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Maya C. Popa joins Kevin Young to read “Artless,” by Brenda Shaughnessy, and her own poem “The World Was All Before Them.” Popa is the author of “Wound Is the Origin of Wonder” and “American Faith,” the latter of which won the North American Book Award. Her third collection, “If You Love That Lady,” will be published by W. W. Norton this July. Popa serves as the poetry editor of Publishers Weekly, and teaches in the undergraduate and M.F.A. programs at New York University.

Lately, the writer Louise Erdrich—whose newest story collection, “Python’s Kiss,” is out this week—has been reading books about children who have lost their parents. As she explained recently, these books examine questions of rootedness and inheritance in roundabout ways. In illustrating the results of cutting children off from their parents, they are also reminders of the urgent stakes of a world descending into chaos. “We are on a precipice,” Erdrich said. “One thing that I think reverberates throughout these books is, What happens to the children?” Her remarks have been edited and condensed.

Kin

by Tayari Jones

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This is an incredibly beautiful novel that follows two female friends from childhood into young adulthood, during the fifties and sixties. They call themselves “cradle friends” because they’ve known each other since they were born. Both lose their mothers: one is abandoned, and the other has a mother who is murdered.

The central question at the outset of the book is, Is it better to have a living mother who you might one day find, or to have one who is irrevocably gone? Which is worse? As the novel follows the two women through life, it examines how their losses haunt them each in different ways.

I just talked to Tayari, and one thing we discussed was how risky it can be to alternate between voices, like she does in “Kin,” where the two main characters take turns. I find that, if you get used to one narrator at the beginning of a book, your heart kind of skips a beat if you have to change to another perspective. But it really works here. Each of the characters has a very distinctive voice that you want to follow, so you’re willing to go along with it.

The Death of the Heart

by Elizabeth Bowen

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I read and reread this novel. It’s one of my favorite books. Bowen was an Anglo-Irish writer who was born into the gentry, and whose mother died when Bowen was thirteen, after which she was brought up by her aunts.

Something similar happens to Portia, the main character of “The Death of the Heart.” Her mother dies when she is just on the cusp of being a young woman. She’s handed off to live in London with her half brother, with whom she’s not particularly close, and his wife, who thinks Portia is strange and despises her for it. Neither of them really acknowledges her grief, which is very much still present. Portia’s memory of her mother is so strong. She will fall off into a reverie where she feels like she’s in Switzerland or some other place they had been together, and it’s clear that she still feels very close to her mother, even though her mother’s not there anymore.

Every word, every description, in this book is so considered, so precise. It just stabs at you. And Bowen has a masterful ability to give us both Portia’s innocence and a sense of how people who grow up without their parents don’t know how to grow into their emotions. Their feelings are murky and nameless.

Austerlitz

by W. G. Sebald

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The main character in this book is a man named Austerlitz who was sent to Wales as a child, on a Kindertransport, and who, as an adult, begins to reconstruct what happened to his mother from memories of when he was four years old. It is a novel, but it also reads, in a strange way, as though it’s a memoir, or nonfiction, because there’s so much history in it.

Sebald structures the book in a winding way that reflects the process of Austerlitz’s search, in which he often gathers clues in the form of sensations. He was raised under a different name, and he only learns his real one by accident. He’s an architectural historian, so space is very important to him. At one point, he enters a train station, this enormous vaulted room, and he feels that he has been there before. Finally, these meanders take him to his former nanny, Vera, who can tell him what happened. And what he finds out is that his mother died in Theresienstadt.

As with the narratives in “Kin” and “The Death of the Heart,” the loss of Austerlitz’s parents has left a void that must be filled. People who’ve lost a parent who they never really knew will often see those parents as guiding presences, as faultless, as people without the imperfections and inevitable failures of the parents that we do get to know. And that’s a haunting tragedy, because when you don’t know those failures, you’re not really grieving a real person, but a kind of ethereal presence.

Last weekend, President Donald Trump vowed that he would carry out huge strikes on Iran’s energy infrastructure, in a threat meant to get Iran’s government to open up the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s closure of the strait was one of the most geopolitically significant developments in a war that began last month with U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran, and has caused chaos in the region and in the world economy. In recent days, however, Trump has seemingly searched for ways to de-escalate the conflict, promising to postpone the strikes while Iran and the U.S. consider ceasefire negotiations.

I recently spoke by phone with Ali Vaez, the director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed what concessions Iran would want in any negotiations to end the war, whether the U.S. and Israel have the same objectives in Iran, and why an off-ramp—let alone a permanent peace—may be so hard to find.

