Germany’s China Challenge: Security Versus Business as Usual

2024-11-23 04:18:10

It looked like a turning point.

In August, the German Foreign Office summoned the Chinese ambassador to Germany, accusing Beijing of conducting a cyberattack against the state cartography agency. It was the first time that Germany had summoned China’s ambassador since the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989.

Germany has woken up to the China challenge. The current government demonstrates a new understanding and willingness to act against Chinese threats. And yet, many decisions continue to reflect a business as usual – and business first – approach. New elections planned for February are unlikely to lead to a significant course correction, even if Donald Trump will be impatient with Berlin’s meandering.

German intelligence agencies have broken with their insular and reticent tradition and are now confronting China. At a 2022 parliament hearing, German spy chiefs warned that while everyone is paying attention to Russia’s disinformation, hacking and espionage, the much greater long-term challenge comes from China. Russia represented “the storm,” they said. China is “climate change.”

Leaked data from a Chinese cyber-attack contractor confirmed this year for the first time that Chinese government contracts sustain a dangerous hacking-for-hire industry. The Chinese government collects weaknesses in code and funnels them to hackers. Before publishing the data,the domestic Verfassungsschutz intelligence agency shared the story in German media.

Political leaders ignore these intelligence warnings. Consider the debate over the inclusion of Chinese vendor Huawei’s equipment in Germany’s 5G networks. In 2019 and again in 2022, the head of the German foreign intelligence agency BND warned of indiscriminate and naïve use of Chinese technology in 5G networks. Although the Foreign Ministry advocated a ban on Chinese 5G technology, the Interior Ministry presented a compromise that would restrict, while not ruling out, Chinese participation. German telecommunications providers lobbied that they could not afford to rip and replace Chinese equipment. The final decision forbids only a small amount of Chinese telecom equipment, even allowing Huawei to continue supplying crucial radio network access hardware.

Amid this fierce debate, Chancellor Olaf Scholz remains cautious. He reportedly requested that the intelligence agencies slow-roll the arrest of suspected Chinese spies until after his visit this year to Beijing. Scholz also insisted that Germany vote against the EU tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles.

Allies are becoming impatient. After being encouraged by the seeming German U-turn on China, the Biden administration grew frustrated that the strategy was too vague, allowing companies and ministries to justify additional engagement with Beijing.  

The cleavage over China reflects differences within the German government. The Foreign Office and intelligence services want to crack down, citing security risks. The Chancellor and the Digital and Transport ministries want to deepen ties, citing economic opportunities. Going forward, expect continued warnings by intelligence agencies without a fundamental policy shift. When decisions would be costly to German businesses, the government prefers a business first approach.

Although this approach arguably served Germany well over the last two decades, it is unlikely to do so in the future. Germany and China were complementary economic partners, with Germany providing technology, machines, and experience with manufacturing, while China provided cheaper labor, good infrastructure, and favorable conditions on land sales and tax rates, often negotiated with local governments. Volkswagen, for example, in 2018, sold roughly 40% of its global car sales in China.

As China ascends value chains, this complementarity can no longer be taken for granted. Volkswagen is down to 33% of its cars sold in China, with profits falling.

The upcoming German elections are unlikely to lead to a fundamental re-think. While the main opposition Christian Democrat party criticizes current China policy, the party’s chancellor candidate Friedrich Merz opposed the EU’s electric vehicle tariffs. Germany’s China policy will likely continue to meander.

A second Trump term will be less patient than the current Biden administration. While Biden has imposed unilateral measures on occasion, these followed extensive negotiations. The Foreign Direct Product Rule on ASML’s advanced machines, which are needed for chip manufacturing, is a good example. When the US implemented export restrictions in 2022, ASML machines remained unaffected. The US then spent a year negotiating with the Dutch government, and only in October 2023 – when the result of negotiations proved unsatisfactory – did the US implement rules to restrict ASML’s sales to China. While the US pushed Germany on 5G under Biden, it has so far held back from carrying out threats to stop sharing intelligence. A Trump government is less likely to be accommodating.

If Germany continues to pursue a business as usual approach, it risks ending up isolated. The EU will make future decisions about China without Germany. The European Commission already pushed through the electric vehicle tariffs despite intense German lobbying.

