2025-04-12 13:44:04
I'm home! Well, for a day, then it's off to the other side of the country (which I just flew over last night on the way back from Dublin 🤦♂️) for an event at the Microsoft Accelerator in Perth on Monday. Such is the path we've taken, but it does provide some awesome opportunities to meet up with folks around the world and see some really interesting stuff. Come by if you're over that way or if you're on the east coast of Aus, I'll be at NDC Melbourne only a couple of weeks later. And somewhere in the midst of all that, we'll get this HIBP UX rebuild finished...
2025-04-05 22:50:09
After an unusually long day of travelling from Iceland, we've finally made it to the land of Guinness, Leprechauns, and a tax haven for tech companies. This week, there are a few more lessons from the successful phish against me the previous week, and in happier news, there is some really solid progress on the HIBP UX rebuild. We spent a bunch of time with Stefan and Ingiber (the guy rebuilding the front end) whilst in Reykjavik and now have a very clear plan mapped out to get this finished in the next 6 weeks. More on that in this week's update, enjoy!
2025-03-31 00:48:41
Well, this certainly isn't what I expected to be talking about this week! But I think the fact it was someone most people didn't expect to be on the receiving end of an attack like this makes it all the more consumable. I saw a lot of "if it can happen to Troy, it can happen to anyone" sort of commentary and whilst it feels a bit of obnoxious for me to be saying it that way, I appreciate the sentiment and the awareness it drives. It sucked, but I'm going to make damn sure we get a lot of mileage out of this incident as an industry. I've no doubt whatsoever this is a net-positive event that will do way more good than harm. On that note, stay tuned for the promised "Passkeys for Normal People" blog post, I hope to be talking about that in next week's video (travel schedule permitting). For now, here's the full rundown of how I got phished:
2025-03-25 15:34:28
You know when you're really jet lagged and really tired and the cogs in your head are just moving that little bit too slow? That's me right now, and the penny has just dropped that a Mailchimp phish has grabbed my credentials, logged into my account and exported the mailing list for this blog. I'm deliberately keeping this post very succinct to ensure the message goes out to my impacted subscribers ASAP, then I'll update the post with more details. But as a quick summary, I woke up in London this morning to the following:
I went to the link which is on mailchimp-sso.com and entered my credentials which - crucially - did not auto-complete from 1Password. I then entered the OTP and the page hung. Moments later, the penny dropped, and I logged onto the official website, which Mailchimp confirmed via a notification email which showed my London IP address:
I immediately changed my password, but not before I got an alert about my mailing list being exported from an IP address in New York:
And, moments after that, the login alert from the same IP:
This was obviously highly automated and designed to immediately export the list before the victim could take preventative measures.
There are approximately 16k records in that export containing info Mailchimp automatically collects and they appear as follows:
[redacted]@gmail.com,Weekly,https://www.troyhunt.com/i-now-own-the-coinhive-domain-heres-how-im-fighting-cryptojacking-and-doing-good-things-with-content-security-policies/#subscribe,2,"2024-04-13 22:03:08",160.154.[redacted].[redacted],"2024-04-13 22:00:50",160.154.[redacted].[redacted],5.[redacted lat],'-4.[redacted long],0,0,Africa/Abidjan,CI,AB,"2024-04-13 22:03:08",130912487,3452386287,,Every active subscriber on my list will shortly receive an email notification by virtue of this blog post going out. Unfortunately, the export also includes people who've unsubscribed (why does Mailchimp keep these?!) so I'll need to work out how to handle those ones separately. I've been in touch with Mailchimp but don't have a reply yet, I'll update this post with more info when I have it.
I'm enormously frustrated with myself for having fallen for this, and I apologise to anyone on that list. Obviously, watch out for spam or further phishes and check back here or via the social channels in the nav bar above for more. Ironically, I'm in London visiting government partners, and I spent a couple of hours with the National Cyber Security Centre yesterday talking about how we can better promote passkeys, in part due to their phishing-resistant nature. 🤦♂️
More soon, I've hit the publish button on this 34 mins after the time stamp in that first email above.
Every Monday morning when I'm at home, I head into a radio studio and do a segment on scams. It's consumer-facing so we're talking to the "normies" and whenever someone calls in and talks about being caught in the scam, the sentiment is the same: "I feel so stupid". That, friends, is me right now. Beyond acknowledging my own foolishness, let me proceed with some more thoughts:
Firstly, I've received a gazillion similar phishes before that I've identified early, so what was different about this one? Tiredness, was a major factor. I wasn't alert enough, and I didn't properly think through what I was doing. The attacker had no way of knowing that (I don't have any reason to suspect this was targeted specifically at me), but we all have moments of weakness and if the phish times just perfectly with that, well, here we are.