From the perspective of the Iranian regime and its new leadership, what do you think their interests are in any potential deal to end the war with the United States and Israel?

Look, the primary objective in any negotiation would be a deal that would insure the Islamic Republic’s survival. That has several requirements. One is, of course, that the hostilities against Iran would stop and that they would not start again—because Iran doesn’t want to end up being another country, like Lebanon or Gaza or Syria, that Israel or the United States can decide to bomb at will. This concept of the U.S. or Israel scheduling a Google Calendar reminder to bomb Iran every six months is not a situation that the Islamic Republic can tolerate, or believes that it would be able to survive, in the medium to long run. So the primary objective is to basically create the conditions under which Israel and the United States are deterred from committing an act of aggression against Iran ever again.

But, at this point, just that is not enough, because Iran has been living with economic warfare against it for several decades. And, after this war, it would have to reconstruct in order to survive. And this is why it would need economic incentives that are real, not just promised and never delivered. So it also needs some sort of arrangement in which it would be able to secure economic reprieve. And that means that if the hot war ends, but Iran ends up in another cold war, that would be as fatal to the regime as the continuation of the hot war. And this is why Iran will impose difficult conditions for accepting a ceasefire.

I have heard you say in the past that there were some ways in which the heavy sanctions on Iran, the economic warfare that you’re talking about, were beneficial to members of the regime and that the people who thought those sanctions would bring the government down were misguided. But now you seem to be saying that you think it’s important for the economic warfare against Iran to stop, not just for the welfare of the Iranian people, obviously, who’ve been suffering under sanctions, but for the regime itself. Why is that?

So these are different issues. Before the war, when the regime was able to govern, even ineffectively or with a lot of mismanagement and corruption, it could still keep the economy afloat. And, yes, there were regime élites who were benefitting from sanctions and were being enriched, and they were secure in their position because they had enough to sustain their power. But, if you look at what happened to the Assad regime, at a certain point Bashar al-Assad couldn’t even afford to pay his security forces anymore. And this war has basically rendered Iran ungovernable unless it can undergo serious reconstruction. This isn’t just about sanctions relief. The Iranian regime needs money for reconstruction. It’s really as simple as that. There is no agreement in which it would accept American promises because it’s been burned by the U.S. too many times. And, in the absence of sanctions relief, the regime knows it would die on the vine.

So you’re saying that Iran needs some real guarantees. What do you think the Americans might plausibly offer now?

I think at this moment, the two sides’ positions are too divergent to be amenable to an agreement. The American demands are as maximalist as they have been throughout the Trump Administration, both in the first term and in the past year or so. And the Iranian position has now hardened. So the U.S. wants Iran to completely dismantle its nuclear program and abandon any ambition of doing enrichment on its soil ever again. It also wants Iran’s enriched uranium to be accounted for and handed over to the International Atomic Energy Agency. It also wants Iran to stop supporting its partners and proxies in the region, and eventually also accept limits on its ballistic-missile program. These are all conditions that Iran has refused to accept in the past, and now Iran believes that it’s in a position of strength, and it has even less incentive to accept those conditions.

Iranians, in return, are asking the U.S. for reparations. They may ask for recognition of the right to enrichment, and they want not a ceasefire but an end to the war—not just against themselves but also against Hezbollah in Lebanon. They want an arrangement for the control of the Strait of Hormuz that would allow them to charge transit fees. And they also want guarantees that the U.S. and Israel would not attack them again. So you put these two sets of conditions from both sides together, and we’re nowhere close to any kind of understanding, which means that the parties have only two options. Those are either to continue apace or to escalate. Continuation of this conflict—I don’t think it’s realistically possible without escalation because, at a certain point, in order to inflict more pain on each other, the two sides would have to cross new red lines, and that means escalation. And escalation is going to increase the risks of this conflict.

For the United States, there are only two possibilities in terms of escalation. One is a ground invasion of a Persian Gulf island or the southern shore of Iran, which could result in a very high number of American casualties, and obviously would deepen the conflict and make it even more complicated to solve. And the other option is to target Iranian energy infrastructure, which could result in Iran retaliating against the Gulf states and torching the entire regional infrastructure.

Which is perhaps why Trump backed down a little bit from his recent threat of targeting Iranian power plants, because he came to the conclusion that that would be the type of escalation he might not want right now, right?

Yeah, correct.

When you laid out what the Americans want, listing things like limits on Iranian uranium enrichment and an end to support for proxies in the region, and so on and so forth, that struck me as what someone at an American think tank would want. I don’t mean that as a criticism exactly. It’s not clear to me that that’s what Donald Trump cares about. I don’t think he is staying up late at night because Iran is funding Hezbollah in Lebanon. So I do wonder if there’s a way to make a deal here that does not fulfill the American demands but does fulfill Trump’s demands. I assume his demands right now are, one, to not look foolish and, two, to get the strait open so that the world economy can get back on its axis.