Berlin enjoys a privileged position with Beijing thanks to strong economic ties and its influence in Europe. Both advantages are now under attack. China’s car industry threatens the German economic pillar. If Chinese leaders see that Germany cannot sway EU partners, they may court more friendly voices such as Hungary’s Victor Orban – and lose interest in Germany.

Antonia Hmaidi is a Senior Analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies. She studies China’s pursuit of tech self-reliance (especially in areas such as semiconductors, operating systems, and internet infrastructure), China’s cybersecurity, and hacking campaigns. She gained experience as a project manager at the Bertelsmann Stiftung, worked at the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ), as a journalist in Asia, and at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).

Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

The post Germany’s China Challenge: Security Versus Business as Usual appeared first on CEPA.

An Explosive Choice: Landmines and Ukraine

2024-11-23 00:45:30

The anti-landmine campaigner, British Maj-Gen James Cowan (ret.) might be expected to condemn outright President Biden’s November 19 decision to send anti-personnel mines to Ukraine.

After all, it has been attacked by campaigning groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty. And indeed the HALO Trust, the world’s biggest landmine clearance group, which Cowan runs, has said the spread of such mines is a “clear and present danger” in Eastern Europe.

But Cowan, former commander of UK forces in Iraq, pointed out that the US decision must be seen in context.

“War is inherently brutal,” he says. “One side seeks to prevail through violence unless the other can resist effectively. The international community has a responsibility to support nations under unwarranted aggression, as recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter, which affirms Ukraine’s right to self-defense.”

Cowan goes out of his way to applaud President Zelenskyy’s commitment to international law, and emphasizes that his country has the legal right to self-defense; and that means, under certain guidelines, that even anti-personnel landmines are legal.

In Ukraine, the military situation is now dire — not just at the front lines, but across vast expanses of the country where landmines are a constant menace to life and limb. Nonetheless, the decision to send the mines (the US already provides anti-tank mines) raises significant diplomatic and humanitarian concerns, not least because Ukraine is a signatory to the 1997 anti-personnel mine convention.

Ukraine is already the most heavily mined country in the world, with many laid by Russia, which is not a convention signatory. In the past 1,000-plus days, an estimated two million landmines have been scattered across the country, leading Mine Action Review to classify the country as “massively contaminated.”

Landmines now affect 40% of Ukrainian territory. Once laid, these cannot be neutralized without extensive clearance efforts from organizations like the HALO Trust. Thus, landmines represent not merely a tactical weapon but a long-term threat to civilian safety, agricultural recovery, and national reconstruction.

Ukraine’s situation is extremely serious, especially since Russian tactics now emphasize the use of small groups of infantry to infiltrate its lines and push back its forces. The Ukrainian military argues the devices will make a significant difference, and notes that the arriving US mines have a limited shelf life since they are battery-powered and designed to expire after a period of time.

Cowan summarizes the guidelines that both Zelensky and the US are following.  

1. Distinction: Combatants must be distinguished from civilians. Traditional landmines, including those that Russia used against Ukraine, fail this test as they do not discriminate between these groups, and lack self-destruction mechanisms once their military purpose has lapsed. The non-persistent US mines aim is to mitigate civilian harm.

2. Proportionality: This principle mandates that collateral damage must not be excessive relative to the military advantage gained. Careful placement away from populated areas and thorough mapping is crucial in minimizing civilian impacts.

3. Humanity: All individuals must have their fundamental rights respected. The moral responsibility for eventual mine clearance lies with those who deploy them and the global community supporting such actions.

4. Military Necessity: This principle justifies America’s decision amid shifting tides of war favoring Russia. Strengthening Ukraine’s defenses is critical for its survival; supplying landmines is a choice between the lesser of two evils.

Cowan emphasizes: “When deploying landmines is deemed necessary for military strategy, there must also be an unwavering commitment to their removal post-conflict. Fortunately, bipartisan support for landmine clearance in the US has been robust across administrations — both during Trump’s tenure and under Biden.”

He acknowledges that: “The scale of this challenge is staggering. If the HALO Trust alone were tasked with clearing two million mines in Ukraine, it would take approximately 127 years under consistent funding conditions.”

This moment presents a profound moral reckoning for the international community: we must support Ukraine in its fight for survival while ensuring that wartime tools do not become permanent hazards within its landscape. Achieving this balance requires a sustained commitment to humanitarian aid, mine clearance efforts, and post-conflict recovery initiatives.  

