2026-11-16 17:52:30
“Hey, I’ll get a job…when I hear the true call.” — Slacker (1990)
About 10 years ago, I met a woman who worked as a mid-level software engineer at Facebook. She didn’t work on machine learning, but just for fun, she read a bunch of papers and got into the subject as a hobby. Later, in the pandemic, she quit her boring corporate job and spent a few years unemployed, contemplating the meaning of life. She made her own clothes, learned ballet, made cute Instagram videos, dyed her hair, and went to a bunch of hackathons (almost all of which she won).
Also in the late 2010s, I knew a man who had been a promising software engineer and data scientist, and before that a top performer on the International Math Olympiad. But when I met him, he was spending a few years unemployed — crashing at his girlfriend’s place, playing Hearthstone (and becoming one of the top-ranked players in the world), learning to skateboard, going on hippie retreats, and contemplating the meaning of life.
Both of those people are billionaires now. They are Sasha Sheng and Diogo Almeida, two of the three founders of TypeSafe AI, a startup that was recently valued at $7.5 billion (and in which I invested a small amount of money). TypeSafe invented Jev, an all-new kind of AI model that bypasses human language, and so is able to make decisions much faster and more cheaply than Claude or GPT. It was an incredibly creative idea — one that the big labs are racing to copy — and it took an incredible amount of hard work to realize.1
Sasha’s and Diogo’s roundabout, seemingly improbable route to stunning success is actually more common in the tech world than you might think. Steve Jobs is the most famous example — he famously dropped out of college, not to start Apple, but to do psychedelic drugs, crash on friends’ floors, immerse himself in hippie spirituality, live on a commune, and travel around India looking for enlightenment before eventually inventing the personal computer and becoming the most beloved tech icon in American history. Jack Dorsey, Larry Ellison, and Mitch Kapor all had their own periods of aimlessness.
Nor is this sort of life path confined to the tech world. History is full of examples of people who looked lackadaisical until they suddenly rose to greatness:
Ulysses S. Grant drank copiously, worked as a clerk in a leather store, engaged in various failed business ventures and was said to lack ambition — until one day he rejoined the military and became the most successful and important military commander in the entire Civil War, as well as President of the United States.
Charles Darwin neglected his medical studies and turned in a mediocre performance on his exams at Cambridge, routinely going hunting and riding instead of studying, before becoming a naturalist, signing up for an ocean voyage, and inventing the theory of evolution.
James Cameron was a college dropout and a truck driver, before seeing Star Wars prompted him to quit his job and teach himself how to make movies, ultimately becoming one of the most commercially successful movie directors of all time. (Kevin Smith had a similar path to success, except his inspiration was the movie Slacker.)
Haruki Murakami ran a jazz bar and had little ambition, before suddenly deciding to become a novelist, and eventually becoming one of the most celebrated writers in the world.
I like to tell these stories because they demonstrate an approach to success in life that I believe is overlooked and deserves more recognition. I call it “bumbition”.
“Bumbition” is an obvious portmanteau of “bum” and “ambition”. In general, we think of ambitious people and slackers as polar opposites — ambitious people work hard, set goals for themselves, and are constantly motivated, while slackers drift aimlessly, laze around, or fail to apply their talents. A lot of our culture is oriented around pushing young people to be ambitious instead of turning into bums.
Bumbition, however, defies placement on the ambitious/bum spectrum. It exhibits elements of both. For a significant portion of their life, a bumbitious person doesn’t strive hard, or apply themselves to definite goals…until a clear and compelling opportunity presents itself. When that opportunity to do something really interesting or impactful does come up, the bumbitious person is quick to recognize it, and works very hard to exploit it.
The key here is that bumbition is not simply intermittent ambition. It’s a fundamentally different approach to life — it has different goals and motivations, and when it succeeds, it succeeds for different reasons.
An ambitious person is always working toward a set of goals — either those they define for themselves, or those defined by the people around them. Those goals could include:
“Make partner by age 30”
“Start a unicorn startup”
“Get a tenured job at a top 10 research university”
“Make a hundred million dollars”
“Conquer Central Asia”
…And so on. The purpose of achieving those goals — the motivation that drives ambitious people — is to feel a sense of personal success.