No, you’re absolutely right. If it were up to Trump, I think he would accept a less-than-ideal agreement, but he has repeatedly demonstrated, and this is not a new phenomenon, that he lets negotiations be conducted by people who believe in those maximum estimates. What Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff have reportedly put on the table is almost a mirror image of Mike Pompeo’s twelve demands in Trump’s first term in office. And these are basically Israeli demands. So I don’t think Trump is acting independently here. These are a set of demands that have been in the circles that are close to him for many years, and they have become a kind of orthodoxy that I don’t think he can abandon, even if he doesn’t personally believe in them. So he’s stuck with them.

And now the problem, even if Trump wants to step aside from the maximalism of the current demands—the Iranians have demands that will be very difficult for him to meet. So I have a hard time really seeing how we can get to a diplomatic agreement anytime soon.

What role are America’s allies in the region, other than Israel, playing here? There’s been reporting in the past few days that the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, has been encouraging Trump to continue the war.

I don’t think there is a single view among U.S. allies in the Gulf. There are a range of perspectives. There are those, like Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait, who would be happy with this war stopping immediately and some sort of mutually beneficial solution being presented. But for Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia I think the situation is different. They do not want this war to end with an Iran that can still project power beyond its borders and threaten their interests again by controlling the strait. The problem is that they don’t have a clear concept of what defanging Iran really means because Iran is threatening these countries by basically firing drones and missiles toward them. And, as we have seen in the war in Ukraine, in order to completely destroy Iran’s ability to produce these cheap drones, which can be made easily in any basement, the U.S. would basically have to invade the entire country, which is just not on the cards. And, as we have seen in the case of Yemen, you can completely destroy a country’s infrastructure, its economy, and you still can’t stem its ability to produce projectiles that could disrupt the Gulf’s economy.

So this is why I think that all the Gulf countries want Iran weakened, but I don’t think the ones who want Iran vanquished have a clear definition of what vanquished really means. And if the U.S. is to go all the way, go for broke, and dismantle the Iranian state or turn it into a failed state, the Gulf countries would be the ones who would then be paying for the consequences. They would have a giant failed state of some ninety-three million people right next door to them, which would cast a shadow over all the prosperity plans that they have been planning for the next generation.

I think the Gulf states are just angry because they didn’t expect Iran to target them. They thought that the degree of détente that they had engaged in over the past few years was sufficient to deter Iran from attacking them. And now that it has happened they don’t have a clear strategy for how to bring this to some sort of soft landing. Other countries have experienced similar situations, like Germany in Europe and Japan in East Asia after 1945. But in those cases there was the total defeat of a state that had hegemonic ambitions, and then there was reintegration. In this case, it’s very hard to imagine either of those scenarios. As I said, totally defeating the Islamic Republic would require the kind of investment in blood and treasure that America is unlikely to have the appetite for. And reintegration is also something that there is no plan for in the region. So this is why I’m saying that the way this is going it is just going to create a more dangerous region, not a region in which the Gulf countries can go back to business as usual.

What you have laid out seems bad for the Gulf and the world and the people of Iran, but it doesn’t completely contradict something that we’ve read about in terms of Israel’s aims, which is that a weakened or unstable Iran may actually be what the Netanyahu government prefers. And it does suggest to me that Israel may then have some interest in keeping this war going for a long time. Which means, if Trump is going to come to any sort of deal with the Iranians, he needs to make a real effort to rein in the Israelis.

Yeah. So whenever Trump decides to stop the war Israel has no choice but to fall in line. The problem is that there is no unilateral ceasefire that Trump can impose because the Iranians agreed to a ceasefire last time, and in their view it only invited another aggression.

After the Twelve-Day War?

Yeah, exactly. And so that option of Trump getting tired of this and leaving is just not possible because the Iranians will keep fighting. And then it’s a question of whether Trump would be able to end this war without opening the strait, because now I think the goalposts have moved in a way that the conflict is no longer really about degrading Iran’s military capabilities or decapitating the system or destroying its infrastructure. It’s really about reopening the strait. And, again, that is not possible without escalation and continuation of this war.

You are right that not reopening the strait is something that Israel is comfortable with because it doesn’t need to necessarily deal with the consequences of it. If Iran and the Gulf states destroy one another’s sources of wealth, if Iran turns into another failed state, if there’s chaos throughout the region, Israel would reign over all of it in a militarized fortress.

