During the twentieth century, the United States declared war on wildfires. In 1935, the chief of the U.S. Forest Service announced “an experiment on a continental scale”: every blaze was to be put out by 10 A.M. on the morning after it began. Given that fires had been burning regularly for hundreds of millions of years, this was an enormous departure from the natural order. Fire clears vegetation and delivers nutrients to soil, creating fresh cycles of growth that help ecosystems. Without it, American forests became dense, prone to megafires, and vulnerable to drought; woods encroached on prairies and wetlands. Only after decades of suppression did the government act on the wisdom of scientists, Indigenous communities, and fire practitioners who understood the benefits of fire. Starting in the sixties, a different kind of experiment began: federal agencies started setting fires intentionally and, in rare cases, allowing naturally occurring wildfires to restore landscapes.
And so, on July 4th, when lightning started a small fire along the North Rim of Grand Canyon National Park, firefighters did not rush to put it out. If anything, the location of the blaze seemed ideal. Park managers had already been planning to burn ten thousand of the surrounding acres in the fall of 2027, and they knew that the fire, which was dubbed Dragon Bravo by a dispatcher, would have a difficult time spreading. To the south and west, the rim of the canyon provided a natural barrier. To the north and east, along a dirt road called the W1, workers had already cleared a buffer. Park officials approved the decision to “contain” the fire rather than extinguish it. It was now considered a managed wildfire.
To predict where Dragon Bravo might spread, park employees used a modelling tool that created probability maps from thousands of potential weather scenarios. The forecast was sunny, with light winds from the east; the fire was predicted to grow to seven hundred and fifty acres in its first week, with a low risk of hazardous behavior. The actual fire burned only fifty-eight acres by day five. Firefighters expected it to go the way of the fire’s namesake, an earlier fire named Dragon, which seasonal monsoons helped extinguish in 2022. We’ll be lucky if it hits the W1, an experienced firefighter remembered thinking.
Resources were diverted to another wildfire, in the nearby Kaibab National Forest. But then, on the afternoon of July 11th, the weather began to defy forecasts. The temperature reached ninety degrees. The relative humidity—an important indicator of the dryness of vegetation—plummeted. The wind switched direction; flames rose to the crowns of conifer trees and spewed embers. Within hours, Dragon Bravo had doubled in size. By evening, it had jumped the W1 and was encroaching on firefighters. It had morphed into what’s called a fast fire, one that grows four thousand acres or more in a single day. The 2018 Camp Fire, the 2023 Maui fire, and the 2025 Los Angeles fires were all fast fires.
The firefighters retreated about five miles southeast, where a fire station, staff housing, and the Grand Canyon Lodge on the North Rim were situated. Models had recently given the fire a 0.2-to-four-per-cent chance of reaching the lodge, but now crews began preparing to defend the structures. Fire and smoke overtook them. Propane tanks exploded. Some took cover from the heat behind vehicles; others found refuge at a nearby heliport. Chlorine gas began leaking from a sewage-treatment plant. The experienced firefighter saw the fire below the rim, moving sideways, and then shooting up the slope like a geyser. “It was almost like watching a volcano.”
An evacuation order spread across the entire North Rim. Robin Bies, a staff member at the Kaibab Lodge, some fifteen miles to the north, drove two hikers and their grandchildren to the South Rim, four hours away. At about 2 A.M., she looked back across the canyon and saw the red glow of Dragon Bravo. “It was just surreal,” she told me. The blaze ultimately covered a hundred and forty-five thousand acres in the span of three months, making it the largest American wildfire in 2025. Bies often wondered why firefighters hadn’t simply put it out to begin with.
A few weeks after Dragon Bravo was fully extinguished, I went to the North Rim in hope of understanding its impact. Driving through the Kaibab National Forest and Grand Canyon National Park, I crisscrossed the fire’s footprint for more than fifty miles. Some roads had only recently reopened. The last few miles of Arizona State Route 67, which led to the Grand Canyon Lodge, were still blockaded; the lodge had burned to a husk, and dozens of other homes and buildings were gone, too.
Once Dragon Bravo broke containment lines, firefighters tried every available tool to stop its progression: aircraft, fire engines, bulldozers, handcrews, hotshots, drones. These battles were written into the landscape. I could see that, in some places, firefighters had halted Dragon Bravo’s advance at a road. Herds of bison were grazing on grass that had sprouted in the blackened soil. In other spots, I saw that the fire had jumped a road and raced up a steep slope. Some evergreen trees were so crispy that they looked like matchsticks.
I stayed the night at the Kaibab Lodge, which had served as a federal-incident command post after the North Rim was evacuated. Bies helped provide food and accommodations for hundreds of wildland firefighters. “They became like family,” she told me. She made weekly trips into town to fetch them cigarettes. A sign was still hanging over the reception desk: “Welcome Dragon Slayers.”
