2025-07-31 01:49:24
The Russian Duma has adopted a bill that effectively introduces punishment for internet searches deemed extremist by the Kremlin. This label is primarily applied to content produced by opposition groups in exile and independent media, and therefore seeks to punish its readers.
The bill introduces fines ranging from 3,000 to 5,000 rubles (approximately $38-$64). However, it is widely understood that the most serious punishment is not the fine itself, but the risk of being blacklisted by Russian authorities – a designation that opens the door to a wide range of consequences in Vladimir Putin’s increasingly repressive despotism.
The direction of travel is clear. The new legislation follows a sustained attack on WhatsApp, which is hugely popular and is now the last major Western social media platform not yet banned. It is an app of choice for all kinds of groups – from parents’ class chats to tenants of apartment buildings. In July, Russian MPs began talking about the need to outlaw and ban the app. Anton Gorelkin, deputy head of the Duma Committee on Information Policy, said it is time for WhatsApp to “prepare to leave the Russian market.”
The crackdown coincides with the rollout of “Max,” a Kremlin-backed messaging app developed by VK (the Russian social media platform) and touted as a domestic alternative to WhatsApp. In July, the Russian government designated Max as a Russian ”national messenger” — a Russian adaptation of the Chinese approach to making state-approved social platforms the standard for communication with state-provided services, banks, and other service providers.
The attack on WhatsApp and the new repressive legislation form part of the same Kremlin effort to harass Russians into switching to Max from WhatsApp. Indeed, six Russian regions — including Mari El, Tatarstan, Altai, Khanty-Mansiysk, and the Vladimir and Tver regions — are reportedly readying themselves to migrate school-related group chats to Max.
The policy is likely to work, especially if the population is given no choice.
However, the larger consequences of the broader crackdown — including the introduction of fines for searching online for information critical of the Kremlin — could be far more significant.
In a way, it is yet another ambitious attempt by the Kremlin to change Russian social behavior following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The Kremlin’s first exercise to alter the social behavior after February 2022 was to intimidate the population into abandoning the bad and dangerous habit of discussing politics in public spaces. Until 2022, it was very common to hear people expressing dissatisfaction with Putin at café tables across Moscow, St Petersburg, and other big cities. That changed within a few months.
Simultaneously, Kremlin propaganda promoted stories about Russians being denounced by fellow travelers to the authorities for watching or reading Ukrainian news on their phones on public transport. The population, already bombarded by constant threats, took this very seriously: these days, one rarely sees Russians watching videos with, say, Zelenskyy, on the Moscow metro. That attempt to change social behavior largely succeeded.
But what about the Kremlin’s effort to change Russians’ habit of searching for independent information?
Generations of Russians grew up on the free internet. When the Kremlin started monitoring and policing social media a decade ago, it aimed to suppress free speech, and it was less interested in what kind of information ordinary Russians could access on YouTube or Instagram.
Citizens could read and watch whatever they want on social media blocked by the Kremlin — VPN use has not been a crime, and millions watch videos made by popular bloggers in exile and read investigations about Kremlin corruption or war crimes in Ukraine — published by journalists placed on the authorities’ wanted list.
This habit of free access to information has been so strong that even Putin’s favorite TV presenter, Ekaterina Andreeva, vocally stood up against the ban of her beloved Instagram, where she had often posted photos of luxury resorts and yachts, and admitted she still used it despite the ban. “I continue posting on Instagram via VPN . . . I believe that banning Instagram in Russia for people who are not involved in extremist activities is wrong,” she said in May 2022.
If even Putin’s propagandists find it hard to change their online habits, re-educating others not to watch their favorite political shows on YouTube or listen to podcasts made by reporters labeled as extremists will be very difficult.
Unless the Kremlin starts arresting people and sending them to prison.
But even then, repression might prove useless in times of major crisis; there is now a well-established and global urge to reach for social media to share emotions and footage. Russia is not immune.
That is why we still see dozens of videos of Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian cities on VK (a Russian analog of Facebook) or Telegram — despite numerous warnings from the Russian military and the authorities against exactly that.
Human habits die hard.
Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan are Non-resident Senior Fellows with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). They are Russian investigative journalists and co-founders of Agentura.ru, a watchdog of Russian secret service activities. Their book ’Our Dear Friends in Moscow, The Inside Story of a Broken Generation’ by Irina Borogan and Andrei Soldatov was published in June.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Cooperation and Competition
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2025-07-30 22:23:38
Washington, DC, July 30 – Today, the Center for European Policy Analysis is pleased to announce that George Casey has been elected by the Board of Directors as its Vice Chairman. Casey, a founding member of CEPA’s Business Leadership Council and a member of the Board of Directors, brings decades of private sector experience, as well as deep expertise on the most urgent issues facing the transatlantic alliance, at a period of critical importance for CEPA’s mission to ensure a secure, democratic, and prosperous transatlantic community.
George Casey is Global Chairman of Corporate and Chairman of the Americas at Linklaters LLP, an international law firm with 3,100 lawyers in 31 offices in 21 countries. Prior to joining Linklaters, George was Global Managing Partner of Shearman & Sterling LLP. George regularly represents boards of directors and management of major multinational companies with respect to strategic transactions, investments, joint ventures, corporate governance, and shareholder relations, among other things. In addition to maintaining his practice, George is an Adjunct Professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, where he has been teaching cross-border mergers and acquisitions since 2010. He is also a regular lecturer on US M&A at l’école de Droit de la Sorbonne – Université Paris I and is a thought leader on corporate, M&A and governance matters, as well as geopolitical issues. He is often invited to speak at major conferences and write commentary on emerging legal, governance, and international policy issues. George serves as a Member of the Board of Trustees and Chair of the Audit Committee of the American College of Greece.
Chairman of CEPA’s Board of Directors, Larry Hirsch stated, “It is wonderful to have George as the Vice Chairman of the Board. No one can better represent the outstanding and principled leadership which George brings to all who get to know him. We are proudly grateful for his contribution to the Board and to the company.”
CEPA’s President and CEO, Dr. Alina Polyakova said, “I look forward to continuing to work with George, whose leadership as the Vice Chair of CEPA’s Board of Directors will ensure CEPA’s impact and strategic position as the premiere institution on Europe-US relations in Washington.”
George Casey said, “I am honored to have been elected by the CEPA Board to serve as its Vice Chair. I look forward to continuing to work with Larry, Board members, Alina and the CEPA team to build on CEPA’s 20-year record as a leading non-partisan think tank. In today’s complex world, CEPA’s mission — providing cutting-edge insights and bringing together decision-makers from across the political spectrum and the business community to discuss key geopolitical issues — could not be more important.”
For media inquiries, please contact [email protected].
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2025-07-29 23:45:11
Ukraine’s pursuit of NATO membership has assumed heightened strategic importance in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion and ongoing aggression. While formal accession remains a complex process, alliance members and Kyiv are finding key pathways to deepen Ukraine’s integration. These include the articulation of NATO membership as a long-term strategic objective in Ukraine’s constitution. The implementation of a robust interim security framework and the institutional elevation of Ukraine through the NATO–Ukraine Council, especially emphasizing the imperative of strategic clarity in alliance commitments. Additionally, the rejection of revisionist narratives concerning NATO enlargement is critical. This, along with the assertion of European leadership, reinforces collective security to ensure Ukraine’s sovereignty within a stable Euro-Atlantic order.
The enduring goal of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic policy is full membership in NATO. Strategic assessments emphasize that no alternative security framework can offer comparable guarantees against Russian aggression. Ukraine has enshrined this aspiration in its constitution. Ukraine’s military has taken significant steps toward aligning its military structures with NATO standards. Russia’s full-scale invasion and occupation of parts of the country have only reinforced this goal in Kyiv and among its partners. Permanent deterrence depends on institutional integration into the alliance.
Nevertheless, the path to membership remains complex and politically sensitive. Catherine Sendak and Ilya Timtchenko explain that, “Ukraine’s situation is critical for NATO’s future… demanding renewed and sustainable political will from a nation worn down by casualties, hardship, and relentless stress, as well as from NATO members and partners who may be distracted by domestic and global challenges.”
NATO allies have stated that they will support Ukraine’s “irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership.” However, the alliance has yet to offer a definitive timeline or invitation for accession due to the ongoing war. Even some NATO members have argued about potential escalation risks. This lack of clarity not only undermines Ukraine’s long-term planning but also weakens deterrence by signaling hesitation. Sam Greene emphasizes that “only a deep, foundational obligation to Ukraine can ensure that Ukraine and Europe itself are adequately defended against further or renewed aggression.” Therefore, while accession is the strategic endpoint, immediate action is required to close the gap between aspiration and reality.
