油生产者不得不削减产量，因为他们无法将所有原油运往市场，也没有地方存放未售出的库存。
关键要点：
此次危机的规模前所未有，其发展轨迹也难以预测。投资者对未来的走向感到极度不确定：过去一周内，油价在单日内的波动幅度超过20%。然而，如果有人对伊朗战争对全球经济的影响有更深入的理解，那可能是格雷戈里·布罗（Gregory Brew）。他是伊朗政权和全球石油市场的历史学家，曾在欧亚集团担任高级分析师，多年为投资者分析伊朗与美国、以色列之间的冲突带来的风险。我们周二讨论了此次石油冲击对经济的影响、快速停火的障碍，以及为何可能已经无法避免长期的能源危机。我们的对话经过了编辑，以提高清晰度和简洁性。
今天的石油冲击在历史上的规模有多大？是否与以往的危机类似？ 从减少市场供应的油量来看，这是历史上最大的供应冲击，至少是以往的两倍。唯一接近的是1979年的冲击，那次也涉及伊朗，导致油价翻倍。但当前的中断——每天2000万桶原油无法流动，持续超过一周——在实际规模上是其两倍。因此，我们正面临前所未有的情况。这也是市场难以解读的原因之一。多年来，伊朗一直威胁要封锁霍尔木兹海峡，但从未真正实施。某种程度上，交易者可能已经认为伊朗不会真的这么做。然而，现在许多人认为，尽管已经进入第二周，局势仍不会很快结束。
石油冲击的直接后果是什么？历史性的全球化石燃料供应下降会产生哪些后续影响？ 油价上涨是石油冲击最直接和政治上最显著的影响，但并不是最重要的。我认为最重要的影响是中馏分油（尤其是柴油）价格上涨。柴油价格上涨使建筑和工业活动成本增加，不仅在美国，而且在全球范围内。这会广泛抑制经济活动。我们还看到航空燃料价格大幅上涨，这将反映在机票价格上涨上。但这不仅仅是一场石油危机，也是一场天然气危机。全球20%的液化天然气（LNG）供应无法进入市场——卡塔尔无法通过霍尔木兹海峡运输LNG。欧洲在冬季结束时本就库存较低，现在面临更高的天然气价格，这将对工业产出和经济活动造成更大压力。东亚地区也面临很大风险，尤其是韩国和台湾。波斯湾地区是主要的农业投入品生产者和出口者，特别是化肥，这将影响食品价格——虽然美国受影响可能不大，但南亚地区很可能受到影响。即使在仅10天后，这场危机已经具备了成为宏观经济冲击的潜力，不仅影响石油市场，还可能波及多种商品市场。
美国是否能避免最严重的后果？ 一些人认为，美国由于是全球最大的石油生产国，能够更好地应对这场危机。毕竟，我们并不像其他国家那样容易受到能源短缺的影响。尽管能源价格上涨伤害了美国消费者，但它却有助于美国的一些主要产业，以及在这些产业中工作的普通美国人。美国在应对这场危机方面比大多数国家更有优势，因为我们是主要的石油和天然气生产国和出口国，而且对波斯湾石油的依赖程度不高。美国每天消耗约2000万桶石油，其中只有约50万桶来自波斯湾。在天然气方面，我们基本实现自给自足。能源价格上涨将促进依赖石油和天然气产业的地区（如德克萨斯州、北达科他州和宾夕法尼亚州的部分地区）的经济增长，但对依赖低能源价格的地区（如美国西海岸、东北部、南部和佛罗里达州）则构成压力。在因人工智能和数据中心热潮而增长较快的地区，高能源成本反而成为阻力。我认为美国不会成为赢家，但也不确定它会成为大输家。
白宫认为美国海军可以迅速恢复霍尔木兹海峡的航运，这种说法是否合理？ 我认为，在另一周的地区局势紧张之后，美国、法国等国家的海军力量将足以支持部分航运恢复。但要让所有油轮和集装箱公司相信安全形势已经改善，这将非常困难。一些公司可能会暂时观望，看看其他更勇敢的同行是否能安全通过。从伊朗政权的角度来看，只要伊斯兰共和国在冲突结束后仍然存在并保持强硬，他们就认为自己取得了胜利。如果特朗普迟迟不采取行动，你最担心的是什么情景？
如果冲突持续下去，你最担心哪种情景？ 在最坏的情况下，伊朗会更加积极地破坏霍尔木兹海峡的航运。虽然石油和商品仍在流动，但会受到伊朗频繁的袭击，导致频繁的中断和停顿，油价持续高企，每批进出海湾的货物都带有更高的风险溢价。如果冲突持续数月，油价高企将开始对宏观经济产生影响，推高各类商品价格，反映在消费者价格指数中，并对依赖能源和商品流动的美国和发达国家造成压力，同时也会对依赖海湾能源和商品的新兴市场带来冲击。更糟糕的情景是，伊朗成功破坏海湾国家的能源基础设施。目前，他们只是进行一些试探性攻击，比如袭击沙特炼油厂、打击卡塔尔的LNG设施、攻击阿联酋的炼油厂。这些行动主要是展示能力。但如果冲突持续数周以上，伊朗将面临更大的压力迫使美国让步，这可能促使他们采取更激进的行动：不再只是袭击炼油厂，而是对沙特和阿联酋的油田发动大规模无人机袭击，不仅影响霍尔木兹海峡的航运，还影响这些国家的石油生产能力。
如果美国和伊朗今天达成停火协议，全球石油市场是否能立即恢复？还是我们已经进入一个长期高能源价格的时代？ 换句话说，海湾国家已经关闭了生产，因为它们没有地方储存未售出的石油，这些国家是否需要数月甚至数年才能重新恢复生产？即使危机今天结束，这些国家也需要数周时间才能恢复到战前的产量水平。这意味着能源价格将维持高位更长时间。进入2026年的预期——一个供应充足的石油市场，甚至可能供过于求——已经不复存在。新的现实是，市场可能更加紧张，油价可能在较长时间内维持高位，甚至可能持续到2027年。
人们不断寻找历史上的类比来理解当前的危机，尤其是1973年和1979年的事件。这些类比有多大的参考价值？
你认为这些历史类比有用吗？ 你已经提到，这次石油冲击是历史上最大的一次。但与1970年代相比，全球经济是否更有能力应对这种冲击？这得益于页岩革命、战略石油储备等其他因素。对我而言，这让我想到两个想法。首先，我们正处于一种矛盾的环境中。2022年的能源危机——由俄罗斯入侵乌克兰引发——实际上增强了市场参与者对全球能源体系韧性的信心。那次冲击被认为非常严重，但最终却相对可控。大多数经济体都从中恢复过来，其中美国就是一个例子。进入2026年时，这一届政府认为全球能源经济有足够的弹性，可以承受大胆的行动而不会引发重大冲击。然而，过去六个月，美国采取了一系列在过去会被视为对油价风险过高的行动，例如支持乌克兰对俄罗斯石油出口设施的攻击、制裁主要俄罗斯石油公司、对委内瑞拉实施石油封锁、逮捕马杜罗等，这些行动最终导致了与伊朗的大规模军事冲突。美国似乎认为这些行动不会对全球能源市场造成负面影响。因此，我认为在当前环境下，国际石油市场中的主要动荡因素不是OPEC，也不是像俄罗斯这样的独裁者，甚至不是伊朗本身，而是美国。美国的行动正在增加全球石油市场的风险和波动性，部分原因在于这一届政府希望采取强硬行动，却认为不会带来负面的经济后果。
The oil market’s worst nightmare just came true.