Mitzi Perdue is a HALO Trust Ambassador, and also a journalist who writes from and about Ukraine.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

The post An Explosive Choice: Landmines and Ukraine appeared first on CEPA.

The European ‘Herbivore’ Must Change its Diet

2024-11-23 00:08:30

The scenario in which a returning President Donald Trump exits NATO or, more likely, undermines confidence in Article 5 is all too familiar across the alliance. So, too, are the policies Europe needs to keep itself secure and free: stronger militaries, European nuclear deterrence, more cooperation, and far higher readiness. 

The problem is not policy but politics: what if what’s needed is impossible? Most of Europe has a defense implementation problem. Domestic politics doesn’t square with strategic needs. The case of Germany is instructive, but the same drama unfolds almost everywhere. 

The trouble is money. Two things have happened in past decades. 

First, Germany, like most European countries, has built distinct federal spending patterns since joining NATO. The big chunks of the budget are social spending and defense. In Europe, the ratio between the two is roughly between 3:1 and 4:1.

This reflects European choices after World War II that were supported by the US.

During the Cold War, Washington needed resilient European societies: wealthy, pacified, and not susceptible to Communist temptation. Building sturdy economies out of Europe’s war-torn societies was the order of the day. 

Washington carried the defense load. This meant Europeans didn’t have to arm themselves again beyond manageable dimensions, and it made the US the hegemon in Western Europe.

This transatlantic bargain worked magnificently but at the price of hard-wiring allocations into European budgets. It created a culture of US-subsidized security and defense where welfare spending would forever be three to four times greater than defense spending.

This is now a problem. What was wise after 1945 is now a structural security risk as Europe faces war on its borders. But unlearning this political culture doesn’t come easily.

The second development came after the Cold War when Europeans “reaped the peace dividend.”

During the Cold War, Europe’s contribution to NATO grew. At its height, Germany spent 4.5% of GDP on defense – a figure unimaginable today. And that was while the US was carrying the bulk of the burden, including costly, extended nuclear deterrence.

After the Cold War, defense spending was slashed, and nowhere was this done more wholeheartedly than in Germany. 

In Bonn and then Berlin, money was diverted to finance re-unification — rebuilding the east shattered by 45 years of Communism. That project cost more than $2 trillion.

This second development lasted for 25 years before being reversed around 2014 after Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

Today, as security worsens, Trump’s reelection means Europe’s protector is turning into a fierce critic, especially on the costs of security, and is anyway increasingly busying itself with Asia. Meanwhile, Europe haggles over spending models from a lost age. These aren’t merely budgetary issues. They represent fiercely held world views, political cultures, and entitlements. 

Facing Russian aggression with a less committed US, Europeans must reverse spending patterns that have made Europe a mere “herbivore,” as President Macron described it.

But spending more on European defense means domestic political battles that will create tensions and big losers. 

Take Germany, where fights over budgetary allocations triggered the collapse of Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s government in November.

While a Körber Foundation poll found 65% of Germans back raising defense spending to at least 3-3.5% of GDP, an equally important finding is that 56% oppose cutting social, environmental, and cultural budgets to do so. 

The German armed forces are meanwhile in an abysmal state even though the Bundeswehr will have to be the backbone of European conventional land forces relying less on the US. 

Defense spending went up in Germany after Crimea. It was boosted after Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine in 2022, when Scholz declared a Zeitenwende (new epoch), and the government created a €100bn fund for military procurement. 

Facing war in Europe, speed was crucial, and so the tough fiscal debates were avoided through debt financing. The Bundeswehr got more money, but nobody else got less. Scholz postponed the hard part of the redistribution conflict. 

This method of boosting defense spending isn’t sustainable. And this is where the German – and European – strategic tragedy sets in. 

In early 2024, Scholz’s government made a timid attempt to cut subsidies for farmers. 

The farmers would not have it. Violent protests were staged, with tractors blocking highways and city centers. The government swiftly relented and canceled most of the planned cuts.

If this is what to expect should re-distribution truly start, then Germany and Europe are in for a very rough ride. 

With the German economy set to contract for a second year in 2024, new taxes hugely unpopular, spending cuts rejected, and massive defense spending increases unavoidable, something’s got to give. 

