2025-04-18 22:21:00
“We should have a business traveler’s handbook that answers key questions for companies entering Ukraine for the first time,” said Derek Berlin, senior vice-president of Logistics Plus, a US company working in Ukraine. “How to find train tickets, which hotels speak multiple languages, which ones can operate during power outages, and what security firms you can work with to try to get in.”
Since March 2022, the company has provided urgent aid to Ukraine. Initially focused on immediate relief, its strategy shifted as Kyiv regained territory, moving to essential services for the government, citizens, and international businesses. It has also helped raise more than $1m in donations and delivered medical supplies, food, clothing and power generators to communities affected by the war.
Berlin joined the efforts in spring 2023 to help guide the transition and, nearly two years later, Logistics Plus has teams in Kyiv, Odesa, and Ivano-Frankivsk. “It has been tough, but we have amazing Ukrainian employees,” he said. “We didn’t need to import any Americans, there is outstanding talent there.”
One of the company’s biggest logistics achievements was delivering more than 22,000 tons of gas pipe through Ukraine’s Danube and Black Sea ports, despite ongoing Russian attacks. They used ships to deep-sea ports, then barges on the Danube from the Romanian port of Constanta, eventually moving more than 1,000 truckloads of equipment for natural gas production to sites across Ukraine.
It was the first non-grain delivery to Ukraine after the full-scale invasion and was “a very challenging project because of the state of the ports, and finding a ship owner willing to do it,” Berlin said. “We had done a lot of research and felt confident the risks were mitigated.”
Frequent air raid alerts, which halt work and force everyone into shelters, are a constant irritation. The head of ports and fleet operations at one of Ukraine’s largest agriculture export companies told Berlin his teams had lost an entire month of labor in a year due to taking shelter.
“It’s a nuance often lost on people overseas how unbelievably disruptive all this is, even when you’re not in a violent incident,” Berlin said.
Housing, transport, energy, industry, commerce, and education have been the sectors most affected by the war, according to the World Bank, and foreign companies in Ukraine have been unable to protect their assets. A survey of US companies by the American Chamber of Commerce found 49% had assets damaged or lost, while 19% reported some had been occupied by Russia.
Despite the disruption, companies have continued to invest foreign capital. YouControl, which tracks commercial data, listed 3,570 companies in Ukraine, adding foreign beneficiaries or participants to their ownership between February 2022 and April 2024. It also reported the establishment of 2,950 companies backed by foreign capital in the same period.
The majority of investments have been in the relatively safer Kyiv and Lviv regions, with significant activity in the Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv regions. Some 44% of investments were in wholesale, retail trade and vehicle repair, with significant activity in manufacturing, IT, construction and transport.
“Attracting investments into a war-torn country is not trivial,” said Halyna Yanchenko, an MP and Secretary of Ukraine’s National Investment Council. “There are at least three sectors where foreign investments are being attracted very actively – the defense industry, energy, and the production of construction materials.”
The government in Kyiv forecasts domestic defense production could soar to $35bn this year, up from $20bn in 2024. Meanwhile, the urgent need for equipment maintenance and repair is attracting foreign companies to shift operations to Ukraine, either in partnership with local firms or by transferring technology.
“Many venture funds and companies are turning to Ukraine for its rapid innovation cycle,” Yanchenko said. “Prototypes are tested directly on the front lines, instead of in labs or on test ranges, and manufacturers work closely with military units to quickly receive feedback and make improvements.”
Co-production initiatives are strongly encouraged by government programs, she added. For example, a UK Export Finance (UKEF) initiative mitigates risks and finances investment projects.
“Currently, UKEF’s key focus is on developing cooperation between the UK and Ukraine in the defense industry,” Yanchenko said. “They see the benefits British companies can gain from collaborating and co-producing with Ukrainian firms.”
Denmark is also actively investing approximately $970m in Ukraine’s defense industry, encouraging others to follow the “Danish model,” under which weapons for Kyiv are purchased directly from Ukrainian companies. Manufacturers like Rheinmetall, KNDS, and AeroVironment are also opening production facilities and forming joint ventures with Ukrainian manufacturers.
“Ukraine has a very impressively functioning economy despite all the strains that Russia is putting on the country,” Berlin said. “I hosted a call with the governor of Odesa region and his leadership team a few weeks ago for about 30 senior representatives of the US business community who are interested in better understanding the landscape and role that US investment could play.”
European companies have been willing to enter the Ukrainian market thanks to their public-private cooperation models, under which governments take responsibility for potential losses.