I stood with one of Bies’s colleagues, Mark Harvey, the lodge’s handyman, in front of a grand stone fireplace. Snow was falling outside; now and then, he fed the fire a cured aspen log. How had their lodge survived? “Just luck,” Harvey said. “The wind changed direction.” He showed me videos of orange flames pulsing against the night sky. Not until mid-August did rain help firefighters corral Dragon Bravo, and the fire wasn’t fully contained until late September. Still, Harvey didn’t see the fire as a calamity. “It’s just a cycle of the forest,” he said. “We’ve got to burn all the old stuff out.” He was looking forward to spring, when he predicted that piney grouse would return and morel mushrooms would proliferate.
Many of my sources feared that Dragon Bravo would invite scrutiny of the very idea of managed wildfires. Arizona’s Democratic governor, Katie Hobbs, called for an official investigation, arguing that “Arizonans deserve answers for how this fire was allowed to decimate the Grand Canyon National Park.” Other politicians have been voicing skepticism that any wildfires should be allowed to burn. Project 2025, the Heritage Foundation policy agenda that has heavily influenced the Trump Administration, criticized the Forest Service for using “unplanned fire” for vegetation management, advocating instead for timber extraction. The Republican governor of Montana, Greg Gianforte, has demanded that the Forest Service “fully embrace an aggressive initial and extended attack strategy.” This year, Trump’s appointee to the chief of the Forest Service said in an annual letter that it was “critical that we suppress fires as swiftly as possible.”
The backlash is coming at a pivotal moment. Historically, thousands of firefighters have worked for diverse agencies within the Department of the Interior: the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service. These entities’ goals are more nuanced than fire suppression; they also value conservation and wilderness protection. But, as early as January, 2026, the Trump Administration plans to consolidate these firefighters under a new agency, the Wildland Fire Service, which will “reflect the increasing risk to people, property and infrastructure,” according to a September press release. (The Forest Service is part of the Department of Agriculture, so its eleven thousand firefighters will remain separate for now.) The Department of the Interior declined to elaborate on the new agency’s priorities.
Researchers, land managers, and firefighters warned that the federal government may be on the verge of regressing into a twentieth-century attitude about fire policy. “Once you create an agency that’s only focussed on fire, life and safety become the main focus, and any notion of fire as a multipurpose ecological tool loses its value,” a research scientist who worked with the Forest Service for decades told me. The Wildland Fire Service will have an incentive to avoid short-term risk rather than manage a wildfire for the sake of the ecosystem, she said. (Since Greece moved its wildland fire response from its forest service to its national fire agency, in the late nineties, its wildfire crisis has deepened; the country now spends four hundred million dollars on putting out fires, compared with only twenty-five million on land management and wildfire prevention, according to research from 2021.) “My biggest fear is that the people in charge of this consolidation are not the people who understand ecologically beneficial fire,” a senior firefighter told me. “It’s hero shit. ‘Get out there and put it out.’ ”
Managed wildfires have spread out of control before. In 1988, when such blazes were called “prescribed natural fires,” they contributed to the Yellowstone fires, which burned around 1.2 million acres over the course of five months. Sensationalized media accounts claimed that pristine forests and animal populations were decimated, which helped fuel a public backlash against the Park Service’s approach to managed wildfires. Yet ecologists now know that even those fires, though large and severe, were completely natural. “Everyone thought Yellowstone was destroyed,” Monica Turner, an ecologist at the University of Wisconsin, told me. “It came back just wonderfully well on its own, without our intervention.”
Fire scientists believe that a patchwork of fire intensity—low in some places, high in others—increases the dynamism and resilience of a landscape. Repeated wildfires can create a mosaic of interlocking burned and unburned areas, which can curb subsequent blazes for a period afterward: flames can only go so far before they reach a place that has already recently ignited. In the past half century, dozens of managed wildfires have moved through a sixty-square-mile area in the Illilouette Creek Basin, in Yosemite National Park. The result of so much fire may seem counterintuitive. Scientists have discovered wet meadows proliferating and mature trees flourishing. Data suggests that, compared with the rest of the national park, the basin could be better prepared for future blazes and droughts that are a projected consequence of climate change.
Could Dragon Bravo similarly bolster the ecosystem of the North Rim? Fortuitously, the fire burned through preëxisting study plots maintained by the park’s ecologists. In August, an interdisciplinary team of experts including engineers, biologists, and vegetation specialists collected soil samples and looked at satellite imagery. They found that only two per cent of the soil had burned at a high severity, meaning that soil properties were largely not altered or damaged. Researchers will continue to gather data on soil, vegetation, and hydrology for years to come.
