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Economics and other interesting stuff, an economics PhD student at the University of Michigan, an economics columnist for Bloomberg Opinion.
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Does it really matter if there’s an intelligence explosion?

2026-11-20 18:13:06

Vernor Vinge is possibly my favorite science fiction author of all time.1 The Singularity, which he famously predicted would happen somewhere between 2005 and 2030, features heavily in most of his stories. It usually happens the same way: an Intelligence Explosion, of the type envisioned by I.J. Good — the smarter AI gets, the faster it’s able to make itself even smarter, meaning that AI becomes godlike nearly instantaneously once it reaches a certain threshold of capability.

Almost every discussion about AI safety that I hear in San Francisco or read in the tech blogosphere centers around this sort of event. The discussions are all about whether recursive self-improvement (RSI) is near, and whether we should “pace the frontier” — i.e., deliberately slow down or pause AI progress — to stop RSI from creating an intelligence explosion.

As I’ve listened to these arguments, I’ve grown increasingly skeptical that this is the right discussion we should be having. But before I explain why, let me quickly summarize the debate itself, to give an idea of what the arguments look like.

The intelligence explosion debate, in brief

In fact, I’ve published some pieces of that discussion on this blog. Back in September, Ramez Naam wrote a guest post arguing that an intelligence explosion is not imminent:

His basic arguments were:

  • OpenAI data show that AI is still only able to automate short chunks of the AI research process.

  • AI research is subject to diminishing returns, so that each increase in AI capability should buy less of a speedup in the pace of automated research.

  • Diminishing returns also mean that accelerating AI progress will require exponentially more of other resources, such as compute and money.

  • There’s no sign yet of an acceleration in the rate of AI progress.

In a follow-up post, Ramez did a deeper dive on the topic of agent swarms, arguing that they’re not as effective as many people believe.

Theo Jaffee echoed these arguments, noting that OpenAI’s data shows that AI hasn’t even been able to fully automate smaller research tasks yet:

Source: OpenAI via Theo Jaffee

Luis Garicano and Alex Imas also wrote a post downplaying the likelihood of an intelligence explosion:

Silicon Continent
Are we approaching an intelligence explosion?
(Dear reader: this is an unusual post; it gets a bit technical. Alex and I are trying to do something hard here: look at the data and try to understand what they tell us about the intelligence explosion. There is math, Greek letters, and two models. So please bear with us, and if you are bored, apologies. We think it is worth making an exception here…
Read more

Their arguments are more economic in nature. They show that although AI progress has accelerated, it also shows diminishing returns in terms of research spending, meaning that every unit of progress has come with a higher price tag:

They also estimate an economic model of RSI,2 and conclude that ideas in AI research are probably getting harder to find, reducing the likelihood of an intelligence explosion.

On the other side of the debate, we have the recent METR report about Anthropic’s internal progress in automating AI research. The report uses Anthropic’s own internal measure of AI capability, AECI, rather than the better-known public ECI. It also relies on data that aren’t public, meaning that deciding how much of the report to believe requires a lot of guesswork and assumption-making. But the basic story METR tells is that Claude is already speeding up Anthropic’s research process by a lot:

As we describe below, we were able to confidently determine that the acceleration [of AI progress in late 2025] was not due to an acceleration in the rate of growth of training compute…We guess that a majority (perhaps ≈80%) of the current…acceleration is due to AI.

Dwarkesh Patel, meanwhile, argues that AI research isn’t that different from math, and that the same factors that made AI suddenly go from useless to godlike at math will happen soon with AI’s own self-improvement:

Dwarkesh Podcast
The avalanche that hit math is coming for AI development
Read more

He writes:

It’s crazy how fast we went from, in 2023, “This model can’t reliably add four-digit numbers,” to…about a month ago, “Okay, it fucking solved a Millennium Prize problem in 88 hours.”…

AI research is actually surprisingly similar to the type of mathematical progress that current AIs are disproportionately good at: unlocking a ton of low-hanging fruit by applying a combination of incredible persistence and a superhuman capacity to connect ideas from lots of adjacent domains…In every domain where we can check answers and give AIs thousands of rounds of practice—for example, competitive programming contests, or well-scoped open math problems—they’ve gone from worse than most humans to better than the best humans within a few years…AI research has those same verifiable properties…

Once AI is as good as the best humans at AI research, algorithmic progress will get radically faster…Today’s AIs already do work at about 10 times human speed.And automated researchers would also be working around the clock, nights and weekends included. As a result, each individual automated researcher will be cramming in roughly 50x more work every calendar week than a human researcher can do…During the intelligence explosion, automated engineers will build tens of thousands of times more [reinforcement learning] training environments than we have currently.

So that’s the debate. Basically, it depends on whether ideas get harder to find faster than AI gets better at finding ideas, and only time will tell which one wins.

But as I said, while this debate is intellectually interesting, I’m not sure how much it matters.

How useful is this debate?

Whether an intelligence explosion happens is obviously very important. A sudden unfathomable leap in AI capabilities to godlike levels would be, to put it mildly, a very big deal. But that doesn’t mean an intelligence explosion is the thing we should be thinking and arguing about.

First of all, if an intelligence explosion is possible, it’s going to happen, and there’s probably just not much we can do to affect how it all shakes out.

Although people disagree about AI’s contribution to its own uplift, everyone agrees that AI capabilities are improving at a steady, rapid rate. Here’s Epoch AI’s ECI number, the most common measure of AI capabilities:

Source: Epoch AI

Most discussions about AI safety policy revolve around the idea of “pacing the frontier” — i.e., using government policy and AI labs’ own decisions to bend that trendline of progress downward. The usual reason given is that this will allow alignment research time to catch up, so that more powerful AI is safe by the time it arrives.

But this approach simply can’t deal with an intelligence explosion. If there’s some threshold at which AI gets good enough to start an intelligence explosion, that threshold will be reached. Even if we “paced the frontier” and slowed the rate of AI progress down by half, that would mean we’d hit the intelligence explosion in 2037 instead of 2032, or 2030 instead of 2028, or something like that. It would only buy us a few extra years.

I guess two years or five years isn’t nothing — we could use it to hang out with our loved ones and try some cool new restaurants while we waited for the arrival of the computer gods. But ultimately, it seems like small potatoes, especially if you’re an AI safety type who thinks an intelligence explosion would be a catastrophic event for humanity.

