2026-02-10 16:49:50
Using new data from the Gallup Workforce Panel, we document a persistent partisan gap in self-reported AI use at work: Democrats are consistently more likely than Republicans to report frequent use. In 2025:Q4, for example, 27.8% of Democrats report using AI weekly or daily, compared with 22.5% of Republicans. Democrats also report deeper task-level integration, using AI in 16% more work activities than Republicans. Consistent with this, Democrats are employed in occupations with higher predicted AI exposure based on task-content measures and report larger perceived differences in AI-related job displacement risk. However, in regression models the partisan gap in AI use disappears once we control for education, industry, and occupation, indicating that observed differences primarily reflect compositional variation rather than political affiliation per se.
That is from a new paper by Nicholas Bloom and Christos Makridis.
The post The politics of using AI appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
2026-02-10 13:52:20
The basic reason why I’m not very optimistic about Africa’s growth prospects under current conditions is that the track record is extremely poor, and there’s little reason to think that anything fundamental has changed. Between 1992 and 2022, median income in China grew at an average annualized rate of 6.6 percent per year; in India it grew at a rate of 2.9 percent per year; but in sub-Saharan Africa it grew at just 1.6 percent per year, less than the rate of growth exhibited in the famously stagnant (and much wealthier) United Kingdom. But in much of the continent the picture has been worse than mere slow growth. Some countries that were relatively stable a few decades ago are now in a state of apparently permanent civil conflict, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or Somalia; while other countries that have been blessed by relative stability, such as Kenya, Malawi, or Zambia, are poorer on a median income basis than they were in the ‘80s or ‘90s.
There are many things to say about why economic growth in Africa has been so disappointing, from the primacy of extractive resource sectors to the dominance of predatory elites to the poor state of human capital to the ubiquity of corruption to the absence, in many places, of a strong state monopoly on legitimate violence. But these are merely surface-level problems: the fact that these conditions exist in nearly every country in Africa, despite their widely varying historical experiences and the different ideologies with which their states have experimented, suggests that the fundamental problem is not so much with the state but the society underlying the state. If you were to describe this problem briefly, you could do quite well with something like “kinship groups crowd out effective institutions.” African societies have extraordinarily strong kinship ties, such that impersonal institutions and relationships are systematically subordinated to family, clan, and ethnic loyalties; as a result many African societies have found it extraordinarily difficult to build effective states and civil societies that are capable of doing what states and civil societies are supposed to do. (For a more complete elaboration of this view, see my article on why African nations don’t have large firms.) Solving that problem took Europe roughly a millennium; and that was when people didn’t have access to AK-47s.
Here is more from David Oks.
The post Poverty reduction is slowing down appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
2026-02-10 07:53:37
Alphabet has lined up banks to sell a rare 100-year bond, stepping up a borrowing spree by Big Tech companies racing to fund their vast investments in artificial intelligence this year.
The so-called century bond will form part of a debut sterling issuance this week by Google’s parent company, according to people familiar with the matter. Alphabet was also selling $15bn of dollar bonds on Monday and lining up a Swiss franc bond sale, the people said.
Century bonds — long-term borrowing at its most extreme — are highly unusual, although a flurry were sold during the period of very low interest rates that followed the financial crisis, including by governments such as Austria and Argentina.
Here is more from the FT, let us see how the yield comes in…
The post This security will be pricing *something* (but what?) appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
2026-02-10 03:24:50
Yup:
Human capital—encompassing cognitive skills and personality traits—is central for labor-market success, yet personality remains difficult to measure at scale. Leveraging advances in AI and comprehensive LinkedIn microdata, we extract the Big 5 personality traits from facial images of 96,000 MBA graduates, and demonstrate that this novel “Photo Big 5” predicts school rank, job matching, compensation, job transitions, and career advancement. The Photo Big 5 provides predictive power comparable to race, attractiveness, and educational background, and is only weakly correlated with cognitive measures such as test scores. We show that individuals systematically sort into occupations where their personality traits are valued and earn higher wages when traits align with occupational demands. While the scalability of the Photo Big 5 enables new academic insights into the role of personality in labor markets, its growing use in industry screening raises important ethical concerns regarding statistical discrimination and individual autonomy.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
The post For a long time I have been predicting the return of phrenology appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
2026-02-10 01:12:05
1. The Southern Cone Thesis (speculative).
2. Ranking potato chips (NYT). Kettle, says I.
3. Henry Oliver visits Shenandoah.
4. Context is that which is scarce.
5. Seb Krier all the way down.
6. What a city on the moon plan might look like, and its problems.
The post Monday assorted links appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.
2026-02-09 14:02:09
To be clear, I am not blaming Singapore on this one. But it is striking to me how much Americans do not talk about Singapore any more. They are much, much more likely to talk about Europe or England, for instance. I see several reasons for this:
1. Much of the Singapore fascination came from the right-wing, as the country offered (according to some) a right-wing version of what a technocracy could look like. Yet today’s American political right is not very interested in technocracy.
2. Singapore willingly takes in large numbers of immigrants (in percentage terms), and tries to make that recipe work through a careful balancing act. That approach still is popular with segments of the right-wing intelligentsia, but it is hardly on the agenda today. For the time being, it is viewed as something “better not to talk about.” Especially in light of some of the burgeoning anti-Asian sentiment, for instance from Helen Andrews and some others. It is much more common that Americans talk about foreign countries mismanaging their immigration policies, for instance the UK and Sweden.
3. Singaporean government looks and feels a bit like a “deep state.” I consider that terminology misleading as applied to Singapore, but still it makes it harder for many people to praise the place.
4. Singapore is a much more democratic country than most outsiders realize, though they do have an extreme form of gerrymandering. Whatever you think of their system, these days it no longer feels transgressive, compared to alternatives being put into practice or at least being discussed. Those alternatives range from more gerrymandering (USA) to various abrogations of democracy (potentially all over). In this regard Singapore, without budging much on its own terms, seems like much more of a mainstream country than before. That means there is less to talk about.
4b. Singapore’s free speech restrictions, whatever you think of them, no longer seem so far outside the box. Trump is suing plenty of people. The UK is sending police to knock on people’s doors for social media posts, and so on. That too makes Singapore more of a “normal country,” for better or worse (I would say worse).
5. The notion of an FDI-driven, MNE-driven growth strategy seems less exciting in an era of major tech advances, most of all AI. Singapore seems further from the frontier than a few years ago. People are wishing to talk about pending changes, not predictability, with predictability being a central feature of many Singaporean service exports.
6. If you want to talk about unusual, well-run small countries, UAE is these days a more novel case to consider, with more new news coming out of it.
Sorry Singapore, we are just not talking about you so much right now! But perhaps, in some significant ways, that is a blessing in disguise. At least temporarily. I wrote this post in part because I realize I have not much blogged about Singapore for some years, and I was trying to figure out why.
Addendum, from Ricardo in the comments:
The post Why is Singapore no longer “cool”? appeared first on Marginal REVOLUTION.