For decades, energy traders have feared that a war might one day close the Strait of Hormuz — the narrow waterway that links the Persian Gulf’s oil reserves to global markets. Before today’s war in Iran, about one-third of the world’s seaborne oil exports and a fifth of global natural gas shipments flow through the strait each day.
Iran has long had the power to block that artery. And it threatened to do so, repeatedly. But it could not follow through on that threat without gravely damaging its own economy. Thus, investors always viewed that scenario as a “tail risk” — a grim but wildly improbable hypothetical.
Now, it is our reality.
As a result, oil prices have soared and Gulf state producers have throttled production, as they have no way to get all their crude to market – and no place to put their unsold stocks.
The scale of today’s crisis is unprecedented. And its trajectory is hard to discern. Investors appear profoundly uncertain about where we’re heading: During the past week, oil prices have repeatedly risen or fallen by more than 20 percent in a single day.
If anyone knows what the Iran war will mean for the global economy, however, it might be Gregory Brew.
Brew is a historian of both the Iranian regime and world oil markets. As a senior analyst at the Eurasia Group, he has spent years advising investors on the risks posed by the conflict between Iran, the US, and Israel.
We spoke on Tuesday about how today’s oil shock will impact the economy, the obstacles to a quick ceasefire — and why it may already be too late to avoid a prolonged energy crisis. Our conversation has been edited for clarity and concision.
How big is today’s oil shock, in historical context? Does this resemble any past crisis or is it unprecedented?
In terms of barrels taken off the market, this is the largest supply shock in history by at least a factor of two. The only one that comes close is the 1979 shock, which also involved Iran, and which caused oil prices to more than double. But the current disruption — 20 million barrels a day unable to flow for over a week — is twice that size in real terms.
So, we’re very much in an unprecedented situation. Which is part of why markets have struggled to interpret it. For years, Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz and it never happened. On some level, I think traders came to believe that Iran would never really do it. Now, many believe that it’s a situation that won’t last much longer despite the fact that we’re in the second week and it doesn’t show any signs of ending.
The immediate consequences of an oil shock are obvious: higher gasoline and energy prices. But what are the downstream effects of a historic drop in the global fossil fuel supply? What are the biggest second-order impacts?
The increase in domestic gasoline prices is the most immediate and politically salient effect, but it’s not really the most important one. I would say the most important effect is higher prices for middle distillates — particularly diesel. Higher diesel prices make construction and industrial activity more expensive, not only in the United States but worldwide. That broadly depresses economic activity.
We’ve also seen tremendous increases in jet fuel prices. That’s going to show up in higher airfare costs.
But this is not just an oil crisis. It’s also a gas crisis. Twenty percent of the global LNG [liquefied natural gas] supply can’t get to market — Qatar can’t move LNG through the Strait. Europe was exiting the winter months with relatively low gas inventories, so it’s now facing higher natural gas prices that will put greater pressure on industrial output and economic activity this year. East Asia is also very exposed, particularly South Korea and Taiwan. And the Persian Gulf is a major producer and exporter of agricultural inputs, particularly fertilizer, which is going to impact food costs — maybe not so much in the United States, but very likely in South Asia.
Even at only 10 days old, this already has the makings of a macroeconomic shock that’s going to play out not only in oil but across a variety of commodity markets.
Will the United States dodge the worst of these consequences? Some have argued that America is unusually well-positioned to weather the crisis it created. After all, we’re the world’s biggest oil producer. So, we aren’t as vulnerable to energy shortages. And even as skyrocketing energy prices hurt our consumers, it helps one of our major industries — and ordinary Americans who work in it.
The US is better positioned to weather this than most countries, given that it’s a major hydrocarbons producer and exporter.
And we also aren’t that dependent on Persian Gulf oil. America consumes about 20 million barrels of oil a day. Only about 500,000 of those come from the Persian Gulf. And with natural gas, we’re basically self-sufficient.
Higher energy prices will boost economic growth in parts of the country that depend on the oil and gas industries — Texas, the Dakotas, parts of Pennsylvania. But there are big chunks of the country that depend on lower energy prices: the West Coast, the Northeast, the South, Florida. And in areas that have seen stronger growth on the back of the AI and data center boom, high energy costs end up being headwinds. I don’t think the US emerges as a winner from this, but I’m not sure it’s a big loser either.
Earlier, you suggested that this crisis could drag on longer than traders realize. Yet the White House has suggested that the shock will end imminently, even if the war doesn’t: The US Navy will simply start escorting oil tankers through the Strait, allowing crude to flow freely across the world’s seas. Is that not plausible?
I think after another week of buildup in the region, there will be a sufficient naval presence — the US, France, and others — to support at least some traffic resuming. But it’s going to be difficult to get all of the tanker and container shipping companies to accept that the security picture has improved. Some will likely sit on the sidelines for a while to see if their more courageous counterparts make it through.
“From the regime’s point of view, so long as the Islamic Republic remains standing and defiant by the end of this conflict, they will have secured a victory.”
But there is sufficient capability to guard tankers against Iranian drone attacks, which is really the most relevant threat at this point. The Iranians are likely running low on ballistic missiles and need to conserve them. Their navy has been largely sunk. They have small boats that could theoretically harass tankers, but those are highly vulnerable to counter-fire. So it’s really drones we’re talking about. Iran has a huge stockpile — thousands of them — and the capability to launch them at the Strait. The US Navy now has quite a lot of experience shooting down Iranian drones after months of combat in the Red Sea. With enough warships and aircraft, they will have the means of shooting down most of them.
But most is not all. If a few drones get through — and hit one or two tankers — traffic will be disrupted again. So if the conflict continues, we’re likely to move from a scenario where the Strait is closed to one where it is open but disrupted — where traffic is resuming, but not at pre-war volumes.
So, the White House probably can’t fully reopen the Strait through mere naval deployments. Can it do so by declaring a ceasefire? According to some analysts, the Iranian regime is not interested in a quick peace. Rather, it wants to first impose grave economic costs on the US and Israel, so as to establish a more lasting deterrent against future assassinations of its leadership. What do you make of that argument?
Iran entered this conflict with two underlying assumptions. The first was that their deterrence had been weakened and needed to be bolstered. That meant a more aggressive, escalatory response: striking not just at US troops and Israel, but also the Gulf states. Iran intended to send a very strong message: If it comes under attack at any point in the future, it will trigger a regional war with implications not only for Iran but for the security of every state in the region and for the global economy. Iran will not fall back on calibrated retaliation. If it is attacked, it will expand the scope of conflict in a way that imposes costs on everyone.
The second assumption is that they are more capable of absorbing cost and pain than the United States — specifically, that the cost of the conflict for Iran will be manageable, whereas for the US president, the price of energy and the political impact of a prolonged conflict will make it impossible to sustain. They assume they can outlast Trump. They believe they can continue firing retaliatory missile and drone attacks against US bases and Gulf states, that they can continue the pressure on energy, and that eventually Trump — not them — will be forced to deescalate. That’s what they’re waiting for.
The final point is that for them, survival and victory are one and the same. It doesn’t matter how many bombs are dropped or how much damage US and Israeli bombers do to Iran — and they’re doing a tremendous amount of damage. From the regime’s point of view, so long as the Islamic Republic remains standing and defiant by the end of this conflict, they will have secured a victory.
If Trump doesn’t blink soon, what scenario are you most worried about? Like, what sequence of events do you consider both reasonably likely and economically punishing, in the event of a prolonged conflict?
