2025-12-11 04:05:18
2020年底，共和党在最高法院获得6比3的超级多数后，最高法院似乎开始按照一份清单行事，即识别那些与共和党立场相悖的重要先例，并以党派投票的方式推翻这些决定。其中包括废除了宪法赋予的堕胎权、几乎全面废除了大学中的平权行动政策，以及扩大了宗教保守派违反基于宗教理由的州和联邦法律的能力。这些决定都与过去由更自由派法官作出的最高法院裁决背道而驰。
在周三早上的“哈姆诉史密斯”（Hamm v. Smith）死刑案件口头辩论中，一个不确定的问题是：共和党法官是否将过去限制政府对罪犯施加残酷和不寻常惩罚的裁决纳入他们的清单。然而，根据周三的辩论，最高法院在刑事惩罚方面的未来计划似乎比他们在种族或堕胎等议题上的雄心要温和得多。目前尚不清楚多数法官是否会支持乔赛夫·克里顿·史密斯（Joseph Clifton Smith）——一位因1997年抢劫杀人罪被判死刑的阿拉巴马州死囚——的主张，即他因智力残疾而不能被处决是合宪的。
值得注意的是，所有法官似乎都默认了2002年“阿特金斯诉弗吉尼亚州案”（Atkins v. Virginia）的裁决，即禁止对智力残疾者执行死刑。而且，包括尼尔·戈萨奇大法官在内的任何一位法官都没有提到他在2019年“布克勒诉普雷西案”（Bucklew v. Precythe）中的多数意见，该意见似乎主张推翻过去60年关于第八修正案禁止残酷和不寻常惩罚的先例。
尽管如此，史密斯仍有可能输掉此案，但这种失败可能相对有限。即使是最支持死刑的法官，也倾向于对执行死刑的法律进行渐进式的修改，而不是彻底推翻。
在“哈姆诉史密斯”案中，史密斯的智力残疾主张较为边缘。他的IQ测试分数在72至78之间，略高于70的临界值。根据之前的最高法院裁决，当一个人的IQ分数在临床确定的范围内时，法院应考虑其他证据来判断其是否具有智力残疾。史密斯的律师指出，除非下级法院犯有“明显错误”，否则上诉法院应尊重其事实认定。因此，最高法院不太可能推翻下级法院关于史密斯是否具有智力残疾的事实认定，除非情况极端。
不过，这些法官在辩论中提出的问题表明，他们并不打算全面推翻“阿特金斯案”的裁决。因此，即使多数法官支持史密斯，他们也可能仅作出有限的裁决。如果最高法院希望进行类似“布克勒案”的革命性变革，那也必须等到未来的案件。而目前，尚不清楚是否已有足够的支持。
此外，最高法院在“布克勒案”中曾提出一种原旨主义的解释，即第八修正案的“残酷和不寻常惩罚”应根据18世纪初的观念来判断。然而，在“哈姆诉史密斯”案的辩论中，这一观点并未被提及，甚至被阿尔托大法官明确拒绝。他强调，法院在本案中应关注“社会道德标准的演变”。因此，周三的辩论表明，史密斯的命运仍然悬而未决，但最高法院的裁决可能相对温和。
From the moment the Republican Party gained a 6-3 supermajority on the Supreme Court, in late 2020, the Court has often acted as if it is going down a checklist — identifying landmark precedents that are out of favor with the GOP, and overruling those decisions in party-line votes.
Among other things, the Court eliminated the constitutional right to an abortion, abolished affirmative action at nearly all universities, and expanded religious conservatives’ ability to violate state and federal laws that they disagree with on religious grounds. Each of these decisions, and more, were clean breaks with previous Supreme Court decisions handed down by a more liberal panel of justices.
One uncertain question going into Wednesday morning’s oral argument in Hamm v. Smith, a death penalty case, is whether the Republican justices’ checklist includes past decisions limiting the government’s ability to impose cruel and unusual punishments on criminal offenders. Based on Wednesday’s oral argument, however, it now appears that this Court’s plan for the future of criminal punishment is much more modest than their ambitions on topics such as race or abortion.
It is unclear whether a majority of the Court will vote to save Joseph Clifton Smith — who is on death row in Alabama and who argues it is unconstitutional to execute him because of an intellectual disability — from being killed by the state. But several key justices appeared sufficiently skeptical of Alabama’s arguments in this case that it is, at least, possible that Smith could prevail.
Significantly, all of the justices appeared to take the Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia (2002), which held that people with intellectual disabilities may not be executed, as a given. And none of them — including Justice Neil Gorsuch — brought up Gorsuch’s majority opinion in Bucklew v. Precythe (2019), which seemed to suggest that the past 60 years of precedents interpreting the Eighth Amendment’s bar on cruel and unusual punishments should be tossed out.
So, while Smith could still lose, it seems likely that such a loss would be relatively narrow. Even the most pro-death penalty justices pushed for relatively incremental changes to the law governing executions, rather than calling for a revolution.
Smith was sentenced to death for a 1997 robbery and murder. But two lower federal courts determined that he cannot be executed, under Atkins, because he is intellectually disabled.
It’s safe to say that Smith’s claim that he has a disability is fairly marginal. It is neither so ridiculous that sensible judges would reject it out of hand, nor so compelling that no fair judge could reject it. Previous Supreme Court decisions applying Atkins establish that courts should apply the clinical definition of intellectual disability in order to determine if a particular criminal defendant has that disability. And the evidence in Hamm indicates that Smith presents a borderline case.
One of several factors that clinicians look at when diagnosing an intellectual disability is the patient’s IQ score. An IQ of 70 or below is generally associated with intellectual disability, but clinical manuals warn that IQ tests have a margin of error, and thus a patient with scores that are slightly above 70 may still be diagnosed with an intellectual disability if they have “such substantial adaptive behavior problems…that the person’s actual functioning is clinically comparable to that of individuals with a lower IQ score.”
Smith has taken five IQ tests, and he scored 75, 74, 72, 78, and 74 on them.
In Moore v. Texas (2017), moreover, the Supreme Court held that courts hearing Atkins claims must “consider other evidence of intellectual disability where an individual’s IQ score, adjusted for the test’s standard error, falls within the clinically established range for intellectual-functioning deficits.” During Wednesday’s argument, all three of the Court’s Democrats seemed to agree that this means that someone like Smith, who has some IQ scores that are only slightly above 70, must be allowed to introduce additional evidence showing that they have adaptive behavioral problems which suggest that they, in fact, have an intellectual disability.
Significantly, at least some of the Court’s Republicans also appeared open to this approach. Early in the argument, for example, Justice Amy Coney Barrett pointed out that some of the Alabama court system’s own death penalty decisions “do move on to adaptive functioning” even when a defendant’s IQ scores are above the 70 IQ threshold.
Similarly, Justice Brett Kavanaugh pushed Alabama’s lawyer, Robert Overing, on what “logic” would justify a rule forbidding a court from looking at more than just IQ scores when there is additional evidence that cuts in a defendant’s favor.
Chief Justice John Roberts, meanwhile, was largely quiet during the argument, but he did accuse Overing of making a “results oriented” argument that would permit courts to look at evidence besides IQ scores when most of a defendant’s scores are below 70, but not when they are above this threshold.