If an intelligence explosion is possible, the only way to prevent it is to halt AI progress completely, rather than just slow it down. In 1993, Vernor Vinge made a powerful argument as to why that’s impossible:

But if the technological Singularity can happen, it will. Even if all the governments of the world were to understand the “threat” and be in deadly fear of it, progress toward the goal would continue. In fiction, there have been stories of laws passed forbidding the construction of “a machine in the form of the mind of man”. In fact, the competitive advantage -- economic, military, even artistic of every advance in automation is so compelling that passing laws, or having customs, that forbid such things merely assures that someone else will get them first.

I’m a little more optimistic than Vinge here — I think we could engineer an AI slowdown if we got sufficiently scared — but I don’t for one minute believe we could engineer a complete halt.

Nor do I believe that alignment research will be able to make an intelligence explosion safe. “Pacing the frontier” so that alignment research can catch up might be effective in a world of steady linear AI progress.3 But in a world of sudden superexponential progress, AI alignment research will immediately be left behind. Even if there is a Singularity for understanding alignment, in a world with an intelligence explosion it will be the superintelligent AI, not us, that carries out that Singularity and decides on its alignment for itself.

A second point is that it’s not obvious why an intelligence explosion would be more dangerous than — or even distinguishable from — the type of rapid, non-explosive progress we’re already getting. Remember, AI going from “can’t add two numbers together” to “solves problems too hard for all human mathematicians combined” in three years is not counted as an intelligence explosion!

It’s clear that at the current rate of steady progress, AI will become superhuman in most domains in a fairly small number of years. Even robotics and other physical tasks look conquerable with the current type of AI that powers Claude and GPT. This means that AI will basically look like a god within our lifetimes, whether or not it looks like the kind of infinitely self-improving gods that populate Vernor Vinge novels.

This is why I’m not sure what an intelligence explosion means for our economy. It’s easy to write down a model in which smoothly increasing AI capabilities drive a smooth increase in GDP. But why should we believe a model like that? Other technologies haven’t really worked that way.

Usually, technologies reach some threshold of usefulness where adopting them makes economic sense. When they hit that threshold, their local contribution to productivity growth becomes very rapid, but also finishes fairly quickly. Fiszbein et al. (2024) shows this for electrification, Bartel (2005) shows it for IT-enabled machines. Each new invention creates a whole bunch of little local Singularities. It’s only when you add all these up across the economy that you get something that looks like a big smooth wave of growth.

A suddenly superintelligent AI isn’t really limited by locality — it could, essentially by definition, take over all or most human tasks if it wanted to. Whereas if an intelligence explosion doesn’t occur, these takeovers are likely to be staggered and irregular. But they will still happen, and the economic effect after the first few years probably won’t be that different.

In other words, I think:

  • The AI we’ll get from our current trend of improvement will look about as godlike — and as economically important — as an AI that suddenly bootstraps itself to godhood.

  • It’s not possible to stop AI improvement completely, and so if an intelligence explosion is possible, it’s going to happen to us soon.

  • Slowing down the rate of AI progress will not help us deal with post-Singularity superintelligence.

This is why I think this whole debate is misplaced. We need to be thinking about how to deal with the AI we already have, and the one we’ll almost certainly get soon — an AI that’s smarter than all humans at most economically important tasks. We need to think about how to regulate that actually existing superintelligence, how to prevent AI-enabled bioterror, how to make sure the economic benefits of AI are widely shared, and so on. We need to think about competition policy, to make sure the benefits of AI don’t exclusively go to one company.

I think we need to accept that nobody is “pacing the frontier” enough to prevent the emergence of superintelligence — and that nobody is likely to do so. If the machine god awakes, then it awakes, and we’ll simply deal with it. In the meantime, we need to focus on dealing with the AI we have now.


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1

The other contender would be Lois McMaster Bujold, who writes a very different kind of sci-fi.

2

This estimation is done with only 16 data points, so I don’t really trust it. But we’re basically flying blind here, so this is the best we’ve got.

3

In fact, I invested in a company called Goodfire that’s at the forefront of AI alignment research.

Roundup #91: Rocketing into the technofuture

2026-11-18 17:50:29

Art by GPT-6

Howdy, folks! Welcome to the future where science fiction becomes reality every day. Where AI-powered cyberattacks paralyze air travel one day and banks the next. Where shadowy billionaires make fortunes illicitly selling America’s enemies the technology to create artificial gods, while you slave away for $150 a day hoping to get half a day off. Where it seems like a new rare disease is cured every week, even as measles returns to America thanks to an anti-science cult that somehow made it to the highest rungs of power. Where self-driving cars whizz past people hunched over dying of fentanyl in the street. I mean, look at this:

Or this:

Or this!

In such confusing times, it’s all your friendly neighborhood economics blogger can do to keep up with it all. But I’m trying my best, so that I can help you understand these crazy times just a little bit better.

First, podcasts. Here’s the latest episode of Hexapodia, in which Brad DeLong and I discuss morality and technology with Ryan Avent:

DeLong's Grasping Reality Weblog
Live with Brad DeLong
Listen now

And here’s a conversation between me and the streamer Destiny, in which we talk about how liberalism can resist rightism and leftism at the same time:

Anyway, on to this week’s roundup.

1. Good news on teen happiness

For years, we watched America’s young people — and young people throughout the world — become less and less happy. They told surveys they were unhappy. They attempted (and committed) suicide more. They were more socially isolated. They formed relationships less.

The most plausible candidate for a cause for all of this was smartphone-enabled social media, which replaced in-person small-group interaction with impersonal arm’s-length interactions with huge numbers of potentially hostile strangers — something the human animal never evolved for.

But human beings are resilient and adaptable, and I always expected young people to find new ways to be happy in a hyper-connected world. Now, there are some signs that things are starting to turn around:

A word of caution: This is just one data source, the Youth Behavioral Risk Survey. Other sources, like the CDC, continue to show high teen suicide rates. It’s far too early to conclude that general teen happiness is on the upswing. But the YBRS data is a very positive sign.

If the trend is indeed turning around, what’s the cause? One possibility is that even as the online world became more all-consuming and alienating, the offline world was becoming kinder and gentler. Here’s Rothwell again:

Another possibility is that teens are moving away from the toxic public platforms — X and Facebook — and moving toward either private discussions or passive video apps like TikTok:

Source: Pew

Other surveys show that teens are trying to cut back on social media use in general, realizing that it’s bad for them.

This is why I’m a long-term techno-optimist. The downsides of technology can sometimes dominate in the short run, but eventually people figure out how to handle it and turn tech to their advantage.

