2026-02-23 01:11:43
1. Sacralized digital authoritarianism.
2. Venezuela update.
3. The flawed paper behind the H-1B 100k fee.
4. Do we misuse our leisure time?
5. Hidden ties and stock returns.
6. Why are American trains so slow?
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2026-02-22 15:25:58
I am not saying it is a good strategy, I genuinely do not know. But the people behind the scenes, what are they thinking? Did we not just, not too long ago, take out or at least disable some big chunk of the Iranian nuclear assets? So what are we going after this time? Can we really affect regime change without large numbers of troops on the ground? Is there a “Venezuela version” of an Iranian intervention?
My simple model is as follows. The Trump people believe that previous administration, along many dimensions, simply never tried hard enough. They were too bound by previous conventions, too captive to polite society, and also they did not exercise executive power enough. When it comes to foreign policy, they did not threaten other nations enough to achieve American ends. When it comes to military action, they did not summon enough forces backed by enough executive will.
This time around, the goal is to make big threats backed by big, serious forces. Which indeed America is doing. The rest of the details will be filled in later.
If you think the binding constraint in the past was “not enough threats backed by serious enough executive will,” that constraint (it seems?) is being relaxed now.
Of course if the binding constraints lie along other dimensions, or along other dimensions as well, the current strategy could fail badly. The plan is simply not complete enough.
I suppose we are likely to find out.
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2026-02-22 13:45:25
I very much enjoyed this exchange, print only, here is the link. Excerpt:
Gaurav: Going back to Iceland for a moment. I’ve never truly appreciated how old that parliament is. A thousand years is extraordinary. What is it about Iceland that has allowed that kind of continuity?
Tyler: Iceland was taken over by Denmark for quite a while. But the Icelanders persisted as an autonomous culture with their own language, not simply becoming Danish. They had this tradition of individualism, which you can read in the Icelandic sagas. Their own kind of common law, a good system of incentives built into the legal code, traditions of autonomy based on food supply and how you deal with the cold and the weather. For a long time, they just played defense. Then after World War II, they had a chance to transform it into what I think is one of the world’s most successful countries.
Their total population is around four hundred thousand. To do that with such numbers in a place that is not always hospitable is remarkable. They have almost entirely green energy. They’re super resourceful, very highly educated. Book sales per capita are through the ceiling. There’s something about their interest in poetry, legal codes, reading, what they do with those long winter nights, that has been quite persistent. That’s an informal institution, and it’s been very durable.
Is there anything in US policy that you see drawing us toward a short-term siren call that makes it harder to create a lasting democracy?
Our government fiscal policy is irresponsible. I hope we can survive it. I’m not a doom-and-gloomer, but thirty-eight trillion dollars in debt is not ideal. I don’t think we should try to run a balanced budget. T-bills play a key role in the world economy, and some amount of debt and deficit is good for us, good for the world. But we’re pushing it too far. We underinvest in our young people, underinvest in parts of our education. But look, we’re a pretty successful country.
There’s this interesting tension between wanting a stable environment to build something that lasts and needing to ride a new wave for something to emerge in the first place.
I was recently thinking about how much the bad weather in the United States is functional for some larger purpose. You learn early that you have to deal with things. You need a certain kind of independence, planning, and preparation.
British weather is quite benevolent. Maybe it’s too gray, but it’s not going to kill you. American weather, hurricanes, blizzards, flooding, is very volatile. We don’t always feel it because we’ve become wealthy, but maybe in part we had to become wealthy to deal with that volatility. That might be a blessing in disguise. It’s related to the earlier point about Iceland. It’s tough there. You’d better be pretty adaptive. A perfectly stable environment is not ideal either.
Interesting throughout, and plenty of fresh material. The weather point I owe to conversations with Henry Oliver and Rebecca Lowe.
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2026-02-22 01:33:44
1. Notes on Oman.
2. Colin McGinn on best philosopher ever.
3. Owner wants to give away Green Mountain Campus.
4. More on rising tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
5. New review of Studwell on Africa.
7. Anna Gát reviews Wuthering Heights.
The post Saturday assorted links appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
2026-02-21 20:21:23
The Supreme Court yesterday struck down Trump’s IEEPA tariffs, holding that the statute’s authorization to “regulate… importation” doesn’t include the power to impose tariffs. The majority’s strongest argument is simple: every time Congress actually delegates tariff authority, it uses the word “duty,” caps the rate, sets a time limit, and requires procedural prerequisites. IEEPA has none of these.