To be sure, even if Roberts, Kavanaugh, and Barrett all agree with the three Democrats that evidence of adaptive functioning is permitted even when a defendant’s IQ scores are all above 70, that doesn’t necessarily mean that Smith will prevail. But, as Seth Waxman, Smith’s lawyer, pointed out, a lower court’s factual determinations normally must be upheld by appeals courts unless the lower court made a “clear error.”
So the Supreme Court should not disturb a lower courts’ factual determination that a specific person has an intellectual disability, except in very extreme cases.
At the very least, however, these justices’ questions do suggest that they do not plan a wholesale assault on Atkins. At the most, they may rule in Hamm that Smith, a death row inmate with a genuinely marginal claim that he is intellectually disabled, may nonetheless be executed.
Historically, the Court’s right flank has criticized Atkins and attempted to undermine it. In Hall v. Florida (2014), for example, one of the Court’s decisions establishing that capital defendants may introduce other evidence that they are intellectually disabled even when their IQ scores are above 70, four justices dissented. Justice Samuel Alito’s dissent, moreover, would have given states a great deal of leeway to determine how criminal defendants are evaluated for an intellectual disability.
Yet, while Alito still pushed for a narrow reading of Atkins, he didn’t seem to have much support from his colleagues. Although Alito spent considerable time suggesting that it would be absurd to let additional evidence into a hypothetical case where the defendant had five IQ scores of 100 and one of 71, for example, none of the other justices seemed to latch onto this unlikely hypothetical.
Additionally, none of the justices, including Gorsuch, brought up an alternative framework for Eighth Amendment cases that Gorsuch floated in Bucklew.
Beginning in the middle of the 20th century, the Court declared that the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” So, as a particular method of punishment grows more “unusual,” it also stands on increasingly infirm constitutional ground.
In Bucklew, however, Gorsuch ignored this “evolving standards” framework and instead suggested that a punishment is unconstitutional only if it would have been considered cruel and unusual when the Eighth Amendment was ratified in the 1790s. This approach would potentially have breathtaking consequences for all criminal defendants. Among other things, it’s not at all clear that the founding generation thought that it was cruel and unusual to give someone an excessive punishment for a minor crime.
But no one brought up this originalist approach during the Hamm argument, and Alito, of all people, seemed to reject it entirely. At one point, he stated fairly explicitly that his Court’s job in Hamm is to determine “the evolving standard of decency.”
The big takeaway from Wednesday’s argument, in other words, is that Smith’s fate remains uncertain. But it also looks like the Court’s decision in this case will be fairly narrow.
If a majority of the justices do crave a Bucklew-style revolution in the Court’s approach to the Eighth Amendment, that revolution will have to wait until a future case. And it is far from clear that there is a majority for such a revolution, even though a total of five justices joined Gorsuch’s opinion in Bucklew.
2025-12-11 03:40:00
2025年4月30日，美国总统唐纳德·特朗普在华盛顿特区白宫的Cross Hall听取英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋的讲话，宣布允许美国芯片制造商英伟达向中国出售其先进的H200芯片，称此举是推翻了拜登政府失败的政策，该政策据称“阻碍了创新并损害了美国工人”。他补充道：“那个时代已经结束了。”这一决定首先标志着英伟达及其盟友在白宫中国鹰派势力的压制下取得了一次重大胜利。其次，如果这是某个时代的终结，那么这个时代的起点却是在特朗普的第一个任期。卡内基国际和平基金会高级研究员史蒂文·费尔德斯坦表示：“最初推动美国转向芯片控制战略的人正是特朗普。”这一时代始于2019年特朗普禁止向中国科技巨头中兴通讯和华为供应美国原产零部件，理由是这些公司与中国政府和军方存在关联。费尔德斯坦指出，正是这些举措促使中国领导人开始认真思考如何摆脱对美国控制的芯片供应链的依赖。尽管中国有自己的半导体制造能力，但最先进的芯片几乎全部由美国公司（如英伟达）设计，并在台湾生产，所用设备则来自荷兰。
这一政策在特朗普和拜登政府之间保持了一定的连续性。拜登政府在2022年进一步收紧了对华为的限制，并扩大了政策范围，不仅限制了中国公司用于制造芯片的设备，还限制了最先进芯片的出口。此举发生在俄乌战争期间，当时中国公司被指控向俄罗斯提供技术组件，违反了美国制裁，同时也正值人工智能热潮兴起，自2022年ChatGPT发布以来，AI行业迅速发展。一些拜登政府官员认为，美国和中国正在展开一场新的军备竞赛，以开发超级智能AI，而美国在芯片供应链上的主导地位使其在这一竞赛中占据优势。为此，美国出台了一项广泛影响的规则，将全球国家分为三类：美国的亲密盟友可以购买美国芯片，像中国和俄罗斯这样的对手则被禁止，而大多数国家则处于中间地带，面临更严格的审查。
然而，特朗普重返白宫后，围绕限制芯片出口的策略展开了一场激烈争论。一方面，来自两党的中国鹰派支持这些措施，甚至提出了跨党派法案，将拜登的限制政策法律化。他们的论点是，限制最先进的人工智能芯片（如英伟达的H200）有助于保持美国在AI竞赛中的领先地位，尤其是在中国努力发展与AI相关的军事能力的背景下。另一方面，AI开发者，如Anthropic的达里奥·阿莫代伊，也公开支持这些限制。而最具影响力的反对声音来自全球最有价值的公司——英伟达，其CEO黄仁勋认为，美国要保持AI领先地位，最好的办法是让世界其他国家继续依赖美国芯片。此外，中国公司也通过进口黑市芯片或在第三国数据中心运营来规避这些限制。
黄仁勋出生于台湾，过去一直保持政治中立，这在英伟达以生产游戏显卡（如Doom和Quake）闻名的时期更容易做到。但如今，英伟达已深度卷入人工智能热潮及其相关的地缘政治纷争，黄仁勋也频繁出现在特朗普身边，可能已取代埃隆·马斯克成为白宫最亲近的科技公司CEO。黄仁勋的立场显然受到AI热潮对股市的支撑影响，英伟达本身占标普500指数约8%。特朗普的决定也使得美国在英伟达收入中分得一杯羹，这无疑增强了其说服力。
与此同时，英伟达在政府中也有盟友，例如投资者、有影响力的播客主持人兼白宫AI事务负责人大卫·萨克斯，他主张放宽限制以帮助美国公司保持市场份额。商务部长霍华德·卢特尼克也表示，美国应努力让中国“上瘾”于美国芯片。这周对特朗普阵营中亲科技的派系来说是个大胜，不仅有对英伟达的决定，还有特朗普暗示将发布一项行政命令，阻止各州对AI的监管，尽管这遭到一些其MAGA盟友的反对。
值得注意的是，尽管黄仁勋和萨克斯经常以维护美国对中国的科技优势为由进行辩护，但特朗普似乎并不特别关注这一点。他的声明中提到：“中国国家主席习近平对此表示非常积极的回应！”这表明特朗普可能更倾向于与中国达成协议，而非继续竞争。然而，这也可能让特朗普陷入尴尬处境，因为一些中国鹰派议员，如众议员约翰·穆伦纳尔，认为中国共产党将利用这些先进芯片来增强其军事能力和极权监控能力。此外，特朗普的这一决定也凸显了个人关系和商业利益在该政府外交政策中的重要性，而非意识形态或传统国家安全考量。
不过，也有可能英伟达选择错了政府。尽管特朗普宣布允许出口，但据称中国正计划限制国内对H200芯片的使用，以鼓励本国企业开发能与中国竞争的产品。因此，特朗普可能只是在芯片战争中宣布了停火，但并未通知北京。
This week, President Donald Trump announced that he would allow US chipmaker Nvidia to sell its advanced H200 chips to China, describing the move as overturning a failed Biden administration policy that he says “slowed innovation and hurt the American worker.”