A bumbitious person does not automatically have a goal at all times,2 because they tend to be motivated less by the need to feel successful than by the desire to do something intrinsically interesting or worthwhile. Such projects are inherently in short supply, in part because what constitutes an inherently “interesting” or “worthwhile” project is highly subjective. An ambitious person can always identify some brass ring that would make them feel like a success; a bumbitious person will often wait years or even decades before finding that one magical opportunity or life calling.
In fact, this is bumbition’s inherent limitation. Sitting around waiting for the right opportunity to present itself is a highly uncertain, risky endeavor. There’s always the possibility that it won’t come until you’re old, or that it’ll come but you’ll fail to see it in time.
The other problem with bumbition is that waiting around for the right opportunity comes with a bunch of costs and risks. Your technical skills and work ethic can decay over time. You can get caught up in life’s various stumbling blocks — bad relationships, drug addictions, depression, etc.
But bumbition also has some big advantages over the ambitious life. One is that ambition can keep people overly busy. If you’re the kind of person that always has to be working toward a goal, and you can’t find a truly great project to work on, you’ll end up working on a modest or mediocre one. If Steve Jobs had become distracted by getting a perfect GPA at Reed College, he might never have had time to start Apple. If Ulysses S. Grant had focused on owning his own leather goods store, he might not have leapt at the chance to join the U.S. Army. If Sasha Sheng had focused on climbing the corporate ladder at Meta, she wouldn’t have founded TypeSafe.
Paul Graham talks about this in his essay “How to Do Great Work”:
Ambition comes in two forms, one that precedes interest in the subject and one that grows out of it. Most people who do great work have a mix, and the more you have of the former, the harder it will be to decide what to do…The trouble with planning is that it only works for achievements you can describe in advance. You can win a gold medal or get rich by deciding to as a child and then tenaciously pursuing that goal, but you can't discover natural selection that way.
In his book Zero to One, Peter Thiel — who I’d classify as an ambitious rather than a bumbitious person — recounts a vivid example of how his ambition almost prevented him from becoming a tech titan:
[A]fter a conventionally successful undergraduate career, I enrolled at Stanford Law School, where I competed even harder for the standard badges of success. The highest prize in a law student’s world is…a Supreme Court clerkship…I was invited to interview for clerkships with Justices Kennedy and Scalia. My meetings with the Justices went well. I was so close to winning this last competition. If only I got the clerkship, I thought, I would be set for life. But I didn’t.
At the time, I was devastated…With the benefit of hindsight…winning that ultimate competition would have changed my life for the worse…Had I actually clerked on the Supreme Court, I probably would have spent my entire career taking depositions or drafting other people’s business deals instead of creating anything new.
Nor is this bumbition’s only advantage. The “bum” phase — the time spent traveling in India, or working at a convenience store, or playing Hearthstone on a couch — isn’t just a holding pattern. The seeming aimlessness of this period of life can serve several important functions that facilitate rapid success once a good opportunity gets spotted.
First, and most importantly, time away from the grind of constant striving allows people to broaden their perspective. A lot of unique and original ideas come from recombinant innovation — from combining insights and perspectives from vastly different fields.3 Even something as simple as changing the context of your surroundings can improve creativity. For an intelligent person with a restless mind, the “bum” phase of life leads to a lot of play and exploration that can end up sparking novel ideas. Here’s a fun example from Richard Feynman:
I used to enjoy doing physics. Why did I enjoy it? I used to play with it. I used to do whatever I felt like doing - it didn't have to do with whether it was important for the development of nuclear physics, but whether it was interesting and amusing for me to play with…Now that I am burned out…I'm going to play with physics, whenever I want to…
Within a week I was in the cafeteria and some guy, fooling around, throws a plate in the air. As the plate went up in the air I saw it wobble…I had nothing to do, so I start to figure out the motion of the rotating plate…I went on to work out equations of wobbles. Then I thought about how electron orbits start to move in relativity. Then there's the Dirac Equation in electrodynamics. And then quantum electrodynamics.
Steve Jobs’ study of calligraphy, during his hippie period, famously helped him to think about what would make the letters on a personal computer look beautiful to the eye.
A related advantage is that the “bum” phase also allows people to develop their interests. Paul Graham talks about how “excited curiosity” will often lead people to their most important life’s work. Bumbitious people aren’t just waiting around; they’re playing around, actively searching for something that sparks their interest. In contrast, if you’re constantly grinding away, it can be hard to develop that curiosity.