Secondly, reading it again now, that's a very well-crafted phish. It socially engineered me into believing I wouldn't be able to send out my newsletter so it triggered "fear", but it wasn't all bells and whistles about something terrible happening if I didn't take immediate action. It created just the right amount of urgency without being over the top.
Thirdly, the thing that should have saved my bacon was the credentials not auto-filling from 1Password, so why didn't I stop there? Because that's not unusual. There are so many services where you've registered on one domain (and that address is stored in 1Password), then you legitimately log on to a different domain. For example, here's my Qantas entry:
And the final thought for now is more a frustration that Mailchimp didn't automatically delete the data of people who unsubscribed. There are 7,535 email addresses on that list which is nearly half of all addresses in that export. I need to go through the account settings and see if this was simply a setting I hadn't toggled or something similar, but the inclusion of those addresses was obviously completely unnecessary. I also don't know why IP addresses were captured or how the lat and long is calculated but given I've never seen a prompt for access to the GPS, I imagine it's probably derived from the IP.
I'll park this here and do a deeper technical dive later today that addresses some of the issues I've raised above.
I'll keep writing this bit by bit (you may see it appear partly finished while reading, so give the page a refresh later on), starting with the API key that was created:
This has now been deleted so along with rolling the password, there should no longer be any persistent access to the account.
Unfortunately, Mailchimp doesn't offer phishing-resistant 2FA:
By no means would I encourage people not to enable 2FA via OTP, but let this be a lesson as to how completely useless it is against an automated phishing attack that can simply relay the OTP as soon as it's entered. On that note, another ridiculous coincidence is that in the same minute that I fell for this attack, I'd taken a screen cap of the WhatsApp message below and shown Charlotte - "See, this reinforces what we were talking about with the NCSC yesterday about the importance of passkeys":
Another interesting angle to this is the address the phish was sent to:
The rest of that address is probably pretty predictable (and I do publish my full "normal" address on the contact page of this blog, so it's not like I conceal it from the public), but I find it interesting that the phish came to an address only used for Mailchimp. Which leaves two possibilities:
Applying some Occam's razor, it's the latter. I find the former highly unlikely, and I'd be very interested to hear from anyone else who uses Mailchimp and received one of these phishes.
Still on email addresses, I originally read the phish on my iThing and Outlook rendered it as you see in the image above. At this point, I was already on the hook as I intended to login and restore my account, so the way the address then rendered on the PC didn't really stand out to me when I switched devices:
That's so damn obvious 🤦♂️ The observation here is that by not rendering the sender's address, Outlook on iOS hid the phish. But having said that, by no means can you rely on the address as a solid indicator of authenticity but in this case, it would have helped.
Curious as to why unsubscribed users were in the corpus of exported data, I went searching for answers. At no point does Mailchimp's page on unsubscribing mention anything about not deleting the user's data when they opt out of receiving future emails. Keeping in mind that this is AI-generated, Google provided the following overview:
That "Purpose of Keeping Unsubscribes" section feels particularly icky and again, this is the AI and not Mailchimp's words, but it seems to be on point. I can go through and delete unsubscribed addresses (and I'll do that shortly as the last thing I'm going to do now is rush into something else), but then it looks like that has to be a regular process. This is a massive blindspot on Mailchimp's behalf IMHO and I'm going to provide that feedback to them directly (just remembered I do know some folks there).
I just went to go and check on the phishing site with the expectation of submitting it to Google Safe Browsing, but it looks like that will no longer be necessary:
2 hours and 15 minutes after it snared my creds, Cloudflare has killed the site. I did see a Cloudflare anti-automation widget on the phishing page when it first loaded and later wondered if that was fake or they were genuinely fronting the page, but I guess that question is now answered. I know there'll be calls of "why didn't Cloudflare block this when it was first set up", but I maintain (as I have before in their defence), that it's enormously hard to do that based on domain or page structure alone without creating a heap of false positives.
On the question of the lat and long in the data, I just grabbed my own records and found an IP address belonging to my cellular telco. I had two records (I use them to test both the daily and weekly posts), both with the same IP address and created within a minute of each other. One had a geolocation in Brisbane and the other in far north Queensland, about 1,700km away. In other words, the coords do not pinpoint the location of the subscriber, but the record does contain "australia/brisbane,au,qld" so there's some rough geolocation data in there.