He continued, “That era is over.”
The first notable thing about the decision is that it’s a clear victory for Nvidia and its allies in the administration over Washington’s China hawks, who have pushed to block China’s access to the chips needed to develop the most advanced AI models. (Nvidia’s even more cutting edge B200 chips are still off the table.)
The second notable thing is that if this is the end of an era, it’s an era that began during Trump’s own first term. “The original person who pivoted the US away toward a chip control strategy was Trump,” said Steven Feldstein, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, who studies technology and geopolitics. This era began in earnest with Trump’s bans on supplying US-origin components to the Chinese tech giants ZTE and Huawei in 2019, citing those companies’ links to the Chinese government and military.
Feldstein says it was these moves that first got Chinese leaders thinking seriously about how to escape their vulnerabilities to US-controlled chokepoints in the chip supply chains. (While China has semiconductor manufacturing of its own, the most advanced chips are overwhelmingly designed by US companies — namely Nvidia — and produced in Taiwan with equipment made in the Netherlands.)
This was an area of continuity between the first Trump and Biden administrations. Biden tightened the restrictions on Huawei and also expanded the policy, restricting not only equipment used by Chinese companies to make chips but also exports of the most advanced chips themselves. This happened in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine, during which Chinese companies have been accused of supplying tech components to Russia, defying US sanctions as well as the AI boom that kicked off in earnest with ChatGPT’s release in 2022.
In the view of some Biden administration officials, the US and China were in a new arms race to develop superintelligent AI, and America’s control of the chip supply chain gave it a head start in that race. This culminated in a wide-ranging rule, dividing the world’s countries into three tiers of access to American chips. America’s closest allies could buy the chips, adversaries like China and Russia could not, and most of the world was in the middle, facing heightened scrutiny.
Since Trump’s return, though, there’s been an active debate over the strategy of restricting chip exports. On one side are China hawks in both parties who largely support these measures; there are proposed bipartisan bills to codify the Biden restrictions into law. Their argument is that restricting the most advanced AI chips, like Nvidia’s H200, will preserve the US advantage in the AI race, which is particularly important given China’s efforts to develop AI-related military capabilities. AI developers, in particular Anthropic’s Dario Amodei, have also been outspoken in support of the restrictions.
The most influential voice on the other side of the debate has been the world’s most valuable company, Nvidia, whose CEO Jensen Huang argues that the best way for the US to maintain AI supremacy is to keep the rest of the world dependent on American chips. (Chinese companies have also been skirting the restrictions by importing black market chips or operating out of data centers in third countries.)
The Taiwanese-born Huang had long been scrupulously apolitical, which was easier to pull off in the days when Nvidia was better known for making the graphics cards that made games like Doom and Quake possible. But his company is now deeply tied to the AI boom and all the geopolitical entanglements that come with that, and Huang has lately been an inescapable presence at Trump’s side, arguably replacing Elon Musk as the tech CEO closest to the White House. It surely doesn’t hurt his cause that the AI boom is keeping the stock market afloat; Nvidia itself accounts for about 8 percent of the S&P 500. The prospect of the US taking a cut of Nvidia’s revenue no doubt sweetened the deal.
The chipmaker also has allies in the administration, notably the investor, influential podcast host, and White House AI czar David Sacks, who has made the case that US interests are better served by loosening restrictions to help US companies maintain their market share. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, too, has argued that the US should try to keep China “addicted” to US chips. It’s been a great week for this tech-aligned faction of Trumpworld, between this announcement and Trump’s teasing of an executive order blocking state-level AI regulation over the objections of some of his MAGA allies.
Notably, though Huang and Sacks often frame their arguments in terms of maintaining the US edge over China, it’s not even clear Trump is very interested in that. His statement made clear that “President Xi responded very positively!” to the announcement.
Back in 2017, the Trump administration proclaimed in its National Security Strategy that “great power competition” had returned, a framework the Biden administration also enthusiastically embraced. The chip restrictions were part of an overall strategy to maintain a technological and military edge over a great power rival. This Trump administration seems less interested in competing with China than cutting deals with it, a reality underlined by a new 2025 National Security Strategy, released last week, which prioritized security concerns in the Western Hemisphere and culture war conflicts with Europe over great power competition.
Trump’s decision puts Republican China hawks in an awkward spot. “The CCP [Chinese Communist Party] will use these highly advanced chips to strengthen its military capabilities and totalitarian surveillance,” said Rep. John Moolenaar, co-chair of the Select Committee on Competition with China. And it’s another example of the degree to which personal relationships and business interests often guide this administration’s foreign policy more than ideology or traditional national security concerns.
However, it’s also possible that Nvidia may have won over the wrong government. Despite Trump’s announcement, China is reportedly planning to limit domestic access to the H200 chips, as part of a strategy to encourage its own companies to make products that compete with the Americans.
Trump may have declared a truce in the chip war, but nobody told Beijing.
