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Our Plastic-Surgery Nightmare

2026-07-11 18:06:03

2026-07-11T10:00:00.000Z

To borrow a phrase from Simone de Beauvoir, the face is not a thing but a situation—one that is, increasingly, more technically beautiful but more spiritually unattractive, replete with new information but devoid of human meaning. Today, the young inject their faces and look old; the old inject their faces and look uncanny; a twenty-year-old got famous for hitting himself in the jaw with a hammer to become hotter; teen-agers ask strangers on the internet if a facelift is their only hope. The internet casually scrambles basic ideas of personhood, reframing people as commodities and stripping us for parts. But only recently has this process been encoded so specifically onto the face, traditionally thought of as a portal to our humanity. The face is separating from the person, and the person is separating from the soul, and this is happening in front of us, on our phones, in the most banal fashion, every day.

About a decade ago, the most visible faces on Instagram—those belonging to famous white models and influencers—began to resemble one another. They already had full lips, catlike eyes, high cheekbones, flawless skin; Botox and filler made their lips more plump, their eyes more catlike, their cheekbones more pronounced. They began to look like cyborgs, their faces contoured by the algorithm, perpetually glinting in the light of digital approval. Looks, particularly for women, have long been a capital asset, and smartphones systematized this neatly, providing users with digital tools to make themselves appear more beautiful in photos and videos, and monetized platforms to broadcast those edited faces, which, back in the real world, could then be retrofitted, via cosmetic intervention, to match. The cycle of digital and physical optimization produced a new ideal and new habits. The needle tip of a cosmetic syringe measures roughly a quarter of a millimetre: the Overton window of what happens to faces has widened in almost imperceptible increments.

Now we have arrived at a place where you can acquire Instagram Face at your local strip mall and the monied are seeking facelifts instead. Instagram Face can be achieved with little tweaks and outpatient procedures, although the results are often overtly artificial: when Kylie Jenner began getting filler, as a teen-ager, it was obvious that her lips had been injected. In contrast, the subtle results of the new facelifts conceal serious invasion—hours of slicing and manipulating fascia, muscle, and fat. A writer for New York magazine observed a deep-plane facelift and described the surgeon’s fingers sliding under his patient’s cheek: “Once all the necessary ligaments have been cut, the features on top move freely and in one piece, like a Halloween mask.”

This violence produces an outcome that is almost supernatural. Lindsay Lohan, a totemic millennial celebrity, reappeared in 2025 out of relative obscurity with the skin of a toddler, the brow of a person who had never felt worried—a face just like her old one, if it had been assembled by blushing angels at sunrise that very day. (Lohan has said that her look is the result of Botox and a healthy life style.) The seventy-year-old Kris Jenner, after her second facelift, looked astonishing—at least as young as her fortysomething daughters, who are themselves most famous for public renovation of their bodies and faces. People detailed a set of nine procedures—a deep-plane facelift, a deep neck lift, a brow lift, a lip lift, an earlobe reduction, and more—that were performed in one six-hour session on a sixty-five-year-old woman who, afterward, looked like a fifty-year-old teen-ager, a time of life that previously existed only in the playground of the mind.

Once, plastic surgery seemed garish, its own obvious signs a kind of cost that people paid for refusing to appear old. This blunt artificiality has not vanished completely; it is present, for instance, in Mar-a-Lago Face, a hyper-exaggerated look common among the women of the second Trump Administration, accompanied by a makeup style that signals a lack of interest in the natural. (Like the Administration, Mar-a-Lago Face locates power in the spectacle of dismissing reality altogether.) But the most expensive plastic surgery today is seamless, vaguely Gnostic, suggestive of complex secret knowledge. On social media, speculative analysts pick apart the work that people may have had done. Sometimes, celebrities disclose details in response—Kylie Jenner posted, “445 cc, moderate profile, half under the muscle!!!!! silicone!!!” in reply to a TikTok about her breast implants. Vogue dubbed 2025 “the year of plastic surgery transparency.” Such candor is ostensibly laudatory, except that when celebrities disclose their plastic surgery it often feels like a speech act akin to a land acknowledgment: something typically said before another act of perpetuating the system identified as unjust. Vogue quoted a plastic surgeon who claimed that the new openness helps “to alleviate the unrealistic standards, which can cause self-confidence issues in young women,” and also helps make “plastic surgery feel more human and more accessible.” In other words, if celebrities disclose their plastic surgery, the rest of us will get more plastic surgery, and that’s good, because we have bad self-esteem from so many celebrities getting plastic surgery.