2. Is AI getting less bang for the buck?

As the Anthropic IPO approaches, various analysts are trying to figure out if the incredible rate of AI progress is going to slow down, speed up, or continue at a steady rate. A number of data sources show that progress has sped up recently, around either late last year or early this year:

Source: METR via roon

One popular theory is that the speedup was due to the advent of AI coding tools. But economists Luis Garicano and Alex Imas argue that what actually accelerated was spending on AI research. They show data showing a smooth deceleration in the amount of AI capability that each dollar of research spending buys:

On the other hand, should we really think of a linear increase in the ECI as a linear increase in capability? Some people argue that each point of increase in the ECI multiplies AI capabilities by a constant factor — like points on the Richter Scale.

Whether that’s true in any meaningful sense is hard to assess. But at the end of the day, what really matters is AI’s ability to generate economic returns. And some people argue that it’s here that we see the true acceleration, as AI hits critical thresholds for economic usefulness:

But it’s also possible that this increase in usefulness doesn’t cleanly map to increases in raw capabilities, and that human beings are simply finding new uses for AI capabilities that already exist.

So the jury is still out on whether AI progress is slowing down.

3. The return of inflation

One of the great accomplishments of economic policy in the last few decades was the conquest of the post-pandemic inflation. The Fed raised rates, and the economy didn’t tank, and inflation went down anyway. But that victory might prove ephemeral; inflation is creeping back up. Though there’s some volatility, most recent months have come in at around 5%:

The rise in oil prices due to the Iran War is an obvious contributor, but in fact the new inflation is remarkably broad-based:

It’s just not possible to play the old game of “Well, inflation is just X and Y and Z, so it’s not really a problem.” There are various possible causes of this broad-based price acceleration — budget deficits, Trump pressuring the Fed to be dovish, cost pressures from the data center buildout, and so on. Teasing these out deserves a longer post.

And just as basic economics would expect, a burst of unexpected inflation is causing real wages to go down:

In other words, Americans are getting poorer this year, because the cost of living is going up and their paychecks aren’t keeping up. It’s not as bad as it was in 2021, but it’s going to be enough to make a lot of Americans very angry at the people in power.

4. Inclusionary zoning is bad

A lot of people mentally divide housing into two types: “luxury” or “market-rate” housing, and “affordable” housing — as if the price of a house or an apartment is built into its walls and floors. The assumption is that if developers aren’t forced to build “affordable” housing, normal people won’t be able to afford housing.

That assumption is totally wrong — building market-rate housing drives rents down and makes housing more affordable. But because lots of people believe in the “luxury”/“affordable” distinction, they embrace policies that try to force developers to offer some units at below-market rates. These policies are called inclusionary zoning. Basically, inclusionary zoning says that some percent of the apartments in a new building have to be rented out for very cheap. The policy is attractive because it doesn’t have any direct fiscal costs — the cost of subsidizing cheap apartments comes out of the pocket of a corporation, rather than the taxpayer.

But this kind of policy ends up backfiring. Forcing developers to take a loss on some of their housing units simply makes it less financially possible to build new housing. And when they do build new housing, they end up raising rents for all the non-“affordable” units in order to try to recoup some of their losses. Here’s what Kouchekinia (2026) finds:

In California, more than a third of localities have adopted [inclusionary zoning ordinances]. Mandatory inclusionary zoning acts as a tax on construction and, all else equal, reduces the overall supply of housing. This potentially reduces affordability in the aggregate…I find the typical inclusionary zoning ordinance reduces annual new residential construction by nearly a third (31.8%). Additionally, I find the policies relocate multi-family developments within jurisdictions to lower rent areas, where the policy is effectively less severe…I estimate the cost of generating an affordable unit with inclusionary zoning to be approximately $800,000 in “excess rents” paid by market rate renters as a result of the policy’s constraint on supply.

As Kouchekinia points out, making housing more scarce acts as a shadow tax on everyone in the area. Inclusionary zoning looks costless, but it’s actually extremely costly.

California cities and other places that use inclusionary zoning are starting to realize that the policy doesn’t do what it’s supposed to do. Some have actually started cutting inclusionary zoning mandates:

Matt Yglesias also has a good recent post about inclusionary zoning in D.C., and why the District should scrap it.

Basically, it’s time for this policy to go. There’s really no salvaging it, it’s making our cities worse for no good reason, and we need to stop viewing it as just another inevitable cost of doing business.

5. More on Cloud Laws

For years, I’ve been arguing that AI is going to cause a scientific revolution. My hypothesis is that there are a bunch of “laws of nature” — i.e., exploitable stable causal relationships — that are too complex and diffuse for the human mind to comprehend, but which AI can learn and exploit on our behalf. I call these “cloud laws”, because I envision them as diffuse clouds of weak but densely interrelated causal effects — the kind of thing that human minds will never be able to either grasp in their entirety or bite off into little separable chunks.

Well, here’s a little bit of evidence that cloud laws exist…in the clouds. Yohan Iddawela writes about Google DeepMind’s new weather forecasting AI model:

A single GPU can now calculate hundreds of global weather scenarios in under 60 seconds. The exact same task requires a supercomputer and hours of brute-force physics.

Google DeepMind recently released WeatherNext 2. The model beats the previous state-of-the-art system on 99.9% of weather variables across a 15-day forecast window. It achieves this massive jump in accuracy using a new modelling approach called a Functional Generative Network.

Meteorologists categorise weather data into two buckets:

1. Marginals are isolated data points, like the precise temperature at a specific location or the wind speed at a certain altitude.
2. Joints are the massive, interconnected systems that form when all those individual elements interact.

The researchers hid the joint systems from the model during training. They only taught it the isolated marginals. When they turned it on, the model skillfully predicted the massive, complex systems anyway…The model gives forecasters a full 24-hour advantage in tropical cyclone tracking compared to the previous leading system. It maps extreme wind speeds and heatwaves with unprecedented precision.

We’re watching a pretty big shift in predictive capabilities. The machine is deducing the structural reality of planetary weather from isolated fragments of data.

Normal weather forecasting is reductionist. We take the basic physical laws of motion, model the atmosphere as a bunch of little chunks of air that sort of behave like independent units, and apply the laws of motion to those units. What Google is doing is something else; it’s letting an AI model look at a bunch of weather data and then predict how the whole system is going to behave.

The AI approach ends up working better than the typical reductionist brute-force approach. Why? My guess is that weather has cloud laws — principles that no human could ever intuit from staring at masses of weather data, and which could never be explained in any graduate textbook, but which AI can just grasp holistically.1

What other phenomena might we be able to predict and control with AI this way? Patrick Collison has a fun list:

We know these effects have some sort of regular causes, but reductionist science has so far been unable to characterize any of them very effectively. But perhaps AI will, because they might be governed by cloud laws.

If so, we’re in for the most rapid and dramatic scientific revolution in our entire history.