2025-12-11 03:00:00
2025年12月8日，印第安纳州州议会大厦展示了一张2025年国会选区划分草案。| Kaiti Sullivan/Bloomberg via Getty Images 特朗普政府正在发起一场选区划分的斗争，旨在削减多个州的民主党众议院席位。这场斗争始于得克萨斯州，当地在8月通过了新的选区划分方案，现在特朗普将目光投向了印第安纳州。印第安纳州众议院上周通过了新的国会选区划分方案，但该方案现在需要提交给州参议院进行表决，而州参议院的共和党议员在投票上存在分歧。特朗普和美国众议院议长迈克·约翰逊正在分别联系参议员，试图说服他们支持该方案，以帮助共和党在明年中期选举中获得多数席位。然而，印第安纳州正出现一种趋势，认为华盛顿特区的立法者不应干涉地方政治。而且，这种“特朗普式”的极端保守路线似乎并未在州级政治中完全体现。这是否意味着特朗普的影响力正在减弱？今天，Explained节目的主持人Astead Herndon就这一问题及其他关于选区划分的议题采访了Politico的国家政治记者Adam Wren。以下是他们对话的节选，内容经过删减和润色。更多内容请收听完整的节目。目前，该方案将在州参议院进行表决，而参议院内部似乎存在一些分歧。这是否意味着该方案一定会通过？如果不能通过，又是什么原因？答案是否定的。几周前，印第安纳州参议院对该方案进行了一次测试投票，参议院共有50名议员，其中40名为共和党人，投票结果是19比19平局，未能达到多数。印第安纳州的共和党参议员更倾向于传统的共和党路线，受前副总统迈克·彭斯和前州长米奇·邓恩的影响较大。因此，尽管印第安纳州是特朗普的州，但并不是典型的“特朗普主义”（MAGA）州。我们正在看到特朗普党内出现的分歧，这或许预示着2028年政治格局的变化。在决定是否通过新选区划分方案的过程中，有哪些关键人物起着决定性作用？最关键的人物是参议院临时议长罗德里克·布雷。他是共和党人，任职近十年，是第三代共和党立法者。他非常注重制度和机构的信誉，认为在中期选举期间进行选区重划是不可接受的。此外，州长迈克·布劳恩也起着重要作用。他是典型的MAGA式共和党人，其政治生涯完全依赖于特朗普的支持。2018年，布劳恩在一场三强共和党初选中与前参议员乔·唐纳利竞争，特朗普支持他并最终使其胜出。去年，布劳恩再次在共和党州长初选中获得特朗普的支持并成功当选。特朗普在Truth Social上表示，布劳恩欠他一个人情。此外，Charlie Kirk的Turning Point组织于上周五宣布，将投入数百万美元来挑战任何反对该方案的印第安纳州参议员。当您提到那些坚持反对该方案的参议院共和党人时，能否解释他们的逻辑？特朗普和白宫的论点是，乔·拜登的普查数据不准确，实际上是由特朗普总统主导的普查数据有误，导致选区划分不公平。他们认为，这种数据错误使得选区划分变得不公平。然而，印第安纳州的共和党参议员则认为，如果2020年的普查数据是不公平的，为什么我们只调整国会选区划分，而不调整规模较小的州参议院选区划分？这实际上暴露了他们对特朗普做法的反对，也表明这场斗争的核心是保护国会中的共和党多数席位。特朗普对州级共和党立法者的抵制反应如何？他在周末通过Truth Social发帖称：“任何真正的共和党人怎么会反对这些选区划分？”这一问题背后意味深长，因为过去十年中，特朗普一直声称自己定义了MAGA。但我们现在看到的是，党内出现了意识形态上的分歧，这表明MAGA这一品牌尚未完全渗透到州立法层，甚至在十年后，这种趋势可能预示着共和党未来将摆脱当前的全国性品牌，走向新的发展方向。本周的投票结果会如何？目前形势非常微妙，难以预测。白宫密切关注着局势。大约有10名共和党参议员尚未公开表态。目前，只有其中一位参议员在自己的选区举办了公开的选民见面会，其他人都尚未公开表态。这位参议员格雷格·古德曾遭到电话骚扰，约有12名参议员因特朗普在Truth Social上公开他们的名字而面临电话骚扰或收到炸弹威胁。本周将为美国政治树立一个令人震惊的先例，如果该方案仅以一两票的优势通过，这可能意味着暴力威胁正在影响未来政治走向。印第安纳州的共和党选民对此有何看法？在印第安纳州进行的多项民调显示，该方案在民众中非常不受欢迎，甚至在特朗普的支持者中也是如此。印第安纳州的共和党和民主党人都普遍认为，这种由华盛顿特区强加于地方政治的干预是不公平的，很多选民并不希望看到这种影响渗透到他们生活的小镇中。
The Trump administration is waging a redistricting war that would slash Democratic House seats in several states. It started in Texas, where a new map was passed in August, and now President Donald Trump is setting his sights on Indiana.
The Indiana House passed a new congressional map last week, but now it goes to the state Senate, where Republicans are split on how to vote. Trump and US House Speaker Mike Johnson are calling the state senators individually and trying to convince them to vote yes, to help Republicans secure a majority in next year’s midterm elections. However, there is a growing sentiment in Indiana that DC lawmakers should stay out of local politics. And that maybe the MAGA maximalist approach isn’t filtering down to the state level.
Does this mean Trump’s influence is waning? Today, Explained co-host Astead Herndon put that question and others about the redistricting efforts to Adam Wren, Politico’s national politics correspondent.
Below is an excerpt of their conversation, edited for length and clarity. There’s much more in the full episode, so listen to Today, Explained wherever you get podcasts, including Apple Podcasts, Pandora, and Spotify.
So the new map will go to the state Senate next where there seems to be some drama. Is this a certainty that this new map passes? And if not, what’s the holdup?
Not at all. A few weeks ago, the Indiana Senate took a test vote on this, and the state senate is 50 people, 40 Republicans, and they deadlocked 19 to 19 on whether or not to pass this. They were seven votes short of a majority. Senate Republicans in Indiana are a much more traditional kind of Republican, a pre-Trump Republican Party. They’re influenced more by former Vice President Mike Pence and former Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels. And so while Indiana is a Trump state, it’s not really a MAGA state. We’re seeing divisions in the Trump party that really could kind of foreshadow where things are headed in 2028.
Who are some of the key players who matter most in determining whether the Senate Republicans will pass the new map?
The person who matters most is Senate President Pro Tempore Rodric Bray. He’s a Republican who’s been in office almost a decade, and he’s a third-generation Republican lawmaker. He has a really institutional-minded approach, and he thinks the credibility of the Indiana Senate is on the line, and to redistrict mid-cycle to him is an anathema.
Then Governor Mike Braun. He is a MAGA Republican who owes his political career entirely to Trump. Braun was in a 2018 three-way Senate Republican primary to go up against former Senator Joe Donnelly. Trump endorsed him in that primary and elevated him, and he won. Then Braun found himself in another Republican gubernatorial primary last year, and Trump endorsed him again, and he won. Trump has essentially posted the Truth Social that Mike Braun owes him one on this. He and Trump are threatening to primary [opponents of the bill]. Charlie Kirk’s Turning Point, they just announced last Friday: They’re going to spend eight figures to primary any Indiana Senate Republican who votes against this this week.
When you mentioned the Senate Republicans that are holding firm, can you take me through their logic?
The argument from Trump and the White House is Joe Biden’s census — it wasn’t his census, by the way; it was run by President Donald Trump — [that] Joe Biden’s census got it wrong. [They say] it overcounted people and it yielded unfair maps.
“There’s a sense of fairness that pervades Indiana politics among Republicans and Democrats alike, and they think that this is an unfair move.”
And what these Senate Republicans are saying is, wait a second: If the 2020 census was unfair, how is it that we only need to change the congressional maps and not our own Senate maps that are smaller than those congressional districts? It sort of gives up the argument here, and it tells the truth that this is really about protecting the Republican majority in Congress alone.
How has Trump reacted to this resistance from state Republican lawmakers?
He posted on Truth Social over the weekend: How would any real Republican oppose these maps? The question embedded in that is interesting because for the last decade in American politics, Trump has said that he’s the one who defines what MAGA is. But what we’re seeing here are sort of ideological cleavages that suggest that the MAGA brand hasn’t really filtered down to the state legislative level yet, even after 10 years, in a way that could point to a Trump-free future where the Republican Party does change and does morph and does evolve beyond its current brand nationally.
How do we think the vote is going to go this week?
It’s a knife’s edge here. It’s hard to say what’s going to happen. The White House is watching closely. There are a group of about 10 Republican senators who have not publicly announced where they’re at. Only one Republican elected official who’s voting on these new maps has held an actual town hall with voters in their own district. None of the others have gone public yet. And that Republican, Greg Goode, has been on the receiving end of a swatting attempt. About a dozen Senate Republicans have been either swatted or faced with threats of pipe bombs after President Donald Trump posted their names on Truth Social.