For now, facelifts before retirement age remain a niche habit of the unusually wealthy and vain. But that demographic is overrepresented in our visual culture—these are faces acquired for the purpose of profitable display, often on screens—and so the desire to alter one’s face spreads rapidly. A recent survey by the American Academy of Facial Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery projected a nineteen-per-cent increase in facial procedures. The authors also note that “one of the most meaningful shifts observed in this year’s survey isn’t which procedures patients are choosing, but when they’re choosing to do them.” Fifty-seven per cent of surgeons reported an increase in patients under thirty seeking cosmetic work. In 2024, the American Society of Plastic Surgeons tabulated almost fifty thousand Botox and filler procedures for patients under age nineteen.

If you Google “facelift in your thirties,” your top suggested search results might proclaim that “mini facelift surgery is ideal” for those at that age and that “a mini facelift at 35” can be “a considered and fulfilling choice.” The A.I.-generated squib at the top of my results told me that surgical facelifts are uncommon for thirtysomethings, and that early aging is “typically treated” with injectables and laser resurfacing. The range of visible argument is so limited. It’s not hard to understand why so many young people, living their lives in dialogue with what they see on their phones, have gone from buying into the idea of “proactive” Botox to believing that visible aging, in any form, at any age, should be treated as one would treat a disease.

Men still have it easy, where much of this is concerned, compared with women: crucially, men are frequently seen as becoming more beautiful as they age. But male-beauty standards have risen markedly during the past decade or so. In the age of social media, women have been able to assert new norms for men, both deep and superficial: for one, men should no longer commit sexual assault in the workplace, and, for another, it would be great if men were expected to be really hot, too. Women have gained the bravado and the platforms to speak publicly about men in the way that men have traditionally often spoken about women—with contempt.

For generations, women have learned at a young age how disgust and disrespect from men might best be avoided. Girls understand by elementary school that they should be sweet, sunny, and accommodating, and also, ideally, competent and interesting, and they should try to look pretty as well. Many men, now subjected to heterosexual contempt as a culturally significant collective force for the first time, have proved less equipped to process it within the bounds of a basic social contract. It has been overwhelming for them: the tweets, the merchandise (T-shirts and mugs with slogans like “Lord Give Me the Confidence of a Mediocre White Man”), and, most of all, the dating apps, which have allowed women of a certain inclination to treat men like commodities. Men are being scrutinized, by women, as though they were women: part by part, inch by inch. And some have responded by seizing the female obsession with looks, already rooted in misogyny, and rebranding it with maximum toxicity—in other words, by becoming looksmaxxers.

Looksmaxxing is a product of the men’s-rights movement, whose adherents previously gathered in fringe corners of the internet, where they solidified their reactionary community around the conviction that women do not deserve equal rights. Now much of their thinking has infiltrated nu-conservatism, and the rest of us have been forced to learn about Braden Peters, better known as Clavicular—the king of the looksmaxxing sphere. Peters, who is twenty, looks like a hot guy in a fraternity; his most remarkable traits are his obsessive commitment to achieving this beauty—he’s used peptides, supplements, meth, hammers—and the total lack of joy it seems to bring him. (“I have, like, no regard for, like, my happiness,” he said recently, on a podcast. “Like, that seems like a very immature idea.” A few months later, he collapsed at a club after a suspected overdose.) The table of contents on the message board looksmax.org enumerates every aspect of the male physique and life style that can be quantified and improved: more than a dozen sections (Eye Area, Craniology, Penis, etc.) broken into even more arcane subtopics (“Limbal Rings Influence Facial Attractiveness,” “The Falio of a Recessed Anterior Nasal Spine”). It goes without saying, or perhaps can be gleaned from the word “craniology,” that looksmaxxers view race, sexuality, and disability from roughly the same vantage point as that of an early-twentieth-century eugenicist.

