2025-12-12 22:55:40
Over the past five years, regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have launched the most sweeping antitrust offensive since the breakup of American telephone monopoly AT&T. They have opened cases against Google, Meta, Apple, and Amazon, arguing that these companies stifle competition, and request radical remedies, including forced selloffs.
Yet a reckoning looks unlikely. Recent rulings suggest shifts in digital marketplaces are weakening the antitrust cases. The time-lag between complaint and remedy spans years. In between, new competitors and technologies have emerged, most importantly in artificial intelligence.
Start with Meta. In December 2020, the US government alleged that the social media company’s acquisitions of Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014 stifled competition and requested divestitures. US federal judge James Boasberg disagreed. He ruled that Meta does not currently hold monopoly power in social networking, citing the rapid rise of rival platforms such as TikTok and YouTube.
Continue with Google. In 2020, the US Department of Justice sued the company for maintaining a search monopoly through default deals on browsers and mobile devices. Judge Amit Mehta found that Google illegally monopolized search. Yet Judge Mehta backed away from demanding that the search company be broken up by selling its Chrome browser.
AI shaped his decision. OpenAI and others have built powerful chatbots that threaten to replace traditional search engines with immediate answers. Google itself has embedded AI at the top of its search results, and Judge Mehta wrote in his ruling that the emergence of generative AI “changed the course of this case.”
Apple’s battle began in 2020 when Epic Games challenged its App Store commissions and steering policies. Four years later, the Justice Department, supported by 16 states, accused the company of running an illegal “walled garden” over the smartphone market. In April 2025, Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers ruled that Apple must stop collecting a commission on some app sales. Apple appealed, and in December 2025, a court reversed parts of the previous court order, ruling them overbroad.
Litigation also remains open against Amazon. Two years ago, the FTC and 17 states accused the e-commerce leader of self-preferencing, forcing disadvantageous fees and fulfillment/Prime obligations on sellers.
Across the Atlantic, the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) imposes structural obligations on designated “gatekeepers,” and has already fined Apple €500 million over its App store commission and €200 million over its plan to force users to either consent to personalized ads or pay a subscription fee. European regulators have launched new investigations into cloud computing services, including Amazon Web Services and Microsoft.
All told, the EU today is pursuing a total of 45 antitrust cases against US tech, which in some cases leave open the possibility of breakups. It fined Google €2.95 billion this year for abusing its monopoly in AdTech, stipulating that its concerns could only be resolved if Google ceded control of its market-leading ad tech tools. Google responded with product and tech changes that would not require divestitures and is appealing. A similar case over Google AdTech is taking place in the US, where Google has made a similar offer that falls short of requested sell-offs.
Although these cases will take years to resolve and the ultimate outcome remains uncertain, the overall trend looks clear: US judges and European regulators remain reluctant to force structural separations. Antitrust enforcement must contend with market evolution that moves faster than litigation. What is dominant at the time of an acquisition or lawsuit may no longer be dominant by the time of trial and verdict.
Both regulators and courts are factoring the role of innovation, and are increasingly aware that AI is undermining the so-called monopolies regulators seek to unwind. Instead of breakups, behavior-based remedies — data-sharing mandates, fair default rules, prohibition of exclusivity — are emerging as more realistic options.
Looking back, landmark antitrust cases — such as the breakup of Standard Oil Company and AT&T — reshaped critical industries at times when technological trajectories were relatively stable. In contrast, today’s digital sector reorganizes on much shorter time spans.
After US judges ruled in 2000 that Microsoft used its Windows monopoly to stifle competition by bunding Internet Explorer, the initial court order to break up the company was overturned on appeal. A settlement imposed restrictions on Microsoft’s business practices, while Google, Apple, and others succeeded in breaking the company’s control over Internet browsing and mobile phones.
The current wave of cases looks set to end in a similar fashion. Courts are wary of crafting solutions for markets in flux. Regulators in Washington and Brussels find themselves playing catch-up to innovation – and policy-makers are slow to do anything that could slow innovation. Technology, not regulation, will ultimately decide our digital future.
Elly Rostoum is a Senior Resident Fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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2025-12-12 22:29:16
In June, NATO leaders agreed that allies will allocate at least 3.5% of GDP annually to hard defense by 2035, and a further 1.5% to more general security spending for a total of 5%.
Despite public proclamations of success, the debate was hard-fought behind closed doors. A group of countries, including the UK, successfully delayed the promised increases until 2035, a full decade after the start date.