In the downside scenario, Iran is attempting more aggressively to disrupt traffic through the Strait. You have oil and goods flowing but under constant Iranian fire — frequent disruptions, frequent pauses, continued high prices, risk premia attached to every shipment in and out of the Gulf. A conflict that lasts months and keeps prices elevated for a prolonged period starts to have macro implications. It raises the prices of goods across the board, shows up in consumer price index prints, and puts pressure not just on the US and developed economies but on emerging markets that depend on energy and goods flowing out of the Gulf.
There’s an even worse scenario, though, where Iran manages to do significant damage to Gulf energy infrastructure. Right now they’re taking pot shots — an attack on a Saudi refinery, strikes on Qatari LNG facilities, a hit on a refinery in the UAE. These are largely signaling moves to indicate capability. But should the conflict continue for more than a few weeks, the Iranians will be under greater pressure to force the US to back down, and that might push them to escalate: Rather than pot shots against refineries, mass drone swarms on Saudi and Emirati oil fields that affect not just traffic through the Strait but the ability of these states to produce oil in the first place.
Let’s say the US and Iran reach a ceasefire tomorrow. Is the damage to the global oil market immediately reversible? Or have we already bought ourselves a prolonged period of higher energy prices?
In other words, will it take a long time for Gulf countries that have shuttered production — because they have no place to store their unsold oil — to fully restart their operations? Or will shipping insurance companies charge higher prices in perpetuity, now that they know that the Strait of Hormuz really can be closed?
“Actions by the US are adding risk and volatility to the global oil market.”
The shut-ins are extremely important. They’re what transform this from a supply-chain disruption into a supply shock. Before the shut-ins, this was tankers not being able to get to their destinations. But as soon as Gulf states began shutting down production, you’re not only removing barrels from the market now — you’re removing barrels from the market over the next three to six months. It takes time to reverse shut-ins and bring production back online. Even if the crisis were to end tomorrow, it would take a number of weeks for regional producers to restore output to pre-war levels.
That means the crisis will keep prices higher for longer. The narrative coming into this year — a well-supplied oil market, maybe even a supply glut — that narrative is over. The new reality is a market that is likely to be tighter, characterized by higher prices for a prolonged period, potentially stretching into 2027.
People keep reaching for historical analogies to comprehend the present crisis — particularly 1973 and 1979. How useful are those comparisons? You already mentioned that this is the largest oil shock in history. But is the global economy better positioned to weather such a shock in 2026 than it was in the 1970s — due to the shale revolution, or strategic petroleum reserves, or other factors?
For me, this brings to mind two thoughts. The first is that we are in a paradoxical environment. The 2022 energy crisis — triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — actually made market actors confident in the resilience of global energy systems. That shock was presumed to be very bad and ended up being tough but quite manageable. Most economies emerged from it in decent shape.
One was the United States. And coming into 2026, this administration believed there was enough slack in the global energy economy for aggressive action that would not trigger a major shock. Over the last six months, you’ve seen the US undertake actions that in the past would have been regarded as too risky for oil prices: supporting Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil export infrastructure, sanctioning major Russian oil companies, imposing an oil blockade on Venezuela, seizing Maduro — all leading up to the decision to engage in a large-scale military conflict with Iran, apparently under the presumption that it would not negatively affect the global energy market.
And that leads me to conclude that in the current environment — very different from the 1970s or prior crises — the key disruptive force driving volatility and risk in the international oil market is not OPEC. It’s not a rogue actor like Russia. It’s not even Iran. It’s the United States. Actions by the US are adding risk and volatility to the global oil market, in part because this administration wants to take aggressive action and thought it could do so without suffering negative economic consequences.
2026-03-11 06:00:28
2026年3月7日，唐纳德·特朗普总统抵达迈阿密国际机场后走向他的豪华轿车。| 索尔·洛埃/法新社/盖蒂图片社
本文出自《Logoff》每日通讯，旨在帮助您了解特朗普政府的动态，而不会让政治新闻占据您的生活。点击此处订阅。
欢迎来到《Logoff》：特朗普与伊朗的战争何时结束？目前的情况如何？
美国和以色列已经对伊朗目标发动了11天的袭击，导致伊朗最高领袖死亡，并摧毁了伊朗的导弹发射器和海军资产。但接下来会发生什么仍不清楚，不同的人会给出不同的答案。
特朗普周一表示：“我认为战争已经非常彻底，基本上结束了。”白宫新闻秘书卡拉琳·利维特今天则表示：“当特朗普认为军事目标已经达成，并且伊朗处于完全无条件投降的状态时，战争才会结束。”而美国中东特使史蒂夫·维托夫今天也表示：“我不知道。”
实际上，有哪些可能的结局呢？正如我的同事扎克·比厄姆报道的那样，“无条件投降”——以及特朗普所希望的更亲美的伊朗领导层——在当前情况下不太可能实现。最有可能的结果是达成一项谈判协议，或者特朗普决定宣称胜利并撤军。
为什么这很重要？这并不是特朗普政府第一次面临无法解释为何发动战争的问题。但随着战争持续，燃料及其他一切商品的价格不断上涨，这一问题只会变得更加严重。根据五角大楼的数据，美国已有8名军人死亡，约140人受伤。
与此同时，美国和以色列正在轰炸德黑兰，这座拥有超过900万人口的城市。周末以色列对石油设施的袭击导致了危险的酸雨从天而降，还引发了大面积停电。周二，国防部长彼得·海格塞思宣布：“这是我们对伊朗境内发动最猛烈袭击的一天。”一位居民告诉《纽约时报》：“如果他们再这样持续轰炸德黑兰10天，德黑兰将一无所有。”
我最近非常喜欢《大西洋》杂志的《Better With Time》通讯，它提供了一套为期八周的建议，帮助您以创新的方式改善生活。如果您感兴趣，可以点击此处订阅，或预览第一期内容。
感谢阅读，祝您有一个美好的夜晚，我们明天再见！
This story appeared in The Logoff, a daily newsletter that helps you stay informed about the Trump administration without letting political news take over your life. Subscribe here.
Welcome to The Logoff: When will Donald Trump’s war with Iran end?
What’s happening? The United States and Israel have now spent 11 days striking targets in Iran, killing the country’s supreme leader and destroying Iranian missile launchers and naval assets. But it’s not clear where they go from here, and you’ll get different answers depending on who you ask.
Trump, on Monday: “I think the war is very complete, pretty much.”
White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt, today: “When [Trump] determines the military objectives have been met…and that Iran is in a position of complete and unconditional surrender.”
US special envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, also today: “I don’t know.”
What are the options, really? As my colleague Zack Beauchamp has reported, “unconditional surrender” — and the more US-friendly leadership Trump has said he wants — isn’t likely under current conditions. Instead, the most likely outcomes are a negotiated settlement, or Trump simply deciding to claim victory and go home.
Why does this matter? This is not a new problem for the Trump administration, which has been unable to explain why it took the US to war. But it’s only going to get more acute as the war drags on and gas — followed by just about everything else — gets more expensive. US casualties are also mounting: Eight service members have died, and about 140 have been wounded, according to the Pentagon.
In the meantime, the US and Israel are bombarding Tehran, a city of more than 9 million people. Israeli strikes on oil facilities over the weekend have caused dangerous acid rain to fall from the skies, and strikes have also caused widespread power outages. On Tuesday, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced “our most intense day of strikes inside Iran.”
“If they keep hitting Tehran like this for another 10 days,” one resident told the New York Times, “nothing will remain of Tehran.”
I’ve really been enjoying The Atlantic’s Better With Time newsletter, which offers a finite, eight-week set of suggestions for outside-of-the-box ways to improve your life. If you’re interested, you can subscribe, or preview the first issue, here. Thanks for reading, have a great evening, and we’ll see you tomorrow!