The dissent pushes back with an intuitively appealing argument: IEEPA authorizes the President to prohibit imports entirely, so surely it authorizes the lesser action of merely taxing them. If Congress handed over the nuclear option, why would it withhold the conventional weapon? Indeed in his press conference Trump, in his rambling manner, made exactly this argument:
“I am allowed to cut off any and all trade…I can destroy the trade, I can destroy the country, I’m even allowed to impose a foreign country destroying embargo…I can do anything I want to do to them…I’m allowed to destroy the country, but I can’t charge a little fee.”
The argument is superficially appealing but it fails due to a standard result in principal-agent theory.
Congress wants the President to move fast in a real emergency, but it doesn’t want to hand over routine control of trade policy. The right delegation design is therefore a screening device: give the President authority he will exercise only when the situation is truly an emergency.
An import ban works as a screening device precisely because it is very disruptive. A ban creates immediate and substantial harm. It is a “costly signal.” A President who invokes it is credibly saying: this is serious enough that I am willing to absorb a large cost. Tariffs, in contrast, are cheaper–especially to the President. Tariffs raise revenue, which offsets political pain. Tariff incidence is diffuse and easy to misattribute—prices creep, intermediaries take blame, consumers don’t observe the policy lever directly. Most importantly tariffs are adjustable, which makes them a weapon useful for bargaining, exemptions, and targeted favors. Tariffs under executive authority implicitly carry the message–I am the king; give me a gold bar and I will reduce your tariffs. Tariff flexibility is more politically appealing than a ban and thus a less credible signal of an emergency. The “lesser-included” argument gets the logic backwards. The asymmetry is the point.
Not surprisingly, the same structure appears in real emergency services. A fire chief may have the authority to close roads during an emergency but that doesn’t imply that the fire chief has the authority to impose road tolls. Road closure is costly and self-limiting — it disrupts traffic, generates immediate complaints, and the chief has every incentive to lift it as soon as possible. Tolls are cheap, adjustable, and once in place tend to persist; they generate revenue that can fund the agency and create constituencies for their continuation. Nobody thinks granting a fire chief emergency closure authority implicitly grants them taxing authority, even if the latter is a lesser authority. The closure and toll instruments have completely different political economy properties despite operating on the same roads.
The majority reaches the right conclusion by noting that tariffs are a tax over which Congress, not the President, has authority. That is constitutionally correct but the deeper question is why the Framers lodged the taxing power in Congress — and the answer is political economy. Revenue instruments are especially easy for an executive to exploit because they can be targeted. The constitutional rule exists to solve that incentive problem.
Once you see that, the dissent’s “greater includes the lesser” inference collapses on its own terms. A principal can rationally authorize an agent to take a dramatic emergency action while withholding the cheaper, revenue-lever not despite the fact that it seems milder, but because of it. The blunt instrument is self-limiting. The revenue instrument is not. That asymmetry is what the Constitution’s categorical division of powers preserves — and what an open-ended emergency delegation would destroy.
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2026-02-21 20:10:25
The conclusion of Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in the tariff case:
For those who think it important for the Nation to impose more tariffs, I understand that today’s decision will be disappointing. All I can offer them is that most major decisions affecting the rights and responsibilities of the American people (including the duty to pay taxes and tariffs) are funneled through the legislative process for a reason. Yes, legislating can be hard and take time. And, yes, it can be tempting to bypass Congress when some pressing problem
arises. But the deliberative nature of the legislative process was the whole point of its design. Through that process, the Nation can tap the combined wisdom of the people’s elected representatives, not just that of one faction or man. There, deliberation tempers impulse, and compromise hammers
disagreements into workable solutions. And because laws must earn such broad support to survive the legislative process, they tend to endure, allowing ordinary people to plan their lives in ways they cannot when the rules shift from day to day. In all, the legislative process helps ensure each of us has a stake in the laws that govern us and in the Nation’s future. For some today, the weight of those virtues is apparent. For others, it may not seem so obvious. But if history is any guide, the tables will turn and the day will come when those disappointed by today’s result will appreciate the legislative process for the bulwark of liberty it is.
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