And so I think Israel is totally fine with it, but Trump, at this point, even if he wants to come down off the high horse and put aside some of the maximalist demands of Israel, would still have to make concessions to the Iranians that would be very uncomfortable for him, I think, at a personal level. And this is why I think that, although Israel did start this war and dragged the U.S. into it, ending it is really no longer dependent on Israel. It’s dependent on Iran and Trump. And, as I said, those two have positions that are totally incompatible at this moment.

Can you say more about your belief that Netanyahu dragged Trump into the war? Netanyahu needs Trump for his reëlection campaign. He needs Trump to keep pressuring the Israeli President to pardon him. Trump could have said no to the war. And as you were saying, if Trump wants to call this off, he can get Bibi to call it off. So, if Israel dragged Trump into this, it’s only because Trump seemed unwilling to use the power that he had, no?

I agree with that. I’m not saying that he didn’t know what he was doing. I’m just saying that I think Trump believed some of the things that we now know Bibi told him before the war, including the idea that the regime was so brittle that killing the Supreme Leader would result in people coming to the streets again and taking over government institutions. And, yes, Trump made the decision to go in. Israel didn’t make that decision for him, but I don’t think we can ignore that Israel created a context for him to believe this would be an easy undertaking.

I think the success of the Venezuela operation probably played into that a little bit, too. I don’t know if Trump would have done this the same way if Venezuela had gone off the rails.

Yeah. Look, there are a lot of other factors as well, including Iran’s reaction to Qasem Soleimani’s killing, and Iran’s reaction to the U.S. bombing of Iran during the Twelve-Day War. After those successful operations, Trump had concluded that war with Iran is cost-free, and changing that perception is precisely the objective of the Iranians in this war. And I think they have managed to achieve that, maybe not fully but to a certain extent. And the question at the end of the day is: Who’s going to blink first?

Some of the things that Trump is saying, honestly, don’t make sense to me. I no longer really understand what he’s trying to do, but to my knowledge there are no serious talks between the U.S. and Iran, and the Iranians would not engage in high-level meetings with the U.S. until and unless they know that he’s going to make major concessions to them. And again, at this moment, I don’t see any evidence of it. ♦

In March, we expect mercurial weather—intrat leo, exeunt agnus—but this March has taken things to an extreme. In Washington, D.C., where I live, the weather was eighty-four degrees and sunny one day, then just above freezing and snowing the next. Then came a promised torrential downpour, followed by tornado warnings that sent locals searching for suitable hideouts, though, in the end, the city got only a wan drizzle. In that latter scenario, and many others of late, I have heard grumblings about weather apps and have experienced their frustrations myself. Check the weather in the morning and you might see sunny icons; come afternoon, it’s raining. Wind gusts aren’t necessarily visible on Apple’s weather app unless you happen to scroll way down the page. A colleague wore open-toed shoes the other day because her phone listed a high of fifty-four degrees—but the balmiest temperature occurred around 2 A.M., and the rest of the day was frigid. Is the problem climate change, which is making the weather more and more difficult to predict? Is it artificial intelligence, which is increasingly integrated into weather forecasting, and often falls short? Is it just the general enshittification of all software?

The answer is all of the above. Judging from the volume and tenor of user complaints, weather might be second only to social media as a space in need of fresh disruption. One entrepreneur, Adam Grossman, is on his second attempt at building a better weather app. In 2010, inspired by his experience getting caught in a surprise downpour during a road trip to Cleveland, he co-founded Dark Sky, which specialized in real-time updates on inclement weather. The app, which cost $3.99, became such a hit in Apple’s App Store that Apple acquired Dark Sky in 2020, and integrated some of the app’s features into its own weather app, employing Grossman along the way. But Apple shut down Dark Sky in 2023, prompting an online outcry, and Grossman eventually left out of frustration with Apple’s sluggish corporate schedule of annual software updates. He planned to get out of the weather business and launch a new startup. But the temptation of trying again proved too great. Grossman told me recently, “Everything from the tech stack you use, to the techniques that you use, to how you visualize the data—it evolved over time.” But, he added, “We would make changes to Dark Sky, and people would get mad.” With Acme, a new app that he launched in February, he could start fresh.