So far, the answer is new debt. The 2022 special military fund was written into the constitution to exempt it from the country’s debt brake rules. The debt break led to the collapse of Scholz’s coalition after two of the three parties, his Social Democrats and the Greens, sought to circumvent it to allow new spending without cuts to social spending. But the liberal Free Democrats, their popularity at rock-bottom, rejected more debt and tax increases. Ultimately, this circle could not be squared, leading to the demise of Scholz’s government after just three years.

The opposition Christian Democratic bloc, whose leader Friedrich Merz is likely to be the next chancellor after the February 23 elections, is wavering on the debt issue. 

One way or another, the debt break will ultimately have to be amended. Germany’s low debt-to-GDP ratio of 64% allows for borrowing without dangerous levels of indebtedness. 

And yet, new borrowing isn’t the solution. Interest rates are high, and debt servicing is the fourth biggest item in the federal budget. Even Germany won’t be able to do the heavy strategic lifting based on this basis. 

Where will the money come from? 

Nobody knows. France’s debt ratios of around 100% of GDP mean it is “broke,” as one French official admits. The UK’s ratio is similar. Italy’s debt-to-GDP ratio is nearing 140%. 

As the continent’s geopolitical situation worsens, the means to militarily harden Europe dry up. (And we haven’t even started discussing nuclear issues.) This is the tragedy of strategic impossibility in Europe.

If Europeans want to survive, the only answer is massive re-distribution within budgets, away from butter and into guns. 

This will meet significant opposition. It will trigger social conflict, political upheaval, and violence. It will worsen Europe’s standard of living and be impossible to execute without public recognition of imminent threats to a free Europe. 

This means the situation must get dramatically worse before painful reform becomes domestically acceptable. And by then, it may be too late.

The legacy of spending patterns since the 1950s and decades of strategic frivolity is now haunting Europe. 

Europeans must start a brutal debate now to speedily adjust their budgets. They need to urgently use the remaining time — the window between Russia regaining conventional military strength and Trump’s America getting fully absorbed in Asia or simply telling Europe, “You’re on your own” — to prepare for horrendously difficult challenges ahead. 

There isn’t much time left. Europe must act now.

Leon Mangasarian worked as a news agency reporter and editor in Germany from 1989 with Bloomberg News, Deutsche-Presse Agentur, and United Press International. He has a PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics and is now a freelance writer in Brandenburg, eastern Germany.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

The post The European ‘Herbivore’ Must Change its Diet appeared first on CEPA.

Romania’s 2024 Elections: Too Familiar

2024-11-22 23:52:11

“Three decades of free elections, and the party rooted in the Communist era still runs the country,” the celebrated poet Ana Blandiana, who defied Romania’s Communist regime, remarked in an interview after three decades of multi-party rule. 

Her words captured the nation’s ongoing struggle with political stagnation. In 2024, a year packed with presidential, parliamentary, local, and European elections, Romanian voters face a familiar political landscape dominated by established interests. Despite the high stakes, the prospect of meaningful change remains frustratingly out of reach.

In the upcoming presidential (November 24 and December 8) and parliamentary elections (December 1), Romanians will choose leaders who will shape the country’s economic future and navigate complex geopolitical challenges, including Romania’s role in influencing European Union (EU) policies on critical issues such as energy security, defense, and the next Commission’s push for strategic autonomy. 

With NATO’s eastern flank under pressure due to Russia’s war in Ukraine — and deep uncertainty looming over an upcoming Trump presidency — Romania’s significance is undeniable. Yet, it is hard to see new faces among the current slate of candidates.

A generally good economic performance eases the pressure to act. While inflation is relatively high, GDP growth has continued an upward trend despite Russia’s war against neighboring Ukraine, unemployment is falling, and national debt is relatively low.

But serious underlying issues continue to dog the country. Despite years of efforts, Romania only secured partial Schengen access in March. It continues to languish at the bottom of the EU’s Digital Economy and Society Index, revealing profound deficits in digital infrastructure and skills. EU funds absorption is low, falling short of the EU average, and corruption is still common — Romania lags at the bottom of the EU table with Bulgaria and Hungary. 