2026-03-11 03:15:25
2026年3月9日，迈阿密一家加油站的油价牌显示了每加仑汽油的价格。| Joe Raedle/Getty Images 特朗普总统在伊朗战争问题上的表态依然模棱两可，但可以明确的是，这场冲突已经对美国和全球经济产生了影响。油价在周一短暂突破每桶100美元，目前处于多年未见的高位。人们已经在加油站感受到这种影响，平均汽油价格已超过每加仑3.50美元。然而，影响不止于此：它还意味着几乎所有商品的价格都可能上涨。《经济学人》的华尔街编辑迈克·伯德（Mike Bird）在接受《Today, Explained》节目主持人诺埃尔·金（Noel King）采访时指出，如果油价持续上涨，这可能会给特朗普及其共和党在即将到来的中期选举中带来麻烦。以下是伯德与《Today, Explained》节目对话的节选，内容经过删减和润色。完整版节目内容更多，建议在Apple Podcasts、Pandora和Spotify等平台收听。
伊朗战争是否已经影响到美国经济？简短回答是：是的。油价会迅速反映当前和未来的状况，并几乎立即影响到汽油价格。如果你拥有汽车，并且最近加过油，你就会发现价格比之前更高了。人们在汽油上的支出增加，意味着他们用于其他方面的钱就少了。这也会影响到各种其他商品，但最明显和直接的影响就是汽油价格上涨。
那么，我们是否应该考虑其他方面的影响？能源是一种基础投入品。你所消费的能源并不只是以汽油的形式存在，而是体现在你购买的各类商品中，甚至包括那些你可能不会认为是能源密集型的产品。农产品需要肥料和拖拉机，所有制造的商品都是在某个地方生产，并且需要一定量的能源。因此，能源价格上涨会波及到几乎所有消费品。
这种影响需要多长时间？如果你今天去超市，是否能发现鸡蛋和蔬菜价格上涨？答案可能是否定的，因为很多商品的供应链活动是在伊朗袭击发生之前就已经开始的。这些影响会有一个较长且变化不定的滞后期。有些商品的价格可能在短期内上涨，而有些则可能需要几个月甚至一年以上的时间才会显现。
那么，市场会如何反应？可以说，市场总是波动不定，但通常最终会上涨。从长期来看，美国股市几乎总是会带来正收益。不过，关键在于你是否能坚持到长期趋势显现。今年市场已经经历了许多波动，过去几天总体呈下跌趋势，这主要是由于当前的不确定性。
更大的问题是，这种局势是否会持续到本周结束，然后以尴尬的撤退和解释收场？还是说，我们会持续关注这个问题长达六个月？现在，我们来谈谈特朗普总统。他对于与伊朗的战争以及经济负担问题说了些什么？过去几天，白宫在谈论油价问题时表现得有些混乱。总统要求投资者和美国公众忽略他所说的短期影响。去年的关税政策就显示了市场对总统行为的制约作用——总统不喜欢看到负面新闻，他能承受的负面报道有限。去年，这种压力促使关税有所降低，但关税并未完全取消，目前仍然以各种形式存在。因此，对于像军事行动这样复杂的问题，其影响尚不明确。
假设我们设想一个世界，油价能回到三周前的水平，那么需要发生什么？从恢复速度来看，关键问题在于冲突持续的时间。冲突持续的时间越长，恢复正常的难度就越大。你不能一夜之间重启生产，因为需要时间重新培训工人，准备资源。如果冲突持续数周甚至数月，恢复过程可能不会是线性的，而是逐渐恶化，取决于持续时间的长短。
总统的批评者会如何利用他拒绝承认目前局势没有明确结束这一点？从经济负担的角度来看，这已经是由于政府行动直接引发的第二次重大供应冲击。对于总统的反对者和批评者来说，最重要的问题是这种局势对中期选举的影响。如果你看到人们为汽油支付了更高的价格，同时整个经济中的价格都在上涨，这对共和党来说将是非常不利的。
President Donald Trump continues to give mixed messages about the war in Iran. But what is clear is the impact that the conflict is already having on the US and global economies.
Oil prices, which briefly crested $100 a barrel on Monday, are higher than we’ve seen in years. People are already seeing the impact at the pump, with average gas prices above $3.50 per gallon. But the impact doesn’t stop there: It also means that the price of, well, everything, can go up.
Mike Bird, Wall Street editor for The Economist, told Today, Explained co-host Noel King that higher prices, if they endure, are likely to cause a problem for Trump and the GOP in the approaching midterm elections.
Below is an excerpt of Bird’s conversation with Today, Explained, edited for length and clarity. There’s much more in the full episode, so listen to Today, Explained wherever you get podcasts, including Apple Podcasts, Pandora, and Spotify.
Is the war in Iran already affecting the US economy?
Yes, is the short answer. Oil prices move very quickly to account for future conditions and current conditions, and that is fed almost immediately into gas prices. If you own a car, if you’ve been to fill it up recently, you will have noticed it was more expensive than the last time.
People who spend money on gas have less money to spend on other things. That also feeds into all manner of other things but the most visible immediate term impact is on gas prices.
Why don’t we go into all manner of other things while we’re here?
Energy’s an input good. The amount of energy you consume is mostly not in the form of gasoline. It’s embodied in products in all sorts of things that you purchase, even things that you wouldn’t consider as being energy intensive.
Agricultural goods require fertilizer, they require tractors. Everything that’s manufactured, it’s made somewhere and uses some amount of energy. So the feed-through from energy prices really hits every consumer item. Almost everything is affected by energy.
How long does it take? If I were to go to the grocery store today, am I going to find that eggs and vegetables are more expensive?
You probably wouldn’t find that immediately, if only because a lot of the supply chain activity around what you see in the store today will have begun before the attacks on Iran began.
These things feed through with a long and variable lag time. Some things will be appreciating relatively soon in the store and some things it might take months, maybe even more than a year.
“From an affordability perspective, this is now the second major supply shock caused directly by actions that the administration’s taken.”
If you imagine something like fertilizer costs, which are very closely pegged to the price of oil, [they] affect the amount of food produced in various parts of the world. You won’t start to see those lower amounts of food produced for quite a long time and the price effects won’t be seen for quite a long time.
What about the markets? The markets, fair to say, are kind of always whipsawing, but [they] always go back up, right?
Markets tend to, in the long term, go back up. It’s just whether you can see it through to the long term. There are not many extended periods — say, 10 years — in American equity market history where you weren’t looking at positive returns afterwards. There are a couple, most of them quite a long time ago.
There’s been a lot going on in markets already this year. It’s been generally down the past few days because of all of this volatility.
The bigger question is, is this something that’s going to be over by the end of the week and there’s going to be an embarrassing withdrawal and a walkback? Or is it something we’re going to be talking about in six months time?
Now we should talk about President Trump. What do we hear him saying about his war with Iran and his affordability agenda?
There’s been a lot of muddled communication from the White House over the past few days when it comes to oil prices. The president has asked investors and the American public to look through what he calls short-term effects.
One thing we did see with the tariffs last year is there is this idea that the market is a disciplining factor on the president — that basically, he doesn’t like seeing the red line go down, that there is only so much of the sort of negative press that he’s willing to put up with.
Last year, it allowed for the reduction of tariffs. The tariffs didn’t go away. Obviously the tariffs [are] still really largely in place by various means. So what that means for something as complicated as this, because it’s a military endeavor, is very unclear.
Let’s say we want to envision a world where we can get oil prices back down to where they were three weeks ago. What has to happen?