In the crude days of my own millennial young adulthood, trying to look hotter was often something a person did in the interest of increasing one’s odds of having fun, exciting sex. This was an imperfect and alcohol-addled goal, “problematic” in its own ways—but an interest in the physical self, in your body and the bodies of others, was built in. This element of the calculus is seemingly vanishing; it is disembodied attention, mediated by the screen, that many young people, both men and women, seem to eroticize today. The looksmaxxers don’t actually seem interested in sex at all. Clavicular has said that he’s likely sterile from injecting high-dose testosterone as a teen-ager; he recently told the New York Times that knowing he can have sex with a woman is better for him than the act itself, which, he said, “is going to gain me nothing.”

The vibe, over all, is a kind of internet-invented nonsexuality: putative straightness is only the pretext for various broadcast demonstrations of dominance and submission, in perpetual psychological reference to other putatively straight men. Women are called “foids” in the looksmax lexicon, short for “female humanoids,” and they are sliced and diced, worshipped and denigrated, in the same coldly unfeeling way. One popular post on looksmax.org lists four versions of the “Top 30 Most Beautiful & Attractive Girls On the Planet (Combined Golden Ratio + Sexual Dimorphism & Appeal + Side Profile).” The post displays a bunch of famous models with Instagram Face; an author’s note clarifies that the lists only contain white women and “mixed-race women who are sufficiently white-passing.” It is important, to looksmaxxers, that these women seem to be naturally beautiful: the post imperiously rules out the many Instagram girls who have obviously altered their appearance. The community has invented a way to admire men for beauty work and to hate women for the same.

Of course, no one understands quite like a model, or maybe even like “any woman in general,”that beauty involves labor and performance. The comically tangled impulses here—the admiration of women who organize their lives around their looks, the disgust toward women who could be so superficial as to organize their lives around looks—can only develop in the absence of real intimacy, of regular exposure to women in their actual natural state. Such thoughts also make real intimacy increasingly impossible. The corporeal self—the face and the body that respond to the presence of another—retreats into the shiny carapace of the commodity, and wonders, from this hidden vantage point, if it will ever be known.

Last year, a thirty-six-year-old woman asked a Guardian advice columnist if it was wrong to judge her peers for getting facelifts, or even to judge herself for kind of wanting to get a facelift as a result. The columnist replied, supportively, “It is a little weird that beauty culture is convincing so many people to surgically saw off some of their facial skin and sew it back on tighter,” before adding, “Am I being judgmental? Yes! But judgment, like mimetic desire, is both human and unavoidable.” This exquisitely careful tone indicates the caution of a woman writing in the delicate space between the slightly ironized worship and heavily ironized contempt that now dominate the internet.

The current media environment is so grim that critique of anything has become radically attenuated. About two decades ago, the feminist website Jezebel, in one of its first posts, offered ten thousand dollars to anyone who could provide the original, unaltered version of a recent glossy-magazine cover photo. The images of women in magazines were “essentially female forgeries,” Jezebel argued, “what with all the computer-artistry involving airbrushing, contouring, and, sometimes, outright body-part swapping.” A few months later, Jezebel published unretouched photographs of the country singer Faith Hill, contrasting them with the image that ran on the cover of Redbook, in which Hill’s body had been thinned, her eyes tweaked, her ordinary lines and wrinkles erased.

After Jezebel came other websites—DoubleX, Rookie, The Hairpin—and a new wave of pop feminism began to infiltrate the mainstream. As an especially commercial form of feminism began to flourish, these sites debated its merits. “Is Kim Kardashian a Feminist Role Model?” a Jezebel headline asked, in 2013. “The short answer is: no,” the article began. “The long answer is: noooooooooooooooo.” That same year, Sheryl Sandberg published “Lean In,” which broadcast to millions of women the tantalizing idea that enriching yourself could be, in itself, a feminist act. Instagram, which was newly ubiquitous, offered a platform for women to “build their brands” through posting hot pictures of themselves. Altering your body and face, and obsessively displaying yourself on the internet, was, by many people, deemed feminist, too. In 2016, BuzzFeed published an article titled “Here’s Why Kim Kardashian Is Actually a Feminist Despite Saying She’s Not.” Donald Trump was elected President three months later.