A “bum” phase also gives people a chance to broaden their human networks. When you’re working hard towards a goal, you usually don’t have much time to meet a lot of people outside work — i.e., outside your narrow current field of endeavor. Ambitious people are always working toward a goal, and thus get relatively little time to go meet interesting people from other walks of life. But the “bum” phase gives bumbitious people time to meet all kinds of folks. This can lead to hearing about radical new opportunities, getting insights from other fields, or even meeting useful partners for a new venture.
Broadly speaking, the “bum” phase of bumbition serves two purposes. It represents waiting and exploration time, as people patiently wait for the big opportunity that will define their career. But it also represents personal development time, either deliberate or unconscious, that helps bumbitious people to better see the big opportunities when they come along.
Now, I don’t mean to claim that bumbition is better than ambition, or vice versa — either in terms of personal success, or in terms of changing the world. Among the greats of any field — politics, business, academia, literature — you can find plenty of examples of both ambitious and bumbitious people.
But I think our society underemphasizes bumming. We have a tendency to frown on people who spend years unemployed, neglecting work in order to play video games or make Instagram videos. We assume that these people are being lazy or squandering their potential, and we tell them to get back to the grind and make something of themselves. Other societies, of course, tend to be even worse on this score — China treats its slacker generation as a national security threat.
In the AI age, this could be even more consequential. AI algorithms are consummate hill-climbers — set them to a task, give them some data, and they’ll be more ambitious than the hardest-working Stanford law student. In a world of abundant AI, setting AI on the right goals will be an increasingly central human task. Figuring out the right goals requires exploration, unique perspectives, and curiosity — all things that bumbition facilitates. We should be teaching our young people to be more bumbitious.
At the same time, we should remember that being bumbitious isn’t just a matter of sitting around on the couch. Just because you tell yourself you’re waiting to hear the true call doesn’t mean you’ll actually hear it when it comes. You have to actually want to do something great — whatever that means to you — and you have to be ready to work incredibly hard for years when that something presents itself. Bumbition isn’t the same as ambition, but it also isn’t the same as being a lifelong bum.
Diogo’s rise as an AI researcher didn’t start with TypeSafe. He was also a key researcher for OpenAI, creating key features of the original ChatGPT and GPT-4 that kicked off the AI boom.
There are actually a few bumbitious people who somehow manage to always find huge passion projects — David Holz of Midjourney comes to mind.
An example I like to cite is a college friend of mine, who ended up adapting a camera technique he learned from his photography hobby to create a novel method of neuroimaging.
2026-11-14 17:00:44

“Partisanship is a helluva drug,” as they say. When your preferred party is in power, the sun seems to shine a little brighter, the birds sing a little more sweetly, and there’s a spring in your step as you walk past the homeless encampments and sterile single-family-home-only neighborhoods of your American city. Foreigners from countries where politics is less contentious, like Japan, will never know this joy.
Anyway, this natural partisan sentiment makes it very hard for me to write about developments in American politics. I would like to give you some analysis that’s more informative than “Yay, Democrats won an election!”. I do consider myself a Democrat, after all (even though I’m registered as an Independent). There has never been a point in my entire life when I’d have told you that the Republican presidential candidate was a better pick than the Democrat (though 2012 was fairly close). I regularly bemoan the state of the Democratic Party, but somehow the Republicans always find some way to be Even Worse.
This has been the unfortunate reality for most people in America for years now. Disgust and dissatisfaction with both parties have grown, as both have become more extremist. But there was little they could do except keep voting for the lesser of two evils, while tuning out political news and expressing anger at the whole system. It got so bad that in my New Year’s essay, I even entertained the notion that liberal democracy itself had suffered a generational failure:
To be honest, I still entertain that notion. Reading that essay again, there’s not much I would change. But on the margin, recent events have made me feel more optimistic about where American politics is going.
A lot of this is downstream of the midterm elections. Trump has turned the Republican Party into something truly awful, and it’s refreshing to see America punish the GOP for going along with that transformation:
But my optimism isn’t just about the fact that Democrats won — it’s also about how they won, and what they seem likely to do with their victory. Here I’ve been pleasantly surprised so far. And there are also some scattered signs that our leaders are starting to take our substantive policy challenges more seriously, instead of just relying on partisanship and culture wars. Basically, I see three broad positive trends:
The Democrats are not becoming extremist at the rate I had feared.