The main question in terms of how quickly things go back to normal is how long this goes on in the first place. The longer it goes on, the more difficult it becomes to get this production all going again.
You can’t just switch it on and off overnight. You don’t have all the workers required ready to go. If it does drag into weeks and months, I think it’s not a linear process. It can get worse and worse depending on how long it lasts.
How do we see the president’s critics seizing on his refusal to acknowledge that he has not provided an end in sight at this point?
From an affordability perspective, this is now the second major supply shock caused directly by actions that the administration’s taken.
In terms of the president’s opponents and critics, the most important thing to start thinking about is how much this affects the midterm elections. If you see people paying significantly more for gas, seeing prices rise across the economy as they have for the past few years, that is going to be pretty bad for the Republicans electorally.
2026-03-11 02:35:44
Vox的总编辑兼出版人斯瓦蒂·沙玛（Swati Sharma）今天宣布，史蒂夫·海瑟（Steve Heuser）将加入该组织担任执行编辑，自3月23日起生效。在新职位上，海瑟将与Vox的编辑领导团队密切合作，指导报道重点，支持编辑和记者，并在快速变化的媒体环境中进一步推动Vox的新闻报道发展。他将负责政治、政策与思想团队；更好生活团队；以及今日解释与解释它团队。
沙玛表示：“我非常高兴欢迎史蒂夫加入Vox。他的编辑判断力、领导经验以及对政治和政策领域的深刻理解，使他成为目前Vox的绝佳人选。”
海瑟此前在政界、政策和创新领域担任了多项高级职务，曾在Politico工作，并以在构建推动美国政治文化变革的宏观叙事方面具有创造力而闻名。在担任Politico杂志编辑期间，他带领编辑和设计师团队开发长篇报道，并负责所有外部撰稿人和观点类新闻。该杂志结合了快速新闻分析与高质量叙事报道，曾发布多个访问量最高的文章。
作为Politico创办的The Agenda的创始编辑，他推出了一个以创意和设计为导向的在线政策杂志，该杂志在健康、能源、科技和金融等领域产生了多项高影响力报道，并赢得了多个奖项。在最近的职位中，海瑟担任Politico首位全球科技编辑，负责华盛顿的科技政策报道，并协调布鲁塞尔、伦敦和加州的团队。他主导了多项重要的科技报道，策划了高关注度的专题和现场活动，并推出了Politico科技播客和《数字未来日报》通讯，后者现在已成为该网站最受欢迎的政策通讯。
在前往华盛顿之前，海瑟曾担任《波士顿环球报》的“想法”编辑，并作为获奖的生物技术记者工作。他编辑的科学系列报道获得了普利策奖的解释性新闻报道奖，并两次获得普利策奖提名。他还曾前往罗马报道教皇选举，并担任过餐厅评论员、旅行作家和书评人等兼职工作。
海瑟毕业于耶鲁大学，闲暇时喜欢骑自行车、滑雪，并与他的妻子和精力充沛的上小学一年级的孩子一起户外活动。
Vox Editor-in-Chief and Publisher Swati Sharma today announced that Steve Heuser will join the organization as executive editor, starting March 23.
In his new role, Heuser will partner closely with Vox’s editorial leadership to guide coverage priorities, support editors and reporters, and further evolve the publication’s journalism in a rapidly changing media landscape. He will oversee the Politics, Policy & Ideas team; the Even Better & Lifestyle team; and the Today, Explained & Explain It to Me team.
“I’m so thrilled to welcome Steve to Vox,” Sharma said. “His editorial judgment, leadership experience, and deep understanding of the politics and policy landscape make him an exceptional fit for Vox at this moment.”
Heuser joins Vox from Politico, where he held several senior roles at the intersection of politics, policy, and innovation — and was known as a creative force in knitting together big-picture storylines on the changes driving American political culture.
As editor of Politico Magazine, he led a team of editors and designers who developed Politico’s longform stories, as well as handling all its outside contributors and opinion journalism. The magazine mixed quick-turn news analysis with high-polish narrative journalism and published several of the site’s highest-traffic stories.
As the founding editor of Politico’s The Agenda, he launched and ran a creative, design-forward online policy magazine that produced some of the site’s highest-profile coverage of health, energy, technology, and finance and won multiple awards.
In his most recent role, Heuser was Politico’s first global technology editor, leading Washington coverage of tech policy and coordinating across teams in Brussels, London, and California. He ran major tech storylines and planned high-profile packages and live events. He also launched the Politico Tech podcast and the Digital Future Daily newsletter, now the site’s most popular policy newsletter.
Before coming to Washington, Heuser was Ideas editor at the Boston Globe and a SABEW Award-winning biotechnology reporter. He edited a science series that won the Pulitzer Prize for explanatory journalism, as well as two Pulitzer finalists. He also covered a papal conclave from Rome and had side gigs as restaurant critic, travel writer, and book reviewer.
Heuser is a graduate of Yale University and, in his spare time, enjoys biking, skiing, and getting outdoors with his wife and very active first-grader.
2026-03-10 20:30:00
美国正在经历历史上最显著的犯罪率下降之一，但几乎没人意识到这一点（除非你读这份通讯）。根据FBI的数据，2024年暴力犯罪下降了4.5%，其中谋杀案减少了近15%。犯罪正义委员会的数据表明，2025年美国主要城市谋杀案又下降了21%，这可能使美国的谋杀率降至历史最低水平。然而，美国的谋杀率仍然是加拿大的两倍多，比大多数西欧国家高出五倍。美国仍以每千人中监禁人数最多的国家之一而闻名。与其它富裕国家相比，美国仍然面临严重的犯罪问题，以及一个经常未能有效帮助受害者和罪犯的司法体系。詹妮弗·多莱克（Jennifer Doleac）希望改变这一现状。她是阿诺德基金会（Arnold Ventures）刑事司法部门的执行副总裁，并入选了我们首届“未来完美50人”名单。她的新书《第二次机会的科学》提出，通过在刑事司法系统的关键节点上实施小型、基于证据的干预措施，可以显著降低再犯率，而我们却错失了大量这样的机会。我最近与多莱克讨论了研究结果，以下是五个主要发现。
1）与其加重惩罚，不如更快抓到罪犯
多年来，美国对犯罪的默认反应是延长监禁和拘留时间。多莱克认为，我们关注的是问题的错误方面。“我的团队在阿诺德基金会花了很多时间，试图将政策讨论从增加刑期和通过延长刑期的法案上转移开，转而专注于更快地解决更多犯罪。”她说。这种方法不仅更有效、更便宜，还有可能获得跨党派的支持。这一逻辑源于行为经济学。大多数犯罪者更关注当下，而不是十年与十五年刑期之间的差异。真正能改变他们行为的是现在被抓住的可能性。多莱克自己的研究提供了一个有力的例证：当丹麦将DNA数据库扩展到所有被指控重罪的人时，一项针对18至30岁男性群体的研究发现，这些人未来犯罪的定罪率下降了40%。这不是因为他们被关押，而是因为一个简单的唾液样本改变了他们的计算。他们知道，如果再次犯罪，更容易被识别出来。“对我来说，最令人兴奋的就是这种再犯率的显著下降，”多莱克说，“利用提高被抓住可能性的能力来改变行为，让人们走上更好的道路。”
2）给初犯者真正的第二次机会
这可能是书中最具反直觉的发现之一：撤销首次轻微犯罪被告的指控并不会导致更多犯罪，反而会显著减少犯罪。多莱克和她的合著者研究了当马萨诸塞州萨福克县的非暴力轻微犯罪案件在初次出庭时被撤销的情况——这通常是因为被告碰巧遇到了较为宽松的检察官。结果发现，这些人未来再次犯罪的可能性降低了53%。另一项在德克萨斯州哈里斯县的研究也发现，首次被起诉的重罪被告如果通过暂缓审判或撤销指控避免了定罪，他们的再犯率减少了一半，就业率在十年内提高了近50%。这些影响非常显著，而多莱克最初对此持怀疑态度。“如果我们以某种方式减轻后果，你可能会看到一些人犯罪更多，”她说，“所以问题就变成了成本效益分析。”结果却显示，犯罪率大幅下降，成本更低，时间更少，而且所有人都更受益。为什么这有效？机制似乎在于犯罪记录本身。一旦出庭，即使案件最终被撤销，该指控也会对雇主和执法部门可见。“这使得找工作或保住工作变得更难，也使得获得住房更难。”多莱克解释道。对于首次犯罪者来说，避免建立第一份犯罪记录，有助于他们继续走在有工作和稳定生活的道路上。