6. Paying people to have kids works (just not enough)

Plummeting fertility is a problem, and nobody knows how to fix it. There are a few people who deny this obvious and disheartening truth. One of those is Lyman Stone, whose own research has cast doubt on the efficacy of paying people to have kids, but who stubbornly insists that such pronatal policies can act as a “crowbar” with which to pry open the door of child-rearing.

Well, they probably can’t do that. Here are Hartley and Jaros, evaluating a Michigan “baby bonus” program that paid people to have kids:

This paper studies the fertility effects of the Rx Kids program, the first baby bonus introduced in the United States. Beginning in 2024, the program was launched in Flint, Michigan and subsequently expanded to additional municipalities across Michigan, creating staggered variation in treatment timing across places….[W]e estimate the effect of Rx Kids on birth outcomes. We find that live birth growth rates increase in treated municipalities…We find that Flint’s $7,500 baby bonus generates a small but statistically significant fertility response: actual 2024 births exceeded a three-year pre-treatment baseline by roughly 7.5%, implying $107,000 in program spending per induced birth. These results provide the first U.S. evidence that direct cash transfers tied to childbirth can measurably affect fertility behavior.

The issue isn’t that these programs don’t work. They do. The problem is that their effects aren’t very large. The United States’ current total fertility rate (TFR) is about 1.6 children per woman; replacement level is between 2.0 and 2.1. That would require at least a 25% increase in fertility rates. The program Hartman and Jaros study resulted in only a 7.5% increase, and was forced to spend $107,000 per child on that paltry increase. That’s not nearly enough, but you can bet that if it were scaled up to the national level, you’d hear a lot of anger directed at the “welfare queens” who benefited from the policy.

And if it’s not nearly enough for the U.S., it’s utterly, laughably inadequate for a country like South Korea, which has a TFR of 0.8. To increase that to replacement level would require a 150% increase — 20 times the size of the increase generated by Michigan’s extremely generous program.

In other words, we’re not going to buy our way out of the baby bust by paying people to have kids. I still think paying people to have kids is a good idea, but the main thrust of effective pronatal policy will have to be something else.

7. Democrats can’t be the Second Party of Tax Cuts

When I was a kid, everyone knew that Democrats were the party that wanted to raise your taxes to spend more on the poor, while Republicans wanted to cut your taxes and spend less. Those days are long gone. America now has two parties who are both dedicated to cutting taxes on the vast majority of Americans — including most wealthy and high-earning Americans — and raising spending at the same time.

This is a big problem for the country, because there will be no getting out of our debt problem until this political equilibrium changes. When I was a kid in 1992, all the presidential candidates were stumbling over themselves to tell America how they were going to fix the deficit, so I know a different equilibrium is possible. We just have to figure out how to get there.

But Democrats’ fiscal profligacy is also a political problem for them. Higher deficits and debt contribute to faster inflation; we’ve already had both Biden and Trump be punished for failing to tame inflation, and Democrats are deluding themselves if they think it can’t happen to them again.

Eric Levitz writes about how the incoming Democrats’ economic policy program is incoherent:

To seize this historic opening, Democrats will need to formulate a platform that effectively advances their core goals. Unfortunately, this will be harder than it sounds — because the party’s current economic priorities appear incompatible with each other…During the midterm campaign, Democrats promised to:

Democrats’ goals…aren’t necessarily coherent.[I]t probably won’t be possible to create large new social programs, avoid tax hikes on anyone but the rich, and drive down inflation and interest rates…

The party’s congressional leaders have signaled support for a social welfare agenda at least as ambitious as President Joe Biden’s unpassed Build Back Better Act, which contained $4.73 trillion of new spending…Add up the estimated fiscal costs of all these programs and the bill comes out to nearly $5 trillion…Critically, America is already on track to run an average annual deficit of $2.4 trillion over the coming decade…[A] greater than $2 trillion deficit will put upward pressure on interest rates and prices.

Democrats do want to raise some taxes, but only on the ultra-mega-super-duper-giga-rich. I’ve written that this approach of “just tax the billionaires” is insufficient to fund all the other economic policies that Democrats want. Levitz concurs.

In time, fear of the deficit will grow to a level that enables the kind of fiscal hawk equilibrium that obtained in 1992. Until then, Democrats need a more modest economic agenda. The American people can be satisfied with an anti-corruption drive, tariff repeal, and policies to spread the wealth generated by AI. They don’t need infinite government largesse in order to be satisfied. Democrats need to stop chasing the Bernie Sanders dream, at least for a while.


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1

Also note that the model Google used here wasn’t an LLM. This suggests that AI is more general than the specific techniques the frontier labs are currently focusing on.

Bumbition

2026-11-16 17:52:30

“Hey, I’ll get a job…when I hear the true call.” — Slacker (1990)

About 10 years ago, I met a woman who worked as a mid-level software engineer at Facebook. She didn’t work on machine learning, but just for fun, she read a bunch of papers and got into the subject as a hobby. Later, in the pandemic, she quit her boring corporate job and spent a few years unemployed, contemplating the meaning of life. She made her own clothes, learned ballet, made cute Instagram videos, dyed her hair, and went to a bunch of hackathons (almost all of which she won).

Also in the late 2010s, I knew a man who had been a promising software engineer and data scientist, and before that a top performer on the International Math Olympiad. But when I met him, he was spending a few years unemployed — crashing at his girlfriend’s place, playing Hearthstone (and becoming one of the top-ranked players in the world), learning to skateboard, going on hippie retreats, and contemplating the meaning of life.

Both of those people are billionaires now. They are Sasha Sheng and Diogo Almeida, two of the three founders of TypeSafe AI, a startup that was recently valued at $7.5 billion (and in which I invested a small amount of money). TypeSafe invented Jev, an all-new kind of AI model that bypasses human language, and so is able to make decisions much faster and more cheaply than Claude or GPT. It was an incredibly creative idea — one that the big labs are racing to copy — and it took an incredible amount of hard work to realize.1

Sasha’s and Diogo’s roundabout, seemingly improbable route to stunning success is actually more common in the tech world than you might think. Steve Jobs is the most famous example — he famously dropped out of college, not to start Apple, but to do psychedelic drugs, crash on friends’ floors, immerse himself in hippie spirituality, live on a commune, and travel around India looking for enlightenment before eventually inventing the personal computer and becoming the most beloved tech icon in American history. Jack Dorsey, Larry Ellison, and Mitch Kapor all had their own periods of aimlessness.