The following years have entailed chauvinistic backlash and the disappearance of women’s media. The feminist sites have largely shut down, and physical media is vanishing; many of the magazines that Jezebel targeted—Redbook, InStyle, Marie Claire, Glamour, Self—have ceased printing or gone entirely defunct. (The thought of a website criticizing a magazine for Photoshop is almost unbearably quaint.) These were flawed but robust publications, staffed by professionals in dialogue with their audience about the state of women’s lives. They have given way to Instagram and TikTok, where the P.R. operations of celebrities and influencers can propagate the same aspirational imagery without dialogue or substance or investment in anything, really, other than algorithmic success.

One of the few things that lives on from the twenty-tens is the idea, honed over the course of a million Instagram captions, that essentially self-interested actions can be part of a progressive journey toward personal actualization—an idea that many women have attached to cosmetic surgery. “I never imagined that a neck-lift would be a transcendental, life-changing experience for me at the age of fifty-five,” Kris Jenner wrote in her memoir, in 2011, adding that the surgery had taught her about “love, friendship, loyalty, self-control, and the power of letting go.” This past year, a former on-camera personality in her fifties detailed her own facelift, on Substack, with admirable forthrightness, explaining that the procedure had changed her relationship with aging by making her “unapologetic.” She could now, she wrote, “redefine what aging gracefully means for me.” It meant empowerment, self-authorship, self-love, rebellion, autonomy, and evolution. She looks amazing.

Kylie Jenner—who began getting lip filler as a teen-ager, got her first boob job at nineteen, and helmed a billion-dollar business selling her look back to consumers—has said that she’d be “heartbroken” if her daughter chose to get plastic surgery as a teen-ager. But the march of these practices seems almost inevitable. According to one survey, there was a seventy-five-per-cent increase, from 2019 to 2022, in patients under the age of nineteen seeking Botox and similar injectables. Young women, in seeking out the same procedures and practices that older women purchase to look younger, are altering the look of youth itself. It may soon be normal for children to fear aging before they have come of age. A couple of years ago, a fourteen-year-old on TikTok went viral for detailing her anti-aging skin routine, which she had been practicing since the age of twelve.

Kids are growing up at a time when the beauty ideal is upheld, more and more, by completely artificial women—flawless physical specimens generated by A.I., placed in real-world scenarios, in images and video clips, to fool the horny and gullible and torment the insecure. (Recently, a bunch of such videos, purporting to capture spontaneous footage of insanely hot girls in the stands at baseball games, went viral.) Instagram demanded a certain sort of woman and then produced her, deranging broad swaths of the population in the process. A.I., which delivers an experience of absolute plasticity, and which builds on the premise that what is specifically human is inferior, for being imperfect, will do worse.

That so many of the most visible women on the internet resemble one another has already had swift consequences in the realm of visual A.I., which understands these qualities to be central to what a woman is. When reporters at the Washington Post asked three A.I. tools to generate images of a “normal woman,” in 2024, nearly every woman produced was thin and light-skinned. When prompted to show a “beautiful woman,” every woman was thin; just two per cent showed any visible sign of age; the vast majority had light- or medium-toned skin. A.I. image generators love to spit out hot women; on X, Elon Musk regularly shares short videos of beautiful fantasy girls generated by his own technology, Grok Imagine. This past November, he posted an unselfconsciously tragic prompt—“She smiles and says ‘I will always love you’ ”—and also the result: a doe-eyed brunette, freckled and glowing. In May, he posted a video of a freaky jellyfish princess blowing bubbles. Both of these artificial females had variations of Instagram Face, and both wore a look of unconditional devotion that is mainly captured, for public consumption, in pornography—which, of course, A.I. is trained on, and is now used to produce.

All of this is so completely unhinged that I occasionally feel the urge to reject modernity and embrace the religion of my childhood. But religion hardly keeps people from fucking with their faces: by one count, fourteen per cent of Mormons have had major cosmetic surgery; if you are in the Dallas area, you can get Botox from a faith-based medical spa where staff members “wholeheartedly embrace the philosophy that each person is fearfully and wonderfully made.” The beauty ideal has always been terribly evil; today’s version is a mark of docility under surveillance, and still, on many days, I wish to bear that mark. Can I save myself from this? “Beauty is finite, ugliness is infinite like God,” Umberto Eco wrote. Maybe I have to go back to St. Augustine: Deformitas Christi te format—the deformity of Christ forms you.

