2026-04-15 20:10:00
This is today’s edition of The Download, our weekday newsletter that provides a daily dose of what’s going on in the world of technology.
Just before Artemis II began its historic slingshot around the moon, NASA revealed an even grander space travel plan. By the end of 2028, the agency aims to fly a nuclear reactor-powered interplanetary spacecraft to Mars.
A successful mission would herald a new era in spaceflight—and might just give the US the edge in the race against China. But the project remains shrouded in mystery.
MIT Technology Review picked the brains of nuclear power and propulsion experts to find out how the nuclear-powered spacecraft might work. Here’s what we discovered.
—Robin George Andrews
This story is part of MIT Technology Review Explains, our series untangling the complex, messy world of technology to help you understand what’s coming next. You can read more from the series here.
Each year, we compile our 10 Breakthrough Technologies list, featuring our educated predictions for which technologies will change the world. Our 2026 list, however, was harder to wrangle than normal. Why? We had so many worthy AI candidates we couldn’t fit them all in!
That got us thinking: what if we made an entirely new list all about AI? Before we knew it, we had the beginnings of what we’re calling 10 Things That Matter in AI Right Now.
On April 21, we’ll unveil the list on stage at our signature AI conference, EmTech AI, and then publish it online later that day. If you want to be among the first to see it, join us at EmTech AI or become a subscriber to livestream the announcement.
Find out more about the list’s methodology and aims here.
—Niall Firth & Amy Nordrum
In January, a handful of volunteers were injected with two experimental gene therapies as part of an unusual clinical trial. Its long-term goal? To achieve radical human life extension.
The therapies are designed to support muscle growth. The company behind them, Unlimited Bio, also plans to trial similar therapies in the scalp (for baldness) and penis (for erectile dysfunction). But some experts are concerned about the plans.
Find out why the trial has divided opinion.
—Jessica Hamzelou
This is our latest story to be turned into an MIT Technology Review Narrated podcast, which we publish each week on Spotify and Apple Podcasts. Just navigate to MIT Technology Review Narrated on either platform, and follow us to get all our new content as it’s released.
The must-reads
I’ve combed the internet to find you today’s most fun/important/scary/fascinating stories about technology.
1 Google, Microsoft, and Meta track users even when they opt out
According to an independent audit, they may be racking up billions in fines. (404 Media)
+ How our digital devices put our privacy at risk. (Ars Technica)
+ Privacy’s next frontier is AI “memories.” (MIT Technology Review)
2 OpenAI has a new cybersecurity model—and strategy
GPT-5.4-Cyber is designed specifically for defensive cybersecurity work. (Reuters $)
+ OpenAI has joined Anthropic in focusing on cybersecurity recently. (Wired $)
+ Like Anthopic, its latest model is only available to verified testers. (NYT $)
+ AI is already making online crimes easier. It could get much worse. (MIT Technology Review)
3 Amazon is buying satellite firm Globalstar in a bid to rival Starlink
The $11.6 billion deal targets the lucrative satellite internet market. (WSJ $)
+ Apple has chosen Amazon satellites for iPhone. (Ars Technica)
4 What it’s like to live with an experimental brain implant
Early BCI users explain what the technology gives—and takes. (IEEE)
+ A patient with Neuralink got a boost from generative AI. (MIT Technology Review)
5 Dozens of AI disease-prediction models were trained on dubious data
A few might already have been used on patients. (Nature)
6 Uber is breaking from its gig economy model to avoid robotaxi disruption
It’s spending $10 billion to buy thousands of autonomous vehicles. (FT $)
7 xAI is being sued over data center pollution
Musk’s AI venture stands accused by the NAACP of violating the Clean Air Act. (Engadget)
+ No one wants a data center in their backyard. (MIT Technology Review)
8 Apple could win the AI race without running
It may reap the rewards of everyone else’s spending. (Axios)
9 How 4chan set a precedent for AI’s reasoning abilities
The notorious forum tested a feature called “chain of thought.” (The Atlantic $)
10 The surprising emotional toll of wearing Meta’s AI sunglasses
Their shortcomings are making users sad. (NYT $)
Quote of the day
—A copywriter tells the Guardian that they’re drowning in “workslop” — AI-generated work that seems polished but has major flaws
One More Thing
Bananas may not be chilled in the grocery store, but they’re the ultimate refrigerated fruit. It’s only thanks to a network of thermal control that they’ve become a global commodity. And that salad bag on the shelf? It’s not just a bag but a highly engineered respiratory apparatus.
According to Nicola Twilley—a contributor to the New Yorker and cohost of the podcast Gastropod—refrigeration has wrecked our food system. Thankfully, there are promising alternative preservation methods.
Read the full story on her research.
—Allison Arieff
We can still have nice things
A place for comfort, fun and distraction to brighten up your day. (Got any ideas? Drop me a line.)
+ Spotify only shows 10 popular songs per artist. This tool lists them all.
+ These GIF animations are mesmerizing loops of nostalgia.
+ This site beautifully visualizes Curiosity’s 13 years on Mars.
+ A retro-futurist designer has turned a NES console into a working synthesizer.