3）关注细节问题
多莱克书中的某些最有效的干预措施几乎简单到荒谬。在纽约市，研究人员发现，大约40%收到轻微违规传票的人未能出庭，这通常不是因为他们逃避法律制裁，而是因为指示不清楚，他们忘记了或无法到达。重新设计文件将未能出庭的比例减少了6个百分点（13%的降幅），而短信提醒则将出庭率从62%提高到70%（增加了8个百分点）。这很重要，因为未能出庭通常会引发逮捕令和新的指控，使人们陷入司法系统，即使最初的违规只是携带未装瓶的饮料。在堪萨斯州约翰逊县，工作人员只是简单地给那些在出狱后被筛查出有精神疾病的人打电话，并提供一次医疗预约。这仅仅是一次电话和一次预约，没有后续跟进或额外支持。这种“温暖的交接”使这些人一年内再次被捕的可能性降低了17%，成本仅为每人15美元。正如书中所说，这些例子展示了如何通过微小的信息和资源调整——经济学家称之为边际激励变化——以极低的成本将人们从系统中引导出来。
4）测试一切，包括流行的观点
多莱克对证据的重视贯穿始终，她的研究结果有时甚至让左翼和右翼的人感到不满。最突出的例子是她对“禁止问犯罪记录”（Ban the Box）政策的研究。这项政策旨在防止雇主在招聘初期询问应聘者的犯罪记录，从而帮助有犯罪记录的人获得工作。然而，研究结果却与初衷相反。“经济学家看到这一点时会说，你并没有真正改变任何根本性的激励因素，”多莱克告诉我，“雇主不会突然对所有人一视同仁，他们反而会试图猜测那些他们无法看到的信息。在美国，犯罪记录与种族高度相关。”她的研究发现，这项政策反而扩大了种族间的就业差距，特别是对那些没有犯罪记录的年轻黑人男性，他们无法向雇主传达自己无犯罪记录的事实。后续研究也发现，这项政策并没有帮助它原本想要帮助的人。但等到证据出现时，“已经有一个非常强大的‘禁止问犯罪记录’游说团体，他们的工作依赖于不被证据说服，因此很难改变这一政策。”更广泛的教训并不是改革毫无希望，而是良好的意图并不足够。政策必须经过严格测试，而政策制定者必须愿意根据数据调整方向。
5）改革窗口仍然开放——至少现在是
犯罪率下降带来了悖论。一方面，犯罪率降低意味着人们不再那么害怕，从而为尝试更聪明的改革方法提供了更多政治空间；另一方面，也存在懈怠的风险。“你可以想象大家说，‘好，这已经结束了’，”多莱克说，“但也许其中的教训是，当我们所有人都努力减少犯罪时，我们确实可以做到。即使现在你的社区没有犯罪问题，但很多社区仍然面临这一问题。”多莱克之所以乐观，与其说是数据，不如说是她亲眼看到的现实。“我现在花了很多时间与各州立法者交谈，”她说，“这与电视新闻上的政治讨论完全不同。”这些立法者是兼职的，人手不足，他们试图解决真实社区中的实际问题。“当我接受这份工作时，我曾认为很多争论会围绕我们是否相信证据展开，”她说，“但我发现，这其实是一个更人性化的问题——政策制定者和研究人员之间缺乏了解。”在改善破案率、测试再犯干预措施、减少不必要的起诉等议题上，这种跨党派的潜力可能是当今刑事司法领域最被低估的好消息。“我们可能并不知道犯罪率为何出现大幅波动，”多莱克说，“但我们能引导人们走向正确的方向。这不仅仅是随机的运气，我们也不必固守自己的理论。我们可以走出去，测试它们。”本文最初发表于《好消息》通讯，欢迎订阅！
The United States is in the middle of one of the most dramatic crime declines in its history — and almost no one seems to know it. (Unless, of course, you read this newsletter.)
FBI data shows violent crime fell 4.5 percent in 2024, with murder plunging nearly 15 percent. Data from the Council on Criminal Justice suggests homicides dropped another 21 percent in 2025 across major cities, potentially putting the country on track for the lowest murder rate ever recorded.
And yet, the US murder rate is still roughly two-and-a-half times Canada’s and five times higher than most of Western Europe. America still locks up more people per capita than almost any other nation on earth. Compared to other wealthy nations, we still have a serious crime problem — and a criminal justice system that too often fails both victims and offenders.
Jennifer Doleac wants to change that. Doleac is the executive vice president of criminal justice at Arnold Ventures and a member of our inaugural Future Perfect 50 list. Her new book, The Science of Second Chances, makes a data-driven case that small, evidence-based interventions at key points in the criminal justice system can dramatically reduce recidivism — and that we’re leaving an astonishing number of those opportunities on the table.
I talked to Doleac recently about what the research shows. Here are five takeaways.
For decades, the default American response to crime has been to make prison and jail sentences longer. Doleac argues we’ve been focused on the wrong end of the problem. “My team at Arnold Ventures is spending a lot of time trying to shift the policy conversation from adding sentence enhancements and passing bills that increase sentence length, to solving more crimes faster,” she told me. “That’s something that not only works better, and it’s cheaper, it also has an opportunity for bipartisan support.”
The logic is rooted in behavioral economics. Most people who commit crime are heavily focused on the present; they’re not weighing the difference between a 10-year and a 15-year sentence. What does change their behavior is the probability of getting caught right now.
Doleac’s own research offers a striking illustration: when Denmark expanded its law enforcement DNA database to include anyone charged with a felony, future criminal convictions among those added fell over 40 percent in a study that focused on men ages 18-30. Not because these people were locked up, but because a simple saliva swab changed the calculus. They knew they’d be more likely to be identified if they reoffended.
“It’s really that reduction in recidivism that most excited me as a researcher,” Doleac said. “The opportunity to use the ability to increase the probability of getting caught as a way to change behavior and put people on a better path.”
This may be the most counterintuitive finding in the book: dropping charges against first-time misdemeanor defendants doesn’t lead to more crime. It leads to dramatically less.
Doleac and her co-authors studied what happened when nonviolent misdemeanor cases in Suffolk County, Massachusetts, were dismissed at arraignment — essentially because the defendant got lucky with a more lenient prosecutor. The result: a 53 percent reduction in the likelihood of future criminal complaints. A separate study in Harris County, Texas, found nearly identical effects for first-time felony defendants who avoided a felony conviction via deferred adjudication or dismissal. Their reoffending rates were cut roughly in half, and their employment rates rose by nearly 50 percent over a decade.
These are major effects, and Doleac told me she was initially skeptical. “If we reduce the consequences in some way, you’re probably going to see some people commit more crime. And so the question is just, what’s the cost-benefit, right?” she said. “And then it just turned out to be this massive drop in crime, costing less money, taking less time, and leaving everybody better off.”