But even that line is always interpreted to lead back to beauty. He hung deformed upon the cross, but his deformity was our beauty. We can’t help wanting beauty, and I don’t think we should. There is a version of human beauty that exists alongside, underneath, and entirely separate from today’s warped ideal—a version that emerges simply from immanence, from the specificity and inalienability of each existence, including our own. This kind of beauty has nothing to do with perfection, which is distributed so arbitrarily and approximated so gracelessly. It does not induce unhappiness and compulsion but makes desire withdraw, as Hegel put it, because the beautiful object is revealed as “inherently free and infinite,” “an end in itself.” When we encounter something beautiful, Elaine Scarry writes, “we willingly cede our ground to the thing that stands before us.”

These ideas—of ceding ground, of viewing another as infinite rather than as a means to address our own unfreedom—are of no use to the industries and technologies that treat the face as a display commodity before all else. The face is no longer supposed to be something that holds intimate, idiosyncratic human information; it has been reconfigured as a consumer guide and a disciplinary manual. It would be ideal, maximally profitable, for the tech and beauty industries if the gaze that emerges from the face learns to seek nothing but its own reflection, and if the gaze that looks at the face learns to stop seeking anything strictly human at all. ♦

Can Office-to-Residential Conversions Survive the Pfizer-Building Crisis?

2026-07-11 18:06:03

2026-07-11T10:00:00.000Z

At the Pfizer building on East Forty-second Street, earlier this week, disaster, and the sense of excitement that disaster can create, lingered. Cops refused to allow the curious to pass through barricades at the edges of a “frozen zone.” A huddle of emergency personnel pored over blueprints before breaking up to enter the stricken tower. A young woman ran by and asked if the building had fallen yet, while a summer hire from the New York Post tried to find people who had been there when the situation first went Code Red. But one CBS on-air reporter had it right. After the city had worked through the night, he announced, taking advantage of a lull in traffic on Second Avenue, things had gone "from unstable to stable.” “Got it,” his soundman said.

The Pfizer building stands opposite the old Daily News building, and one block from the Chrysler Building. The firm founded by the prolific New York City architect Emery Roth built the tower—technically two adjoining buildings—in the nineteen-sixties. Pfizer had its headquarters there for decades before, finally, looking for fresh office space. In 2024, a real-estate group led by Nathan Berman, a well-known converter of out-of-date office buildings into apartments, began transforming the towers—the taller of which was thirty-seven-stories high—into a mixed commercial-residential complex. Berman knew how to do it. He had built his career in New York on rehabbing such structures, even earning himself the nickname the King of FiDi, for his developments around Wall Street. I wrote about Berman, and his firm, Metro Loft Management, in 2024, when he was in the middle of one of his financial-district projects, on 55 Broad Street, and shortly after he had signed on to convert the Pfizer building, which was to be his biggest job ever. In a city plagued by a perpetual housing crisis, Berman’s repurposing of vacant office space had been wildly successful (“We’ve never had this kind of imbalance between demand and supply before,” he told me, in 2024) and fit with the popular push to do something—anything!—to alleviate it. In the past few municipal-election cycles, New York’s housing crunch has reliably been a major focus of voter concern, and the importance of turning the hundreds of sclerotic mid-century office buildings that splatter midtown like refuse from a party long since over into livable spaces has practically become an article of faith within New York City’s political class. (Pfizer relocated to dewy new Hudson Yards in 2023.)

But sometime Tuesday morning the city received a 911 call that some bricks were falling from the Pfizer façade. (The report later proved false.) Shortly after, the Fire Department responded to a report from construction workers that some of the steel support columns on the twenty-first floor were buckling. Despite their insouciance—the workers, in a video later posted on the internet, seemed to be in no hurry to get out—this was not something you ignore. Construction sites have lots of mishaps, big and small, but columns don’t buckle halfway up skyscrapers. Columns that fail cause other columns to fail. Steel columns that fail are the worst kind, according to Joel Silverman, a well-known construction consultant based in New York, because while concrete columns pancake, the “collapse modality” in a steel building is that they “topple.” He added: “And therefore the footprint of the failure is, what, thirty-five stories or five hundred feet.” Suddenly, a project launched with great energy and acclaim—a recent piece on Berman and conversions disclosed that he was adding a floor every four days—had the makings of the Titanic.