2026-04-15 19:26:12
From inside a money-laundering center in Cambodia, an employee opens a popular Vietnamese banking app on his phone. The app asks him to upload a photo associated with the account, so he clicks on a picture of a 30-something Asian man.
Next, the app requests to open the camera for a video “liveness” check. The scammer holds up a static image of a woman bearing no resemblance to the man who owns the account. After a 90-second wait—as the app tells him to readjust the face inside the frame—he’s in.
The exploit he’s demonstrating, in a video shared with me by a cyberscam researcher named Hieu Minh Ngo, is possible thanks to one of a growing range of illicit hacking services, readily available for purchase on Telegram, that are designed to break “Know Your Customer” (KYC) facial scans.
These banking and crypto safeguards are supposed to confirm that an account belongs to a real person, and that the user’s face matches the identity documents that were provided to open the account. But scammers are bypassing them in order to open mule accounts and launder money. Rather than using a live phone camera feed for a liveness check, the hacks typically deploy a tool known as a virtual camera. Users can replace the video stream with other videos or photos—depicting a real or deepfake person or even an object.
As financial institutions enact enhanced security measures aimed at stopping cyberscammers, these workarounds are the latest round in the cat-and-mouse game between criminal operators and the financial services industry.
Over the course of a two-month investigation earlier this year, MIT Technology Review identified 22 Chinese-, Vietnamese-, and English-language public Telegram channels and groups advertising bypass kits and stolen biometric data. The software kits use a variety of methods to compromise phone operating systems and banking applications, claiming to enable users to get around the compliance checks imposed by financial institutions ranging from major crypto exchanges such as Binance to name-brand banks like Spain’s BBVA.
“Specializing in bank services—handling dirty money,” reads the since-deleted Telegram bio of the program used by the Cambodian launderer, complete with a thumbs-up emoji. “Secure. Professional. High quality.” Some of the channels and groups had thousands of subscribers or members, and many posted bullet points listing their services (“All kinds of KYC verification services”; “It’s all smooth and seamless”) alongside videos purporting to show successful hacks.
Telegram says that after reviewing the accounts, it removed them for violating its terms of service. But such online marketplaces proliferate easily, and multiple channels and groups advertising similar tools remain active.
The rise in KYC bypasses has occurred alongside an expansion of a global industry in “pig-butchering” cyberscams. Crypto platforms and banks around the world are facing increasing scrutiny over the flow of illegally obtained money, including profits from such scams, through their platforms. This has prompted tightened banking regulations in countries such as Vietnam and Thailand, where governments have increased customer verification and fraud monitoring requirements and are pushing for stronger anti-money-laundering safeguards in the crypto industry.
Chainalysis, a US blockchain analysis firm, estimates that around $17 billion was stolen in 2025 in crypto scams and fraud, up from $13 billion in 2024. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, meanwhile, warned in a recent report that the expansion of Asian scam syndicates in Africa and the Pacific has helped the industry “dramatically scale up profits.”
That combination of factors—more scrutiny, but also more revenue—has vaulted KYC bypasses to the center of the online marketplace for cyberscam and casino money launderers. Although estimates vary, cybersecurity researchers say these kinds of attacks are rising: The biometrics verification company iProov estimated that virtual-camera attacks were more than 25 times as common worldwide 2024 than in 2023, while Sumsub, a company providing KYC services, reported that “sophisticated” or multi-step fraud attempts, including virtual-camera bypasses, almost tripled last year among its clients.
Three financial institutions that were named as targets on such Telegram channels—the world’s largest crypto exchange, Binance, as well as BBVA and UK-based Revolut—told me they’re aware of such bypasses and emphasize that they’re an industry-wide challenge. A spokesperson from Binance said it has “observed attempts of this nature to circumvent our controls,” adding that “we have successfully prevented such attacks and remain confident in our systems.” BBVA and Revolut also declined to comment on whether their safeguards had been breached.
It’s difficult to estimate success rates, because companies may not be aware of bypasses—or report them—until later. “What’s important is what we don’t see,” Artem Popov, Sumsub’s head of fraud prevention products, told me, referring to attacks that go undetected. “There’s always part of the story where it might be completely hidden from our eyes, and from the eyes of any company in the industry, using any type of KYC provider.”
Advertisements for the exploits appear simple enough, but on the back end, building a successful bypass is complex and often involves multiple methods. Some channels offer to jailbreak a physical phone so that scammers can trigger the use of a virtual camera (VCam) instead of the built-in one whenever they’d like. Other hacks inject code known as a “hooking framework” into a financial institution’s app that triggers the VCam to open. Either way, VCams can be used to dupe KYC safeguards with images or videos that replace genuine, live video of the account’s owner.
Sergiy Yakymchuk, CEO of Talsec, a cybersecurity company that primarily serves financial institutions, reviewed details from the Telegram channels identified by MIT Technology Review and says they are consistent with successful tactics used against his banking and crypto clients. His team received help requests from banks and exchanges for roughly 30 VCam-based hacks over the past year, up from fewer than 10 in 2023.