“Public financing is used to support overseas operations by European companies, which helps mitigate some of the risks,” Berlin said. “This isn’t necessarily through insurance, but through upfront investment, so the risk is removed from the company’s balance sheet from the beginning, instead of relying on insurance after something negative happens.”
He encourages potential investors to distinguish between real and perceived risks and is working with the Ukrainian government and G7 representatives to better communicate the issues and opportunities involved. He insists they shouldn’t be deterred by the apparent dangers.
“Everyone I’ve traveled with — congressional delegations, business leaders, and security experts — finds Ukraine a perfectly pleasant and remarkably resilient place to visit and operate,” he said. “I have business friends who bring their middle school children with them, and they even play soccer games while there.”
Elina Beketova is a Non-resident Fellow with the Democratic Resilience program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). She is the author of Behind the Lines, a database and article series focused on Ukraine’s temporarily occupied territories. Elina began her career as a journalist in Crimea and later worked as a journalist, editor, and TV anchor for news stations in Kharkiv and Kyiv.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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2025-04-18 01:19:09
Compared to first-rate military powers, European countries are small. Simple approximations (adjusted for local spending power) show the continent’s militaries are short of major military assets.
Tanks, advanced combat planes (4th or 5th generation fighters), submarines, and aircraft carriers all showcase Europe’s comparable weakness. In sum, Europe spends about $300bn on defense, just above a third of the US annual outlay.
Europe has about 5,000 main battle tanks across the continent, but many are old, many are not operational, and they consist of a constellation of Leopards, legacy Soviet systems and their derivatives (e.g. the T-72, PT-91), Arietes, and Leclercs.
Europe has over 1,000 advanced combat planes, likewise consisting of various platforms at various readiness levels (e.g. the Eurofighter, F-35, Gripen, Rafale). Many EU countries don’t operate submarines at all, there are under 60 subs spread across EU operators. Most glaringly, the EU only has one conventional aircraft carrier – the French nuclear-powered Charles de Gaulle. The Spanish Juan Carlos is a repurposed amphibious assault ship, the Italian carriers are smaller VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) carriers.
In contrast, China has up to 6,000 main battle tanks, a growing fleet of 60-plus submarines, perhaps up to 1,600 advanced combat planes, and will soon field three conventional aircraft carriers.
Although many EU countries have realized their military capabilities leave much to be desired and are allocating greater resources towards defense, the smorgasbord of different platforms and piecemeal efforts means a lot of money will be wasted.
Every vehicle, plane, and ship requires its own set of technical experts, logistics, and administration to enable their development and maintenance.
European countries often support national champions. But because individual EU countries are relatively small, the military assets to be purchased will almost always be expensive and limited in number. For instance, the French Leclerc tank costs approximately 20-50% more per vehicle to manufacture than an American M1 Abrams, and its production line was previously closed. This lack of scale makes weapons systems not only more expensive to governments and potential export markets, but also makes it difficult to increase output amid uncertain and volatile order books.
Europe could benefit immensely by integrating its procurement process and standardizing major military assets.
Capabilities are similar across high-quality Western platforms; there is little material tradeoff from fielding a Leopard II tank instead of a M1 Abrams, but there are major tradeoffs in terms of upfront costs, development, logistics, and upkeep. What if every European nation used the same main battle tank? Can the Polish army not use the Leopard II tank instead of the Korean K2 tank that it has ordered? Can the Italians not use the Eurocopter Tiger?
What if aircraft carriers were purchased from a central source and allocated to individual states? By creating a single mass procurement approach, EU countries would reap the same benefits of scale across nations as the US without compromising sovereign command structures.
This should not be an EU-only project. The UK has every significant capability in naval ship and submarine building, combat aircraft design and construction, and in many advanced technologies. Norway and Turkey likewise have much to offer. And US firms with a long history in European defense could also be involved (assuming the political will exists).
Common and standardized procurement would have a major impact on military asset numbers. A simple model based on the EU’s PPP-adjusted GDP, assuming overall defense spending of 3% of GDP, assuming the same asset prioritization as the United States, and that the EU benefited from the same scale and costs (and major inefficiencies) as the United States, suggests the EU could field a total of 5,000 modern main battle tanks, over 2,000 advanced combat planes, nine-10 conventional aircraft carriers, and 50-70 nuclear-powered submarines (as opposed to the current UK-French total of 19 such vessels).