If so, Berman, who had previously been celebrated for bringing conversions to the city that were, if not cheap, at least not pornographically expensive, was suddenly a potential J. Bruce Ismay. Buildings don’t just typically fall over; someone, in all probability, made a mistake in building them. The Pfizer conversion used almost no organized labor, which did not make the unions happy; the only union workers on the site were the steamfitters, who immediately claimed that Berman skimped on steel. (He has called the charge “total nonsense.”) Scabby, the inflatable rat, quickly made an appearance at the site. The carpenters’ union deployed a truck to the area with an electronic readout sign: “Crime Scene,” one message read. “1,600 residential units at risk due to cutting corners.” Another readout asserted “Shame on Metroloft.” (Berman told me he would not comment on the Pfizer situation.)

In the world of New York City real estate, Berman is prominent but neither famous nor infamous. Mike Vatter, of the Laborers’ Union, told me that Berman was just “one of many.” And, although the current mayoral administration wants new units in old buildings, Berman’s projects don’t exactly fit neatly within the Zohran Mamdani mold. In 2024, as we toured his Wall Street conversions, he pointed out amenities such as swimming pools and well-stocked gyms—luxe additions that had been planned for the Pfizer building as well. Creating housing for first-year associates at Goldman Sachs—which is how Berman told me he conceptualizes his work—qualifies you as a do-gooder only within the extraordinary economic microenvironment of Manhattan.

But, anyway, renown wasn’t what Berman sought, as he made clear when I wrote about him. For him, the puzzle of how to make money was what mattered—he likened converting an office building into a residence to solving a Rubik’s Cube. If the math didn’t work, he hollowed out cores and used the leftovers to add floors on top until it did. Berman’s passion for shoving as many units into as small a space as possible and then going big on plush facilities led one of his own architects to describe the developments to me as “slums for the rich.” He was unapologetic: “If the price per pound is right, I say, ‘Let’s go.’ ” Berman was born in the Soviet Union, in 1959, and another of his business principles, he explained, was to try to avoid any deal that involved government, i.e., he would not get involved in a project that required a change in zoning regulations. “Life is short,” he said.

Up until July 7th, none of this was a problem. But now, faced with a potential debacle on East Forty-second Street, Berman could have used a few friends—city officials, union leaders, the kind you make when you put your name on an art museum. (Before turning to real estate, Berman worked at his father-in-law’s art gallery.) It didn’t help that when Berman stepped up to explain the problem, he made the mistake of free-associating in front of a reporter. “This incident is nothing more than a typical construction mishap,” he told the Times, on Tuesday evening. “It happens, unfortunately, far too often on construction sites: falling cranes, people—God forbid—falling off buildings, windows falling.”

Though attention immediately focussed on Berman, he wasn’t the only possible malefactor by any means. A conversion of this size isn’t a solo project. Berman isn’t the only owner of the structure—he shares that title with David Werner, known informally around the city as the King of Flips, whose sense of civic obligation makes Berman start to sound like a member of Mamdani’s Democratic Socialists of America. And where was Gensler, the global design and planning firm that would have submitted the architectural drawings? Or the structural engineer, the well-known firm Goldstein Associates Consulting Engineers? And the layers of inspection oversight that a renovation like this gets from the private inspectors that it hires, and ultimately from the city? According to the Times, which combed through “millions of rows of city violation records,” the inspection firm hired for the project had a history of errors and violations on previous jobs, for which the city assessed fines, not all of which the company appeared to have paid. Previous problems with the Pfizer-building renovation also came to light in the press—a fall off a ladder and objects that plummeted to the street below. Money, as George Bernard Shaw once wrote, “is not made in the light.” New York City real estate sometimes resembles a basement crawl space.

Since the buckled columns soared into the public consciousness on Tuesday, the city has moved in steel struts to reinforce the structure. By the front entrance on Forty-second Street, I could see piles of them lying on the nearby ground, ready to be deployed so that the Pfizer building might stand. A widely circulated image showed a warped column near a window under which Berman had installed a combo heat-slash-air-conditioning unit. I remember how proud he’d been about the units, which he had also installed at 55 Broad Street—it was cheaper, he told me, to install such units in every one of the thousands of apartments he was creating than to use central heating and cooling. No one had ever done it before, he explained: the technology was new; the business model was impeccable. That was the type of pride he took in his work. “You add more load to something that can’t support it,” Berman told The Real Deal, an industry publication, after the buckling at Pfizer. “It’ll give way, and that’s what happened, and now it just needs to be fixed.”