Why does this work? The mechanism appears to be the criminal record itself. Once you’re arraigned, that charge is visible to employers and law enforcement — even if the case is eventually dropped. “It makes it harder to get a job or keep a job, harder to get housing,” Doleac explained. For first-timers, avoiding that first record keeps them on a path where they can still find work and stability.
Some of the most effective interventions in Doleac’s book are almost absurdly simple.
In New York City, researchers found that about 40 percent of people issued a summons for low-level offenses missed their court hearings — often not because they were fleeing justice, but because the instructions were confusing and people forgot or couldn’t get there. Redesigning the paperwork cut failures to appear by 6 percentage points (a 13 percent reduction), and text reminders raised appearance rates from 62 percent to 70 percent (8 points.) That matters because a missed hearing typically triggers an arrest warrant and new charges, pulling people deeper into the system over what might have started as an open-container violation.
In Johnson County, Kansas, outreach workers simply called people leaving jail who screened positive for mental illness and offered to make them a health care appointment. That was it — a phone call and an appointment. No follow-up, no hand-holding. That “warm handoff” reduced the likelihood of another jail booking (a proxy for rearrest) by 17 percent over the following year, at a cost of $15 per person. As the book puts it, these are examples of how small shifts in information and access — what economists would call changing incentives on the margin — can divert people away from the system at a fraction of the cost of incarceration.
Doleac’s commitment to evidence cuts in every direction, and some of her findings have upset people on both the left and the right.
The most prominent example is her research on “Ban the Box” — the popular policy preventing employers from asking about criminal records on job applications early in the hiring process. The goal was to help people with records get hired. The unintended result was the opposite.
“Economists look at that and they’re like, wait, you didn’t actually change any of the underlying incentives involved,” Doleac told me. “Employers are not just going to treat everyone equally now — they’re going to try to guess about the information that they wish they could see. And in the United States, criminal records are highly correlated with race.”
Her study found that Ban the Box increased racial gaps in employment, reducing job prospects for young Black men. The effect was particularly felt by those who didn’t have a record, and who could no longer signal that fact to employers. Subsequent research found the policy wasn’t even helping the people it was designed for. But by the time the evidence came out, “there was a really established Ban the Box lobby, whose jobs depended on not being convinced by the evidence, and it became very difficult to shift that.”
The broader lesson isn’t that reform is hopeless — it’s that good intentions aren’t enough. Policies need to be tested rigorously, and policymakers need to be willing to pivot when the data says something isn’t working.
Falling crime rates create a paradox. On one hand, less fear means more political space to experiment with smarter approaches. On the other, there’s a risk of complacency.
“You could imagine everyone saying, ‘Okay, good, that’s over,‘” Doleac said. “But maybe part of the lesson here is when we all try really hard to reduce crime, we can do it. And crime is still, even if it’s not a problem in your neighborhood right now, it’s a problem in a lot of neighborhoods.”
The reason Doleac is optimistic has less to do with the data and more to do with what she’s seeing on the ground. “I now spend a lot of time talking to state lawmakers,” she told me. “And that is just a very different world from the cable news political conversation.”
These lawmakers are part-time, understaffed, and trying to solve real problems in real communities.
“When I took this job, I really thought a lot of the fights would be over whether we believe the evidence or not,” she said. “What I’ve learned is it’s a much more human problem — policymakers and researchers just do not know each other.”
That bipartisan potential — on issues like improving clearance rates, testing what works in reentry, and reducing unnecessary prosecution — may be the most underappreciated good news in criminal justice today. “We might not know why there are big swings in crime,” Doleac said. “But we can point people in the right direction. It’s not just random chance, and we don’t just have to cling to our theories. We can go out and test them.”
A version of this story originally appeared in the Good News newsletter. Sign up here!
2026-03-10 19:00:00
人们似乎常常被分成两类：一类人很容易丢弃物品，另一类人则总是舍不得丢。对于那些属于后者的人来说，像春季大扫除和整理物品这样的任务可能是一项挑战，尤其是考虑到美国人通常会积累大量物品。事实上，71%的美国人表示，他们购买一些已经拥有的东西，仅仅是因为找不到原来的那件。随着婴儿潮一代逐渐变老，他们和子女都在努力处理彼此之间积累的大量物品。那么，一个人拥有过多物品和一个人有囤积问题之间有什么区别呢？玛丽·多齐尔是密西西比州立大学的临床心理学家和教授，她研究囤积症，并专门帮助老年人解决囤积问题。她说，最终这取决于个人感受。“一个人觉得杂乱无章的环境可能对另一个人来说却完全正常，”她告诉 Vox，“这就是我思考这个问题的方式：这种杂乱是否阻碍了你按照自己期望的方式使用家？”我们该如何学会摆脱生活中的杂乱？什么时候该保留物品？多齐尔在最新一期的 Vox 周刊问答播客“Explain It to Me”中回答了这些问题。以下是我们的对话摘录，已进行删减和润色。你可以通过 Apple Podcasts、Spotify 或其他播客平台收听完整节目。如果你想提交问题，可以发送电子邮件至 [email protected] 或拨打 1-800-618-8545。
你帮助那些因为囤积物品而严重影响生活的人，但我认为我们很多人都在努力管理自己的物品。为什么我们会舍不得丢？我们内心到底在想什么？我认为我们拥有的物品是自身的一种外在表现。我们往往因为这些物品来自过去或家人过去而舍不得丢，因为它们让我们感受到自己的根源。我们也会因为对未来的某种期待而保留物品。我生活中有个滑稽的例子，就是一台意大利面机。虽然有点尴尬，但十年前我和丈夫一起上了一堂意大利面制作课，当时觉得很简单，于是我们决定回家后一定要尝试。结果我们试了一次，发现并不容易。我认为有些梦想比其他更容易放手。
把所有东西都扔掉真的就是解决办法吗？比如，我们是否应该直接把那台意大利面机扔掉？当你提到这一点时，我的心跳都加快了。说实话，我们知道，当人们有严重的囤积问题时，他们可能无法安全地留在家中。有时候必须进行一次彻底的清理，但这种经历对许多人来说非常痛苦，就像经历了龙卷风摧毁家园的创伤后应激反应一样，因为实际上他们失去了所有东西。
虽然极简主义和极客主义之间存在一个广泛光谱，但我认为我们应保留那些能让我们感受到自我的物品。这些物品以一种外部的方式向世界展示我们的身份，无论是通过我们的衣着、配饰，还是手提包里的杂乱。我们选择保留的物品向外界传达了我们如何看待自己。
你是否认为像玛莉·柯尔多的方法或其他极简主义整理技巧对那些你帮助的人有效？这是否那么简单，还是有更多因素需要考虑？我认为这背后还有更多东西，尤其是“激发喜悦”这一概念。如果你把一只小狗放在我面前，我肯定会说它此刻让我感到喜悦。但喜悦和满足感是不同的。我总是鼓励人们在整理物品时思考：你想要保留什么，想要丢弃什么？在开始整理之前，先问问自己你的价值观是什么？你在意世界上什么？对你来说什么更重要？然后在处理每件物品时，思考它是否符合这些价值观。你不需要因为内疚而保留某样东西。如果有人送你礼物，而你并不想要，那也没关系。这并不意味着你对那个人不重视，也不代表你们的友谊有问题。内疚不应该成为你保留物品的理由。
在你看来，有哪些合理的理由不丢弃物品？回到你对物品的情感联系。比如，这是否是你与祖父之间唯一的纽带？有时候人们会陷入这样的想法：“我要保留所有能让我想起祖父的东西，我要保留所有与我梦想相关的东西。”所以，试着思考你保留物品的原因，以及你需要保留多少。有没有办法重新看待杂乱，让它更好地服务于我们？我认为，退一步思考会很有帮助，比如问自己：“如果这个家里没有任何东西，我想要什么？”你保留的每一样东西都是你主动选择的，有时候人们会不加思考地做出保留的决定。但即使不采取行动，这种不作为本身也是一种选择。这或许就是生活中更广泛的真理之一。你是因为每天选择留在这段关系中而维持它，还是仅仅因为这是你一直以来的习惯？我们可以用同样的方式思考我们与物品的关系。
随着婴儿潮一代逐渐变老，而年轻一代开始拥有更多物品，他们可能会问：“这些东西该怎么处理？”你对此有什么建议吗？有一种叫做“瑞典死亡整理”的方法，它主要是让婴儿潮一代在去世前处理自己的物品，以避免后代继承时的麻烦。这是一种在去世前清理物品的理念，我经常在治疗中遇到这种情况。这些老年人可能会说：“我可以把这些东西扔掉，但我想确保它们能被欣赏。我希望女儿能继承我的婚宴餐具，但我知道她现在并不想要。”于是他们把物品当作一种责任来保留。我们的责任是对他人的，而不是对物品的。
你认为有可能成为一个快乐的极客主义者吗？当然可以。关键在于是否影响了你的生活。如果你的家中堆满了物品，但你在这个环境中过着健康、快乐的生活，那当然没问题。这取决于个人的主观感受。虽然现在有一种文化趋势是极简主义，比如曾经流行的乡村核心风格，但这些潮流会来会去。重要的是，你如何真正喜欢自己的空间。你喜欢完全空白的墙壁，还是想要一种画廊风格？我认为，只要你的生活方式健康、快乐，并且不伤害他人，无论你选择哪种方式都是可以的。
It often feels like people fall into one of two categories: those who throw things away easily, and those who hold onto everything. For those of us who fall into the latter category, tasks like spring cleaning and downsizing can be a challenge, especially when you take into account the amount of stuff we as Americans tend to accumulate.