By dividing these platform sums across EU countries by relative economic size, after accounting for the potential increase in major platforms, should every country meet a 3% of GDP on defense target, highlights how every European nation would benefit immensely from central procurement.
Germany, for example, would experience a net gain of nearly 600 modern tanks over its potential inventory number; France and Italy could field another 250-300. Germany might operate two nuclear carriers, 200 new combat planes, and gain 10 nuclear-powered submarines (it has never possessed such vessels to date).
Poland could also operate a conventional carrier (if it wanted one), an additional 100 advanced combat aircraft, and several additional submarines. While these back-of-the envelope calculations are simply estimations, they do suggest the massive potential scale an integrated approach can yield.
To ensure that jobs are not lost from this effort, manufacturing and maintenance should be spread across European countries. If, say, a Belgian assault rifle design is adopted as the EU standard, manufacturing should also take place in countries with existing competencies like the Czech Republic and Poland. Spreading logistical networks would also improve supply chain resilience and redundancies. Should Poland be occupied in a war, the Czech Republic would still be able to generate output.
A central European defense procurement initiative can foster more than cost savings. Tying defense capabilities into a common framework gives individuals a greater stake in Europe’s continued success. Standardizing equipment means EU nations can seamlessly use one another’s parts and ammunition and gain enormous maintenance efficiencies.
Indeed, if one country has a shortfall or urgent need, partner states are more readily capable of lending equipment and manpower. Joint procurement and EU-centric defense industrial projects will reduce reliance on external suppliers, strengthening Europe’s ability to act independently and reducing vulnerability to external geopolitical disruptions. Centralized procurement will promote combined research and development programs — pooling scientific talent and reducing redundant efforts across nations. Larger collaborative ventures can deepen trust and cooperation among EU member states.
Europe’s geopolitical positioning and defense strategy is undergoing a historic change. Allocating the money to start rearming (which it has agreed) is just the start. A continent-wide standardized procurement approach to rearmament would be a major contributor to a continent-wide security policy.
Pooling resources is the most efficient approach to scale. Just as its founders foresaw, by banding together, European countries can achieve lasting peace and promote the common good.
Nathan Decety is a macroeconomic strategy consultant and a captain in the US Army.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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2025-04-17 23:33:02
When China recently suspended exports of six rare earth minerals, the danger became clear: a wide range of Western industries, ranging from aerospace to semiconductors, are vulnerable to Beijing’s whims. Americans and Europeans now must consider how to respond – (1) open new mines (2) double down on new recycling tech and capacity or (3) go cap-in-hand to Beijing.
Rare earths — comprising 17 metallic elements — are not truly rare. They are just spread widely, making profitable extraction difficult, expensive, and environmentally taxing. China dominates global rare earth reserves, with a 90% market share. Brazil, India, Australia, Russia, Vietnam, the United States, and Greenland trail.
The new Chinese export restrictions on key minerals came in response to US tariffs, Chinese customs officials are blocking exports of heavy rare earth metals and magnets not just to the US, but to all countries, including Europe.
Rare earths make up a small share of Chinese exports. Beijing suffers little by forgoing these earnings — while imposing maximum pain on the US and its allies. The metals power everything from electric vehicles to wind turbines. A single megawatt of wind power can require as much as 600 kilograms of permanent magnets, and rare earths account for roughly a third of that total.
Multiply across the gigawatt-scale projects planned throughout Europe, and demand skyrockets. Britain alone, for instance, already operates more than 11,000 turbines producing around 30 gigawatts of electricity, with an eye to double that by 2030. To meet its ambitious climate goals, Europe and the US must move swiftly to diversify their supply chain.
So far, the US approach seems to be dig, dig, dig. President Donald Trump has pressed Ukraine for a rare earth deal and signed an executive order to boost US mineral output. Ukraine controls around 5% of the planet’s rare earth deposits, including considerable lithium reserves. At the time of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine has only exploited 15% of that potential due to steep costs and scarce investment. The US is also casting eyes on Greenland and its mineral reserves.
But it will take billions of investments and years of development to bring new reserves online. And Europe just does not have those reserves at all. In the meantime, the best solution is new tech and capacity for recycling. Europe is taking the lead with the Critical Raw Materials Act. This multi-billion-euro initiative introduced in 2023 sets firm domestic targets for extraction, processing, and recycling, while limiting reliance on any single foreign supplier. In doing so, it elevates critical minerals to a top-tier strategic priority.