Nor is this sort of life path confined to the tech world. History is full of examples of people who looked lackadaisical until they suddenly rose to greatness:

  • Ulysses S. Grant drank copiously, worked as a clerk in a leather store, engaged in various failed business ventures and was said to lack ambition — until one day he rejoined the military and became the most successful and important military commander in the entire Civil War, as well as President of the United States.

  • Charles Darwin neglected his medical studies and turned in a mediocre performance on his exams at Cambridge, routinely going hunting and riding instead of studying, before becoming a naturalist, signing up for an ocean voyage, and inventing the theory of evolution.

  • James Cameron was a college dropout and a truck driver, before seeing Star Wars prompted him to quit his job and teach himself how to make movies, ultimately becoming one of the most commercially successful movie directors of all time. (Kevin Smith had a similar path to success, except his inspiration was the movie Slacker.)

  • Haruki Murakami ran a jazz bar and had little ambition, before suddenly deciding to become a novelist, and eventually becoming one of the most celebrated writers in the world.

I like to tell these stories because they demonstrate an approach to success in life that I believe is overlooked and deserves more recognition. I call it “bumbition”.

“Bumbition” is an obvious portmanteau of “bum” and “ambition”. In general, we think of ambitious people and slackers as polar opposites — ambitious people work hard, set goals for themselves, and are constantly motivated, while slackers drift aimlessly, laze around, or fail to apply their talents. A lot of our culture is oriented around pushing young people to be ambitious instead of turning into bums.

Bumbition, however, defies placement on the ambitious/bum spectrum. It exhibits elements of both. For a significant portion of their life, a bumbitious person doesn’t strive hard, or apply themselves to definite goals…until a clear and compelling opportunity presents itself. When that opportunity to do something really interesting or impactful does come up, the bumbitious person is quick to recognize it, and works very hard to exploit it.

The key here is that bumbition is not simply intermittent ambition. It’s a fundamentally different approach to life — it has different goals and motivations, and when it succeeds, it succeeds for different reasons.

An ambitious person is always working toward a set of goals — either those they define for themselves, or those defined by the people around them. Those goals could include:

  • “Make partner by age 30”

  • “Start a unicorn startup”

  • “Get a tenured job at a top 10 research university”

  • “Make a hundred million dollars”

  • “Conquer Central Asia”

…And so on. The purpose of achieving those goals — the motivation that drives ambitious people — is to feel a sense of personal success.

A bumbitious person does not automatically have a goal at all times,2 because they tend to be motivated less by the need to feel successful than by the desire to do something intrinsically interesting or worthwhile. Such projects are inherently in short supply, in part because what constitutes an inherently “interesting” or “worthwhile” project is highly subjective. An ambitious person can always identify some brass ring that would make them feel like a success; a bumbitious person will often wait years or even decades before finding that one magical opportunity or life calling.

In fact, this is bumbition’s inherent limitation. Sitting around waiting for the right opportunity to present itself is a highly uncertain, risky endeavor. There’s always the possibility that it won’t come until you’re old, or that it’ll come but you’ll fail to see it in time.

The other problem with bumbition is that waiting around for the right opportunity comes with a bunch of costs and risks. Your technical skills and work ethic can decay over time. You can get caught up in life’s various stumbling blocks — bad relationships, drug addictions, depression, etc.

But bumbition also has some big advantages over the ambitious life. One is that ambition can keep people overly busy. If you’re the kind of person that always has to be working toward a goal, and you can’t find a truly great project to work on, you’ll end up working on a modest or mediocre one. If Steve Jobs had become distracted by getting a perfect GPA at Reed College, he might never have had time to start Apple. If Ulysses S. Grant had focused on owning his own leather goods store, he might not have leapt at the chance to join the U.S. Army. If Sasha Sheng had focused on climbing the corporate ladder at Meta, she wouldn’t have founded TypeSafe.

Paul Graham talks about this in his essay “How to Do Great Work”:

Ambition comes in two forms, one that precedes interest in the subject and one that grows out of it. Most people who do great work have a mix, and the more you have of the former, the harder it will be to decide what to do…The trouble with planning is that it only works for achievements you can describe in advance. You can win a gold medal or get rich by deciding to as a child and then tenaciously pursuing that goal, but you can't discover natural selection that way.

In his book Zero to One, Peter Thiel — who I’d classify as an ambitious rather than a bumbitious person — recounts a vivid example of how his ambition almost prevented him from becoming a tech titan:

[A]fter a conventionally successful undergraduate career, I enrolled at Stanford Law School, where I competed even harder for the standard badges of success. The highest prize in a law student’s world is…a Supreme Court clerkship…I was invited to interview for clerkships with Justices Kennedy and Scalia. My meetings with the Justices went well. I was so close to winning this last competition. If only I got the clerkship, I thought, I would be set for life. But I didn’t.

At the time, I was devastated…With the benefit of hindsight…winning that ultimate competition would have changed my life for the worse…Had I actually clerked on the Supreme Court, I probably would have spent my entire career taking depositions or drafting other people’s business deals instead of creating anything new.

Nor is this bumbition’s only advantage. The “bum” phase — the time spent traveling in India, or working at a convenience store, or playing Hearthstone on a couch — isn’t just a holding pattern. The seeming aimlessness of this period of life can serve several important functions that facilitate rapid success once a good opportunity gets spotted.

First, and most importantly, time away from the grind of constant striving allows people to broaden their perspective. A lot of unique and original ideas come from recombinant innovation — from combining insights and perspectives from vastly different fields.3 Even something as simple as changing the context of your surroundings can improve creativity. For an intelligent person with a restless mind, the “bum” phase of life leads to a lot of play and exploration that can end up sparking novel ideas. Here’s a fun example from Richard Feynman:

I used to enjoy doing physics. Why did I enjoy it? I used to play with it. I used to do whatever I felt like doing - it didn't have to do with whether it was important for the development of nuclear physics, but whether it was interesting and amusing for me to play with…Now that I am burned out…I'm going to play with physics, whenever I want to…

Within a week I was in the cafeteria and some guy, fooling around, throws a plate in the air. As the plate went up in the air I saw it wobble…I had nothing to do, so I start to figure out the motion of the rotating plate…I went on to work out equations of wobbles. Then I thought about how electron orbits start to move in relativity. Then there's the Dirac Equation in electrodynamics. And then quantum electrodynamics.

Steve Jobs’ study of calligraphy, during his hippie period, famously helped him to think about what would make the letters on a personal computer look beautiful to the eye.

A related advantage is that the “bum” phase also allows people to develop their interests. Paul Graham talks about how “excited curiosity” will often lead people to their most important life’s work. Bumbitious people aren’t just waiting around; they’re playing around, actively searching for something that sparks their interest. In contrast, if you’re constantly grinding away, it can be hard to develop that curiosity.