It’s an incredible precedent that’s going to be set in American politics this week, because if there’s only one or two votes that it passes by, one of the takeaways could be that threats of violence work to shape our politics going forward.
Is there any sense of where the Republican voters are?
Public poll after public poll commissioned in Indiana show that this is remarkably unpopular, even among Trump’s own voters. There’s a sense of fairness that pervades Indiana politics among Republicans and Democrats alike, and they think that this is an unfair move — to have this power in Washington, DC coming to Indiana and trying to inject something on these small towns that a lot of voters just don’t want.
2025-12-10 23:45:00
20年前，詹姆斯·兰森森（James Randerson）从一家公司订购了一段天花病毒的DNA序列。天花是唯一被人类成功根除的疾病，自46年前起便不再存在。它是历史上最致命的传染病之一，三千多年来导致约5亿人死亡，其中仅上个世纪就有3亿人死于该病。如果某人——比如不满意的科学家、恐怖组织或流氓国家——能够合成并释放天花病毒，我们可能会再次面临这种致死率高达30%的疾病，而如今大多数人已不再具备免疫力。幸运的是，兰森森当时是《卫报》的记者，他是在调查DNA合成公司的客户筛查政策松懈问题，而不是一个潜在的生物恐怖分子。
这则故事最初发表于《未来完美》（Future Perfect）通讯。如果你想了解世界面临的复杂问题以及最有效的解决方法，可以在这里注册订阅，每周两次接收最新内容。
兰森森写道：“只需一个虚构的公司名称、一个手机号码、一个免费电子邮件地址，以及伦敦北部的一处住址，就能通过邮寄方式收到该订单。” 近20年来，DNA合成领域迅速发展。DNA合成是现代生物技术研究的重要基石：科学家们订购合成DNA以开发基因疗法、改造细菌以提高农业产量、制造新疫苗等。然而，当人们可以订购特定的基因序列时，也有可能制造出有害的病原体。公司需要确保不会将可能构成生物武器的基因片段发送给恶意分子，但合成DNA的需求却在全球范围内持续增长。如今，编写基因代码从未如此便宜或便捷。而监管措施和实施安全措施的能力则因国家而异。
因此，国际生物安全与生物安全倡议组织（IBBIS）——一个致力于保护现代生物科学和生物技术的非政府组织——于周二在联合国日内瓦总部举行的生物武器公约工作组旁听活动上推出了“全球DNA合成地图”。这是一张互动地图，汇集了80多个国家的数据，展示了各国的筛查机制、监管框架以及DNA合成的可及性。IBBIS高级研究员玛雅·阿门埃罗斯（Mayra Ameneiros）表示：“一年前我们启动这个项目时，还没有对DNA合成领域进行全面的概述。” 这张地图是首个公开且持续更新的全球DNA合成提供商分布图，不仅包括中国和美国这样的主要国家，还包括之前被忽视的拉丁美洲和非洲地区。目前，地图显示全球有1023家DNA合成公司分布在81个国家。它还突出了那些已有健全监管框架和DNA序列筛查要求的地区，使用户能够比较不同国家和地区的状况，发现存在的监管漏洞。
公司应关注地图所揭示的漏洞。阿门埃罗斯表示：“对私营部门而言，这非常重要，因为公司如果无意中向恶意分子出售了高风险的DNA序列，可能会面临法律后果。如果出现问题，出售该序列的公司将始终被追责。” 目前，只有10%的合成DNA供应商会对有潜在风险的DNA序列进行筛查，这意味着公司可能正在向危险分子发送制造致命病原体的材料。这构成了巨大的生物安全漏洞。
目前，超过700家公司提供合成核酸（遗传物质的基本构建模块）和台式DNA合成设备，使科学家能够在自己的实验室中合成定制的DNA序列，而无需从商业供应商处订购。其中超过500家公司需要对订单进行筛查，以确保符合当地法规。然而，随着DNA合成技术日益分散化，有效的筛查可能变得更加困难。随着台式DNA合成设备的出现，人们甚至不需要等待订单到达就可以开始使用合成DNA。越来越多的人能够接触到这项技术。这在发展中国家尤其令人担忧，因为这些地区通常监管较少。此外，人工智能的出现也使得设计新的DNA序列变得更加容易。这可以加快救命基因疗法的开发，但也可能被用于制造新型病原体。同样，我们也可以利用AI来改进筛查，但也可以用它来规避现有的筛查软件。
随着这些技术不断进步并变得更加普及，它们必须得到更严格的保护，因为利用它们制造生物武器的门槛正在降低。防止这些高风险序列落入潜在的危险分子手中变得尤为重要，而这张地图正是为了实现这一目标。最终，IBBIS希望这张地图能够作为一项持续更新的实时资源，推动建立最佳筛查实践的标准，最终将目前混乱的各国监管体系转化为一个可行的国际标准。如果没有这样的标准，世界将比20年前兰森森订购天花DNA时面临更大的由实验室制造的病原体威胁。本文最初发表于《未来完美》通讯，欢迎订阅。
Almost 20 years ago, James Randerson ordered a sequence of smallpox DNA. Smallpox is the only human disease to have ever been successfully eradicated — 46 years ago as of yesterday. It’s one of the deadliest infections in human history, killing about 500 million people over three millennia — with 300 million of those deaths estimated to have occurred in the last century alone.
If someone — like a disgruntled scientist, terror group, or rogue nation — were to synthesize and unleash smallpox, we could see the reemergence of a disease that killed three out of 10 people it infected, one that the vast majority of humanity is now no longer protected against.
Thankfully, Randerson was a journalist for The Guardian writing an exposé on the lax customer screening policies of DNA synthesis companies, rather than an aspiring bioterrorist.
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“All it took was a[n] invented company name, a mobile phone number, a free email address and a house in north London to receive the order by post,” Randerson wrote.
In the nearly 20 years since, the field has grown massively. DNA synthesis is a cornerstone of modern biotechnological research: Scientists order synthetic DNA to develop gene therapies, engineer bacteria to improve agricultural output, create new vaccines, and much more.
But when you can order certain genetic sequences, you can potentially build harmful pathogens as well. Companies need to ensure that they aren’t sending the building blocks of a possible bioweapon to malicious actors, but the demand for synthetic DNA is growing worldwide. It’s never been cheaper — or easier — to write genetic code. And regulations and the ability to institute safeguards vary significantly depending on where you are.
That’s why the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS), an NGO dedicated to safeguarding modern bioscience and biotechnology, launched the Global DNA Synthesis Map on Tuesday at a side event at the Biological Weapons Convention working group at the United Nations in Geneva.
The interactive map draws upon data from more than 80 countries to highlight their screening practices, regulatory frameworks, and access to DNA synthesis.
“When we started this project a year ago, there was no comprehensive overview of the DNA synthesis landscape,”Mayra Ameneiros, a senior fellow at IBBIS and the map’s project lead, told me. It’s the first public and continuously updated look at where DNA synthesis providers operate around the world, including not just the major players like China and the US, but previously neglected regions like Latin America and Africa.
The map currently shows 1,023 DNA synthesis companies operating across 81 countries. It also spotlights regions with established regulatory frameworks and DNA synthesis screening requirements, allowing users to compare countries and territories with each other and notice where gaps exist.