The youth unemployment rate is at 22.2%, and average wages are among the lowest in the EU. The healthcare sector fares no better, with spending levels near the bottom in Europe, directly affecting service quality and access. Public trust in democratic institutions has plummeted, with only 19.4% of Romanians expressing confidence in the government. These failings are exacerbated by a significant brain drain: between 2007 and 2015, over 3.4 million Romanians left the country, which represents the second-highest emigration growth rate after Syria. 

The brief tenure of Dacian Cioloș, a former European Commissioner turned technocratic reformer, in 2015 highlighted Romania’s entrenched political barriers. Despite initial optimism, his administration faced relentless opposition from established parties, stalling meaningful change. The Union Save Romania (USR), founded in 2016 as a reformist force, has also struggled — plagued by internal divisions and resistance from established networks that protect a culture of patronage. A 2019 report revealed that political appointments in public administration remained prevalent, undermining institutional efficiency and public trust. 

Leading the presidential polls at 25.3%, Marcel Ciolacu represents the Social Democratic Party, Romania’s dominant political force. Despite branding the Social Democrats as a center-left party focused on social welfare and economic stability, its roots lie in the Communist party, and it has suffered a long history of corruption scandals.

George Simion, leader of the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians, is in second place, polling at 19.1% and capitalizing on anti-EU and nationalist rhetoric. His party gained significant traction by exploiting dissatisfaction with the way the government handled the COVID-19 pandemic and growing Euroscepticism, propelling it to strong performances in the 2024 European and local elections. 

Simion’s presidency could erode democratic institutions, destabilize the region, and push Romania down a path reminiscent of Hungary’s illiberal drift, jeopardizing the country’s pro-European commitments and isolating it within the EU. He opposes Ukraine aid while denying he is pro-Russian and seeks to redraw Romania’s post-war borders.

Nicolae Ciucă is the National Liberal Party’s candidate. Despite its pro-European, center-right branding, many voters struggle to see a difference from the Social Democrats, alienating many. This shift became evident in 2021 when the two parties formed a coalition that blurred ideological lines. The National Liberals and Social Democrats also ran as a coalition in June’s European Parliament elections.

Once a rising star in the Social Democratic Party, Mircea Geoană, now running as an independent, has built an impressive diplomatic résumé, including his tenure as NATO’s Deputy Secretary General. While his supporters tout his strategic vision and international experience as assets to enhance Romania’s global influence, his campaign has struggled to generate the momentum he anticipated. 

A former journalist turned mayor, Elena Lasconi, polling at 14.3%, the Union Save Romania candidate, is not a credible anti-system contender. Despite being framed as an outsider, her limited political experience and lack of a substantial political track record undermine her appeal. 

It remains uncertain who will join Ciolacu in the second round of presidential polling. If Simion advances, it will simplify the choice for voters determined to oppose the far right. Yet, regardless, the options are leaving many voters disillusioned. A 2023 poll showed that 71% of Romanians believe the country is headed in the wrong direction, citing inflation, low incomes, and corruption as top concerns, while trust in political parties (9%), the presidency (15%), and parliament (12%) is among the lowest.

The same dynamics are at play in the upcoming parliamentary elections that will take place on December 1. This election is unlikely to deliver the sweeping reforms many Romanians desperately seek, such as rooting out entrenched corruption, improving healthcare infrastructure, and creating economic opportunities to curb the brain drain.

There may have been a time when Romania could look inward, and the effects elsewhere were limited. But the war on its eastern border means that’s no longer true. Without bold leadership, the many challenges facing the nation, at home and abroad, will go unaddressed. 

Blandiana was right: true transformation is still out of reach. The hope lies in the rise of grassroots movements and a new political generation willing to challenge an entrenched status quo.

Anda Bologa is an independent expert on Central European foreign policy, transatlantic affairs, and AI and digital policy. She was a Denton Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

The post Romania’s 2024 Elections: Too Familiar appeared first on CEPA.

Romania’s Pro-Ukraine Policy in Focus as Elections Near

2024-11-22 23:43:43

Romania’s first-round presidential election on November 24 boils down to one thing: who comes second? 

The big question is which of the 13 presidential candidates makes it to the December 8 runoff and what it will mean for Romania at a time when the war in neighboring Ukraine is at a crucial stage, and as Donald Trump prepares to take office and seek a peace agreement.  