Weather apps have a tendency to alienate their user bases, perhaps because people’s physical experiences—their plans, their dress, their commutes—so directly depend on an accurate report. As Jonas Downey, the co-founder of an app called Hello Weather, told me, “It doesn’t take much for the app to lose trust with someone.” One unforeseen storm might send users looking for an alternative. Ever since Dark Sky shut down, Downey added, “There’s been this absence in the market.” Acme (which has a subscription-based model, at twenty-five dollars a year) is less cluttered than Dark Sky by design. When you open the app, you are presented with the weather “Right Now,” the forecast for the “Next 24 Hours,” and the forecast for the “Next 10 Days”; each is listed under a bold text banner that resembles a print newspaper headline. The twenty-four-hour temperature forecast is shown as a fluctuating black line tagged with icons denoting the weather every three hours. Crucially, though, there are alternate forecasts that appear in the form of paler gray lines; sometimes the gray lines hew closely to the main black one; other times they stray considerably, indicating that the predictions are less reliable during that window. As Grossman put it to me, “Climate change is causing an increase in uncertainty. It sucks that we can’t predict the weather perfectly, but knowing that uncertainty is very useful.” He cited, as an example, one recent day in his home state of Connecticut, when the forecast predicted snow in the morning and rain in the evening; in between, the conditions were harder to pinpoint. Acme dealt with this by displaying alternate forecast lines for both rain and snow, coded in different colors—a visualization that doubled as an admission that the forecast that day was a bit of a mess.

Apple’s Weather, by contrast, seems designed to telegraph an aggressive certainty, which can contribute to incidents like my colleague’s shoe mishap. Its home screen’s hourly forecast consists of temperatures, weather icons, and illustrative background visuals, such as gloomy rain clouds, that sometimes fail to match the view out the window. The individual data points don’t seem to visually or intellectually knit together. Acme integrates prose descriptions—“Clear skies this afternoon, turning partly cloudy this evening”—and precipitation percentages into its own home screen, for what Grossman called “context”—the kind of narrative information that a television weather forecaster might provide. Words are better at suggesting ambiguity than plain numbers or emojis. Acme’s main and alternate forecast lines turn the weather into a story arc.

The differences among weather apps are largely a matter of presentation; most apps run on the same set of data and predictions available to anyone. In the United States, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the National Weather Service release their data to the public for free. Businesses can also license data from the likes of the Weather Company, AccuWeather, or the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts. Most indie weather apps rely on predictions from one data service or another. Brian Mueller, the creator and developer of a popular independent weather app called Carrot, told me that he spends in the six figures annually for an assortment of data sets and for server costs. “No one weather data source can ever be accurate for everybody all over the whole planet,” Mueller said. One of Acme’s advantages over its smaller competitors is that it generates its own, bespoke forecasts, comparing and merging the various data sources and predictions using machine learning, and adjusting for factors such as regional microclimates. The app also uses its own algorithm to determine which information to show a user at a given moment. A radar map will pop up at the top of the scroll, for instance, when inclement weather is predicted.

The challenge of weather-app creation lies both in the improbability of accurately predicting the weather and in the difficulty of designing something that works for any user, anywhere. “Everybody wants their own weather app,” Mueller told me. An Angeleno may care more about air quality, for instance, whereas a Bostonian wants to know the chance of snow. Carrot’s imperfect solution is to allow users to customize their own display, choosing which information to foreground, against a backdrop of chaotic animations and snarky jokes (“The temperature is low, but my disdain for you is even lower”). Hello Weather separates various stats—on UV or wind—into separate onscreen tiles. Acme’s answer, the most elegant of the three, is to show a minimum of information based on what matters most in a given moment. Downey, of Hello Weather, told me that the public’s faith in weather forecasts hasn’t been helped by the current political environment, as President Trump has worked to defund the institutions responsible for reliable scientific measurement, including with cuts to NOAA. “People started trusting the weather data less,” Downey said, leading to even more animosity toward their apps. Acme imparts a sense of trust by foregrounding its own lack of omniscience. As I write, I can see on the app that it’s unlikely to rain this afternoon—but that there’s an alternate forecast suggesting a possibility of snow. At least I know that I can’t be sure. ♦

Israeli fighter jets crossed the waters of the Persian Gulf on the afternoon of March 18th, a regular occurrence in the Israeli military’s campaign to weaken the Iranian regime. But this was not a routine mission. The target was South Pars, the world’s largest natural-gas field, shared by Iran and Qatar. The objective was to hurt the regime from within—the natural gas from South Pars is Iran’s largest source of energy—and, more important, to send a warning to Tehran: end the stranglehold on the Strait of Hormuz, a roughly thirty-five-mile-wide body of water in the Persian Gulf, vital for the health of the global economy, or face more assaults on oil-and-energy infrastructure.