The dispute was notable in exposing NATO’s dividing lines between a hardcore group of countries that see an imminent and worrying Russian threat, and those that do not. The surprise was only that the British, traditionally a hardline leader in continental defense, had swapped camps.
“Those that are geographically closer to Russia are not hanging about, while the UK, France, and Italy are acting more slowly,” said James Fennell, an analyst and former Royal Navy officer who was Director of the UK FCDO’s stabilization program in Ukraine from 2022-24. “It suggests the imperative is weaker the further you get from Russia, and isn’t helped by high levels of public debt. I do wonder if the new US National Security Strategy will change that calculus; now there’s a more hostile US, security issues are coming closer to home.”
The defense hawks comprise 10 of the 30 European NATO members. These are Germany, Poland, and the Nordic-Baltic Eight of the five Nordic countries plus the three Baltic states. The doves, for want of a better term, are only just meeting the old 2% NATO pledge or are effectively standing still. A middle group is raising spending at a moderate pace.
Below is an overview of selected NATO countries and their projected defense spending in the coming years. Defense expenditure figures for 2025 are NATO estimates, where available. Estimates for future spending are national numbers.
Poland is currently the highest spender in the alliance relative to GDP. Governments from both sides of the country’s fractious political divide agreed on the need for sharply increased capabilities long before the NATO pledge.
Polish defense spending rose steeply to 3.8% of GDP (or national wealth) in 2023 from 2.2% a year before. This will reach 4.48% this year and 4.8% next year, all of which is hard defense spending. Poland has made a number of enormous capability commitments, including US F-35 jets, British frigates, and South Korean tanks. It ultimately aims for the armed forces to more than double to 500,000 men and women.
Lithuania, one of three Baltic states bordering Russia, has been among the highest defense spenders in NATO. In 2025, the defense budget exceeded €3.3bn ($3.68bn).
It plans to spend much more. A rearmament program is investing in new equipment, including French self-propelled artillery. Foreign Minister Kestutis Budrys has said that the country will allocate 5-6% of GDP to defense between 2026 and 2030.
Denmark will allocate an additional 50 billion DKK ($7bn) to improve defenses in 2025 and 2026. It is a part of the Acceleration Fund intended to help the country meet NATO targets. Denmark will maintain defense spending of more than 3% of GDP in 2026.
Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen said in October that Denmark will invest DKK 27.4 billion to strengthen its military presence in the Arctic and to purchase 16 new F-35 aircraft, on top of the previous order for 27 US jets.
Prime Minister Petteri Orpo announced that Finland’s defense spending will rise by €488m to €6.5 billion in 2025. The increase is mainly due to new fighter jet acquisitions. The country aims to raise military spending toward 3% by 2029 and says it will reach NATO’s 5% target by 2032.
The Swedish government has proposed more than SEK 170 billion ($17.9bn) in additional funding for defense between 2025 and 2030. In March, before the NATO meeting in June, Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson said that Sweden aims to increase spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2030.
The Netherlands will increase its defense budget to €27bn in 2026 and aims to meet NATO’s 3.5% target by 2035. The Ministry of Defense also plans to increase the number of military personnel from 70,000 to 200,000.
Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil pledged earlier this year to reach 3.5% of GDP by 2029 (from 2.4% this year), with the defense budget expected to double to €162bn ($189bn) by then.
Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said in November that Germany will not reach the 3.5% goal but is projected to hit 3.05% by 2029. A law approved in December aims to raise the armed forces’ strength to 260,000 regular personnel backed by 200,000 reservists.
In the 2024/2025 financial year, the UK spent £60.2 billion ($79.8bn) on defense. Prior to the NATO meeting that set the 3.5% target, Prime Minister Keir Starmer said that the UK will spend 2.5% of GDP on defense by 2027. The government has not laid out a timeline to meet the 5% target beyond saying it will be achieved by 2035, as NATO requires. It left defense spending unchanged in its November budget, reportedly bringing warnings from the chiefs of staff that they will be unable to fulfill the goals of the government’s own Strategic Defence Review published earlier in 2025.
France plans to spend ($75bn) on defense in 2027. An additional €3.5bn is scheduled for the 2026 budget and another €3bn in 2027. Although France is moving toward NATO’s new spending benchmark, the 3.5% target remains far off. President Macron says spending should reach at least 3% of GDP by 2030, but the country is very heavily indebted, and the source of any new money is unclear. With the UK, nuclear-armed France has traditionally been a leader on European defense, but like the UK, risks this status as other European states overtake it. Also like the UK, it is spending a large part of its defense budget on the renewal of its submarine-based nuclear deterrent.