The European Commission has adopted 47 strategic projects across 13 EU Member States to strengthen the bloc’s raw materials value chain. These aim to boost extraction, processing, recycling, and substitution of key minerals, helping the EU meet its 2030 targets while reducing reliance on external suppliers.
Real change is happening on the ground too:
The long-term solution is a fully circular economic strategy. A strong recycling infrastructure will enable Europe to close the loop on rare earth metals, limiting imports, ultimately to near-zero, and building resilience. Rare earths do not degrade over multiple uses, so they can be recovered and repurposed indefinitely.
Europe cannot hope for any kind of tech sovereignty while relying on Chinese-controlled rare earths. It cannot count on cooperating with the US. Targeted investment in new recycling technology and refining capacity represents the best response.
Christopher Cytera CEng MIET is a non-resident senior fellow with the Tech Policy Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis and a technology business executive with over 30 years’ experience in semiconductors, electronics, communications, video, and imaging.
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
European Union digital regulations are spreading across the globe. CEPA is mapping where similar rules have been adopted or are under consideration, starting with the Digital Markets Act.
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2025-04-17 02:38:36
After three years and a million casualties, Russia has discovered something that even the ancient Romans knew: combining different types of weapons creates a synergy more lethal than the sum of its parts.
Russia has devised a successful approach for penetrating Ukrainian defenses. The good news? In the early months of 2025, Ukraine may have discovered a response.
Here’s the problem. By combining ground assaults with artillery and glide bombs, as well as drones in what British experts call an “offensive triangle,” Russia has been able to make small but steady gains in 2024 by placing Ukrainian troops in an untenable position.
“First, the AFRF [Russian armed forces] continue to pin down Ukrainian ground forces on the line of contact with infantry and mechanized forces,” according to a study by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a British think tank. “Second, they prevent maneuver and inflict attrition with first-person view (FPV) drones, Lancet drones, and artillery firing both high-explosive shells and scatterable mines.”
“Third, the AFRF has increased its use of UMPK glide bombs against Ukrainian forces who are holding defensive positions,” RUSI said. This “creates a competing dilemma: should the AFU [Ukrainian armed forces] hold and invest in static defensive positions to reduce attrition from FPVs and drone-enabled artillery, or retain mobility to avoid destruction from glide bomb strikes, which have the explosive yield to demolish or bury even well-prepared fortifications?”
It is a crude approach that has neither given Russia a decisive victory nor spared it from losing more than 1,000-plus soldiers per day. But as the Romans would have agreed, success in war is more important than subtlety. Russia captured close to 4,000 square kilometers (1,500 square miles) in 2024, its greatest gains since the early days of the Russian invasion in February 2022.
In terms of combat proficiency, Russian ground troops don’t seem much better than in 2022, while artillery — now supplemented by drones — has always provided the bulk of Russian firepower. The new factor in Russia’s tactical equation is airpower. The Russian Air Force proved a major disappointment for most of the war, deterred by Ukrainian air defenses from providing desperately needed close air support to the ground troops.
The solution to resurrecting Russian airpower proved simple and lethal: glide bombs. By affixing its own satellite guidance system and wings to its huge Cold War stockpile of unguided “dumb bombs,” Russia created a cheap smart bomb that can dropped from up to 60 miles behind the front line.
This keeps Russian aircraft safely out of range of Ukrainian anti-aircraft missiles. While not as accurate as Western counterparts like America’s Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), the Russian munitions are huge — up to 6,000 pounds or close to 3 metric tonnes — so that even a near miss will devastate Ukrainian entrenchments.
While some Western observers dismissed these weapons as a sign that Russia lacked the capacity to manufacture sophisticated smart bombs, no one is laughing now. As glide bomb production has ramped up, so have Ukrainian casualties.
“The rise in UMPK glide bomb production from 40,000 units in 2024 to 70,000 units anticipated in 2025, has significantly increased the number of Ukrainian troops killed during defensive operations,” said RUSI. “This has had numerous knock-on effects for the different arms and services, as they have been pushed to completely avoid observation of their positions, to disperse or seek concealment underground, and to rely on uncrewed or autonomous systems to keep and kill the enemy at arm’s length.”
And yet, happily, and despite Putin’s faith in wonder weapons, the glide bombs will probably be defanged. Already, Ukraine claims to have had success in jamming them, leading to a sharp decrease in accuracy. “The golden era of the ‘divine’ UMPK turned out to be short-lived,” lamented a Russian pilot on social media. Perhaps not coincidentally, the Russian advance has slowed in recent months.