There is some real bipartisan movement on good policymaking at the federal level.
The nation is waking up to the problem of corruption, and holding the perpetrators to account.
Over the past few years, I’ve watched the emergence of a leftist faction within the Democratic Party, which I’ve likened to MAGA on the right. This faction had its roots in the Bernie insurgency of 2016-2020, but it has grown beyond that. The Palestine movement both invigorated the leftists and radicalized them, shifting the locus of power in left-of-center activism away from Black activists, identitarian movements, and anti-capitalism, and toward explicitly anti-American “decolonial” ideas.
As recently as this summer, I believed that a Democratic victory in the midterms would be led by this hard-left vanguard:
Here’s what I wrote:
Democrats have spent their political capital moving to the left…[They are selecting] candidates who are so far to the left that they end up frightening and/or offending many voters, and then basically daring people to keep voting for the Republicans…
When DSA-type candidates were just winning in deep blue cities, it was possible to think that they would remain a small, limited faction within the party. But Francesca Hong is going to be the Democratic nominee in a statewide race. So is Abdul El-Sayed, who, while not a member of the DSA, is closely aligned with them (especially on Israel, which he focuses on a lot)…This, increasingly, is who the Democrats are now.
Well, happily, I was wrong about this. Francesca Hong was actually defeated in the Democratic primary race just a few days later in a stunning upset, showing that even partisan Democrats aren’t sold on the DSA faction.
Even more importantly, the hard left didn’t end up leading the anti-Trump charge in the midterms, as I had expected. Despite the blue wave, most of the high-profile DSA-faction candidates performed significantly worse than their normie Democrat counterparts. Jeff Maurer has great data on this:
And the same voters who powered the big Democratic victories also endorsed a lot of centrist policies at the ballot box. Here’s the Washington Post:
Voters in North Carolina elected a Democratic senator…giving former governor Roy Cooper an overwhelming win. At the same time, they approved three [Republican] measures…The first would add a constitutional requirement for a levy limit on property taxes…The second would cap the state income tax at 3.5 percent…The third would require photo ID for voting…
In Wisconsin, Democrat David Crowley won the gubernatorial election…Those same voters approved an initiative…to ban affirmative action in state institutions…Iowa voters elected Democrats as governor and senator while amending their constitution to make it substantially harder to raise state income taxes…Ohio….went blue for Senate and governor. At the same time, two-thirds of voters backed an amendment to require photo ID for voting…
Moderates and independents drove Democratic gains in all these places.
Voters in several blue and purple states also approved measures to restrict women’s sports teams by biological sex.
There’s also a general indefinable “vibe shift” in the air. Anecdotally, people I talk to are less ashamed to voice full-throated support for the kind of liberalism that Barack Obama typified in the early 2010s. Meanwhile, liberal influencers online are beginning to push back more strongly on leftist shouters.
And in Congress, the sheer scale of the Democrats’ victory means that the DSA faction will be effectively disempowered. Because marginal victories tend to be won by moderates in purple states, the leadership in both the House and the Senate is likely to be held by moderates like Hakeem Jeffries and Chuck Schumer. This is driving the DSA factionalist types apoplectic with rage:
Note that the knives are already coming out for Jon Ossoff, whose potential as a 2028 presidential contender surged after his massive midterm victory. But who can leftists run against Ossoff? Enthusiasm around AOC has dimmed, and there’s no obvious replacement.
If they fail to find a candidate for 2028, and if Democrats take back the White House with a normie liberal, the leftist faction faces the real possibility that the window of America’s decade of unrest will limp to a close without them. That would, of course, be good for the nation.
Even moderate politicians, of course, often support unworkable or inadvisable policies. On the Democratic side, the worst problems are anti-development policies at the state and local level. “Progressive” policies have made it prohibitively difficult and/or expensive to build housing, roads, trains, power stations, and transmission lines across much of the country, freezing our built environment in the 1970s. I’ve been loudly complaining about this for years now:
This was a big part of my pessimism about politics. What’s the use of kicking out the Republicans, if the Democrats are just going to decide that “open space” and historic gas stations are more important than giving the middle class a place to live and power for their homes?
Now there are signs that at long last, America’s leaders recognize this problem and are taking action to fix it.
2026-11-13 15:10:54
I was busy with rabbit stuff today, so my next post will be delayed until tomorrow! In the meantime, have another episode of Hexapodia, my revitalized podcast with Brad DeLong.