Increasingly, hackers compromise both the phone itself and the code of the financial institutions’ apps before feeding the virtual camera a mix of stolen biometrics and deepfakes, Yakymchuk says.
“Some time ago, it was enough to decompile the app of a bank and distribute this on Telegram, and that was everything you needed,” he says. “Now it’s not enough, because you have KYC—and more and more things are needed.”
For money launderers, KYC bypasses have “become essential for everything right now—because scam compounds need to move money,” says Ngo, the researcher who shared the demo video. A convicted former hacker who became a cybersecurity advisor for the Vietnamese government, Ngo now runs an anti-scam nonprofit and helps law enforcement investigate money laundering.
He describes how the process works in the case of pig-butchering scams: Funds originating with victims are received into bank accounts controlled or rented by a money-laundering network, known colloquially as “water houses.” Money launderers use KYC bypasses to access the accounts and quickly redistribute the profits before converting them into digital assets—typically in the form of the stablecoin Tether, a type of cryptocurrency that is pegged to the US dollar.
These transactions often happen in seconds, under tightly orchestrated management. “They know, very clearly, the flow of how the banks verify or authenticate accounts,” Ngo says.
The growth of cyberscam money laundering has led to heightened scrutiny of financial institutions. In 2023, Binance pleaded guilty in US federal courts to operating without anti-money-laundering safeguards. Donald Trump pardoned former Binance CEO Chaopeng Zhao last October.
Recent analysis from the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists found that after Zhao’s guilty plea, more than $400 million continued to move to Binance from Huione Group, a Cambodia-based firm that the US sanctioned after the Treasury Department deemed it a “critical node” for money laundering in pig-butchering scams.
Binance says it has “state-of-the-art security systems” that prevented billions in fraud losses and that the company processed more than 71,000 law enforcement requests in 2025.
But John Griffin, a finance and blockchain expert at the University of Texas at Austin, does not think the exchanges are sufficiently secure. “Even though they have all this press about ‘Oh, yes, we’ve changed this and that’—well, the proof is in the pudding. The criminals are still using your exchange,” Griffin told me of the industry at large. “So there must be holes.” (Binance says it “objects to the dubious findings” of Griffin’s work tracking the flow of criminal profits across exchanges like Binance, Huobi, OKX, and Tokenlon, calling it “misleading at best and, at worst, wildly inaccurate.”)
Binance also pointed out that some purported bypass services are themselves scams, casting doubt on whether successful bypasses are as widespread as the Telegram marketplace may suggest. Engaging with such services “exposes individuals to significant security risks,” a spokesperson said. “Even where access appears to be granted, accounts are often already restricted by internal detection and compliance controls, rendering them nonfunctional for trading or withdrawals.”
Regulators around the world are trying to catch up. In Thailand, where citizens’ bank accounts regularly serve as money mules for cyberscams based in neighboring Myanmar and Cambodia, new legislation has enhanced KYC monitoring, limited daily transactions, and strengthened oversight bodies’ ability to suspend accounts. The US money-laundering regulator, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, issued a warning against KYC deepfakes and the use of VCams in late 2024, encouraging platforms to track broader transaction patterns to identify money laundering.
For scammers, any new security or reporting requirements will make bypasses harder, but “it’s not going to stop them,” Ngo says. “It’s just a matter of time.”
2026-04-15 17:00:00
For four days in February 2019, some 30 synthetic biologists and ethicists hunkered down at a conference center in Northern Virginia to brainstorm high-risk, cutting-edge, irresistibly exciting ideas that the National Science Foundation should fund. By the end of the meeting, they’d landed on a compelling contender: making “mirror” bacteria. Should they come to be, the lab-created microbes would be structured and organized like ordinary bacteria, with one important exception: Key biological molecules like proteins, sugars, and lipids would be the mirror images of those found in nature. DNA, RNA, and many other components of living cells are chiral, which means they have a built-in rotational structure. Their mirrors would twist in the opposite direction.
Researchers thrilled at the prospect. “Everybody—everybody—thought this was cool,” says John Glass, a synthetic biologist at the J. Craig Venter Institute in La Jolla, California, who attended the 2019 workshop and is a pioneer in developing synthetic cells. It was “an incredibly difficult project that would tell us potentially new things about how to design and build cells, or about the origin of life on Earth.” The group saw enormous potential for medicine, too. Mirror microbes might be engineered as biological factories, producing mirror molecules that could form the basis for new kinds of drugs. In theory, such therapeutics could perform the same functions as their natural counterparts, but without triggering unwelcome immune responses.
After the meeting, the biologists recommended NSF funding for a handful of research groups to develop tools and carry out preliminary experiments, the beginnings of a path through the looking glass. The excitement was global. The National Natural Science Foundation of China funded major projects in mirror biology, as did the German Federal Ministry of Research, Technology, and Space.
By five years later, in 2024, many researchers involved in that NSF meeting had reversed course. They’d become convinced that in the worst of all possible futures, mirror organisms could trigger a catastrophic event threatening every form of life on Earth; they’d proliferate without predators and evade the immune defenses of people, plants, and animals.