Nationalist George Simion, 38, has consistently polled second place in (not very reliable) opinion surveys and is considered to have the best chance, partly thanks to support from Romanian Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu who is expected to come first, but not win an outright majority of 50.1%-plus. Ciolacu’s campaign views Simion as an easier candidate to defeat in round two. 

Trump’s victory has given Europeans skeptics, like Simion, a boost. So what effect might that have on Romania’s foreign policy. 

Romania has been solidly pro-European under President Klaus Iohannis, who is stepping down after a maximum two terms in office, but that could change if nationalist parties score well, positioning themselves as defenders of traditional values against what they portray as corrupt elites and foreign influences. 

Analysts say that Simion’s Alliance for the Unification of Romania AUR party and the Euroskeptic SOS party headed by Diana Sosoaca, who was banned from running by the Constitutional Court in a controversial ruling, could win up to 40% of the votes, making them a powerful minority in parliament and calling into question Romania’s commitment to the European Union (EU) and NATO. 

The nationalists have an ally in Ciolacu who would like to run against Simion in the second round as it would then be easy to portray him as the respectable pro-European candidate, an advantage he wouldn’t have against pro-European candidates. He has already publicly defended Simion against allegations that the AUR leader is a Russian agent. Simion denies this. 

The 38-year-old former football ultra has morphed into a far-right politician. He created the populist AUR party in 2019 which is hoping to gain traction in the December 1 parliamentary elections if its candidate makes it into the runoff.  

AUR came from nowhere to win 20% of the parliamentary vote in 2020 elections, riding a wave of frustration about pandemic restrictions and resentment about mainstream parties. It represented a desire to reassert national identity in an increasingly European Romania.   

Simion, who in 2022 grabbed then Energy Minster Virgil Popescu by the neck in parliament, has toned down his extremist rhetoric during the campaign. But he has a major handicap. He has been declared persona non grata in Ukraine and Moldova. Since Romania’s president oversees the country’s foreign policy, a ban on traveling to key regional states would be a major handicap for a Romanian leader. 

The AUR party opposed aid to Ukraine in the European Parliament and Simion has been associated with Kremlin-style Russian divisive rhetoric in Ukraine and Moldova

Simion says the small Romanian minority in Ukraine is oppressed and argues Romania has territorial claims on Ukraine, repeating recent Kremlin propaganda.  

Among the other candidates, the three most pro-European all face a simple, arithmetic problem. Votes are split between them, making it hard for any one of them to reach the runoff and prevent a Ciolacu-Simion final round. It’s also unclear which has the greatest chance of defeating Ciolacu. There have been calls for one of them to drop out to avoid jeopardizing Romania’s pro-Atlantic path, but to no avail. 

Polls suggest that mayor of the small town of Campulung-Muscel, Elena Lasconi, is polling higher, but only just. Promising to clean up corruption and cronyism, Lasconi scores high on the sincerity scale but has been criticized for major gaps in her foreign policy knowledge. 

On paper, former Prime Minister Nicolae Ciuca looks like a strong candidate. A former army Chief of Staff, he served as defense minister and  prime minister. He is a veteran of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is also the chairman of the center-right National Liberal Party, the second-largest party in parliament, and has US backing. 

But he lacks charisma and is widely seen as the successor to the current steady but unpopular Iohannis, the outgoing ethnic-German president,  

The other candidate in with a chance is former NATO deputy secretary-general Mircea Geoana who began with high poll ratings, but has fallen behind after a series of missteps and the absence of a party machine to back him. Although qualified and eloquent, voters are unsure whether he is aligned with the Social Democrats or pro-European parties. 

The two-round presidential elections have greater significance since they set the stage for the parliamentary vote. Whoever scores well on November 24 has a better chance of winning seats in the two-chamber legislature. 

The outcome is likely to be another coalition government, but the major question is whether the nationalists will enter the government for the first time ever.   

Alison Mutler is a British journalist who has been working in Romania for almost 35 years. She was the Associated Press bureau chief for 25 years, and was  part of a team that covered the Romanian revolution for the British TV channel, ITN. For the past five years, she has worked for the Romanian-English website Universul.net and has been its director for the past three years.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

The post Romania’s Pro-Ukraine Policy in Focus as Elections Near appeared first on CEPA.