A “bum” phase also gives people a chance to broaden their human networks. When you’re working hard towards a goal, you usually don’t have much time to meet a lot of people outside work — i.e., outside your narrow current field of endeavor. Ambitious people are always working toward a goal, and thus get relatively little time to go meet interesting people from other walks of life. But the “bum” phase gives bumbitious people time to meet all kinds of folks. This can lead to hearing about radical new opportunities, getting insights from other fields, or even meeting useful partners for a new venture.

Broadly speaking, the “bum” phase of bumbition serves two purposes. It represents waiting and exploration time, as people patiently wait for the big opportunity that will define their career. But it also represents personal development time, either deliberate or unconscious, that helps bumbitious people to better see the big opportunities when they come along.

Now, I don’t mean to claim that bumbition is better than ambition, or vice versa — either in terms of personal success, or in terms of changing the world. Among the greats of any field — politics, business, academia, literature — you can find plenty of examples of both ambitious and bumbitious people.

But I think our society underemphasizes bumming. We have a tendency to frown on people who spend years unemployed, neglecting work in order to play video games or make Instagram videos. We assume that these people are being lazy or squandering their potential, and we tell them to get back to the grind and make something of themselves. Other societies, of course, tend to be even worse on this score — China treats its slacker generation as a national security threat.

In the AI age, this could be even more consequential. AI algorithms are consummate hill-climbers — set them to a task, give them some data, and they’ll be more ambitious than the hardest-working Stanford law student. In a world of abundant AI, setting AI on the right goals will be an increasingly central human task. Figuring out the right goals requires exploration, unique perspectives, and curiosity — all things that bumbition facilitates. We should be teaching our young people to be more bumbitious.

At the same time, we should remember that being bumbitious isn’t just a matter of sitting around on the couch. Just because you tell yourself you’re waiting to hear the true call doesn’t mean you’ll actually hear it when it comes. You have to actually want to do something great — whatever that means to you — and you have to be ready to work incredibly hard for years when that something presents itself. Bumbition isn’t the same as ambition, but it also isn’t the same as being a lifelong bum.


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1

Diogo’s rise as an AI researcher didn’t start with TypeSafe. He was also a key researcher for OpenAI, creating key features of the original ChatGPT and GPT-4 that kicked off the AI boom.

2

There are actually a few bumbitious people who somehow manage to always find huge passion projects — David Holz of Midjourney comes to mind.

3

An example I like to cite is a college friend of mine, who ended up adapting a camera technique he learned from his photography hobby to create a novel method of neuroimaging.

I’m feeling more optimistic about American politics

2026-11-14 17:00:44

“Partisanship is a helluva drug,” as they say. When your preferred party is in power, the sun seems to shine a little brighter, the birds sing a little more sweetly, and there’s a spring in your step as you walk past the homeless encampments and sterile single-family-home-only neighborhoods of your American city. Foreigners from countries where politics is less contentious, like Japan, will never know this joy.

Anyway, this natural partisan sentiment makes it very hard for me to write about developments in American politics. I would like to give you some analysis that’s more informative than “Yay, Democrats won an election!”. I do consider myself a Democrat, after all (even though I’m registered as an Independent). There has never been a point in my entire life when I’d have told you that the Republican presidential candidate was a better pick than the Democrat (though 2012 was fairly close). I regularly bemoan the state of the Democratic Party, but somehow the Republicans always find some way to be Even Worse.

This has been the unfortunate reality for most people in America for years now. Disgust and dissatisfaction with both parties have grown, as both have become more extremist. But there was little they could do except keep voting for the lesser of two evils, while tuning out political news and expressing anger at the whole system. It got so bad that in my New Year’s essay, I even entertained the notion that liberal democracy itself had suffered a generational failure:

To be honest, I still entertain that notion. Reading that essay again, there’s not much I would change. But on the margin, recent events have made me feel more optimistic about where American politics is going.

A lot of this is downstream of the midterm elections. Trump has turned the Republican Party into something truly awful, and it’s refreshing to see America punish the GOP for going along with that transformation:

But my optimism isn’t just about the fact that Democrats won — it’s also about how they won, and what they seem likely to do with their victory. Here I’ve been pleasantly surprised so far. And there are also some scattered signs that our leaders are starting to take our substantive policy challenges more seriously, instead of just relying on partisanship and culture wars. Basically, I see three broad positive trends:

  1. The Democrats are not becoming extremist at the rate I had feared.

  2. There is some real bipartisan movement on good policymaking at the federal level.

  3. The nation is waking up to the problem of corruption, and holding the perpetrators to account.

Liberals, not leftists, are leading the anti-Trump charge

Over the past few years, I’ve watched the emergence of a leftist faction within the Democratic Party, which I’ve likened to MAGA on the right. This faction had its roots in the Bernie insurgency of 2016-2020, but it has grown beyond that. The Palestine movement both invigorated the leftists and radicalized them, shifting the locus of power in left-of-center activism away from Black activists, identitarian movements, and anti-capitalism, and toward explicitly anti-American “decolonial” ideas.

As recently as this summer, I believed that a Democratic victory in the midterms would be led by this hard-left vanguard:

Here’s what I wrote:

Democrats have spent their political capital moving to the left…[They are selecting] candidates who are so far to the left that they end up frightening and/or offending many voters, and then basically daring people to keep voting for the Republicans…

When DSA-type candidates were just winning in deep blue cities, it was possible to think that they would remain a small, limited faction within the party. But Francesca Hong is going to be the Democratic nominee in a statewide race. So is Abdul El-Sayed, who, while not a member of the DSA, is closely aligned with them (especially on Israel, which he focuses on a lot)…This, increasingly, is who the Democrats are now.

Well, happily, I was wrong about this. Francesca Hong was actually defeated in the Democratic primary race just a few days later in a stunning upset, showing that even partisan Democrats aren’t sold on the DSA faction.