When the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran four weeks ago, the goals were to topple the Iranian government, destroy the country’s military, security, and nuclear capabilities, and diminish its influence in the region by cutting off its support for proxy forces. After a U.S.-Israeli strike killed Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, President Trump demanded the regime’s “unconditional surrender.” He urged its forces, especially members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, to defect, and encouraged Iranians to rise up against the regime. On March 9th, he said that the war would be over “pretty quickly.” None of that happened. The Trump Administration underestimated Iran’s ability and determination to fight back, wreak chaos outside its borders, and unleash economic pain worldwide. Now the war has turned into a race to stabilize the rapidly deteriorating global economic order, central to which is reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Waging drone strikes on tankers and issuing threats of laying sea mines, Iran has effectively shut down the narrow body of water through which a fifth of the world’s supply of oil and natural gas flows. It wasn’t a surprise: U.S. military planners have, for decades, mapped this out as a likely scenario in the event of war with Iran.

For the country’s leadership, weakened militarily and more isolated than ever, inflicting economic suffering has become the most powerful weapon available. Proving that Iran can effectively close the strait is now a critical strategy to deter future strikes by the U.S. and Israel, and a potent point of leverage in any future talks about the war and Iran’s nuclear program. For Trump, the Strait of Hormuz has become a geopolitical albatross. The longer the strait remains blocked, the greater the chance of lasting harm to the global economy, and the greater the risks for Trump politically; an extended standoff could diminish his popularity at home, as midterm elections approach and voters grapple with high gas prices and airline fares. It could sap his authority internationally and weaken American influence in the region. But fully reopening the strait could take weeks, even months, and could require sending in U.S. ground troops and a naval convoy to protect ships. These possibilities are also fraught with risks. And it may be too late for Trump to negotiate from a position of strength with Iran, or simply declare victory and stop the war, as that would leave Iran in control of the strait. “Trump needed to cut a deal, and he could still try to cut a deal, but the price, the political price, of the deal keeps going up, and so the problem he’s facing is, there’s no golden off-ramp,” Robert Pape, a political scientist at the University of Chicago specializing in international-security affairs, told me.

The pressure on Trump to reopen the strait was made evident on Saturday, when, on Truth Social, he delivered an ultimatum: if the Iran does not “FULLY OPEN, WITHOUT THREAT, the Strait of Hormuz, within 48 HOURS,” he said, the U.S. will “obliterate” Iran’s power plants. It was his first attempt to apply pressure by threatening Iran’s civilian energy infrastructure.

The next day, Lieutenant Colonel Ebrahim Zolfaghari, an Iranian military spokesman, according to state media, warned that, if its power plants are targeted, Iran will not only strike “fuel and energy” targets but expand its attacks to civilian “information-technology and desalination infrastructures” used by Israel, the United States, and its regional allies. (Desalination plants are the main source of freshwater in the Middle East, critical to millions of lives.) Iranian officials also warned that they would fully shut down the strait, as opposed to just blocking it for ships from the U.S., Israel, and their allies, a move that would introduce more chaos and uncertainty into the global economy. “The Iranian regime is in survival mode, and so they’ll fight to the end, and they’ll throw everything they have at it,” Daniel Shapiro, a former U.S. Ambassador to Israel during the Obama Administration, told me. “They will obstruct the strait. They will be willing to sacrifice some of their own oil infrastructure—or, if they have to, they will impose an identical cost on their neighbors across the Gulf. All they really have to do to claim victory is to survive.”

On Monday, shortly before the deadline he’d set, Trump wrote that he had just had “VERY GOOD AND PRODUCTIVE CONVERSATIONS” with Iran “REGARDING A COMPLETE AND TOTAL RESOLUTION OF OUR HOSTILITIES.” All military strikes against Iranian power plants and energy infrastructure had been postponed for a five-day period, Trump added, depending on the success of the talks. Oil prices fell, and global stock markets rebounded. But Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of Iran’s parliament and a top official, contradicted Trump, saying in a post on X that no negotiations were held and that Trump’s statement was meant “to manipulate the financial and oil markets and escape the quagmire in which the US and Israel are trapped.”

What has happened since the attack on South Pars exemplifies Trump’s conundrum. Instead of cowing Iran, the Israeli strike escalated the war. As South Pars burned, spewing thick clouds of dark smoke, Iran struck back, firing missiles into Ras Laffan, Qatar’s massive liquefied-natural-gas hub, and targeting oil-and-gas facilities in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Nearly every day, Trump Administration officials have made declarations that the U.S. and Israel are winning the war. Thousands of American and Israeli strikes have decimated Iran’s senior leadership and degraded its military and naval capabilities. Yet the air campaign, costing billions of dollars, has not forced Iran to capitulate and loosen its grip on the strait. If anything, the regime is more defiant, belligerent, and brazen, determined to prevail at any cost. New, more hard-line leaders have replaced those who were assassinated, while, as South Pars and its aftermath reveal, Iran is still able to fire cheaply made missiles and drones daily at Israel and U.S. allies, hitting targets with increasing accuracy. And, even as the International Energy Agency, last week, said that the war “is creating the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market,” Iran has still been able to ship millions of barrels through the strait, earning foreign currency, as the regime selectively allows some ships to pass through that are linked to allies such as China. In a desperate effort to contain soaring energy prices, the U.S. Treasury Department has temporarily lifted sanctions on some Iranian oil to allow the sale of more than a hundred and forty million barrels of crude stranded on ships at sea. Paradoxically, this could help fund the war against the United States and its allies.