“I wish that one sunny afternoon we were having coffee and we realized the world’s about to end, but that’s not what happened.”
Kate Adamala, synthetic biologist, University of Minnesota
Over the past two years, they’ve been ringing alarm bells. They published an article in Science in December 2024, accompanied by a 299-page technical report addressing feasibility and risks. They’ve written essays and convened panels and cofounded the Mirror Biology Dialogues Fund (MBDF), a broadly funded nonprofit charged with supporting work on understanding and addressing the risk. The issue has received a blaze of media attention and ignited dialogues among not only chemists and synthetic biologists but also bioethicists and policymakers.
What’s received less attention, however, is how we got here and what uncertainties still remain about any potential threat. Creating a mirror-life organism would be tremendously complicated and expensive. And although the scientific community is taking the alarm seriously, some scientists doubt whether it’s even possible to create a mirror organism anytime soon. “The hypothetical creation of mirror-image organisms lies far beyond the reach of present-day science,” says Ting Zhu, a molecular biologist at Westlake University, in China, whose lab focuses on synthesizing mirror-image peptides and other molecules. He and others have urged colleagues not to let speculation and anxiety guide decision-making and argued that it’s premature to call for a broad moratorium on early-stage research, which they say could have medical benefits.
But the researchers who are raising flags describe a pathway, even multiple pathways, to bringing mirror life into existence—and they say we urgently need guardrails to figure out what kinds of mirror-biology research might still be safe. That means they’re facing a question that others have encountered before, multiple times over the last several decades and with mixed results—one that doesn’t have a neat home in the scientific method. What should scientists do when they see the shadow of the end of the world in their own research?
The French chemist and microbiologist Louis Pasteur was the first to recognize that biological molecules had built-in handedness. In the late 19th century, he described all living species as “functions of cosmic asymmetry.” What would happen, he mused, if one could replace these chiral components with their mirror opposites?
Scientists now recognize that chirality is central to life itself, though no one knows why. In humans, 19 of the 20 so-called “standard” amino acids that make up proteins are chiral, and all in the same way. (The outlier, glycine, is symmetrical.) The functions of proteins are intricately tied to their shapes, and they mostly interact with other molecules through chiral structures. Almost all receptors on the surface of a cell are chiral. During an infection, the immune system’s sentinels use chirality to detect and bind to antigens—substances that trigger an immune response—and to start the process of building antibodies.
By the late 20th century, researchers had begun to explore the idea of reversing chirality. In 1992, one team reported having synthesized the first mirror-image protein. That, in turn, set off the first clarion call about the risk: In response to the discovery, chemists at Purdue University pointed out, briefly, that mirror-life organisms, if they escaped from a lab, would be immune to any attack by “normal” life. A 2010 story in Wired highlighting early findings in the area noted that if a such a microbe developed the ability to photosynthesize, it could obliterate life as we know it.
The synthetic biology community didn’t seriously weigh those threats then, says David Relman, a specialist who bridges infectious disease and microbiology at Stanford University and a trailblazer in studying the gut and oral microbiomes. The idea of a mirror microbe seemed too far beyond the actual progress on proteins. “This was almost a solely theoretical argument 20 years ago,” he says.
Now the research landscape has changed.
Scientists are quickly making progress on mirror images of the machinery cells use to make proteins and to self-replicate. Those components include DNA, which encodes the recipes for proteins; DNA polymerases, which help copy genetic material; and RNA, which carries recipes to ribosomes, the cell’s protein factories. If researchers could make self-replicating mirror ribosomes, then they would have an efficient way to produce mirror proteins. That could be used as a biological manufacturing method for therapeutics. But embedded in a self-replicating, metabolizing synthetic cell, all these pieces could give rise to a mirror microbe.
When synthetic biologists convened in Northern Virginia in 2019, they didn’t recognize how quickly the technology was advancing, and if they saw a threat at all, it may have been obscured by the blinding appeal of pushing the science forward. What’s become apparent now, says Glass, is that scientists in different disciplines, all related to mirror life, were largely unaware of what other scientists had been doing. Chemists didn’t know that synthetic biologists had made so much progress on creating mirror cells with natural chirality from scratch. Biologists didn’t appreciate that chemists were building ever-larger mirror macromolecules. “We tend to be siloed,” Glass says. And nobody, he says, had thought to seriously examine the immune system concerns that had already been raised in response to earlier work. “There was not an immunologist or an infectious disease person in the room,” Glass says, reflecting on the 2019 meeting. “I may have come closest, given that I work with pathogenic bacteria and viruses,” he adds, but his work doesn’t address how they cause infections in their hosts.
These scientists also didn’t know that around the same time as their meeting, another conversation about mirror life was happening—a darker dialogue that was as focused on danger as it was on discovery. Starting around 2016, researchers with a nonprofit called Open Philanthropy had begun compiling research files on catastrophic biological risks. The organization, which rebranded as Coefficient Giving in 2025, funds projects across a range of focus areas; it adheres to a divisive philanthropic philosophy called effective altruism, which advocates giving money to projects with the highest potential benefit to the most people. While that might not sound objectionable, critics point out that the metrics devotees use to gauge “effectiveness” can prioritize long-term solutions while neglecting social injustices or systemic problems.
