2026-03-03 04:21:53
2. Just say no to the monopsony model.
3. Your dose of John Cochrane.
4. More on the recent climate change estimate. It seems the paper should not have been published?
5. “During their lives, centenarians rarely get sick.“
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2026-03-03 01:23:07
From my new Free Press column, I see these as the most important facts:
Congress has not passed explicit regulation of AI foundation models, and an executive order from President Trump limited regulation at the state level. But do not think that laissez-faire reigns. In addition to existing (largely pre-AI) laws, which lay out general principles of liability, and laws from a few states, the United States is engaged in a kind of “off the books” soft regulation.
The major AI companies keep the national security establishment apprised of the progress they are making, as has been the case with Anthropic. There is a general sense within the AI industry that if the national security authorities saw anything in the new products that was very concerning or that might undermine the national interest, they would inform the president and Congress. That would likely lead to more formal and more restrictive kinds of regulation, so the major AI companies want to show relatively safe demos and products. An informal back and forth enforces implied safety standards, without the involvement of formal legislation.
That may sound like an unusual way to do regulation, but to date the system has worked relatively well. For one thing, I believe our national security establishment has a better and more sophisticated understanding of the issues than does Congress. Congress right now simply isn’t up to the job, as indeed the institution has been failing more generally. Most representatives seem to know little about the core issues behind AI regulation.
As it stands, AI progress has been allowed to proceed, and the United States has stayed ahead of China, without major catastrophes. The burden on the companies has been manageable, and the system, at least until last week, was flexible.
Another advantage of this system is that both Congress and the administrative state can be very slow to act. The AI landscape can change in just weeks, yet our federal government is used to taking years to issue laws and directives. Had we passed AI legislation in, say, 2024, today it would be badly out of date, no matter what your point of view on what such regulation should accomplish. For instance, in 2024 few outsiders were much concerned with the properties of, or risks from, autonomous AI “agents.” Today that is the number-one topic of concern.
Though it is not driven by legislation, the status quo AI regulatory system is not anti-democratic, as it operates well within the rules passed by Congress and the administrative state. It is more correct to say the current AI guardrails rely on the threat of regulation, rather than regulation itself, with the national security state as the watchdog. The system sticks to a kind of creative ambiguity. The national security state offers no official imprimatur for the new advances, but they proceed nonetheless. Nevertheless, the various components of the national security state reserve the right to object in the future.
It is also correct, however, to believe that such a system cannot last forever. At some point creative ambiguity collapses. Someone or some institution demands a more formal answer as to what is allowed or what is not allowed. At that point a more directly legalistic system of adjudication enters the picture, and Congress likely starts paying more attention.
With the recent dispute between Hegseth and Anthropic, we have taken a step away from the previous regulatory mode of quiet cooperation. Instead, the relationship between the military and the AI companies has become a matter of public concern. Now everyone has an opinion on Hegseth, Anthropic, and OpenAI, and social media is full of debate.
No matter “whose side you take,” it would have been better to have resolved all this behind closed doors.
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2026-03-02 20:19:12
My latest paper, Chaos and Misallocation under Price Controls, (with Brian Albrecht and Mark Whitmeyer) has a new take on price controls:
Price controls kill the incentive for arbitrage. We prove a Chaos Theorem: under a binding price ceiling, suppliers are indifferent across destinations, so arbitrarily small cost differences can determine the entire allocation. The economy tips to corner outcomes in which some markets are fully served while others are starved; small parameter changes flip the identity of the corners, generating discontinuous welfare jumps. These corner allocations create a distinct source of cross-market misallocation, separate from the aggregate quantity loss (the Harberger triangle) and from within-market misallocation emphasized in prior work. They also create an identification problem: welfare depends on demand far from the observed equilibrium. We derive sharp bounds on misallocation that require no parametric assumptions. In an efficient allocation, shadow prices are equalized across markets; combined with the adding-up constraint, this collapses the infinite-dimensional welfare problem to a one-dimensional search over a common shadow price, with extremal losses achieved by piecewise-linear demand schedules. Calibrating the bounds to stationlevel AAA survey data from the 1973–74 U.S. gasoline crisis, misallocation losses range from roughly 1 to 9 times the Harberger triangle.