The repercussions of Iran’s choke hold on the strait are not limited to the gas pump and jet fuel. Hundreds of millions of people, and entire industries, from the Persian Gulf to Asia, have been affected by industry shutdowns, rising food and heating costs stemming from higher energy prices, and fuel shortages. Companies that export goods to, or import them from, the Middle East are crippled, as global supply chains are interrupted. The strait is also a crucial gateway for nitrogen-based fertilizer components, such as urea and ammonia. As a result of the disruption, their prices have spiked, deepening food insecurity in vulnerable countries and influencing spring-planting decisions by farmers in the U.S. Even the U.S. defense industry may be affected: roughly half the global trade of sulfur—a mineral that’s key not only to sustaining America’s electrical grid but to building semiconductors in precision-guided munitions, and to repairing military equipment—flows through the strait.

“The main question still lying in front of us is, will President Trump use boots on the ground and prolong the war to try to open the strait?” Danny Citrinowicz, a Middle East expert at the Institute for National Security Studies, in Tel Aviv, told me. “Or will he stop, declare victory, and return to dealing with Cuba or China, or whatever else?” When I asked what Trump could do to bring down climbing gas and energy costs, Citrinowicz replied, “There are no good options whatsoever, unfortunately.” The South Pars strikes showed that “you cannot attack infrastructure in Iran to force them to open the strait. This is not going to happen.” Trump, he added, “doesn’t understand anything about Iranians. It is what it is.”

Despite Trump’s noise about negotiations, his objectives are far from clear, whether he’s leaning toward escalating the war, exiting by declaring victory, negotiating with Iran, or staying the course with aerial strikes. His messaging has been inconsistent; his goals shift nearly every day. Only three days before his ultimatum to Iran, after Israel’s assault on South Pars, Trump said that the U.S. “knew nothing about this particular attack,” and warned Israel not to target the area again if it wanted to avoid another escalation. Yet Shapiro and other analysts told me that the U.S. and Israel have been closely coördinated on military targeting, and Trump likely knew about, and even approved, the South Pars strikes, but didn’t expect Iran’s strong response, or the harm to the global economy. Even as Trump sought, at least publicly, to de-escalate the war, Israel and Iran weren’t listening. On Tuesday, after dozens of tit-for-tat strikes between the two countries, oil prices climbed again. And Trump’s recent actions suggest that the U.S. is preparing for a longer war. The Pentagon has asked for two hundred billion dollars in additional funds, and the U.S. military has announced plans to move roughly twenty-five hundred combat soldiers from the Indo-Pacific region to the Middle East. Another twenty-five hundred marines are expected to be deployed next month. Military analysts predict that the marines could be used to open a new phase in the conflict, launching raids and seizing control of several strategic Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf that are vital to Iran’s oil production. The biggest target is Kharg Island, the main export hub through which Iran moves ninety per cent of its oil. In 1988, during the Iran-Iraq War, Trump, then a New York real-estate mogul, told the Guardian, “I’d be harsh on Iran. They’ve been beating us psychologically, making us look like a bunch of fools. One bullet shot at one of our men or ships, and I’d do a number on Kharg Island. I’d go in and take it.” Now several of Trump’s closest advisers have said that Kharg is the key to shortening the war and breaking Iran’s stranglehold on the strait. “If Iran loses control or the ability to operate its oil infrastructure from Kharg Island, its economy is annihilated,” the Republican senator Lindsey Graham, of South Carolina, wrote on X. “He who controls Kharg Island, controls the destiny of this war.”