When I have conversations with breached companies, my messaging is crystal clear: be transparent and expeditious in your reporting of the incident and prioritise communicating with your customers. Me doing anything less than that would be hypocritical, including how I then handle the data from the breach, namely adding it to HIBP. As such, I’ve now loaded the breach and notifications are going out to 6.6k impacted individual subscribers and another 2.4k monitoring domains with impacted email addresses.
Looking for silver linings in the incident, I’m sure I’ll refer this blog post to organisations I disclose future breaches to. I’ll point out in advance that even though the data is “just” email addresses and the risk to individuals doesn’t present a likelihood of serious harm or risk their rights and freedoms (read that blog post for more), it’s simply the right thing to do. In short, for those who read this in future, do not just as I say, but as I do.
I emailed a couple of contacts at Mailchimp earlier today and put two questions to them:
A number of people have commented on social media about the second point possibly being to ensure that someone who unsubscribes can’t then later be resubscribed. I’m not sure that argument makes a lot of sense, but I’d like to see people at least being given the choice. I’m going to wait on their feedback before deciding if I should delete all the unsubscribed emails myself, I’m not even sure if that’s possible via the UI or requires scripting against the API,.
The irony of the timing with this happening just as I’ve been having passkey discussions with the NCSC is something I’m going to treat as an opportunity. Right before this incident, I’d already decided to write a blog post for the normies about passkey, and now I have the perfect example of their value. I’d also discussed with the NCSC about creating a passkey equivalent of my whynohttps.com project which highlighted the largest services not implementing HTTPS by default. As such, I’ve just registered whynopasskeys.com (and its singular equivalent) and will start thinking more about how to build that out so we can collectively put some pressure on the services that don’t support unphishable second factors. I actually attempted to register that domain whilst out walking today, only to be met with the following courtesy of DNSimple:
Using a U2F key on really important stuff (like my domain registrar) highlights the value of this form of auth. Today’s phish could not have happened against this account, nor the other critical ones using a phishing resistant second factor and we need to collectively push orgs in this direction.
Sincere apologies to anyone impacted by this, but on balance I think this will do more good than harm and I encourage everyone to share this experience broadly.
Update 1: I'll keep adding more thoughts here via updates, especially if there's good feedback or questions from the community. One thing I'd intended to add earlier is that the more I ponder this, the more likely I think it is that my unique Mailchimp address was obtained from somewhere as opposed to guessed in any targeted fashion. A possible explanation is the security incident they had in 2022, which largely targeted crypto-related lists, but I imagine would likely have provided access to the email addresses of many more customers too. I'll put that to them when I get a response to my earlier email.
Update 2: I now have an open case with Mailchimp and they've advised that "login and sending for the account have been disabled to help prevent unauthorized use of the account during our investigation". I suspect this explains why some people are unable to now sign up to the newsletter, I'll try and get that reinstated ASAP (I'd rolled creds immediately and let's face it, the horse has already bolted).
Pondering this even further, I wonder if Mailchimp has any anti-automation controls on login? The credentials I entered into the phishing site were obviously automatically replayed to the legitimate site, which suggests something there is lacking.
I also realised another factor that pre-conditioned me to enter credentials into what I thought was Mailchimp is their very short-lived authentication sessions. Every time I go back to the site, I need to re-authenticate and whilst the blame still clearly lies with me, I'm used to logging back in on every visit. Keeping a trusted device auth'd for a longer period would likely have raised a flag on my return to the site if I wasn't still logged in.
Update 3: Mailchimp has now restored access to my account and the newsletter subscription service is working again. Here's what they've said:
We have reviewed the activity and have come to the same conclusion that the unauthorized export and API key from 198.44.136.84 was the scope of the access. Given we know how the access took place, the API key has been deleted, and the password has been reset, we have restored your access to the account.
They've also acknowledged several outstanding questions I have (such as whether passkeys are on the roadmap) and have passed them along to the relevant party. I'll update this post once I have answers.
There's been a lot of discussion around "Mailchimp are violating my local privacy laws by not deleting emails when I unsubscribe", and that's one of the outstanding questions I've sent them. But on that, I've had several people contact me and point out this is not the case as the address needs to be retained in order to ensure an opted-out individual isn't later emailed if their address is imported from another source. Read this explainer from the UK's ICO on suppression lists, in particular this para:
Because we don’t consider that a suppression list is used for direct marketing purposes, there is no automatic right for people to have their information on such a list deleted.