And companies can benefit from paying attention to gaps that the map highlights. “For the private sector, this is important because companies could face legal consequences if they unknowingly sell a risky sequence to a bad actor,” Ameneiros said. “If something goes wrong, the company that made the sale will always be held responsible.”
The map reveals that only 10 percent of synthetic DNA providers currently screen for DNA sequences of concern, meaning that companies could be sending out the makings of a dangerous pathogen. That’s a tremendous biosecurity gap. More than 700 companies provide synthetic nucleic acids, the building blocks of genetic material, and benchtop DNA synthesis devices, which allow scientists to synthesize custom DNA sequences in their own labs rather than ordering it from a commercial provider. More than 500 of those companies need to screen orders to guarantee compliance with local regulations.
But effective screening could become more challenging as DNA synthesis technologies are becoming increasingly decentralized. With the advent of benchtop DNA synthesis devices, people don’t even have to wait for their orders to arrive to start using the synthetic DNA. More people can have access to this technology than ever before. This is of particular concern in the Global South, where there are often fewer regulations.
And then there’s the effect of AI, which can enable the design of novel DNA sequences. That can speed up the pace of life-saving gene therapy development — but it can also help facilitate the creation of novel pathogens. And just as we can use AI to improve screening, it can also be used to evade existing screening software tools.
As these technologies improve and become more accessible, they must be increasingly safeguarded as the barrier to entry to weaponize them decreases. Keeping sequences of concern out of potentially dangerous hands becomes that much more important, and the map aims to facilitate that.
Ultimately, IBBIS hopes the map, which will be continually updated as a live resource, will inform standards around best screening practices, with the aim of eventually turning a dizzying patchwork array of regulations into a workable international standard. Without one, the world will be in much greater danger from lab-made pathogens than it was when James Randerson ordered smallpox sequences to his home nearly 20 years ago.
A version of this story originally appeared in the Future Perfect newsletter. Sign up here!
2025-12-10 20:00:00
2025年12月2日，唐纳德·特朗普在白宫参加内阁会议。 | Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
在最近的选举中，共和党遭遇了重大挫败，这让他们感到不安。国会议员们纷纷离开，氛围与特朗普在2025年1月重返权力时的喜悦截然不同。为了理解当前局势以及这对右翼未来意味着什么，我与Vox每日通讯《Today, Explained》的同事安德鲁·普罗科普进行了交谈。以下是我们的对话（已删减并整理），你也可以在这里订阅该通讯，获取更多类似讨论。
为什么现在右翼似乎陷入混乱？
在2024年，人们普遍认为右翼的氛围正在向他们倾斜，公众意见似乎在向右翼靠拢，历史也站在他们这边，精英阶层也承认他们在某些重大问题上是正确的。然而，进入特朗普第二个任期近一年后，这种氛围似乎再次发生了变化。右翼的不同派别开始越来越多地讨论和质疑，到底出了什么问题？他们是如何从“特朗普主义”（MAGA）的胜利转变为对现状的怀疑的？这种变化在哪些方面表现出来？
一个有趣的例子是MAGA影响力群体。在特朗普第一任期时，右翼受众最看重的是对特朗普的忠诚，只要支持他，就能获得最大的病毒传播和互动。但到了2025年，这种模式似乎不再奏效。虽然并非完全脱离特朗普，但一些社交媒体影响者和媒体人物开始对特朗普第二任期的一些政策提出批评，因为他们更清楚地了解受众的想法。此外，国会中一些共和党议员也表现出对特朗普政策的不完全支持，例如释放“埃普斯坦文件”的投票。右翼生态系统的讨论正逐渐转向他们党派应真正代表什么。
特朗普失去势头的原因是什么？
部分原因是总统连任后任期限制的正常现象。11月的选举结果让共和党感到震惊，也再次证明了民调的准确性：特朗普并不受欢迎，公众不喜欢他的行为，而共和党在中期选举中面临严峻挑战。此外，右翼氛围的变化也与特朗普的成功有关。在特朗普第一任期时，他的总统任期一直受到调查和弹劾的困扰，这反而成为右翼团结的纽带。但现在，这些威胁已经消失，特朗普在2024年以压倒性优势获胜，也终结了针对他的调查，因此他不再有这种“威胁”可以依赖。
另一个曾经团结右翼的威胁是对“觉醒主义”（wokeness）的仇恨和恐惧。尽管MAGA 2.0联盟在许多问题上存在分歧，但他们一致认为自己反对“觉醒主义”。然而，这也是一种特朗普自身成功带来的后果：随着右翼对“觉醒主义”的恐惧逐渐消退，他们不再将这一问题作为主要关注点，从而有更多精力去讨论彼此之间的分歧。
这是否只是暂时现象，还是特朗普陷入更长期的困境？
总统在第二任期通常会感到更自由，因为他们不再担心连任。特朗普可能会继续尝试突破法律或社会接受的界限。我们已经看到一些迹象，例如史蒂芬·米勒认为移民政策应更加严厉。如果特朗普继续掌权，这种趋势可能会加剧。右翼基础并未与特朗普决裂，他们并不反对他，只是对未能实现所有梦想感到失望。他可能会尝试提供更多胜利来维持他们的支持，并鼓励他们在中期选举中投票。
JD·万斯（JD Vance）可以说是特朗普的潜在继承人。他在这一过程中扮演什么角色？
万斯与特朗普紧密相连，这让他处于一个艰难的位置：作为副总统，他必须在特朗普日益被视为失望对象的情况下证明自己能做得更好。理论上，他可以通过不同的方式来实现这一点，但压力很大，不能与特朗普彻底决裂。不过，目前共和党选民对特朗普仍保持强烈的支持，这对万斯来说是一个巨大的优势。除非出现类似乔治·W·布什第二任期时那样的进一步分裂，否则万斯仍处于有利地位。
你还有什么值得关注的吗？
我认为有必要区分特朗普在公众中的日益不受欢迎（这主要归因于经济问题）与右翼群体内部日益增长的失望和不满。这两者来源不同，表现也不同。右翼群体对特朗普的不满与普通公众的反对之间存在显著差异。
It’s been a rocky month for the GOP after losing big in last month’s elections, and the party knows it. Members of Congress are heading for the exit; the vibe couldn’t be further from Trump’s exultant return to power in January.
To understand what’s going on — and what it portends for the future of the right — I spoke with my colleague Andrew Prokop for Vox’s daily newsletter, Today, Explained. Our conversation, edited for length and clarity, is below, and you can sign up for the newsletter here for more conversations like this.
Why does it feel like the right is in disarray right now?
In 2024, there was a lot of talk about the vibes shifting in favor of the right. There was a sense that public opinion was moving in their direction, history was on their side, elites had accepted they were right on some major questions. Nearly a year into the second Trump administration, the vibes appear to have shifted again. Various factions of the right are increasingly discussing and debating this question of, What has gone wrong? How did they go from MAGA triumphant to this increasing suspicion that things aren’t actually going well for them anymore?
How has that manifested?
The most interesting example is in the MAGA influencer sphere. Back in Trump’s first term, the way to get maximum virality and engagement from a right-wing audience was loyalty: Just back Donald Trump in whatever he did. We are increasingly seeing that it doesn’t quite work like that anymore in 2025.