A ground invasion of Kharg and the surrounding islands is certain to escalate the conflict, further driving up oil prices and, most likely, increasing the number of U.S. casualties, in a war that is already unpopular with many Americans. The first obstacle for the marines would be getting their ships—which would be carrying combat troops, helicopters, fighter jets, and amphibious assault vehicles—to successfully land on the islands. Geography works against them: Iran’s side of the strait is rugged and mountainous. Iranian forces could rain missiles and drones on U.S. ships from high, hard-to-detect vantage points, allowing only a few seconds to respond. Then, if the marines managed to seize Kharg, holding it would pose various challenges. They could face daily barrages of missiles fired from the mainland, in addition to drone strikes and attacks from Revolutionary Guard troops on the island. “There’s just a lot of threats here,” Pape, the University of Chicago professor, said. “You’re going to have multiple clusters of hornets’ nests.” And although the Iranians will have varying levels of success, Pape added, “they only need a few per cent of their attacks to actually hit, and that will be painful. We’ll basically have to be sitting ducks.”

The Trump Administration has considered sending naval convoys to protect oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, and has even demanded that NATO allies, along with China, Japan, and South Korea, contribute ships. (None has yet agreed to do so.) The last time U.S. warships escorted oil tankers through the strait was in the late nineteen-eighties, during the Iran-Iraq War. That was the largest naval-convoy endeavor since the Second World War, and included aircraft carriers and reconnaissance planes. During the operation, an Iranian mine damaged a massive tanker, the S.S. Bridgeton. It was a propaganda victory for Iran and embarrassing for the U.S. Navy. Steven Wills, a former U.S. Navy officer and a researcher at the Center for Maritime Strategy, a nonpartisan think tank, told me that the Navy has become more adept at shooting down drones and missiles, owing to the American campaign in the Red Sea against Yemen’s Houthi militia, and mines remain the biggest threat today. But, Wills told me, “There’s always going to be danger.” U.S. warships must pass through the strait’s bottleneck opening, sailing roughly ten nautical miles from the Iranian mainland. They have mere seconds to react to drones and missile attacks, he explained. “Naval warfare is ugly and messy, and, if a U.S. ship takes a hit, then hundreds of crew could die.”

If America and Israel destroy Iran’s oil infrastructure, power plants, and other energy facilities, as Trump has threatened, most experts predict a doomsday scenario. The Iranian regime has already declared that any such acts won’t bring them to the negotiating table and will only prompt more retaliation. And a total shutdown of the strait, combined with a bottleneck in exports from Iran, OPEC’s third-biggest producer, could anger China, the largest recipient of Iranian oil, leading to tensions with the United States at a time when the U.S. military, with its focus on the Middle East, is stretched thin in Asia.

There will also be hard consequences if Trump opts to declare victory and end America’s involvement in a war that could become long and costly. Iran’s government, now more hard-line and militarized than ever, will remain in power. Its nuclear program will be intact, including its stockpiles of enriched uranium. Having outmaneuvered the U.S. and Israel, Iran will be emboldened; at any time, it could threaten global economic chaos by shutting down the strait again. “The Strait of Hormuz situation won’t return to its pre-war status,” Ghalibaf, the speaker of Iran’s parliament, posted on X last week.

Israel and most of the Gulf countries want the United States to press on until the Iranian regime is dismantled or too weak to pose harm, according to analysts I spoke with. They fear that even a damaged but intact Iran will remain a long-term existential threat and wield more power over their economies and daily lives. Saudi Arabia, in particular, appears to be losing patience. In the aftermath of the South Pars strikes, its foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, sternly warned that the kingdom has “the right to take military action if deemed necessary.” On Tuesday, the Times reported that Saudi Arabia’s de-facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, is pushing Trump not to wind down the conflict. “The U.S. cannot afford to stop the war now. There are no off-ramps at this point,” Muhanad Seloom, a professor of international politics and security at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, in Qatar, told me. “If the war stops now, Iran would understand that, in the future, if they come under pressure, they don’t have to hit the U.S. They don’t have to hit Israel. They would just have to hit the Gulf countries.” This could lead the Arab countries to try to reduce their dependence on the U.S. as a security partner, possibly turning to Russia or China, or creating their own military alliance, often called an Arab NATO, weakening U.S. influence in the Middle East. Iran is already goading the Arab states to rethink their security ties with the U.S. In another post on X, Ghalibaf wrote, “This war proved one thing quite clearly: American bases in our region does not protect anyone—they are a threat. America sacrifices everyone for Israel and does not care about anyone but Israel. Anyone clothed by the US is literally NAKED!”

After Trump reversed course again, postponing strikes on Iran’s power plants, it became clear that Iran was in a stronger negotiating position now that it had handcuffed the world’s economy. “Trump blinked first—out of a clear understanding that striking Iran’s energy infrastructure would trigger a direct and significant retaliation,” Citrinowicz, of the Institute for National Security Studies, wrote in a post on X. “This regime is unlikely to reopen the Strait without meaningful concessions from the U.S.” Trump may not have wanted a long war, but he’s got one now. ♦