Italy’s Defense Ministry announced €31.3bn ($36.2bn) in defense spending for 2025 in October. The budget is expected to remain stable in 2026 and 2027. The planned increase is enough for Italy to meet the previous 2% goal. The Defense Minister says he hopes to raise spending by as much as 0.2% of GDP annually from next year until 2035, so as to meet the NATO target.
Spain, seen by President Trump and many European allies as a defense laggard, explicitly refused to join NATO’s commitment to NATO’s 3.5% goal for 2035. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez secured an exception, capping Spain’s defense budget at approximately 2.1% of GDP. Sánchez has said the current spending level is “sufficient”.
European defense budgets have surged in recent years. In 2024, EU member states collectively allocated €343bn to defense, marking the 10th consecutive year of increases. According to the European Council, that figure is expected to rise to €381 billion ($440bn) in 2025.
In addition, the EU has created a €150bn rearmament loan fund, known as Security Action for Europe (SAFE), allowing member states to apply for loans for defense investments until 2030. Canada has become the first NATO country outside the EU to join the initiative.
Heine Sandvik Brekke is an Editorial Intern at CEPA. He is currently studying at the American University in Washington, DC. Heine is pursuing a degree in journalism and has worked in a variety of editorial roles, including at the daily newspaper Aftenposten. He also served in the Norwegian Army as a conscript in Northern Norway.
Francis Harris is Managing Editor of CEPA’s geopolitical website, Europe’s Edge.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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2025-12-11 19:47:08
Putin’s system is often described as a hierarchy of power, a so-called power vertical, with direct centralized control flowing downwards from the Kremlin. In fact, the real operation of the system is more complicated.
While maintaining political control, the Kremlin delegates substantial authority to lower tiers of government. This delegation is an important source of Russia’s flexibility in times of war against Ukraine.
For many experts and practitioners, Russia’s remarkable resilience during the war with Ukraine came as a big surprise. The unprecedented wave of nearly 24,000 economic sanctions was expected to cripple the Russian economy by making it the most-embargoed country in the world. Instead, Russia’s businesses quickly spun around: trade with China, India, and the so-called Global South replaced closed Western channels, with natural resources providing the foundation for these new partnerships.
Yet the flexibility of the market economy tells only part of the story of Russia’s unexpected resilience.
Consider the country’s enormous size. For many Russians, their status as the world’s biggest country by land mass, at almost 6.6 million square miles, confirms its great-power status. However, enormous size means inter-regional disparities, as well as multi-ethnicity and multi-confessionalism inherited by Russia from its imperial past.
Such a vast and diverse space would appear very difficult to control, especially since the war was bound to exacerbate splits and cleavages. And yet, the fact remains: the Kremlin has managed to maintain the loyalty of all Russian regions without exception. This is critically important because without their support, including the supply of weapons and manpower required, it would be impossible to continue the war. Decisions are made in Moscow, but the regions do the fighting.
Throughout the war, there has not been a single case of disloyalty on the part of regional governors — all of them enthusiastically supported Putin, the war against Ukraine, the entire “patriotic agenda,” and even the transfer of additional areas of responsibility to their shoulders. Regional governors are essential to the regime’s legitimacy.
So, how does the Kremlin secure their loyalty?
The intuitive answer might be total control, including a return to Soviet methods. Indeed, Putin’s vertical power structure does echo Soviet practices, but with crucial differences in execution. These stem from the differing nature of the two systems: The Soviet Union was a party-based regime, while Putin’s Russia operates through one man’s personal authority. Where the Soviets deployed comprehensive ideological control through Communist Party structures, Putin employs a more selective mechanism of elite management.
In addition, unlike the Soviet command economy, which demanded central control over most economic activity, Putin’s model operates within a market framework, permitting significant economic autonomy while maintaining political centralization. This separation of political and economic control marks a fundamental break with Soviet practice, where the two were inseparable.
Putin’s central–regional model has achieved equilibrium through an unusual bargain: complete political centralization paired with relative economic freedom. The presidential administration doesn’t attempt to control every gubernatorial action, an impossible but unnecessary task.
Instead, it demands specific deliverables: voter turnout figures, votes for Putin and United Russia, and support for Kremlin-backed candidates. Governors must recruit contract soldiers, fulfill obligations to military families, and deliver periodic speeches about Russian greatness and Western decline. Beyond these requirements, governors operate with considerable autonomy, monitored only for deviations from Kremlin standards.