There’s not a full break from Trump, but we’re seeing increasing criticism on certain issues where these social media influencers and media personalities are very attuned to what their audience is thinking. There is this increasing move toward debate and criticism about certain things in Trump’s second term that might not be going very well. And there are signs in Congress of congressional Republicans being a bit less likely to go along with what Trump wants.
This can be exaggerated a little bit, but we have seen some instances of defiance, like the vote to release the Epstein Files. The debate in the larger right-wing ecosystem is about what their party should actually stand for.
What’s responsible for Trump’s loss of momentum?
Part of this is a familiar, normal story about the president winning and being term-limited. The recent election results in November put a scare into Republicans, and hammered home the message that, actually, the polls are correct. Trump is unpopular. The public doesn’t like what he’s doing. And the GOP is on track for a difficult midterms.
I also think that a lot of the vibe shift on the right is about ways in which the broader issue environment has changed, in part because Trump was so successful. For instance, in Trump’s first term, his presidency was constantly under siege, beset by investigations and impeachment. That actually served as a unifying force on the right. But now those threats are gone. Trump won convincingly in 2024. He shut down the investigations into him and so he doesn’t really have that to fall back on anymore.
“I also think that a lot of the vibe shift on the right is about ways in which the broader issue environment has changed, in part because Trump was so successful.”
The other big threat that has united the right, especially in recent years, was the hatred and fear of “wokeness.” The MAGA 2.0 coalition could disagree on a lot of things, but they all came together in the belief that they hated wokeness. And again, this is a case where Trump is a victim of his own success: There has been this vibe shift in which the right’s monster of wokeness appears to have been slain and the culture appears to have moved on. The people who were once united against it are now no longer focused on it as a big threat anymore, and are freed up to focus on what they disagree on.
Is this a temporary thing, or the start of a longer spiral for Trump?
There’s always a push and pull with this stuff. A lot of times in the second term, once reelection concerns are gone, presidents feel more free to try to please their base, to do things that maybe they would have shied away from early on. I do expect Trump to continue to try to push the limits of what’s legal or acceptable.
We’ve seen signs that he’s going to that: Stephen Miller thinks the immigration crackdown should be even harsher than it already is. If he remains empowered in the administration, we should expect it to get harsher. We should expect these constant attempts to implement policy from the executive branch.
The right-wing base hasn’t broken with Trump — they’re not against him. They’re just a little burned out or disappointed that they haven’t gotten everything they dreamed of. He might try to deliver them more wins to keep them engaged and to try to get them to turn out to vote in the midterms.
JD Vance is arguably Trump’s heir apparent. What role does he play in all of this?
He has his wagon hitched to Trump, and that’s a tough spot: a vice president trying to succeed a president who is increasingly being viewed as somewhat of a disappointment. He would have to make the case about what he would do differently; and, in theory, there are ways he can do that, but there’s a lot of pressure not to break from the president in any way.
Having said that, loyalty and affection toward Trump among the larger Republican electorate is still quite strong, so it’s a tremendous advantage for Vance if he does end up being Trump’s anointed successor. It’s going to be very hard to dislodge him unless there’s some sort of even further break from Trump, akin to George W. Bush’s popularity collapse in his second term. Unless that happens, Vance is still in a pretty good place.
Anything else you’re keeping an eye on here?
I do think it’s good to distinguish between Trump’s increasing unpopularity among the general public — which is probably mainly because of the economy — and the increasing disillusionment and dissatisfaction among elements of the highly engaged right-wing Republican coalition, because I think they stem from different sources. The particular issues, and the way this plays out among the right-wing coalition, are very different from what we might be seeing in the general public’s backlash against Trump.
2025-12-10 19:45:00
本月早些时候，房地产网站Zillow结束了一项微妙的社会实验。2024年，Zillow开始在其房产资料中直接嵌入气候风险数据，对洪水、野火、风灾、高温和空气质量等未来风险进行1到10分的评分。例如，如果你正在寻找适合家庭居住的房屋，发现了一间完美的三居室卡普 Cod 房屋，但靠近海岸线，Zillow的房产信息可能会显示其洪水风险评分为9分。根据你个人的风险承受能力，这可能会让你放弃购买该房屋。将这些信息纳入房产资料对Zillow来说似乎是一个显而易见的举措。由于全球变暖加剧的灾害，房屋正遭受数十亿美元的损失，而其竞争对手如Redfin早已在其房产信息中加入气候风险数据。Zillow首席经济学家Skylar Olsen去年曾表示：“气候风险已成为购房决策中的关键因素。” Zillow自己的数据显示，许多购房者确实开始将气候变化纳入考虑，与房屋面积、附近学校和外观吸引力等因素并重，以至于房地产代理和卖家抱怨这些气候风险评分开始影响销售。这正是Zillow的初衷：让购房者了解全球变暖可能导致的野火或洪水风险，从而引导他们远离高风险房产。随着时间推移，人们会购买更安全的房屋；如果他们仍选择购买高风险区域的房产，至少他们事先知情，可以提高保险政策。
野火经常威胁着美国内华达州和加利福尼亚州太浩湖周边的社区。尽管火焰很少进入住宅区，但该地区经常被附近野火产生的浓烟笼罩，居民们开始意识到，野火终将威胁到他们。非营利组织Tahoe Fund今年启动了一个试点项目，旨在打造“太浩湖最防火的社区”。他们发布了一本指南，希望其他地区能借鉴其经验来降低火灾风险。他们首先与内华达州一个名为Tyrolian Village的业主协会合作，该协会位于松树林覆盖的Incline Village，拥有9000名居民，平均房价为140万美元。该协会共有228套房屋。Tahoe Fund团队使用多种火灾风险模型，识别出最容易起火的区域。这些模型比房地产网站使用的更先进，也更贴近社区需求，帮助团队更有效地确定哪些措施能最有效地提高社区的火灾抵御能力。Tahoe Fund的负责人Amy Berry表示：“通过技术，你并不需要做所有事情，只需要做那些最重要的事情，以最大程度降低风险。” 他们随后与社区领袖合作，确定优先采取的措施，如减少公共区域的可燃物、建立防火带、提高房屋的防火能力，并利用公共资金和私人捐款支持这些行动。试点项目还为房主提供了个人火灾风险评估和待办事项清单，并为高优先级房屋的业主提供资助。这一努力已经开始见效，Tyrolian Village的房屋保险费用下降了三分之一。Berry表示，这种有针对性的风险降低措施可以应用于许多地方。
保险公司在任何关于灾害的讨论中都扮演着重要角色。在加利福尼亚州，保险公司已经开始拒绝为高野火风险的客户提供服务。在佛罗里达州和路易斯安那州，一些私人保险公司已停止为新房产提供保险，甚至破产或退出市场。由联邦支持的国家洪水保险计划也持续亏损数十亿美元。因此，一个能有效降低风险的项目是值得鼓励的。
然而，社区中仍有许多人不愿正视他们所面临的威胁。Berry表示：“我们给所有人发了电子邮件和明信片，让他们查看报告，了解该做什么，但只有50户业主查看了报告。” 此外，还需要记住，风险预测并不一定准确，气候变化只是众多影响因素之一。许多房屋即使不在洪水区仍会遭遇洪水，而一些位于高风险区域的房屋却能保持地下室干燥。同样，位于高火灾风险区和非高风险区的房屋也存在类似情况。然而，即使是对风险的模糊认识，也能帮助人们规划诸如排水系统和防波堤等基础设施。购房者可以开始将气候风险评估纳入房屋检查，检查房屋结构是否具有防火材料和良好的排水系统，同时检查白蚁损害和地基裂缝等问题。但这要求购房者意识到这些潜在危险的存在。
过去的研究表明，对气候变化的信念也是影响易受灾地区房价的重要因素。在那些人们认真对待气温上升威胁的社区，房价往往低于那些认为气候变化不是问题的洪水风险区。人们也常常忘记过去的灾难教训，往往在曾经被洪水或野火影响的地区重建甚至扩建房屋。而要让人们适应他们从未经历过的事情，更是难上加难。因此，尽管预测气候变化和适应新兴威胁仍是巨大挑战，但最大的障碍是人类行为，即让人们真正正视他们所面临的危险。隐藏这些信息只能让卖家暂时受益，但最终账单还是会到来。
Earlier this month, the real-estate listing site Zillow ended a subtle social experiment. In 2024, they began to embed climate risk data directly in their property profiles, scoring a home’s future risks from flood, wildfire, wind, heat, and air quality on a 1-to-10 scale.