This sentiment was likely a bit optimistic. The crisis was over—sort of. The city’s frozen zone had thawed. The Casual Greek restaurant on East Forty-fourth had reopened. The problems, that Berman pointed out were contained to a twenty-by-twenty-foot corner of a 1.3-million-square-foot building, were no longer a threat. He shrugged off the experience, telling the Times, “I don’t know that a four-inch sag is a collapse.” He promised to get right back to work—and maybe he will. But the real-estate niche that Berman had carved out for himself in New York was likely forever changed. Or at least the financial calculations were. Two days after the incident, a developer told the Wall Street Journal that the days of high-wire stunts—like pulling out cores and sticking extra floors on the roof—might belong to the past. A real-estate lawyer warned of a “new Pfizer premium” on conversions in the near term. But first, Berman will have to deal with the immediate aftermath of July 7th. Mamdami has vowed a “rigorous” safety assessment before work resumes, and the city comptroller has vowed that there will be an investigation. Berman, who had long tried to minimize municipal interface, was about to enter his Room 101. ♦

The Great American State Flop

2026-07-11 18:06:03

2026-07-11T10:00:00.000Z

In the middle of the Great American State Fair, fifty yards or so from a scaled-down model of the triumphal arch that President Donald Trump is threatening to build (it reminded some visitors of the botched, runty Stonehenge in “This Is Spinal Tap”), sat a booth not for a state but for a federal district—Washington, D.C. The booth was similar to the others that occupied the National Mall for the sixteen-day event. Two walls had boards on which visitors could write their names or draw pictures; one had maps, inviting people to stick a pin to show where they were from. In two corners were lists of fast facts. Who knew that go-go, a percussion-heavy funk subgenre, is Washington’s official music? In another corner stood a plastic Yoshino cherry tree—the variety that lines the Tidal Basin—which people were encouraged to festoon with uplifting messages written on what looked like price tags. Holding down the booth was a team from Destination DC, the District’s tourism arm; the aim, a statement said, was to show “the culture of Washingtonians who live, work and thrive in our city.”

“I’m enjoying myself,” Romeo Guerrero, a retiree from St. Cloud, Florida, said. He was visiting, with his wife, for the first time. “It’s a beautiful city. People are very kind. If you listen to the news, it feels like it’s militarized. It’s not. Everybody’s helpful. There’s a lot of food.” The Guerreros had gone to the fair’s opening ceremony to hear the President, whose rally-style speech substituted for the slew of musical artists who had backed out after learning of the event’s partisan origins.

For all the politics involved in the fair’s conception, and all the tumult between the District and the President since his reascension, the vibe was mostly apolitical. The D.C. booth contained no reference to the compromise between Northern and Southern states that led to the city’s creation, in 1790, and no mention of the Home Rule Act, which allowed D.C. limited self-governance fifty-three years ago. The only nod to the National Guard troops that Trump deployed in the capital last year were the troops themselves, stationed around the fair.

Jim Grossman, a former executive director of the American Historical Association, wandered in. “So far, it meets my low expectations,” he said. He attributed those not to the D.C. booth’s staff but to the fair’s Trump-affiliated organizers. He had some notes on how the booth could have been improved: “Better representation of the District’s diversity, and a better representation of disenfranchisement, which is part of the District’s identity. There’s no indication of taxation without representation.”

Mary S. Templeton, a retired nurse who has lived in D.C. since 1968, was “delighted” with the fair, but said that the District’s fight for statehood “should be emphasized everywhere.” Her husband chimed in: “Our population is greater than two states’!”

Couple sitting quietly in kitchen with sign behind them that reads “NO TALKING BEFORE MIDDAY.”
Cartoon by Victoria Roberts

But Washingtonians were not the fair’s target audience; airing the statehood grievance could have risked inviting even more micromanaging from an Administration that has already tried to take over some of the District’s most beloved cultural institutions. A federal employee who didn’t want to be identified noted, of the fair’s booths, “You can see that you’re only allowed to say certain things, show certain things.”