The federal government has established an expanding set of criteria for evaluating gubernatorial effectiveness, with the “level of trust in authorities” serving as the primary metric. This key indicator encompasses both decreased regional protest activity and increased youth patriotism. While the Presidential Administration monitors these, the federal government oversees all other metrics.
These additional criteria are secondary, and partial compliance rarely results in significant consequences for incumbent governors. But governors, like federal officials and city mayors, work under constant threat of dismissal and criminal prosecution (the main reason being alleged corruption). It was reported in August that 99 senior officials at the federal and local levels had faced criminal proceedings, and that such prosecutions had become much more common since the all-out war began. These red lines are well-recognized and accepted by regional governors.
Crucially, this model makes the delegation of additional powers a risk-free policy from the Kremlin’s standpoint. Since governors pose no political threat, granting them operational authority enhances regional management without endangering central political control. Regional governors inhabit a cage —but it’s a spacious one that doesn’t constrain their administrative functions. At relatively low cost, Moscow secures loyal and effective governors for wartime, while policing their behavior with the threat of imprisonment and disgrace. The model achieves compliance without extensive resources because it doesn’t seek uniformity across all levels of society, only where it matters most.
Under what conditions could this model erode? Some believe that discontent “from below” (from the regions) and a localized desire to reconsider their relationship with the center could undermine the system.
However, these authors see no evidence of this. Regional governors, like Moscow, are interested in preserving the current model. The model could be undermined — and ultimately collapse — only if Moscow were to experience significant and prolonged weakening, causing the regions to stop relying on the center and switch to a strategy of survival using their own resources. This happened in the 1990s and could happen again after Putin.
Irina Busygina is a Research Scholar at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University.
Mikhail Filippov is a Professor of Comparative Politics at the Political Science Department at the State University of New York (Binghamton, NY).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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2025-12-11 19:39:48
Moscow’s forces have launched nearly 50,000 Geran/Shahed drones into Ukraine since the full-scale invasion of 2022 and shifted to a near-continuous rhythm of strikes that have overwhelmed defenses, disabled infrastructure, and killed families in their homes.
Figures from the Ukrainian Air Force’s daily bulletins in 2025 indicate that in January, Russia fired 2,599 long-range attack drones, rising to 3,902 in February and 4,198 in March, before major peaks in June (5,438) and July (6,297), which were followed by intense months in September (5,636), October (5,298), and November (5,445).
In all, more than 38,000 long-range kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and decoys were launched between January and November. This represented 64% of the total since February 2022, marking a rapid acceleration in their use. During most months of 2025, there were Geran strikes almost daily.
These numbers underscore the heft of Russia’s industrial manufacturing capacity and its sustained attempt to break Ukraine’s resistance. Russia is outproducing Europe and the US by a significant margin in a class of munitions that can deliver affordable strategic effects.
Russia’s continued ability to sustain a low-cost, high-tempo, high-volume deep strike campaign has drained Kyiv’s air and missile defense, making it harder for defenders to identify and destroy the faster and more destructive cruise and ballistic missiles during combined attacks.
While Ukrainian countermeasures against the Geran have significantly improved, with interception rates typically between 80–97%, hundreds of Gerans still manage to reach their targets every month. Even a small proportion of successful strikes, when distributed across energy grids, military sites, and civilian infrastructure, imposes real damage and accelerates wear on Ukraine’s defensive capacity.
Early Geran-2s used a combination of an inertial navigation system and a basic four-element controlled reception pattern antenna (CRPA) to provide global satellite connectivity, which was effective at first but became vulnerable to Ukraine’s increasingly sophisticated jamming and spoofing techniques. The drones also lacked sensors, such as electro-optical cameras, and were inaccurate compared to Russian missiles.
By contrast, late-2024 and 2025 iterations included a variety of features to increase performance in contested environments, including external cameras and multi-element Chinese or Russian CRPAs, significantly improving resilience to Ukrainian countermeasures.
Russia also shifted from pre-loaded coordinate navigation to semi-manual control. Several Geran-2 “Y-series” drones carried Ukrainian SIM cards, telemetry units, and modems, enabling operators to manually adjust course during the terminal phase, although these developments were not without their problems, including signal delays and dependency on local Ukrainian networks.
More recently, Gerans recovered by Ukraine have been found with Chinese mesh communication modems operating on various frequency bands alongside electro-optical cameras. Ukrainian specialists say these enable low-latency video transmission and “chain control,” providing communication links across multiple drones.