Brian has a superb write up that makes the paper very accessible. Unfortunately, the paper is timely and relevant.
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2026-03-02 13:56:43
Numerous nations in the Middle East are being pulled into the current conflict and have received missile attacks from Iran. I believe the proper Bayesian update is that Brazil is underrated.
The country has plenty of water, and lots of capacity to grow its own food. It is an agricultural powerhouse. It is developing more and more fossil fuels. No neighbor or near neighbor dares threaten it. You cannot imagine conquering it, because even the government of Brazil has not conquered its own country.
It is big enough that even the United States can push it around to only a limited degree.
Crime rates are high, but on the up side that gives the place a certain resiliency. People are used to bad events, and society is structured accordingly. You cannot write of “Brazil falling into dystopia” without generating a laugh.
If immigration bothers you (not my view), Brazil and Brazilian culture is not going to be swamped by people coming from somewhere else. For better or worse.
Brazil has “stayed Brazil” through both democracy and autocracy.
Worth a ponder. Here is an FT piece on “Brazil’s Dubai.”
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2026-03-02 13:13:45
Some observations and comments on Trump and Israel’s war on Iran:
1. Tehran is not looking for a ceasefire and has rejected outreach from Trump. The reason is that they believe they committed a mistake by agreeing to the ceasefire in June – it only enabled the US and Israel to restock and remobilize to launch war again. If they agree to a ceasefire now, they will only be attacked again in a few months.
2. For a ceasefire to be acceptable, it appears difficult for Tehran to agree to it until the cost to the US has become much higher than it currently is. Otherwise, the US will restart the war at a later point, the calculation reads.
3. Accordingly, Iran has shifted its strategy. It is striking Israel, but very differently from the June war. There is a constant level of attack throughout the day rather than a salvo of 50 missiles at once. Damage will be less, but that isn’t a problem because Tehran has concluded that Israel’s pain tolerance is very high – as long as the US stays in the war. So the focus shifts to the US.
4. From the outset, and perhaps surprisingly, Iran has been targeting US bases in the region, including against friendly states. Tehran calculates that the war can only end durably if the cost for the US rises dramatically, including American casualties. After the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran says it has no red lines left and will go all out in seeking the destruction of these bases and high American casualties.
5. Iran understands that many in the American security establishment had been convinced that Iran’s past restraint reflected weakness and an inability or unwillingness to face the US in a direct war. Tehran is now doing everything it can to demonstrate the opposite – despite the massive cost it itself will pay. Ironically, the assassination of Khamenei facilitated this shift.
6. One aspect of this is that Iran has now also struck bases in Cyprus, which have been used for attacks against Iran. Iran is well aware that this is an attack on a EU state. But that seems to be the point. Tehran appears intent on not only expanding the war into Persian Gulf states but also into Europe. Note the attack on the French base in the UAE. For the war to be able to end, Europe too has to pay a cost, the reasoning appears to be.
7. There appears to be only limited concern about the internal situation. The announcement of Khamenei’s death opened a window for people to pour onto the streets and seek to overthrow the regime. Though expressions of joy were widespread, no real mobilization was seen. That window is now closing, as the theocratic system closes ranks and establishes new formal leadership.
Again: The question “How will this end?” should have been asked before this war was triggered. It wasn’t.
That is from Trita Parsi, via B. Note that some people consider Parsi a biased source (not sufficiently anti-Iran?), in any case it is worth pondering how other parties may view the current situation.
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2026-03-02 01:15:27
2. UAE to cover expenses for affected travelers. And “emergency visas” are issued on the spot.
3. Abbas Amanat, Iran: A Modern History is for me (by far) the best general history of the country. I like the cover too.
4. From two weeks ago: “Perhaps there is a new “Trump doctrine,” namely to focus on going after lead individuals, rather than governments or institutional structures. We already did that in Venezuela, and there is talk of that being the approach in Iran. If so, that is a change in the nature of warfare, and of course others may copy it too, including against us. Is there a chance they have tried already?”
5. “Simple believers” in Ukraine shun the modern world (NYT).
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