Someone in Open Philanthropy’s biosecurity group had suggested looking into the risks posed by mirror life. In 2019 the organization began funding research by Kevin Esvelt, who leads the Sculpting Evolution group at the MIT Media Lab, on biosecurity issues, including mirror life. He began reading up to see whether mirror life was something to worry about.
Esvelt made waves in 2013 for pioneering the use of CRISPR to develop a gene drive, a technology that could spread genetic changes introduced into a living organism through a whole population. Researchers are exploring its use, for example, to make mosquitoes hostile to the parasite that causes malaria—and, as a result, lower their chance of spreading it to humans. But almost immediately after he developed the tool, Esvelt argued against using it for profit, at least until proper safeguards could be set and its use in fighting malaria had been established. “Do you really have the right to run an experiment where if you screw up, it affects the whole world?” he asked, in this magazine, in 2016. At the Media Lab, Esvelt leads efforts to safely develop gene drives that can be deployed locally but prevented from spreading globally.
Esvelt says he’s often thinking about the security risks posed by self-sustaining genetically engineered technologies, and research led him to suspect that the threat of mirror organisms hadn’t been seriously interrogated. The more he learned about microbial growth rates, predator-prey and microbe-microbe interactions, and immunology, the more he began to worry that mirror organisms, if impervious to the innate defenses of natural ones, could cause unstoppable infections in the event that they escaped the lab.
Even if the first experimental iteration of such a germ were too fragile to survive in the environment or a human body, Esvelt says, it would be a light lift to genetically engineer new, more resilient versions with existing technology. Even worse, he says, the results could be weaponized. The possible path from 2019 to global annihilation seemed almost too direct, he found.
But he wasn’t an expert in all the scientific fields involved in research on mirror life, so he started making calls. He first described his concerns to Relman one night in February 2022, at a restaurant outside Washington, DC. Esvelt hoped Relman would tell him he was wrong, that he’d missed something over the years of gathering data. Instead, he was troubled.
When Relman returned to California, he read more about the technology, the risks, and the role of chirality in the immune system and the environment. And he consulted experts he knew well—ecologists, other microbiologists, immunologists, all of them leaders in their fields—in an attempt to assuage his concerns. “I was hoping that they’d be able to say, I’ve thought about this, and I see a problem with your logic. I see that it’s really not so bad,” he says. “At every turn, that did not happen. Something about it was new to every person.”
The concern spread. Relman worked with Jack Szostak, a professor of chemistry at the University of Chicago, and a group of researchers to see if it was possible to make an argument that mirror life wasn’t going to wipe out humanity. Included in that group was Kate Adamala, a synthetic biologist at the University of Minnesota. She was a natural choice: Adamala had shared the initial grant from the NSF, in 2019, to explore mirror-life technologies.
She also became convinced the risk was real—and was dumbfounded that she hadn’t seen it earlier. “I wish that one sunny afternoon we were having coffee and we realized the world’s about to end, but that’s not what happened,” she says. “I’m embarrassed to admit that I wasn’t even the one that brought up the risks first.” Through late 2023 and early 2024, the endeavor began to take on the form of a rigorous scientific investigation. Experts were presented with a hypothesis—namely, that if mirror cells were built, they would pose an existential threat—and asked to challenge it. The goal was to falsify the hypothesis. “It would be great if we were wrong,” says Vaughn Cooper, a microbiologist at the University of Pittsburgh and president-elect of the American Society for Microbiology.
Relman says that as the chemists and biologists learned more about one another’s work and began to understand what immunologists know about how living things defend themselves, they started to connect the dots and see an emerging picture of an unstoppable synthetic threat.
Some scientists have pushed back against the doomsday scenario, suggesting that the case against mirror life offers an “inflated view of the danger.”
Timothy Hand, an immunologist at the University of Pittsburgh who hadn’t participated in the 2019 NSF meeting, wasn’t initially worried when he heard about mirror life, in 2024. “The mammalian immune system has this incredible capability to make antibodies against any shape,” he says. “Who cares if it’s a mirror?” But when he took a closer look at that process, he could see a cascade of potential problems far upstream of antibody production. Start with detection: Macrophages, which are cells the immune system uses to identify and dispatch invaders, use chiral sensing receptors on their surfaces. The proteins they use to grab on to those invaders, too, are chiral. That suggests the possibility that an organism could be infected with a mirror organism but not be able to detect it or defend against it. “The lack of innate immune sensing is an incredibly dangerous circumstance for the host,” Hand says.
By early 2024, Glass had become concerned as well. Relman and James Wagstaff, a structural biologist from Open Philanthropy, visited him at the Venter Institute to talk about the possibility of using synthetic cell technology—Glass’s specialty—to build mirror life. “At first I thought, This can’t be real,” Glass says. They walked through arguments and counterarguments. “The more this went on, the more I started feeling ill,” he says. “It made me realize that work I had been doing for much of the last 20 years could be setting the world up for this incredible catastrophe.”