Even more importantly, the hard left didn’t end up leading the anti-Trump charge in the midterms, as I had expected. Despite the blue wave, most of the high-profile DSA-faction candidates performed significantly worse than their normie Democrat counterparts. Jeff Maurer has great data on this:

I Might Be Wrong
How Leftists and Moderates Did in the Midterms
Three months ago, I wrote a post “setting up the goal posts” to measure how individual candidates did in the midterms. I did that for two reasons: First, I did it to be a dick. I feel that liberals can be too polite, and we bite our tongues in response to the hate and idiocy that DSA types are trying to smuggle into the mainstream — I see a role for a t…
Read more

And the same voters who powered the big Democratic victories also endorsed a lot of centrist policies at the ballot box. Here’s the Washington Post:

Voters in North Carolina elected a Democratic senator…giving former governor Roy Cooper an overwhelming win. At the same time, they approved three [Republican] measures…The first would add a constitutional requirement for a levy limit on property taxes…The second would cap the state income tax at 3.5 percent…The third would require photo ID for voting…

In Wisconsin, Democrat David Crowley won the gubernatorial election…Those same voters approved an initiative…to ban affirmative action in state institutions…Iowa voters elected Democrats as governor and senator while amending their constitution to make it substantially harder to raise state income taxes…Ohio….went blue for Senate and governor. At the same time, two-thirds of voters backed an amendment to require photo ID for voting…

Moderates and independents drove Democratic gains in all these places.

Voters in several blue and purple states also approved measures to restrict women’s sports teams by biological sex.

There’s also a general indefinable “vibe shift” in the air. Anecdotally, people I talk to are less ashamed to voice full-throated support for the kind of liberalism that Barack Obama typified in the early 2010s. Meanwhile, liberal influencers online are beginning to push back more strongly on leftist shouters.

And in Congress, the sheer scale of the Democrats’ victory means that the DSA faction will be effectively disempowered. Because marginal victories tend to be won by moderates in purple states, the leadership in both the House and the Senate is likely to be held by moderates like Hakeem Jeffries and Chuck Schumer. This is driving the DSA factionalist types apoplectic with rage:

Note that the knives are already coming out for Jon Ossoff, whose potential as a 2028 presidential contender surged after his massive midterm victory. But who can leftists run against Ossoff? Enthusiasm around AOC has dimmed, and there’s no obvious replacement.

If they fail to find a candidate for 2028, and if Democrats take back the White House with a normie liberal, the leftist faction faces the real possibility that the window of America’s decade of unrest will limp to a close without them. That would, of course, be good for the nation.

Smart policy is starting to win (and “the groups” are starting to lose)

Even moderate politicians, of course, often support unworkable or inadvisable policies. On the Democratic side, the worst problems are anti-development policies at the state and local level. “Progressive” policies have made it prohibitively difficult and/or expensive to build housing, roads, trains, power stations, and transmission lines across much of the country, freezing our built environment in the 1970s. I’ve been loudly complaining about this for years now:

This was a big part of my pessimism about politics. What’s the use of kicking out the Republicans, if the Democrats are just going to decide that “open space” and historic gas stations are more important than giving the middle class a place to live and power for their homes?

Now there are signs that at long last, America’s leaders recognize this problem and are taking action to fix it.

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Brad and Noah discuss the reindustrialization of America

2026-11-13 15:10:54

I was busy with rabbit stuff today, so my next post will be delayed until tomorrow! In the meantime, have another episode of Hexapodia, my revitalized podcast with Brad DeLong.

In today’s episode, Brad and I discuss the question of whether and how to reindustrialize the United States. Brad wrote a whole book on this topic, in fact. Basically, there are three main reasons we might want to boost American manufacturing:

  1. Geopolitical and military reasons: Having a supply chain for defense manufacturing and dual-use manufacturing that isn’t dominated by China would allow us to actually fight a war against China, if we ever had to do that. And since China has shown themselves perfectly willing to use export controls to bully other countries (including ours), we should develop supply chains that China can’t dominate, in order to avoid being bullied.

  2. Economic growth reasons: Having a robust manufacturing sector, in addition to a robust service sector, may make our country richer, by adding agglomeration and clustering effects.

  3. Economic equality reasons: We might want good high-paying blue-collar manufacturing jobs to help revitalize the American middle class.

Brad and I basically think that #3 is a dead end here — it’s not going to work. Especially with the advent of AI and AI-driven robotics, most manufacturing is going to be mostly automated; there will be no way for America to be competitive using human hands in factories when robot hands work so much better. That means the era of mass semi-skilled blue-collar factory employment is simply over and done.

But that doesn’t mean that manufacturing can’t create jobs. They just have to be different kinds of jobs — for example, local service jobs created by the money that the automated factories bring in to a town. That’s called a “local multiplier” effect, and it’s very powerful and important. Of course, it’ll require that the people who run the factories live near them, so they can spend their money locally.

Which leaves geopolitics and security as the main driver of reindustrialization. We note that the one country that we know of that has ever successfully reindustrialized was Ukraine, which built a strong drone and robotics industry out of necessity in order to fight off the Russian invasion. It’s not necessarily the most optimistic example for us to look to, but it may be the most important.

Anyway, Brad and I then spend a long time discussing what, exactly, America needs to reindustrialize. We come to the tentative conclusion that America really lacks only two important things — land use, and bank loans.

Land use, of course, is what the permitting bill currently moving through Congress is meant to address, and it’s important for a whole lot of other things besides manufacturing.

Bank finance seems to be important for manufacturing for a whole lot of reasons (expect more blog posts about this in the near future), and this is one area where America really struggles compared to other countries. My idea is to use America’s moribund megabanks as pools of capital for reindustrialization by giving them selective exemptions from the Dodd-Frank restrictions enacted after the financial crisis of 2008. More on that later.


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India is quietly doing great

2026-11-11 16:51:56

Photo via Ojhayogesh via Wikimedia Commons

My last post was about how for the first time, I’m becoming bearish on China’s continued economic and technological outperformance. A number of people asked me whether I was similarly bearish about India. The answer is no — I’m actually more bullish on India than I have been in a while. In fact, I had been meaning to write a post about that, so this gives me a good opportunity to do so.

The reason I’m bullish on India and bearish on China is that we’re asking the two countries to do two different things. When we think of China’s future success, we think of whether it’ll eclipse the combined economies of the U.S. and its allies, seize the lead in artificial intelligence, reach Taiwan or Korea’s level of income, or dominate Asia. I’m increasingly skeptical about its ability to do all of those things. But India’s job right now is a lot simpler — it just has to escape poverty and become an upper middle income country. And this I think it can do.

In both GDP terms and in terms of the Human Development Index (which combines GDP with education and health), India is around where China was in the late 2000s.

Source: OWID

It’s easy to forget, but in the 2000s, people still thought of China as a basically developing country — its cities choked with smog, its rural areas still mired in poverty, its economy driven by cheap labor and lax environmental protections, and so forth. The challenge now for India is to make the leap that China made in the 2010s — to build abundant high-quality roads, trains, housing, and energy, provide decent jobs and livelihoods to the majority of its people, and catch up to the frontier of technology.