I suspect this explains Mailchimp's position, but I suggest that should be clearer during the unsubscribe process. I just went through and tested it and at no time is it clear the email address will be retained for the purpose of supression:
My suggestion would be to follow our approach for Have I Been Pwned where we give people three choices and allow them to choose how they'd like their data to be handled:
At present, Mailchimp is effectively implementing the first option we provide and the folks that are upset were expecting the last option. Hopefully they'll consider a more self-empowering approach to how people's data is handled, I'll update this blog post once I have their response.
Update 4: Someone has pointed out that the sending email address in the phish actually belongs to a Belgian cleaning company called Group-f. It's not unusual for addresses like this to be used to send malicious mail as they usually don't have a negative reputation and more easily pass through spam filters. It also indicates a possible compromise on their end, so I've now reached to them to report the incident.
Update 5: I've been contacted by someone that runs a well-known website that received the same phishing email as me. They made the following observation regarding the address that received the phish:
We have subscribed to Mailchimp with an address that is only used to subscribe to services, no outgoing communication from us. The phishing emails were delivered to exactly this address, couldn't yet find them on any other address. This makes me very much believe that possibility #2 is the case - they got the address from somewhere.
This aligns with my earlier observation that a customer list may have been obtained from Mailchimp and used to send the phishing emails. They went on to say they were seeing multiple subsequent phishes targeting their Mailchimp account.
Btw, we got some more (Mailchimp) phishing emails today — same style, this time 4 times writing about a new login detected, and once that an abuse report was received and we needed to take immediate action.
That a customer list may have been compromised was one of the questions I put to Mailchimp and am still awaiting an answer on. That was about 36 hours ago now, so I've just given them a little nudge.
Update 6: There have been a lot of suggestions that Mailchimp should be storing the hashes of unsubscribed emails rather than the full addresses in the clear. I understand the sentiment, and it does offer some protection, but it by no means ticks the "we no longer have the address" box. This is merely pseudoanonymisation, and the hashed address can be resolved back to the clear if you have a list of plain text candidates to hash and compare them to. There's a good explainer of this in the answer to this question on Security Stack Exchange about hashing email addresses for GDPR compliance. IMHO, my example of how we handle this in HIBP is the gold standard that Mailchimp should be implementing.
And there's also another problem: short of cracking the hashed addresses, you can never export a list of unsubscribed email addresses, for example, if you wanted to change mail campaign provider. The only way that would work is if the hashing algorithm is the same in the destination service, or you build some other level of abstraction at any other future point where you need to compare plain text values to the hashed impression list. It's messy, very messy.
Update 7: Validin has written a fantastic piece about Pulling the Threads of the Phish of Troy Hunt that takes a deep dive into the relationship between the domain the phish was hosted on and various other campaigns they've observed.
Given these similarities, we believe the phishing attempt of Troy Hunt is very likely Scattered Spider.
Scattered Spider certainly has previous form, and this was a very well-orchestrated phish. Four days on as I write this, it's hard not to be a bit impressed about how slick the whole thing was.
2025-03-21 13:37:04
It's time to fly! 🇬🇧 🇮🇸 🇮🇪 That's two new flags (or if you're on Windows and can't see flag emojis, that's two new ISO codes) I'll be adding to my "places I've been list" as we start the journey by jetting out to London right after I publish this blog. If you're in the area, I'll be speaking at Oxford University on Wednesday at 17:00 and that's a free and open event. And since recording this morning, we have managed to confirm that I will be speaking at a community event in Reykjavik the following Monday morning, and you'll see a link on my 2025 events page as soon as they make one available. No public events planned for Ireland yet, but if you're in Dublin and would like to run something the week after I'm in Iceland, get in touch. Just to round out a big schedule, I'll be back in Aus speaking in Perth at Microsoft's Student Accelerator on 14 April and then it's off to NDC Melbourne shortly after that for a talk on the 30th. Then rest 🙂
2025-03-16 08:20:25
What an awesome response to the new brand! I'm so, so happy with all the feedback, and I've gotta be honest, I was nervous about how it would be received. The only negative theme that came through at all was our use of Sticker Mule, which apparently is akin to being a Tesla owner. Political controversy aside, this has been an extremely well-received launch and I've also loved seeing the issues raised on the open source repo for the front end and Ingiber's (near instant!) addressing of each and every one of them. Please keep that feedback coming, and I'll talk more about some of the changes we've made as a result in the next weekly update.