In light of the uncertainty around NATO accession, a structured interim framework is needed to support Ukraine’s defense needs. This must include the urgent delivery of advanced weapons systems, particularly in air defense and precision artillery. Additionally, a secure communication infrastructure and battlefield logistics are essential. These tools are crucial to Ukraine’s ability to repel further incursions and stabilize the frontlines.
Catherine Sendak and Ilya Timtchenko argue that “Ukraine has the second-largest military in Europe, which is battle-tested and innovative, proving its readiness and agility to respond to needs and evolve on the battlefield. It has the capacity to become a major security exporter — both of intelligence and military services and of arms production. Streamlining NATO-Ukraine standards will be in the interest of the alliance.”
The framework should also feature deeper integration of Ukrainian forces into NATO operational practices, including joint exercises, embedded training missions, and strategic planning cooperation to help build interoperability. They also demonstrate political solidarity. Defense industrial support is equally critical. Reducing bureaucratic hurdles, such as licensing and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) restrictions, could further enhance production and international cooperation. It bolsters Ukraine’s domestic arms production and repair capacity, ensuring that the country can sustain long-term resistance without over-reliance on external supply chains.
The Ukraine Defense Contact Group, established in April 2022 at Ramstein Air Base, now brings together over 50 nations and the European Union monthly to coordinate military assistance to Kyiv. This coalition has created specialized “capability coalitions.” These cover air defense, artillery, armor, drones, demining, maritime security, IT, and integrated missile defense. These coalitions enhance both pooled procurement and task-sharing mechanisms.
While these institutional arrangements promote unity and operational aid, the remaining challenges include increased bureaucracy, an over-reliance on US leadership, and concerns about the long-term sustainability of the group. To overcome these challenges, the international donor community, Ukraine, and industry should establish a task force led by the US Security Assistance Group-Ukraine and International Donor Coordination Center teams to develop a road map for future needs.
The July 2023 creation of the NATO–Ukraine Council marked a significant institutional breakthrough. Unlike earlier formats, this mechanism grants Ukraine equal footing with NATO members in discussions and joint decision-making. It allows Ukraine to participate directly in shaping policy responses to security threats. Moreover, it enables real-time crisis coordination — an unprecedented step for a non-member state.
The Council also institutionalizes Ukraine’s de facto status as a frontline partner in European security. Through working groups, joint consultations, and operational dialogue, it creates a permanent political channel to advance defense cooperation. However, equal participation must be matched by strategic commitments. Without tangible defense guarantees, the Council risks becoming symbolic rather than transformative.
A central theme of NATO-Ukraine relations is the danger of strategic ambiguity. Vague commitments or delayed timelines for Ukraine’s membership create space for adversaries to exploit. This is particularly the case for Russian information operations. They often cite unsubstantiated claims that NATO agreed to halt expansion. By failing to clearly articulate the conditions and path for accession, NATO undermines its own credibility, as well as inadvertently signaling to Moscow that coercion may succeed.
Planning for Article 5 implementation while Ukraine is actively defending against Russia’s invasion must begin even before NATO grants formal membership. This may not mean immediate military guarantees granted by the North Atlantic Treaty, but rather a phased process of operational alignment, focusing on integration of command structures and scenario planning. Former US Ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker explains that Article 5 does not require NATO members to pledge ground forces to Ukraine immediately, and the article could be used to implement additional security steps, including:
Amb. Volker explains, “These four steps – and perhaps others – could therefore become NATO’s Article 5 commitment to Ukraine – discussed and agreed within the NATO-Ukraine Council.” Such clarity would reinforce deterrence and stabilize the security environment. It would also send a powerful message of political resolve to both allies and adversaries.
A persistent narrative promoted by Russia and echoed by some Western voices claims that NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement provoked the current conflict. Strategic and historical evidence strongly refute this interpretation from Moscow, Beijing, and elsewhere. The voluntary aspirations of democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe drove NATO’s expansion following the collapse of communism and did not result in war at the time.
Moreover, the notion that Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions triggered the 2022 invasion is both factually and morally flawed. Russia’s military buildup and ideological hostility toward Ukrainian sovereignty began long before NATO membership was a serious prospect.
Maciej Bukowski argues that “It is madness to think that Europe’s security can be bought by appeasing Russian paranoia. Ukrainians are fighting for their identity and their future. If we Europeans wish for the same, we must be as determined as they are. We cannot kneel before the Kremlin.” Appeasing such revisionist claims would reward aggression and set a dangerous precedent for future crises.