Mike Hopkins, a local wearing a cap with D.C.’s flag, lamented the political messaging he had seen in many booths: “That’s a turnoff for me.”

The D.C. booth featured a District-themed trivia wheel, with questions specific to each of the capital’s eight wards. (“Lincoln!” a visitor yelped, attempting to answer the question of which Ward 2 neighborhood, likely named after King George II and not the first President, is the oldest in D.C.) The prizes contained subtle references to the District’s long fight; winners got pins emblazoned with the logo for the statehood campaign (a cutout of the District and a big “51”), or key chains marked “statehood.dc.gov.” A few of the questions hinted at the struggle, too. One father-and-son pair looked flummoxed when presented with the question “How many votes does D.C. have in Congress?”

By the afternoon, the booth’s coloring wall was filled with names and comments, praise for and derision of the President scribbled side by side. A message reading “Trump 2028 2032 2036 2040” was crossed out and annotated with the word “Boooo.”

“The grass is great,” the federal employee said. “But I feel sorry for the people who travelled.” She’d found most of the booths superficial, lacking in historical context. “This whole thing is very indicative of what we’re living in right now,” she said. “It’s a show that has nothing inside it.” ♦

The Platner Implosion, and What It Means for Democrats

2026-07-11 12:06:02

2026-07-11T03:59:00.000Z

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The Washington Roundtable digs into the stunning collapse of Graham Platner’s Senate campaign in Maine, and what it means for the Democratic Party’s performance in the upcoming midterms. The hosts are joined by Neera Tanden, the president and C.E.O. of the Center for American Progress and a former adviser to President Joe Biden. The panel grapples with the pressing question of how the Party might resolve some of its ideological divisions and position itself to attract voters looking for an alternative to Donald Trump. Across the board, Americans are seeking a break from the status quo, Tanden argues—regardless of where a given candidate falls on the political spectrum. “People want action,” she says. “It’s not ideological as much as people are hungry for ideas.”

This week’s reading:

How Political Is This Supreme Court?,” by Isaac Chotiner

Tune in to The Political Scene wherever you get your podcasts.



The World Cup, the Knicks, and LeBron James’s Fate: An All-Time Summer in Sports

2026-07-11 03:06:01

2026-07-10T18:00:00.000Z

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With all the sports news at play this summer, from the New York Knicks winning the N.B.A. Finals to Donald Trump having a direct impact on FIFA’s decisions during the World Cup, it’s time for a deep dive into the biggest sports moments of late. The New Yorker sportswriter Louisa Thomas and David Remnick talk about the most significant stories of the week, and what to keep an eye on in the days and weeks ahead.

Further reading, viewing, and listening:

New episodes of The New Yorker Radio Hour drop every Tuesday and Friday. Follow the show wherever you get your podcasts.

The New Yorker Radio Hour is a co-production of WNYC Studios and The New Yorker.

How an Estimated Seven Hundred Thousand People Have Died from DOGE’s U.S.A.I.D. Cuts

2026-07-11 03:06:01

2026-07-10T18:00:00.000Z

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The Department of Government Efficiency, better known as DOGE, has officially been terminated. Its July 4th sunset date was part of Donald Trump’s original executive order that created the agency, which Elon Musk ran. During his tenure, Musk oversaw the dismantling of U.S.A.I.D., which used to provide life-saving medical and nutritional programs around the world. Musk, who recently became the world’s first trillionaire, claims that there is no evidence that a single person died after DOGE cancelled more than eighty per cent of U.S.A.I.D.’s programs, cutting basic health-care access to some ninety-five million people. Atul Gawande disagrees. He was the assistant administrator for global health at U.S.A.I.D. until he stepped down, the same week Trump ended U.S. foreign assistance. Gawande says an estimated seven hundred thousand people have already died as a result of the cuts. David Remnick speaks with the longtime New Yorker contributor about the profound effects of ending U.S.A.I.D.’s work abroad, Musk’s involvement in these decisions, and the deaths it all has wrought.

Further reading, viewing, and listening:

New episodes of The New Yorker Radio Hour drop every Tuesday and Friday. Follow the show wherever you get your podcasts.

The New Yorker Radio Hour is a co-production of WNYC Studios and The New Yorker.