In the second half of 2024, the growing group of scientists assembled the report and wrote the policy forum for Science. Relman briefed policymakers at the White House, members of the defense community, and the National Security Agency. Researchers met with the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation. “We briefed the United Nations, the UK government, the government of Singapore, scientific funding organizations from Brazil,” says Glass. “We’ve talked to the Chinese government indirectly. We were trying to not blindside anybody.”
A year and a half on, the push has had an impact. UNESCO has recommended a precautionary global moratorium on creating mirror-life cells, and major philanthropic organizations that fund science, including the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, have announced they will not finance research leading to a mirror microorganism. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists highlighted considerations about mirror life in its most recent report on the Doomsday Clock. In March, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Scientific Advisory Board issued a brief highlighting the risks—noting, for example, that recent progress on building mirror molecules could reduce the cost of creating a mirror microbe.
“I think no one really believes at this stage that we should make mirror life, based on the evidence that’s available,” says James Smith, the scientist who leads the MBDF, the nonprofit focused on assessing the risks of mirror life, which is funded by Coefficient Giving, the Sloan Foundation, and other organizations. The challenge now, Smith says, is for scientists to work with policymakers and bioethicists to figure out how much research on mirror life should be permitted—and who will enforce the rules.
Not everyone is convinced that mirror organisms pose an existential threat. It’s difficult to verify predictions about how mirror microbes would fare in the immune system—or the larger world—without running experiments on them. Some scientists have pushed back against the doomsday scenario, suggesting that the case against mirror life offers an “inflated view of the danger.” Others have noted that carbohydrates called glycans already exist in both left- and right-handed forms—even in pathogens—and the immune system can recognize both of them. Experiments focused on interactions between the immune system and mirror molecules, they say, could help clarify the risks of mirror organisms and reduce uncertainty.
Even among those convinced that the worst-case scenario is possible, researchers still disagree over where to draw the line. What inquiries should be allowed and what should be prohibited?
Andy Ellington, a biotechnologist and synthetic biologist at the University of Texas at Austin, doesn’t think mirror organisms will come to fruition anytime soon. Even if they do, he isn’t sure they will pose a threat. “If there is going to be harm done to the human race, this is about position 382 on my list,” he says. But at the same time, he says it’s a complicated issue worth studying more, and he wants to see the conversations continue: “We’re operating in a space where there’s so much unknown that it’s very difficult for us to do risk assessment.”
Even among those convinced that the worst-case scenario is possible, researchers still disagree over where to draw the line. What inquiries should be allowed and what should be prohibited?
Adamala, of the University of Minnesota, and others see a natural line at ribosomes, the cellular factories that transform chains of amino acids into proteins. These would be a critical ingredient in creating a self-replicating organism, and Adamala says the path to getting there once mirror ribosomes are in place would be pretty straightforward. But Zhu, at Westlake, and others counter that it’s worth developing mirror ribosomes because they could possibly produce medically useful peptides and proteins more efficiently than traditional chemical methods. He sees a clear distinction, and a foundational gap, between that kind of technology and the creation of a living synthetic organism. “It is crucial to distinguish mirror-image molecular biology from mirror-image life,” he says. That said, he points out that many synthetic molecules and organisms containing unnatural components, including but not limited to the mirror-image subset, might pose health risks. Researchers, he says, should focus on developing holistic guidelines to cover such risks—not just those from mirror molecules.
Even if the exact risk remains uncertain, Esvelt remains more convinced than ever that the work should be paused, perhaps indefinitely. No one has taken a meaningful swing at the hypothesis that mirror life could wipe out everything, he says. The primary uncertainties aren’t around whether mirror life is dangerous, he points out; they have more to do with identifying which bacterium—including what genes it encodes, what it eats, how it evades the immune system’s sentinels—could lead to the most serious consequences. “The risk of losing everything, like the entire future of humanity integrated over time, is not worth any small fraction of the economy. You just don’t muck around with existential risk like that,” he says.
In some ways, scientists have been here before, working out rules and limits for research. Two years after the start of the covid-19 pandemic, for example, the World Health Organization published guidelines for managing risks in biological research. But the history is much deeper: Horrific episodes of human experimentation led to the establishment of institutional review boards to provide ethical oversight. In the early 1970s, in response to concerns over lab-acquired infections and growing use of biological warfare, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention established biohazard safety levels (BSLs), which govern work on potentially dangerous biological experiments.
And in 1975—at the dawn of recombinant DNA research, which allows researchers to put genetic material from one organism into another—geneticists met at the Asilomar conference center in Pacific Grove, California, to hammer out rules governing the work. There were concerns over what would happen if some virus or bacterium, genetically engineered to have traits that would make it particularly dangerous for people, escaped from a lab. Scientists agreed to self-imposed restrictions, like a moratorium on research until new safety guidelines were in place. As a result of the meeting, in June 1976 the NIH issued rules that, among other things, categorized the risks associated with rDNA experiments and aligned them with the newly adopted BSL system.