In today’s episode, Brad and I discuss the question of whether and how to reindustrialize the United States. Brad wrote a whole book on this topic, in fact. Basically, there are three main reasons we might want to boost American manufacturing:
Geopolitical and military reasons: Having a supply chain for defense manufacturing and dual-use manufacturing that isn’t dominated by China would allow us to actually fight a war against China, if we ever had to do that. And since China has shown themselves perfectly willing to use export controls to bully other countries (including ours), we should develop supply chains that China can’t dominate, in order to avoid being bullied.
Economic growth reasons: Having a robust manufacturing sector, in addition to a robust service sector, may make our country richer, by adding agglomeration and clustering effects.
Economic equality reasons: We might want good high-paying blue-collar manufacturing jobs to help revitalize the American middle class.
Brad and I basically think that #3 is a dead end here — it’s not going to work. Especially with the advent of AI and AI-driven robotics, most manufacturing is going to be mostly automated; there will be no way for America to be competitive using human hands in factories when robot hands work so much better. That means the era of mass semi-skilled blue-collar factory employment is simply over and done.
But that doesn’t mean that manufacturing can’t create jobs. They just have to be different kinds of jobs — for example, local service jobs created by the money that the automated factories bring in to a town. That’s called a “local multiplier” effect, and it’s very powerful and important. Of course, it’ll require that the people who run the factories live near them, so they can spend their money locally.
Which leaves geopolitics and security as the main driver of reindustrialization. We note that the one country that we know of that has ever successfully reindustrialized was Ukraine, which built a strong drone and robotics industry out of necessity in order to fight off the Russian invasion. It’s not necessarily the most optimistic example for us to look to, but it may be the most important.
Anyway, Brad and I then spend a long time discussing what, exactly, America needs to reindustrialize. We come to the tentative conclusion that America really lacks only two important things — land use, and bank loans.
Land use, of course, is what the permitting bill currently moving through Congress is meant to address, and it’s important for a whole lot of other things besides manufacturing.
Bank finance seems to be important for manufacturing for a whole lot of reasons (expect more blog posts about this in the near future), and this is one area where America really struggles compared to other countries. My idea is to use America’s moribund megabanks as pools of capital for reindustrialization by giving them selective exemptions from the Dodd-Frank restrictions enacted after the financial crisis of 2008. More on that later.
2026-11-11 16:51:56

My last post was about how for the first time, I’m becoming bearish on China’s continued economic and technological outperformance. A number of people asked me whether I was similarly bearish about India. The answer is no — I’m actually more bullish on India than I have been in a while. In fact, I had been meaning to write a post about that, so this gives me a good opportunity to do so.
The reason I’m bullish on India and bearish on China is that we’re asking the two countries to do two different things. When we think of China’s future success, we think of whether it’ll eclipse the combined economies of the U.S. and its allies, seize the lead in artificial intelligence, reach Taiwan or Korea’s level of income, or dominate Asia. I’m increasingly skeptical about its ability to do all of those things. But India’s job right now is a lot simpler — it just has to escape poverty and become an upper middle income country. And this I think it can do.
In both GDP terms and in terms of the Human Development Index (which combines GDP with education and health), India is around where China was in the late 2000s.

It’s easy to forget, but in the 2000s, people still thought of China as a basically developing country — its cities choked with smog, its rural areas still mired in poverty, its economy driven by cheap labor and lax environmental protections, and so forth. The challenge now for India is to make the leap that China made in the 2010s — to build abundant high-quality roads, trains, housing, and energy, provide decent jobs and livelihoods to the majority of its people, and catch up to the frontier of technology.
A lot of people don’t seem to realize how good of a start India has made. For one thing, extreme poverty in India has mostly been conquered over the last two decades:

This is an incredible accomplishment — a full tenth of humanity saved from deprivation. And what’s remarkable is that — unlike China — India managed to do this incredible poverty reduction while also reducing inequality:

How did India manage this feat? The World Bank says that it was due to the two usual suspects — economic growth and redistribution:
Over the past decade, India has made remarkable progress in reducing poverty across both monetary and non-monetary dimensions, recording one of the fastest poverty declines in the world…This progress was mainly driven by strong consumption growth, rising employment, especially among women, and expanded social transfers, including food subsidies. [emphasis mine]
A strong welfare state is certainly important, but economic growth has to take the lion’s share of the credit here; without growth, there’s simply less of a pie to redistribute in the first place. And India’s growth has certainly been impressive. Ever since the pandemic, India has been growing faster than China:

Now, India isn’t growing as fast as China did when China was at $10,000 of per capita GDP. Back in the late 2000s and early 2010s, China was still growing at close to double-digit rates; it didn’t slow down to India’s current rate until 2014, at which point it was 40% richer than India is now. But 6.5% is still a very healthy growth rate — it represents almost a doubling of living standards every decade.