Say you are looking for a home in your budget for your growing family, and you find the perfect three-bedroom Cape Cod house — but it’s close to a shoreline. Zillow’s property listing might show that it has a nine out of 10 flood risk score. Depending on your personal risk tolerance, that might rule out the house for you.
Including this information seemed like an obvious move for Zillow. Disasters worsened by warming are contributing to multibillion-dollar damages to homes, and the site’s competitors, such as Redfin, already feature climate risk information in their listings.
“Climate risks are now a critical factor in home-buying decisions,” Skylar Olsen, chief economist at Zillow, said in a statement last year.
Zillow’s own data proved that many homebuyers were indeed starting to think more about climate change alongside square footage, nearby schools, and curb appeal — so much so that real estate agencies and sellers complained that the climate risk scores were starting to hurt sales.
Which is kind of the point.
Giving homebuyers a sense of where warming temperatures could lead to a higher chance of a wildfire or flood should ideally steer people away from properties facing greater danger. Over time, people would buy safer homes — and if they chose to buy in riskier areas, at least they were forewarned and could boost their insurance policies.
But climate risk assessments are not great if your current house has a bad score, and you’re trying to sell it. Under pressure from real estate groups, Zillow stopped including them. The climate risks, of course, haven’t gone away.
Welcome to the “la, la, la, can’t hear you” climate era.
In many parts of the US, populations are still increasing in areas vulnerable to disasters such as floods, extreme heat, drought, and fires, while the federal government under President Donald Trump is removing references to climate change from government websites.
People, too, will cover their eyes when the climate reality threatens real estate prices. Clear Lake, Texas, for example, installed signs showing the potential high water mark from storm surge after Hurricane Ike in 2011, but when locals complained that the warnings were hurting sales, the signs were taken down. In 2012, North Carolina outlawed a forecast of sea level rise that showed that many more coastal properties were at risk of flooding over the next century, in favor of adopting a forecast that only looked 30 years ahead.
Yet, while sellers might want to overlook future risks, banks, insurance companies, and buyers don’t want to lose money on what is often their single-most expensive purchase. More costly disaster damages are also taking a bigger bite out of the $55 trillion US residential housing market as a whole.
“I don’t think this is a good thing for anyone but Zillow — people need to know more about their risk, not less,” said Marc Ragin, a researcher studying disaster risk at the University of Georgia, in an email.
Anticipating future threats worsened by climate change is not just about creating warnings, though; they can be useful tools for adapting to climate change. One community that took them seriously actually saved money by lowering their property insurance rates. Here’s how.
Wildfires regularly confront the communities around Lake Tahoe in Nevada and California. Though the flames rarely make it into neighborhoods, the basin is often bathed in choking smoke from nearby blazes, and residents are starting to realize that it’s only a matter of time before they will face an inferno up close.
The Tahoe Fund, a nonprofit, took an unflinching look at the wildfire risks in the area and launched a pilot project this year to create “the most fire-ready community in Tahoe.” They laid out their process in a playbook for reducing fire risks that they hope any place looking to reduce the odds of homes going up in flames could draw on.
They began with a homeowners association in pine-forested Incline Village, Nevada — home to 9,000 people — where the average home price is $1.4 million. The association, Tyrolian Village, is composed of 228 homes. Using a mix of fire risk models, the Tahoe Fund team identified the areas most primed to burn. The models they used were more sophisticated than those used on real estate sites and more tailored to the community, but it helped the team get more bang for their buck when it came to figuring out what tactics would best improve the neighborhood’s fire resilience.
“Through technology, you don’t necessarily need to do everything,” said Amy Berry, who leads the Tahoe Fund. “You need to do the things that are the most important that are going to have the biggest impact on lowering risk.”
They then reached out to community leaders to set priorities for measures like reducing fuel loads in public areas, building defensible spaces, and making homes more fire-resistant, drawing on public funds and private donations. The pilot project also gave homeowners individual fire risk assessments and to-do lists, offering grants to spur owners of the highest-priority homes to act.
The effort is already starting to produce results. Tyrolian Village saw its home insurance premiums drop by one-third. Berry said that this kind of targeted risk reduction could be applied in many places.
Insurance looms in the background of any discussion of disasters. In California, insurance companies have been dropping customers whose wildfire risks were too hot to handle. In states like Florida and Louisiana, some private insurers have stopped insuring new properties, gone bankrupt, or left the market entirely. The federally backed National Flood Insurance Program is continually losing billions of dollars. So, a project that measurably reduces risks is encouraging.
Yet, there are still many people in the community who are reluctant to grapple with the threats they face. “We emailed everyone. We sent postcards. We said open your reports, so you know what to do, and only 50 of the homeowners have opened their reports,” Berry said.
It’s also important to remember that risk forecasts aren’t guarantees, and climate change isn’t the only factor at play. Plenty of homes that aren’t in established flood zones still flood, while some in high-risk areas have kept their basements dry. The same goes for homes inside and outside high fire-risk zones.
Still, having even a vague sense of where risks to property are higher and lower can be useful for planning things like storm drains and seawalls. Individual homebuyers could start to include climate risk assessments in their home inspections, checking structures for fire-resistant materials and water runoff alongside termite damage and cracks in the foundation.
But, that requires buyers to realize these perils are out there. Past research showed that another driver of real estate prices in vulnerable areas was belief in climate change. Homes in at-risk communities where people took threats of rising temperatures seriously sold for less than in flood zones where residents did not think climate change was a problem.
People also quickly forget the lessons of past disasters, often rebuilding and expanding in an area that’s flooded or burned. And it’s even harder to get people to adapt to things that they’ve never experienced before.
So, while forecasting climate change and adapting to emerging threats are still immense challenges, the biggest hurdle is human behavior, getting people to actually engage with the dangers they face. Hiding this information can only help sellers for a little while before the bill comes due.