Asilomar is often hailed as a successful model for scientific self-governance. But that perception reflects a tendency to recall the meeting through a nostalgic haze. “In fact, it was incredibly messy and human,” says Luis Campos, a historian of science at Rice University. Equally brilliant Nobelists argued on either side of the question of whether to rein in rDNA research. Technical discussions dominated; talks about who would be affected by the technology were missing. The meeting didn’t start establishing guidelines, says Campos, until the lawyers mentioned liability and lab leaks.
For now it’s unclear whether these examples of self-governance, which arose from the demonstrated risks of existing technologies, hold useful lessons for the mirror-life community. Three competing images of the future are coming into focus: Mirror life might not be possible, it might be possible but not threatening, or it might be possible and capable of obliterating all life on Earth.
Scientists may be censoring themselves out of fear and speculation. To some, shutting down the work seems necessary and urgent; to others, it is unnecessarily limiting. What’s clear is that the question of what to do about mirror life has been both illuminating and disorienting, pushing scientists to interrogate not only their current research but where it might lead. This is uncharted territory.
Stephen Ornes is a science writer based in Nashville, Tennessee.
2026-04-15 14:00:00
The practice of privacy-led user experience (UX) is a design philosophy that treats transparency around data collection and usage as an integral part of the customer relationship. An undertapped opportunity in digital marketing, privacy-led UX treats user consent not as a tick-box compliance exercise, but rather as the first overture in an ongoing customer relationship. For the companies that get it right, the payoff can bring something more intangible, valuable, and durable than simple consent rates: consumer trust.
The opportunities of privacy-led UX have only recently come into focus. Adelina Peltea, the chief marketing officer at Usercentrics, has seen enterprise sentiment shift: “Even just a few years ago, this space was viewed more as a trade-off between growth and compliance,” she says. “But as the market has matured, there’s been a greater focus on how to tie well-designed privacy experiences to business growth.”
And it turns out that well-designed, value-forward consent experiences routinely outperform initial estimates.
Touchpoints for privacy-led UX often include consent management platforms, terms and conditions, privacy policies, data subject access request (DSAR) tools, and, increasingly, AI data use disclosures.
This report examines how data transparency builds trust with customers; how this, in turn, can support business performance; and how organizations can maintain this trust even as AI systems add complexity to consent processes.
Key findings include the following:
This content was produced by Insights, the custom content arm of MIT Technology Review. It was not written by MIT Technology Review’s editorial staff. It was researched, designed, and written by human writers, editors, analysts, and illustrators. This includes the writing of surveys and collection of data for surveys. AI tools that may have been used were limited to secondary production processes that passed thorough human review.
2026-04-15 02:00:00
Software engineering has experienced two seismic shifts this century. First was the rise of the open source movement, which gradually made code accessible to developers and engineers everywhere. Second, the adoption of development operations (DevOps) and agile methodologies took software from siloed to collaborative development and from batch to continuous delivery. Now, a third such shift looks to be taking shape with the adoption of agentic AI in software engineering.
Thus far, engineering teams have mainly used AI to assist with coding, testing, and other individual tasks, within tightly designed parameters. But with agentic capabilities, AI agents become reasoning, self-directing entities that can manage not just discrete tasks but entire software projects—and do so largely autonomously. If adopted and fully embraced by engineering teams, agentic AI will usher in end-to-end software process automation and, ultimately, agent-managed development and product lifecycle automation.
This report, which is based on a survey of 300 engineering and technology executives, finds that software engineering teams are seeing the potential in agentic AI and are beginning to put it to use, but so far in a mainly limited fashion. Their ambitions for it are high, but most realize it will take time and effort to reduce the barriers to its full diffusion in software operations. As with DevOps and agile, reaping the full benefits of agentic AI in engineering will require sometimes difficult organizational and process change to accompany technology adoption. But the gains to be won in speed, efficiency, and quality promise to make any such pain well worthwhile.
Key findings include the following:
Adoption momentum is building. While half of organizations deem agentic AI a top investment priority for software engineering today, it will be a leading investment for over four-fifths in two years. That spending is driving accelerated adoption. Agentic AI is in (mostly limited) use by 51% of software teams today, and 45% have plans to adopt it within the next 12 months.
Early gains will be incremental. It will take time for software teams’ investments in agentic AI to start bearing fruit. Over the next two years, most expect the improvements from agent use to be slight (14%) or at best moderate (52%). But around one-third (32%) have higher expectations, and 9% think the improvements will be game changing.
Agents will accelerate time-to-market. The chief gains from agentic AI use over that two-year time frame will come from greater speed. Nearly all respondents (98%) expect their teams’ delivery of software projects from pilot to production to accelerate, with the anticipated increase in speed averaging 37% across the group.
The goal for most is full agentic lifecycle management. Teams’ ambitions for scaling agentic AI are high. Most aim for AI agents to be managing the product development and software development lifecycles (PDLC and SDLC) end to end relatively quickly. At 41% of organizations, teams aim to achieve this for most or all products in 18 months. That figure will rise to 72% two years from now, if expectations are met.
Compute costs and integration pose key early challenges. For all survey respondents—but especially in early-adopter verticals such as media and entertainment and technology hardware—integrating agents with existing applications and the cost of computing resources are the main challenges they face with agentic AI in software engineering. The experts we interviewed, meanwhile, emphasize the bigger change management difficulties teams will face in changing workflows.