I heard differing opinions about the fire’s wider impact on vegetation. Historically, the North Rim burned in large, periodic fires; during the eighteenth century, it experienced four major regional wildfires. The last large-scale fire was in 1879, and fuel loads—measured in tons per acre—eventually climbed to dangerous levels. By some estimates, the tree density of the North Rim before Dragon Bravo was more than three hundred per cent higher than it was a century ago. “We certainly achieved those goals of reducing tons per acre,” the experienced firefighter said. “Over all, I think we had good effects in most of the areas.” But a local firefighter based in Flagstaff, who had seen maps of burn severity, said that some areas may be permanently transformed—for example, from forest to shrubland.
During my drive, the North Rim looked operatic. In a single hour, I drove under blue skies and through hailstorms. Thunder rumbled overhead. Rainbows framed my view of the Colorado River. When I stopped to walk through burned areas, along the eastern flank of Dragon Bravo, I saw mule deer run through colonies of aspen trees. Beneath majestic ponderosa pines, I dug into the blackened topsoil to find brown, untouched earth. At one point, I parked next to a patch of blackened Gambel oaks. On a rock, I saw a plaque that quoted Theodore Roosevelt: “Leave it as it is. You cannot improve on it.”
Only half a per cent of unplanned ignitions are allowed to burn as managed wildfires. Many scientists worry that, at a time when they should be getting more widespread, they will only become rarer. Jennifer Balch, a geographer at the University of Colorado Boulder, has studied the dangers of fast fires and found that they’re uniquely damaging and costly to fight. Still, she argued that we need to keep finding opportunities for managed wildfires. Dragon Bravo hasn’t changed her mind.
In Balch’s view, the upsides of wildfires remain underappreciated. Her preliminary research, which is currently undergoing peer review, shows that, between 2010 and 2020, 3.1 million hectares of forest burned in what she deemed good wildfires. (Her definition: fires that have ecological benefits and match historical patterns of fires in the area.) That’s even larger than the 1.4 million hectares that were burned intentionally, in prescribed fires.
Firefighters were still struggling to understand why Dragon Bravo exploded in intensity. “We prepped that road so many times,” the experienced firefighter said of the W1. “I thought it was as secure as it could be.” Some of my sources felt that modelling tools are failing to account for new extremes. Faulty models also seemed to play a role in the Calf Canyon/Hermits Peak Fire—the most destructive wildfire in the history of New Mexico.
The Department of the Interior has begun an official investigation. Early coverage of Dragon Bravo consistently described it as a managed wildfire that was being contained, not suppressed; Watch Duty, a nonprofit that tracks wildfires in real time, reported on July 8th that Dragon Bravo was being managed “for resource benefit objectives using a confine/contain strategy,” citing the public-affairs office of Grand Canyon National Park. But, when I contacted the same office, a spokesperson offered a different narrative, asserting that, “from the beginning, the fire was managed under a suppression strategy.” One of my sources, a wildfire expert who has written fire-management plans for the National Park Service, considered this claim “incoherent” and worried that it would be seen as an “inept coverup.” My sources who fought the fire felt that the park had not been forthcoming with information, and that, as a result, they had been vilified by the media and the public for struggling to contain Dragon Bravo. But I was surprised to learn that the experience did not lead to a crisis of faith in managed wildfires. If anything, it seemed to have strengthened firefighters’ convictions. “In my mind, I’m more aggressive,” the experienced firefighter said. “We got to burn more.” The Park’s public-affairs office did not respond to follow-up questions.
On my way back from the North Rim, as the sun was setting, I stopped in Coconino National Forest to meet the Flagstaff firefighter. In this part of the state, close to seven hundred thousand acres have burned in managed wildfires since 2010. These blazes are credited with helping undo the damage of fire suppression and returning the world’s largest continuous ponderosa-pine forest to health. The sky was turning pink; from where we stood, on the edge of a meadow, the North Rim was just a band of dark blue on the horizon. The firefighter told me that he’d been there when the Grand Canyon Lodge, a place that he loved, burned. “It was easily the most complex situation I’ve ever experienced firsthand,” he said. “Fighting fire in a nighttime environment mixed with power lines, no water, and homes burning. That is an impossible battle you can’t win.” During a crew debriefing afterward, he told me, he and many others had cried in frustration.
The firefighter pointed to a cluster of trees that had been struck by lightning in June. The surrounding area, like the North Rim, had been scheduled for several prescribed burns. He’d heard that federal officials, in Washington, had voiced a preference that the fire be suppressed quickly. Instead, a number of hotshot crews herded and cajoled and steered the fire, helping it to burn ten thousand acres in three days. Managing the fire cost around seventy dollars per acre, the firefighter estimated; a prescribed burn might have cost a thousand an acre. “We know what good land management looks like,” he told me. “We felt the pressure not to do it, and we did it anyway.” Then he paused, took in the scene before us, and added, “I just love this fire.” ♦