And Bloomberg expects Indian growth to accelerate even further, to 8% by the end of the decade. Neelkanth Mishra, the executive director of the World Bank, points out that because India’s recovery from the pandemic recession is still incomplete, there’s plenty of room for a growth acceleration.
You’d expect this kind of growth to transform every part of Indian society and culture, and this appears to be exactly what’s happening. Arjun Ramani has a great in-depth report from his travels across India, focusing on how economic development is changing life on the ground:
How is India producing this rapid growth? India is long past the point where you can tell a simple story about the country’s economic progress — manufacturing, finance, real estate, business services, IT, and a bunch of other sectors are all growing at once.
How is India managing to grow so fast? The Economist mostly credits liberalizing reforms and prudent macroeconomic policy:
A programme of fiscal consolidation has cut the budget deficit from 9.2% of gdp in fiscal 2021 (when it was bloated by pandemic spending) towards a target of 4.4% for fiscal 2026. Excluding interest payments, the deficit will be only around 0.9% of gdp…With inflation under control, interest rates have been cut by 1.25 percentage points over the past year…
The decline in inflation is not just limited to food, points out Sonal Varma of Nomura, a bank. Earlier reforms, such as the creation of a digital-payments infrastructure, which made prices more transparent, as well as the RBI’s shift to an inflation-targeting regime in 2016, have helped reduce inflation expectations and are now paying off. The RBI has also built up its stock of foreign-exchange reserves. A banking sector clean-up and reforms to the bankruptcy code have kept the financial system stable…
The longer term looks even more promising, thanks to a vigorous reform effort…A long-mooted cut in the number of labour codes, from 29 to four, was enacted in November. A cap of 74% on foreign direct investment in the insurance industry has been lifted. Nuclear power has been opened up to the private sector. Financial-market regulation has been overhauled…The states have also pursued reforms. Allowing women to work after dark, for instance, means textile and electronics factories can stay open later.
I have to say, I’m skeptical of this story. Fiscal probity is well and good, but India’s long-term borrowing rates haven’t come down all that much:
A stable financial system is very good, but it’s not clear how that automatically accelerates growth. And most of the real structural reform The Economist mentions is in the future. It’s possible for businesses’ expectations of structural reform to drive growth, but as the article mentions, domestic private-sector investment isn’t really driving the boom. FDI is sluggish too (or at least was until this year).
One bright spot is government investment, which has increased by a factor of four since before the pandemic, in spite of the country’s falling debt levels:

The Indian government has been on a tremendous infrastructure-building boom — correcting one of the country’s notorious chronic deficiencies. Highway spending has increased by a factor of five over the last decade. Central government railway spending has risen eightfold.
This is boosting growth in the short term, but in the long term it’ll make both manufacturing and consumption a lot easier in India. It’s also changing the physical look and feel of the country, much as China’s own modernization did in the 2000s and 2010s (if not as rapidly). India is now building its own bullet trains:
I recently saw an example of a Japanese man who declared that he was impressed by how clean and quiet Indian subways were, compared to Japanese ones!
Another important factor in India’s growth story — and another long-standing deficiency that’s now beginning to be corrected — is the growth in Indian manufacturing.
The old story of India’s economy is that it had “leapfrogged” manufacturing and gone straight to services — call centers, business process outsourcing, software outsourcing, and the like. That concealed a quiet disappointment that India hadn’t managed to get on the same industrialization bus that has carried so many other countries out of poverty. But India’s current growth is very broad-based — manufacturing is growing right alongside services. The Economist has some details:
Manufacturing output in August, the most recent figure available, was 9% higher than the year before, thanks in particular to surging production of cars and electronics…India’s rising manufacturing output…reflects its growing appeal as a place to make things. In dollar terms India’s electronics exports were up by 90% in August, year on year, with American-bound iPhones accounting for a large share of that.