A lot of people don’t seem to realize how good of a start India has made. For one thing, extreme poverty in India has mostly been conquered over the last two decades:

Source: OWID

This is an incredible accomplishment — a full tenth of humanity saved from deprivation. And what’s remarkable is that — unlike China — India managed to do this incredible poverty reduction while also reducing inequality:

Source: World Bank

How did India manage this feat? The World Bank says that it was due to the two usual suspects — economic growth and redistribution:

Over the past decade, India has made remarkable progress in reducing poverty across both monetary and non-monetary dimensions, recording one of the fastest poverty declines in the world…This progress was mainly driven by strong consumption growth, rising employment, especially among women, and expanded social transfers, including food subsidies. [emphasis mine]

A strong welfare state is certainly important, but economic growth has to take the lion’s share of the credit here; without growth, there’s simply less of a pie to redistribute in the first place. And India’s growth has certainly been impressive. Ever since the pandemic, India has been growing faster than China:

Source: OWID

Now, India isn’t growing as fast as China did when China was at $10,000 of per capita GDP. Back in the late 2000s and early 2010s, China was still growing at close to double-digit rates; it didn’t slow down to India’s current rate until 2014, at which point it was 40% richer than India is now. But 6.5% is still a very healthy growth rate — it represents almost a doubling of living standards every decade.

And Bloomberg expects Indian growth to accelerate even further, to 8% by the end of the decade. Neelkanth Mishra, the executive director of the World Bank, points out that because India’s recovery from the pandemic recession is still incomplete, there’s plenty of room for a growth acceleration.

You’d expect this kind of growth to transform every part of Indian society and culture, and this appears to be exactly what’s happening. Arjun Ramani has a great in-depth report from his travels across India, focusing on how economic development is changing life on the ground:

Economy Class
Dispatches from India
Before starting my PhD, I spent the past three years as a journalist for The Economist. The final year was the best. I was based in India, lived between Mumbai and New Delhi, and travelled across 10 states and over 30 cities and villages as the country carried out history’s largest election. I was responsible for the paper’s India economics coverage, wh…
Read more

How is India producing this rapid growth? India is long past the point where you can tell a simple story about the country’s economic progress — manufacturing, finance, real estate, business services, IT, and a bunch of other sectors are all growing at once.

How is India managing to grow so fast? The Economist mostly credits liberalizing reforms and prudent macroeconomic policy:

A programme of fiscal consolidation has cut the budget deficit from 9.2% of gdp in fiscal 2021 (when it was bloated by pandemic spending) towards a target of 4.4% for fiscal 2026. Excluding interest payments, the deficit will be only around 0.9% of gdp…With inflation under control, interest rates have been cut by 1.25 percentage points over the past year…

The decline in inflation is not just limited to food, points out Sonal Varma of Nomura, a bank. Earlier reforms, such as the creation of a digital-payments infrastructure, which made prices more transparent, as well as the RBI’s shift to an inflation-targeting regime in 2016, have helped reduce inflation expectations and are now paying off. The RBI has also built up its stock of foreign-exchange reserves. A banking sector clean-up and reforms to the bankruptcy code have kept the financial system stable…

The longer term looks even more promising, thanks to a vigorous reform effort…A long-mooted cut in the number of labour codes, from 29 to four, was enacted in November. A cap of 74% on foreign direct investment in the insurance industry has been lifted. Nuclear power has been opened up to the private sector. Financial-market regulation has been overhauled…The states have also pursued reforms. Allowing women to work after dark, for instance, means textile and electronics factories can stay open later.

I have to say, I’m skeptical of this story. Fiscal probity is well and good, but India’s long-term borrowing rates haven’t come down all that much:

A stable financial system is very good, but it’s not clear how that automatically accelerates growth. And most of the real structural reform The Economist mentions is in the future. It’s possible for businesses’ expectations of structural reform to drive growth, but as the article mentions, domestic private-sector investment isn’t really driving the boom. FDI is sluggish too (or at least was until this year).

One bright spot is government investment, which has increased by a factor of four since before the pandemic, in spite of the country’s falling debt levels:

Source: Reuters

The Indian government has been on a tremendous infrastructure-building boom — correcting one of the country’s notorious chronic deficiencies. Highway spending has increased by a factor of five over the last decade. Central government railway spending has risen eightfold.

This is boosting growth in the short term, but in the long term it’ll make both manufacturing and consumption a lot easier in India. It’s also changing the physical look and feel of the country, much as China’s own modernization did in the 2000s and 2010s (if not as rapidly). India is now building its own bullet trains:

I recently saw an example of a Japanese man who declared that he was impressed by how clean and quiet Indian subways were, compared to Japanese ones!

Another important factor in India’s growth story — and another long-standing deficiency that’s now beginning to be corrected — is the growth in Indian manufacturing.

The old story of India’s economy is that it had “leapfrogged” manufacturing and gone straight to services — call centers, business process outsourcing, software outsourcing, and the like. That concealed a quiet disappointment that India hadn’t managed to get on the same industrialization bus that has carried so many other countries out of poverty. But India’s current growth is very broad-based — manufacturing is growing right alongside services. The Economist has some details:

Manufacturing output in August, the most recent figure available, was 9% higher than the year before, thanks in particular to surging production of cars and electronics…India’s rising manufacturing output…reflects its growing appeal as a place to make things. In dollar terms India’s electronics exports were up by 90% in August, year on year, with American-bound iPhones accounting for a large share of that.

Another encouraging sign is the breadth of India’s manufacturing growth. Whereas Bangladesh’s manufacturing boom last decade was powered mostly by the garment industry, India is making and exporting a bunch of different high-tech products:

The strength of India’s engineering exports lies partly in the diversity of its product segments. Automobiles remained the largest contributor in FY 2025–26, accounting for 21.9% of total engineering exports. Industrial machinery followed with an 18% share, while iron and steel products accounted for 16.9%…Electrical machinery contributed 12.5%, other engineering products 12.7%, and non-ferrous metals and products 11.6%.

And keep in mind, this is all in spite of China’s attempts to throttle Indian industrialization by denying them key technological exports and factory expertise. Competitive pressure from a more established economic power is not something China itself had to deal with, since the U.S. wholeheartedly supported China’s industrialization in the 1990s and 2000s.

Whether India’s growth boom can continue past the next couple of years is an open question. Private investment will have to rise, and probably FDI as well. India is also going to need to correct its bigger structural issues at some point — especially bad rural education, female underemployment, and incomplete urbanization.

But for now, India looks like a big economic success story — perhaps the brightest in the entire world right now. It’s less visible than China’s rapid rise two decades earlier, but it’ll be no less world-shaking when it happens. More people should be taking notice.


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