This content was produced by Insights, the custom content arm of MIT Technology Review. It was not written by MIT Technology Review’s editorial staff. It was researched, designed, and written by human writers, editors, analysts, and illustrators. This includes the writing of surveys and collection of data for surveys. AI tools that may have been used were limited to secondary production processes that passed thorough human review.
2026-04-14 20:10:00
This is today’s edition of The Download, our weekday newsletter that provides a daily dose of what’s going on in the world of technology.
If you’re following AI news, you’re probably getting whiplash. AI is a gold rush. AI is a bubble. AI is taking your job. AI can’t even read a clock. Stanford’s 2026 AI Index—the field’s annual report card—cuts through the noise.
The data reveals a technology evolving faster than we can manage. From the China-US rivalry and model breakthroughs to public sentiment and the impact on jobs, here are the index’s key findings on the state of AI today.
—Michelle Kim
Stanford’s 2026 AI Index is full of striking stats. It also reveals a field riddled with inconsistencies, most notably in the gap between experts and non-experts.
On jobs, 73% of US experts view AI’s impact positively, compared to just 23% of the public. Similar divides emerged on the economy and healthcare. What’s driving this disconnect?
Part of the answer may lie in their diverging experiences. Those using AI for coding and technical work see it at its best, while everyone else gets a more mixed bag. The result is two very different realities. Read the full story on what they are—and why they matter.
This story is from The Algorithm, our weekly newsletter on AI. Sign up to receive it in your inbox every Monday.
—Will Douglas Heaven
Grizzly bears have made such a comeback across eastern Montana that in 2017, the state hired its first-ever prairie-based grizzly manager: wildlife biologist Wesley Sarmento.
For seven years, Sarmento worked to keep both bears and humans out of trouble. He acted like a first responder, trying to defuse potentially dangerous situations. He even got caught in some himself, which led him to a new wildlife safety tool: drones. Find out the results of his experiments in digital ecology.
—Emily Senkosky
This article is from the next issue of our print magazine, which is all about nature. Subscribe now to read it when it lands on Wednesday, April 22.
The must-reads
I’ve combed the internet to find you today’s most fun/important/scary/fascinating stories about technology.
1 Human scientists still trounce the top AI agents at complex tasks
The best agents perform only half as well as experts with PhDs. (Nature)
+ Can AI really help us discover new materials? (MIT Technology Review)
2 OpenAI is escalating its fight with Anthropic while pulling away from Microsoft
A leaked memo exposes plans to attack Anthropic. (Axios)
+ And says Microsoft “limited our ability” to reach clients. (The Information $)
+ While touting a budding alliance with Amazon. (CNBC)
3 Carbon removal technology is stalling—and that may be good news
Better solutions could now emerge. (New Scientist)
+ Here are three that are set to break through. (MIT Technology Review)
4 AI is finding bugs faster than we can fix them—and hackers will benefit
Welcome to the bug armageddon. (WSJ $)
+ AI may soon be capable of fully automated attacks. (MIT Technology Review)
5 A Texas man has been charged with the attempted murder of Sam Altman
He allegedly threw a Molotov cocktail at the OpenAI CEO’s home last Friday. (NPR)
+ The suspect reportedly had a list of other AI leaders. (NYT $)
6 AI is beginning to transform mathematics
It’s proving new results at a rapid pace. (Quanta)
+ One AI startup plans to unearth new mathematical patterns. (MIT Technology Review)
7 Students are turning away from computer science
It’s had a massive drop in enrollments. (WP $)
+ AI coding tools have diminished the degree’s value. (NYT $)
8 India’s bid to become a data center hub is sparking a fierce backlash
Farmers are protesting Delhi’s courtship of hyperscalers. (Rest of World)
9 Meta is set to overtake Google in advertising revenue this year
And become the world’s largest digital ad platform for the first time. (WSJ)
10 AI influencers are taking over Coachella
Synthetic content creators are “everywhere” at the festival. (The Verge)
Quote of the day
—The alleged firebomber of Sam Altman’s home shares his distrust of AI leaders in a blog post.
One More Thing
A few years ago, Brad Lowell, a Harvard University neuroscientist, figured out how to crank the food drive to the maximum. He did it by stimulating neurons in mice. Now, he’s following known parts of the neural hunger circuits into uncharted parts of the brain.
The work could have important implications for public health. More than 1.9 billion adults worldwide are overweight, and more than 650 million are obese. Understanding the circuits involved could shed new light on why these numbers are skyrocketing.
—Adam Piore
We can still have nice things
A place for comfort, fun and distraction to brighten up your day. (Got any ideas? Drop me a line.)
Top image credit: Stephanie Arnett/MIT Technology Review | Getty Images
+ Someone built a mechanical version of Tony Hawk’s Pro Skater from Lego.
+ Enjoy this wholesome clip of toddlers discovering the existence of hugs.
+ This interactive body map shows exactly which exercises you need.
+ Jon McCormack’s photos of nature’s patterns are breathtaking.