This shift is tactically significant as it turns a salvo of UAVs from a “dumb” mass of projectiles into a distributed network capable of sustaining operator control deep into Ukrainian airspace, even amidst intense electronic warfare.
The use of mesh connectivity also allows the operators to track the position of the drones and map the approximate location of Ukrainian air defense units as they are intercepted.
The recovery of a Geran-2 equipped with an Nvidia Jetson Orin computer board and an infrared camera also pointed to experimentation with visual-based navigation or automated target recognition. This does not mean Russia has mastered real-time AI-driven targeting, but it shows that its engineers are constantly experimenting and Gerans may soon evolve into semi-autonomous strike assets with machine-assisted guidance.
There are a range of warhead types used by the Geran family of UAVs. Alongside the original 50kg high-explosive-fragmentation payload, Moscow has employed thermobaric, incendiary-fragmentation, high-explosive, high-explosive airburst, and even submunition-dispersing variants. The most consequential upgrade, however, is a 90kg (200lb) warhead introduced in 2024, which combines a penetrator-shaped charge with a layer of steel balls to pierce fortified infrastructure and maximize human casualties. This diversification broadens the Geran’s targets, which now include defensive positions and tactical radars in addition to energy infrastructure and civilian housing, giving Moscow’s commanders new strike options.
The jet-powered Geran-3 marks yet another design and capability shift. With a 3-meter (10ft) wingspan and takeoff weight of 370kg, it can achieve 370mph, roughly triple the speed of its propeller-driven predecessors. This compresses Ukrainian reaction time and complicates interception by gun-based systems or helicopters, which have been effective against propeller-driven variants. It also improves penetration on impact, maximizing the destructive effects of the warhead.
However, turbojet engines use more fuel, resulting in shorter range, the use of launch sites closer to Ukraine to reach their targets, and reduced cruising speeds to improve their reach. These tradeoffs increase their vulnerability to Ukrainian interceptors and counterstrikes. Ukrainian defenders have already managed to intercept jet-powered Gerans with affordable interceptor drones, such as the $3,000 Wild Hornets’ Sting, demonstrating the potential of fast drone interceptors. As Ukraine ramps up the production of fast interceptor drones, Russia’s countermove has been the installation of rear-looking cameras on top of the Geran’s fuselage or nose that are supposed to alert the drone operator so that he can initiate evasive maneuvers. So far, the effectiveness of the technique appears to be limited.
Moscow is experimenting with different roles for the Geran. A recently destroyed model carried a Soviet-era R-60 air-to-air missile, suggesting attempts to directly engage Ukrainian aircraft hunting the drones. It demonstrates Russia’s constant process of adaptation and search for new mission profiles. And its tactics have evolved alongside the technical upgrades. At first, the focus was on staggered low-altitude attacks on fixed infrastructure from Crimean launch sites, but accuracy was limited and strike routes were relatively easy for Ukrainian planners to anticipate.
Then, increasingly effective electronic warfare, combined with tactical aviation and mobile fire groups, significantly decreased the effectiveness of Gerans between the second half of 2023 and the first half of 2024.
To address these problems, Russia dramatically ramped up Geran production. It also shifted to simultaneous mass salvos, with Gerans and multiple decoys flying at higher altitudes and using maneuver tactics to evade interception. Furthermore, a selected number of Gerans fly in circular patterns and provide communication relay for the rest of the strike package through mesh radio networks, enabling the remote control of multiple drones. These large-scale converging attacks are often synchronized with cruise or ballistic missiles to saturate Ukrainian air defense and force it to redirect resources and use its interceptors prematurely.
The Geran’s cost-effectiveness allows Russia to sustain continuous pressure on Ukraine’s air defenses while preserving high-end assets for selected overwhelming strikes. The introduction of the Geran-3 and employment of increasingly advanced features suggest the system will remain central to Russia’s attacks on strategic infrastructure.
As Ukraine’s air defense stocks face growing pressure and Western military support is constrained by political disagreements, Russia’s ability to field thousands of Gerans per month is disproportionately influential in shaping the war through exhaustion and sustained infrastructure degradation.
The mass production and integration of cheap drone interceptors — alongside other cost-effective and scalable countermeasures — should be a priority for both Ukraine and NATO allies. There also needs to be strict sanctions enforcement, together with direct targeting of the Geran’s component, production, and launch sites
Federico Borsari is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and a cohort of the NATO 2030 Global Fellowship. At CEPA, he focuses on issues at the intersection between technology and international security, in particular, unmanned systems and autonomy, and his portfolio also includes NATO and transatlantic defense and security.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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2025-12-11 19:33:24
In 2026, the Kremlin will seek to demonstrate that Russia retains the initiative and remains a great power despite its economic and military decline. This is designed in part to emphasize a country on the brink of historic success and to build on images of President Vladimir Putin hosting “peace talks” with the US, and strutting the world stage during his December visit to India.