NATO’s consensus-based structure limits the speed of collective action. However, this provides European nations with an opportunity to lead during this critical period. Several member states, particularly in Central and Northern Europe, have provided robust support with weapons, training, and reconstruction aid. Expanding these efforts, either individually or through multilateral coalitions, can help fill gaps while NATO deliberates long-term plans.
Former commander of US Army Europe Ben Hodges, CEPA Fellow Alexander Crowther, and Lieutenant Colonel Jahara Matisek emphasize that, “As Ukraine fights for its survival, European leaders must ensure they are not merely spectators but active participants in shaping the security of their region. Without immediate and sustained military commitments, the very foundations of Europe are at risk. The time for debate has passed — Europe must act.”
European leaders must also reject any framing of Ukraine’s membership as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Russia. Strategic ambiguity serves only to embolden autocracies. Sustained assistance must support a credible path to NATO. Furthermore, a clear refusal to allow external actors to dictate alliance policy is essential.
Ukraine’s alignment with NATO is not just a strategic necessity for Kyiv. It is a defining test for the alliance’s credibility. The road to formal membership remains fraught, but the geopolitical stakes demand action now. Through a combination of interim security measures, institutional integration, and narrative clarity, Ukraine and its partners can chart a course toward lasting peace and shared security.
Michael Newton is the Deputy Director for communications and operations at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
CEPA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, public policy institution. All opinions expressed are those of the author(s) alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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2025-07-29 04:12:46
CEPA’s Inside Cyber Diplomacy Redux podcast hosts foreign and tech policy leaders discussing the state of play in international cybersecurity policy. Engaging experts, innovators, and leaders around the globe, co-hosts Jim Lewis and Chris Painter shine a light on the international cybersecurity environment.
In this episode, the hosts debrief the outcomes of the recent meeting of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on the use of information and communications technologies for cybersecurity. The OEWG sets standards and rules for the digital domain and the use of information technologies, impacting the future of international cybersecurity.
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Listen and subscribe on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, and wherever you get your podcasts.
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2025-07-29 03:28:04
In Washington, rare bipartisan agreement exists on one point: artificial intelligence will shape — indeed, decide — who wins the 21st century. But what it means to “win” divides President Donald Trump from his predecessor, Joseph Biden.
The Trump Administration’s new AI Action Plan marks a sharp reversal in approach to AI governance, industrial policy, and national security. While Biden aimed to place guardrails around a fast-moving and unpredictable technology, Trump is bullish and unapologetically pro-business. His Action Plan comprises 90 recommendations, underpinned by three executive orders. It calls for slashing environmental regulations, fast-tracking data center construction, preempting restrictive state laws, and promoting AI exports. The aim, in Trump’s words, “America started the AI race. And we’re going to win it.”
By abandoning AI safeguards, the US will pile pressure on Europe — and perhaps Silicon Valley as well. Although Europe is considering a pause on its AI Act, the continent remains concerned about minimizing the potential risks associated with the new technology. Will it resist US deregulation, even at the possible cost of losing the AI race? US companies, already under scrutiny in Europe, may find it challenging to navigate contradictory policies on both sides of the Atlantic.
Under Biden, Washington shared many European concerns. It treated AI as a dual-use technology — full of promise, while fraught with risk. The Biden administration imposed controls on chip exports to China, required AI developers to disclose safety data, and directed federal agencies to ensure their systems were free from bias and discrimination.
Trump has dismantled this policy. Gone are the “diffusion rules” that limited AI computing power to certain countries, as are procurement safeguards, civil rights audits, and transparency requirements.
Gone, too, is Biden’s high-fence approach, which sought to restrict advanced AI capabilities for national security reasons. It is the “full-stack export package” — a strategy for bundling AI hardware, software, and American technical standards into cohesive offerings for countries with substantial budgets. The Trump White House prefers out-exporting rather than out-regulating China. Case in point: lifting the NVIDIA H20 chip exports to China.
Another dumped Biden priority: environmental regulation. The Trump AI plan proposes carving out exemptions to accelerate data center construction and other related power infrastructure.
In the Trump vision, the federal government’s word should be supreme, overruling any state AI laws that could “strangle innovation.” In theory, this could simplify compliance. In practice, it centralizes control over AI governance in the executive branch.