As with much else in the Ukraine war, the question is whether the lessons are universal. If ground troops, supported by artillery/drone/glide bomb attacks, can hammer Ukrainian positions in Donetsk, why not NATO positions in the Suwałki Gap?
The best answer is that Russia’s offensive triangle only works under the specific conditions in Ukraine. Russian bombers enjoy sanctuary behind the front lines because Ukraine lacks long-range air-to-air missiles to pick them off. Russian artillery can fire First World War-style barrages because the front lines are static, which is ideal for a rigid command and control system. Russian ground forces can operate without fear of manned aircraft hitting troops and supply lines.
Mass drone attacks would be a problem for NATO and other nations that lack air defense and electronic warfare capabilities. But Russia relies on a synergy between drones and other weapons. That triangle would be disrupted by NATO airpower that could target key links in the triangle, especially Russian strike aircraft as well as artillery.
This shouldn’t make NATO complacent. Given sufficient munitions and an almost inhuman indifference to casualties, Russia’s triple threat could inflict serious damage on Western forces. But it is a triangle that can be broken.
Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Business Insider, Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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2025-04-16 02:21:38
April’s inaugural Central Asia-EU Summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, was the first of its kind for the two sides and was seen as a means to elevate the bloc’s influence in the region. Amid growing great power competition over Eurasian connectivity, Brussels was looking to secure a more solid footing.
The most tangible outcome was the EU’s €12bn ($13.6bn) assistance package, which is intended to support the expansion of commercial routes, the mining sector, and digital connectivity across Central Asia. Specifics around how the funds will be distributed, or how they are linked to the €10bn in development aid pledged at the 2024 Global Gateway Investors Forum, are sparse.
What is known so far is that out of the €12bn, €3bn will be directed to the transport sector, €6.4bn to energy projects, and €100m for the development of satellite Internet. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) also has a pipeline of €7bn–€8bn worth of projects planned through 2027, though no details were released.
Central Asia, which includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, is vital for the EU as a key partner in the development of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (or middle corridor) in competition with China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative.
The goal is for cargo transportation between Europe and Central Asia, bypassing Russia, to be halved to 15 days. The EU is already the largest foreign investor in Central Asia, accounting for 40% of all foreign direct investment, and Central Asian capitals are interested in closer cooperation.
At the summit, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said an agreement to open a European Investment Bank (EIB) office had been reached and announced the ratification of a project to supply electricity from Central Asia to Europe.
Tajik President Emomali Rahmon said he was counting on trade preferences and investments from the EU, while Kazakhstan’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said his country, which accounts for 13% of EU oil imports, is ready to increase the flow. Kazakhstan also announced the start of joint work with Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan on the construction of a green energy transmission line across the Caspian Sea to improve access to European markets.
The timing of the summit put a spotlight on rare earth materials, another critical element of cooperation. As the US, Russia, and China scramble to carve up (and politicize) supplies of the coveted resources, the EU is looking to Central Asia as a potential source.
Tokayev said Kazakhstan produces 19 of the 34 raw materials needed by the EU, while Mirziyoyev promised to strengthen cooperation between Uzbekistan and the bloc in the development of critical mineral resources.
Despite these pronouncements, the summit fell short of delivering any further concrete results, and no major announcements were made, making it more of a symbolic starting point than a moment of breakthrough. The leaders’ joint statement ran to 20 points, largely restating existing priorities and shared interests.
While it included pledges about upgrading relations to a “strategic partnership,” the document lacked specifics on the next steps. It also reaffirmed the importance of a Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the two sides, first adopted in 2023.
There was an apparent lack of enthusiasm among Central Asian leaders, who are becoming accustomed to being courted by Asian governments and individual European capitals. The money proposed by the EU didn’t seem to impress them either, as China and the Gulf Cooperation Council offer more and act more quickly.
The effectiveness of the EU’s engagement with Central Asia is also contingent on how it fares in the South Caucasus, which serves as a vital geographic bridge. Brussels’ relations with both Georgia and Azerbaijan are far from good, and while geopolitical imperatives may drive the sides to patch up their differences, agreement is a long way off.
The overall impression at the summit was that, while it emphasized political will and reaffirmed broader goals, it failed to match those ambitions with deliverable actions.
Ultimately, the question is whether the EU can become an effective geopolitical actor. Its Geopolitical Commission, instituted in 2019 with a mission to respond to great power competition, has so far produced few results.
The bloc needs greater speed and dexterity in its foreign policy.