In fact, 71 percent of Americans say they buy things they already have because they can’t find the original in all of their clutter. And as baby boomers age, they and their children are trying to get a handle on all the things that have accumulated between them.
So what’s the difference between someone who might have a few too many things and someone who could be considered having a hoarding problem?
Mary Dozier is a clinical psychologist and professor at Mississippi State University. She studies hoarding disorder and specializes in intervention to help older adults with hoarding problems, and she says that at the end of the day, it’s subjective.
“The level of clutter that one person finds to be completely functional, another person might find that they can’t use their home the way they want to anymore,” she told Vox. “That’s how I always think about it: is the level of clutter keeping you from using the home how you would like to use it?”
How can we learn to get rid of the clutter in our lives? And when should we hold onto things? Dozier answers these questions and more on the latest episode of Explain It to Me, Vox’s weekly call-in podcast.
Below is an excerpt of our conversation, edited for length and clarity. You can listen to the full episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get podcasts. If you’d like to submit a question, send an email to [email protected] or call 1-800-618-8545.
You work with people who hold on to too much stuff in a way that really limits them and impacts their lives in a negative way. But I think a lot of us struggle to manage our things. Why do we hold on? What’s going on with us?
I think of the items we have as an external manifestation of ourselves. We tend to hold onto things from either our past or family members’ past because it gives us this sense of where we’ve come from. But we also often hold onto things because of the promise of who we could be.
The silly example I have from my life is a pasta maker. It’s embarrassing, but a whole decade ago, I took a pasta-making class with my husband, and in the class, it was really easy, and so we were like, “We’re definitely going to go home and make pasta.” We tried it once. It was not easy. And I think some of those dreams are easier to let go of than others.
How often is throwing everything out the answer? Like, should we just throw that pasta maker in the garbage?
I felt my heart rate go up when you said that. Truthfully, one of the things we know is that when people have really, really severe hoarding problems, it’s not safe for them to be in their home.
Sometimes what has to happen is this massive cleanout, but it’s an incredibly traumatic thing that it’s the same kind of a PTSD response as if you lost your home in a tornado, because in essence, you did. A tornado swept through your home and took everything away.
I know that there’s a broad spectrum of minimalism to maximalism, but I think I’m a fan of keeping the things around us that help us feel like who we are. It’s that external way that we present the world, whether it’s through our clothing or our accessories or the clutter that we have in our handbags. The things that we choose to keep on ourselves or to keep in our home signal to the world of who we think that we are.
I’m curious if things like the Marie Kondo method or any of those other kinds of minimalist decluttering hacks work for the people that you help. Is it that simple or is there a little more there?
I think there’s more to it, and especially to the idea of sparking joy. If you put a puppy in front of me, I’m going to say this puppy is sparking some joy right now. There’s a difference between happiness and fulfillment.
I always encourage people to go through your clutter and think about what you want to keep and what you want to let go of. Starting before you even do that, ask yourself what are your values? What do you care about in the world? What’s important for you in a broader sense? And then as you’re going through these items, thinking through if that item is consistent with those values.
You don’t have to hold onto something out of guilt. If somebody gives you a present and you don’t want it, that’s okay. It doesn’t say anything about you or your friendship with that person to not keep that item. That guilt shouldn’t be part of why you’re holding onto things.
In your opinion, what are some of the good reasons not to get rid of stuff?
Come back to that sense of what this item is doing for you. Is it that this is the one thing that seeing it gives you that connection to your grandfather? I think sometimes people get lost in, “I’m going to hold onto everything that reminds me of my grandfather. I’m going to hold onto everything that’s about this dream I could be.” Try to think through why you keep things and how many of those things you need to keep.
Are there ways that we can reframe clutter to better serve us?
I think it can be helpful to take that step back and think, “If there wasn’t anything in this home, what would I want to be in here?” Everything that you keep, you’re making a decision to keep, and sometimes people default to that decision because it’s hard to think through.
But you’re still making that choice. That inaction in itself is still an action, which I think is probably one of those broader truths about life. Are you staying in a relationship because you’re choosing to be in that relationship every day, or are you staying in the relationship just because it’s what you’ve been doing? You can kind of think about our relationships with our items.
I think as boomers age and younger generations start to get more of their stuff it can be like, “What do you do with it?” Do you have any advice for that?
There’s something called Swedish Death Cleaning. I don’t know if you’ve come across it, but it’s basically putting the responsibility on the baby boomers: They’re the ones that should be going through their things before we’re inheriting it. It’s this idea of cleaning out your things before you die.
It’s something that I deal with a lot of my patients that I’ve treated. These older adults who will say things like, “I could get rid of these things, but I want to make sure it goes somewhere where it’s going to be appreciated. I want my daughter to inherit my wedding china but I know that right now she doesn’t want it.” And so they’re holding onto it as this responsibility for it. Our responsibility is to people, but not necessarily to things.
Is it possible to be a happy maximalist?
Absolutely. It comes back to if it’s dysfunctional or not. If your home is filled to the brim, but you’re living a healthy, happy life in that environment, that’s absolutely okay.
It’s all about the subjectivity of it. Just because there might be a current cultural norm for minimalism or — I know cottagecore was in for a while — these trends come and go, but think about what’s your truth of how you like your space to be.
Are you someone who likes a completely blank wall, or do you want it to be gallery style? I think whatever somebody’s truth may be is good if you’re healthy, if you’re happy, if it’s not hurting anyone.