While deregulating, the Trump administration wants to shape the way AI presents information. Conservatives accuse AI models of a liberal bias. In response, Trump intends to purge what he calls “woke AI.” An Executive Order mandates that all large language models used by federal agencies must be “ideologically neutral.”
Trump’s AI strategy is, in many ways, a natural extension of his economic worldview: deregulatory, export-oriented, and pro-free markets. It reflects a particular understanding of the tech industry’s role in global power. While the Biden administration tried to balance AI development with safety, rights, and democratic oversight, the Trump White House seems to view such constraints as indulgences.
The Trump plan does devote attention to a different concern: security by design. It highlights the vulnerabilities of AI systems to data poisoning, input manipulation, and privacy breaches that could undermine their performance or reliability. The plan proposes a coordinated effort led by the Department of Defense, in partnership with NIST, the Department of Commerce, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to refine and institutionalize AI assurance standards, frameworks, and toolkits.
With its AI Action Plan, the Trump administration has given American big tech nearly everything it wanted: deregulation, export support, and permissive rules for training data. Whether that bargain produces a technological renaissance or a regulatory reckoning remains to be seen.
Elly Rostoum is a Google Public Policy Fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). She is a Lecturer at Johns Hopkins University. You can find out more about her work here: www.EllyRostoum.com
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
CEPA Europe’s Tech & Security Conference in Brussels.
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2025-07-29 00:41:32
The threat during the Cold War was not just communist ideology, but imperialism. Controversial at the time, that principle was highlighted in Public Law 86-90, a joint resolution of Congress passed in 1959. It highlighted the plight of those languishing in what was later called the evil empire, and “authorized and requested” the president to proclaim the third full week in July as “Captive Nations Week”, until such time as “freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world.”
The captive nations were initially defined as “Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, Rumania, East Germany, Bulgaria, mainland China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Korea, Albania, Idel-Ural, Tibet, Cossackia, Turkestan, North Viet-Nam, and others.” Admittedly, the initial list was an odd one (what’s Cossackia?). But it worked.
The story behind the resolution and its aftermath is told in a new book, “Unyielding Resolve” by its instigator, Lev Dobriansky, Another story is how critics, sometimes helped by the KGB, heard echoes of Nazi-led wartime efforts to resist the Red Army’s advance westwards, and tried to tar the captive nations campaigners as war criminals, and as supporters of fascist death squads in Latin America. The Cold War was never as simple as it seems in retrospect. Lobbyists for post-1991 Russia said talk of “captive nations” was an anachronism. Look how that turned out.
The Russian foreign ministry now explicitly praises the Soviet Union’s annexation in 1940 of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and decries their progress since 1991. The Turkic and Finno-Ugric peoples briefly represented by the Idel-Ural proto-state in 1918 still languish under Russian linguistic and cultural chauvinism. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) repression in Turkestan (home to the Uighurs) and Tibet is far harsher than it was in 1959. Ukraine is fighting for its survival against the old colonial hegemon.
Yet commemoration this year was, to put it mildly, patchy. The Victims of Communism Foundation marked the week’s start with an event focusing on the dismantling of the Chinese empire. But where was the White House? Donald Trump’s first administration marked the event punctually each year with a proclamation on the preceding Friday. In 2017, it quoted President Reagan’s words from 1983, that America is a “shining city upon a hill” with a duty to “shine its beacon light on freedom-loving people around the world.” In 2018, it quoted him again: “Free people, if they are to remain free, must defend the liberty of others.” In 2019, it denounced “tyrannical and coercive governments”. In 2020, it denounced the CCP, blaming it for the COVID-19 global pandemic, and for snuffing out freedom in Hong Kong, a “bastion of liberty.”
But this year, nothing. On Thursday, I began making a fuss and encouraging others to do the same. A text, it seemed, had been prepared, but was awaiting signature. I asked the White House press office about the delay: no answer. More messages, including to friends who work for the president. At lunchtime on Friday (a week late by past standards), the proclamation was finally issued, “advancing a new era of peace where freedom is cherished, sovereignty is respected, and every nation can live without fear of tyranny or oppression.”
The annual proclamations always have a topical twist and reflect the administration’s priorities. This year’s was perhaps not the White House wordsmiths’ finest effort. It mischaracterizes Captive Nations Week’s origins as a response to the“emerging” threat of communism in 1959 (ten years out of date). It contained no mention of Ukraine’s struggle for freedom. But campaigners are just glad that it was issued at all.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Cooperation and Competition
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