Another encouraging sign is the breadth of India’s manufacturing growth. Whereas Bangladesh’s manufacturing boom last decade was powered mostly by the garment industry, India is making and exporting a bunch of different high-tech products:
The strength of India’s engineering exports lies partly in the diversity of its product segments. Automobiles remained the largest contributor in FY 2025–26, accounting for 21.9% of total engineering exports. Industrial machinery followed with an 18% share, while iron and steel products accounted for 16.9%…Electrical machinery contributed 12.5%, other engineering products 12.7%, and non-ferrous metals and products 11.6%.
And keep in mind, this is all in spite of China’s attempts to throttle Indian industrialization by denying them key technological exports and factory expertise. Competitive pressure from a more established economic power is not something China itself had to deal with, since the U.S. wholeheartedly supported China’s industrialization in the 1990s and 2000s.
Whether India’s growth boom can continue past the next couple of years is an open question. Private investment will have to rise, and probably FDI as well. India is also going to need to correct its bigger structural issues at some point — especially bad rural education, female underemployment, and incomplete urbanization.
But for now, India looks like a big economic success story — perhaps the brightest in the entire world right now. It’s less visible than China’s rapid rise two decades earlier, but it’ll be no less world-shaking when it happens. More people should be taking notice.
2026-11-10 07:01:29
Azeem Azhar of Exponential View is an excellent blogger whom I tend to cite a lot. So it was very fun to call him up and talk to him about the AI boom, and the possibility of an AI bust! The discussion was sparked by this post of mine a few weeks ago:
I don’t think we reached any firm conclusions, but it was fun to mull these issues over. Expect more discussions between me and Azeem in the future!
2026-11-09 15:59:29
Many longtime fans of my Hexapodia podcast with Brad DeLong have been begging us to bring it back. Well, here it is! Hexapodia will now be a series of Substack Live conversations that you can tune in to, and which will be recorded as podcasts and sent out as emails.
Our first episode was a little rocky, as I got the time wrong and ended up arriving 20 minutes late. But Dan and Brad are both brilliant people, so you can watch them talk for a while before I show up! The topic of our discussion was the Anthropic IPO, inspired by my post about it last week:
I give the bull case for Anthropic, while Dan and Brad are both more skeptical. I think this quote sums up my side of the argument:
My bull case [for Anthropic] is not envisioning a world where Anthropic rules all businesses, rules 100% of every industry, or close to it. I’m also not envisioning a case where AI replaces human beings in their jobs.
I’m envisioning a change in the capital structure of the efficiently producing economy. I’m envisioning…a world where in order to succeed in any industry, you must create a tie-up with a frontier AI company that offers you access to an internal proprietary frontier model that will be months ahead of any model distilled from it. And…that doing this will require not purchasing services…at arm’s length from that company, but tying up your capital structure with that company so that you become in some sense a subsidiary of that company. I am envisioning that.
So I’m saying that instead of something where…AI is like oil and everyone has to buy oil or the things made downstream from oil…instead of that sort of arm of length world, I’m envisioning a world in which every company in order to succeed must become a subsidiary of Anthropic, OpenAI, [or] Google…and Anthropic is simply the biggest of those fish in a oligopolistic ecosystem of a few conglomerates competing against each other via their little subsidiaries in every single industry at the same time.
Interestingly, some economists at Google Deepmind just released a paper with a model in which this sort of thing happens. From the abstract of Imas, Koh, and Legg (2026):
When will advances in AI lead to economic transformation? We develop a model of how intelligence…matters for organizations….AI expertise is reproducible while humans’ are in fixed supply, and AIs may not face the same human limits on coordination….When AI is more capable than the average human, organizations of complementary humans can nonetheless outperform AI. Increases in AI competence can change the composition of workers within firms and decrease firm size. As AI coordination improves, however, this can break the Coasean ceiling on firm size and the market structure undergoes a phase transition toward large, concentrated AI-heavy firms. [emphasis mine]
I was envisioning a slightly more complex version, in which humans and AI are complements, where humans have private data that AI is better at using, and where one big conglomerate enters every industry but retains human workers. But I think Imas et al.’s model gets at some of the basic dynamics here.
Financial disclosure: I have no current position in Anthropic, but unless something major changes, I will probably buy Anthropic stock when it IPOs. I own stock in TypeSafe, an Anthropic competitor.