A new era of great power competition might not be the best time for soft power projection, but to be effective in Central Asia, the EU needs to brandish its strengths as a source of quality investment and trade and energy partner. The inaugural summit showed more work needs to be done.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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2025-04-16 02:05:53
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was never just about toppling its government or conquering its territory. It was also a war on memory — an essentially colonial endeavor by Vladimir Putin to erase Ukraine’s identity and reimpose a Kremlin-approved version of history.
For the Russian president, subjugating Ukraine meant not just defeating its army, but deleting the national consciousness that had for centuries resisted Moscow’s grip.
Ukrainians understand what’s at stake and have joined the battle to preserve and spread what the Kremlin wants forgotten, and to remove the symbols of past imperial rule. That was the case after Russia’s initial invasion in 2014, and even more so after the full-scale assault in 2022.
As part of a national decommunization effort, hundreds of Lenin statues were torn down across the country. By 2021, the last such monument on public land had been removed. As the Lenins tumbled, Russia was busy restoring the image of Joseph Stalin, unveiling new statues of the dictator who engineered the Holodomor, the manmade famine that killed perhaps 4 million Ukrainians in the 1930s and provided cover for a campaign of brutal national repression by the NKVD.
Despite Putin’s disdain for Lenin (who he historically “blames” for creating 1,200 year-old Ukraine), statues of him have reappeared across Russian-occupied territory. As historian Serhy Yekelchyk told The Economist these monuments are not about communism but control: “In Ukraine,” he said, “Lenin doesn’t stand for communism, but for Russian control.”
That reaches beyond symbols. In previously occupied Kherson, historians became targets. In autumn 2022, Oleksiy Palah, an expert in 18th-century history, was detained for nearly a month by Russian forces. “Historians are more dangerous than soldiers,” they told him, “because they poison people’s minds.”
In July, Russian occupation authorities in Luhansk removed a granite cross monument to Holodomor victims, claiming it “insulted the patriotic feelings of the residents.” Dozens of similar memorials, along with tributes to Ukrainian cultural figures executed by the Soviet regime, have also been destroyed in Russian-occupied territories.
This effort to rewrite history is not new. As early as the 2000s, Russia pushed for the “harmonization” of Russian and Ukrainian history textbooks, a move widely criticized by Ukrainian historians as an attempt to impose Moscow’s imperial narrative. Russian-approved textbooks erased mention of events like the Holodomor and minimized Ukrainian national movements, portraying Kyiv as a provincial outpost and centering Moscow as the cradle of civilization.
John Vsetecka, an Assistant Professor of History at Nova Southeastern University in Florida, explained that “the memory of the Holodomor is strong in Ukraine, and it is one that continues to cut across generations despite the distance in time.” He noted that Ukrainians have kindled this memory “to remind the world of what can happen when aggression goes unchecked.” According to Vsetecka, Holodomor memory politics became increasingly mainstream during the 2000s, particularly during the 2004-25 Orange Revolution.
“The Holodomor has played a pivotal historical role in Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine. Beyond the battlefield, this war has been, in many ways, about the fight for historical narratives,” said Vsetecka.
Kristina Hook, an Assistant Professor at Kennesaw State University in Georgia, emphasized that “many Ukrainians understand that Putin’s plan to crush Ukraine is part of a long tradition of horrific violence to their assertions of independence and autonomy.”
She stated that modern Russia’s denial of the Holodomor has laid the foundation for its current campaign of cultural and physical destruction. “Looking back, we can see that these bitter roots of denying Ukrainian autonomy over their [own] state, their society, and their historical interpretation have again borne genocidal fruit,” she said.
After all, Russia’s foreign policy turned increasingly aggressive and hostile toward the West following the Orange Revolution, a pivotal moment that not only shaped Ukraine’s democratic identity but also triggered a lasting shift in Russian foreign policy, pushing the Kremlin toward nationalism and authoritarianism, along with renewed military aggression against its neighbor and open hostility toward the West. From that point on, Putin viewed democratic movements as a direct threat to his grip on power, constantly referring to the danger of what he termed “color” (i.e., popular) revolutions.
Fearing the spread of people-power movements, Putin responded by launching an aggressive campaign against democratic uprisings, laying the groundwork for Russia’s later invasions of Ukraine and its broader confrontation with the post-Cold War international order.
Now when Putin tells Donald Trump that the “root causes” of the war must be addressed before a ceasefire takes hold, his meaning is clear. He demands the complete destruction of the Ukrainian state and the obliteration of the popular memory.
David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. He can be found on X/Twitter @DVKirichenko.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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