Alongside diplomatic posturing and photo opportunities, this goal will be manifested across three expanding arenas of hybrid warfare against Ukraine’s allies in democratic Europe.
Firstly, sabotage will target Europe’s expanding defense production infrastructure and Ukraine-bound supply chains. As continental ammunition factories ramp up and logistics networks are more visible, they will become prime targets. There have already been troubling events, including a Russian attack on a Ukraine-linked warehouse in the UK, an arson attack attributed to Russia at an air defense firm in Germany last year, as well as an unexplained fire at a weapons factory at Cugir, Romania, in August.
Expect attacks designed to delay weapons deliveries, drive up security costs, and force governments to divert resources from supporting Ukraine to domestic protection.
The second element will be subversion, especially information warfare of the type seen in Moldova’s election in September, which will intensify dramatically during key elections in 2026, especially those the Kremlin regards as key, such as the Hungarian election in April. Pro-Russian populist parties already top polls across Europe, and every percentage point and political message amplified to their advantage offers Moscow hope of crumbling Western resolve.
Coercion, through conventional military provocation, can also be expected to escalate from sporadic to systematic. Expect increasingly aggressive airspace and naval violations, like September’s 12-minute combat aircraft incursion over the Gulf of Finland, and nuclear rhetoric calibrated to create psychological pressure. The intended message is that supporting Ukraine risks direct escalation with Russia, so restraint is wiser.
These will be backed by the favored new tactic of threatening civilian aircraft and passengers, including political leaders, with drone incursions near runways. Irish Justice Minister Jim O’Callaghan said drones near Dublin airport during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Ireland in December were intended to pressure “EU and Ukrainian interests,” while France is investigating after drones were spotted over the base of the French nuclear deterrent in Brest. French marines fired a jamming device in response.
The UK’s air regulator, the CAA, warned in November that it was “not a question of if, only of when” major airports like Heathrow suffered attacks like those that have closed down Copenhagen, Munich, and Brussels airports this year.
Russia has been helped by Europe’s pedestrian attempts to build credible hybrid deterrence. The continent’s failure to establish clear thresholds for shadow warfare attacks means incidents of sabotage, cyber-interference, and misinformation are still largely treated as isolated crimes rather than elements of a Russian hybrid strategy.
NATO is finally moving — with its top commander and Secretary General outlining policy shifts — but Europe will enter 2026 behind the curve and with the potential for weakened resolve.
Politically, populist right-wing parties, often with pro-Russian sympathies, are topping polls in a year of major elections on the continent; economically, governments have been constrained by slow growth, sticky inflation, and energy supply uncertainties; and militarily, many are only at the beginning of their rearmament programs.
These factors combine to limit Europe’s ability to formulate a decisive response, strengthening the Kremlin’s belief that its tactics will succeed. There has been close to zero cost for Russia’s shadow activities, and it is therefore unsurprising that it has stepped up its campaigns throughout this year.
Europe must establish credible deterrence, or Putin will be emboldened to go much further.
Putin is betting Europe lacks the resolve to impose meaningful costs on Russia. And the evidence suggests he is right: even the Kremlin’s open and evidence attack on Poland in September, using as many as 20 military drones, brought nothing more than European NATO pledges to strengthen defenses. Likewise, Russia’s planting of parcel bombs on transatlantic courier planes.
Proving Putin wrong requires clarity over what the West won’t tolerate and finally defining clear thresholds. What level of sabotage should trigger NATO’s collective defense, which diplomatic personnel should face expulsion for facilitating attacks, and how the alliance will respond to systematic airspace violations? Until there are answers, Russia’s assault will continue.
William Dixon is a Senior Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute, specializing in cyber and international security issues.
Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategy and security analyst and writer whose work focuses on Russia, Ukraine, and international security.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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2025-12-10 22:00:00
The CEPA Podcast is a series of dynamic interviews, bringing together leaders and experts from both sides of the Atlantic to explore the most important challenges shaping our world today.
In this episode, General Philippe Lavigne, a Distinguished Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at CEPA, draws upon his experience as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation to discuss the future of NATO amidst the evolving role of AI and autonomous systems, the future of security in the Arctic, and investing in the future of security.
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