2025-10-08 19:08:16
Results from Georgia’s October 4 municipal elections indicated a landslide win for the ruling party of Georgian Dream. With all 3,061 precincts counted across the country, the party that has now held power for 13 years, won all the mayoral races and throughout all 64 municipalities. Georgian Dream won towns with over 70% of the vote, with its share in some cases surpassing 80%-90%.
It’s true not all parties joined the opposition boycott, and that turnout dropped from about 50% in 2021 to 41%, but the outcome simply hands more power to Georgian Dream. Unlike the 2024 general election, there were no widespread claims of vote-rigging because there was no need to engage in electoral skullduggery.
The municipal elections have traditionally carried limited national weight and were of low geopolitical importance when it comes to Georgia’s foreign policy. Yet this year’s vote was viewed as a major test for the ruling party’s popularity given it struggled to win the majority of votes in the parliamentary elections of October 2024 (and there was significant evidence it engaged in vote-rigging).
Condemned for “irregularities, deviations and anomalies”, last year’s parliamentary vote has enabled a systematic crackdown on opponents and an extension of ruling party control over state institutions from the judiciary and large parts of the media, to electoral institutions.
In the run-up to the municipal elections, Georgia’s opposition forces splintered. Persistent infighting and the absence of a charismatic leader have left it fragmented and ineffective.
Street protests continue, but they are smaller and less organized than in late 2024 when massive turnouts were recorded. There are signs that the opposition is exhausted. With its key leaders in prison and no unifying figure in sight, its decision to boycott the vote risks frittering away whatever popular trust remains.
As for those opposition parties that did participate, the Lelo/Strong Georgia alliance and former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia’s For Georgia, the results proved underwhelming.
Despite the disorganization of its opponents, Georgian Dream took the opportunity to show its disdain for demonstrably fair electoral behavior. The authorities obstructed independent monitoring. The invitation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and its monitoring mission was deliberately delayed until September, effectively preventing comprehensive international oversight. The organization refused to participate, stating it didn’t have enough time to carry out systemic checks.
The government will have been further aided by attempts by a small group of protesters to break into the presidential palace on October 4. This behavior caused uproar even among those who were present at the massive demonstration on that day.
Yet, the municipal elections also showed that the ruling party has troubles ahead. For instance, in Tbilisi, its candidate, Kakha Kaladze, got more than 70% of the vote. But a closer look reveals a different picture. Out of nearly one million registered voters, the ruling party candidate received about 250,000. That’s hardly a popular mandate, something underlined by dismal turnout in the capital — only 31% bothered to vote.
Even so, the results are likely to further embolden the ruling party. It will grasp the momentum and push for an absolute ban of most opposition parties from the political scene. Some opposition parties will survive, including those that participated in the October 4 vote.
As for the others, there is likely to be an enforced transformation of the political landscape. The United National Movement (led by the imprisoned former President Mikheil Saakashvili) and its satellite parties will gradually fade from the political scene and be replaced by groups more amenable to Georgian Dream and its billionaire leader Bidzina Ivanishvili.
Georgian Dream’s chief objective now is to consolidate its hold on power, which will continue to be exercised in an authoritarian manner. This will further distance the country from the European Union (EU) and underline that any talk of future membership is doomed. This despite overwhelming popular support for joining both the bloc and NATO (A September poll showed 74% back joining the EU, with just 5% opposed.)
Attacks on the EU have become a defining characteristic of the regime and its outlets. It meanwhile continues its pivot to Russia, China, and others.
This does not mean that Tbilisi necessarily wants full alignment with Moscow, which still occupies 20% of Georgian territory, but the country now has few other friends.
Collaboration with Russia will be born out of necessity to deal with isolation from the West and the need to push for a solution to its territorial problem. The strongly pro-EU Georgian population, meanwhile, recognizes Russia as a geopolitical threat. It’s a difficult needle for the government to thread.
The name of this CEPA contributor has been withheld to shield him/her from retribution by dictatorial and authoritarian states.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Taking place October 8-9, 2025.
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2025-10-08 01:02:48
There is now a clear campaign underway by Russia’s drones and its shadow fleet to bring disruption and sometimes chaos to Europe’s airspace and sea lanes. How can European NATO respond?
The evidence of Russian involvement is clear. And while in itself this is not new, the scale of the Kremlin’s operations has been accelerating since the drone attack on Poland on September 9-10.
Most visibly, drones have closed operations at two of the continent’s biggest airports at Copenhagen and Munich, but there have been many other incursions, including formations of unmanned aerial vehicles over military bases. Danish and German leaders have made clear they believe Russia is behind the string of at least 42 incidents up to October 6.
As Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz said on September 29: “Let me put it in a sentence that may be a little shocking at first glance . . . we are not at war, but we are no longer at peace [with Russia] either.”
What to do? Firstly, the response must be lawful, fast, and visible.
Poland invoked consultations under NATO’s Article 4 in September, and NATO deployed Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to reinforce surveillance along the eastern flank. These actions are necessary to monitor and reassure, but they remain reactive. More surveillance reveals more violations without deterring them. The rising tempo is straining Europe’s response capacity, leaving allies stuck in a cycle of observation.
It needs to impose costs.
First, deal with hostile drones in ways that do not put civil aviation at risk. EUROCONTROL and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) caution that jammers can interfere with satellite navigation signals, which makes them unsafe to use near airports.
A safer approach is layered detection combined with non-jamming defeat methods that produce evidence usable in court. Governments should allow police or gendarmerie helicopter teams to operate with military sensor support, permit radio-frequency takeover tools that meet aviation standards, use net capture or frangible-round interceptors where rules allow, and keep a full chain of custody so incidents can be publicly attributed.
Second, lawfully detain shadow fleet vessels for long enough to impose real costs. Within territorial seas and ports, coastal authorities and Port State Control (PSC) officers can demand documents, check crews and safety standards, and hold non-compliant ships under the Paris Memorandum of Understanding and International Maritime Organization procedures.
Denmark and Sweden already use Vessel Traffic Services in the Danish Straits, a natural choke point. Authorities can direct high-risk tankers to anchor, inspect their registry and protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance, and hold them until deficiencies are corrected or courts rule. This effect can be multiplied by joint inspection teams supported by prosecutors on call.
Third, respond to cyber operations with lawful reciprocity. International law allows unfriendly but legal acts, called retorsions, and proportionate countermeasures when facing a wrongful act. In practice, this can mean disabling hostile command-and-control servers, seizing illegal jammers and drone controllers, excluding offending entities from European hosting, and shutting down unlawful transmissions. Each action should be reviewed to ensure it remains legal, proportionate, and safe for civil aviation.
Fourth, use sanctions and maritime services to create leverage at sea. The European Union’s (EU’s) latest package lowered the oil price cap to $47.60 per barrel with the aim of keeping it 15% below the Urals benchmark. Member states should enforce this in ports and coastal waters by requiring verifiable P&I insurance and registry, denying services to evasive carriers, and targeting high-risk ships through the European Maritime Safety Agency’s (EMSA) THETIS database.
THETIS is the central inspection and detention system used by European port authorities to record results, flag high-risk ships, and track enforcement. A dedicated shadow-fleet cell inside THETIS, fed by Automatic Identification System (AIS) anomalies and opaque ownership flags, would increase detentions and force costly rerouting and delays.
Fifth, speed up and simplify public reporting. NATO members should release verified radar tracks, inspection records, or satellite images within hours to show what happened, deter repeats, and maintain public confidence. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), EUROCONTROL, and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) provide reporting standards that allow quick, defensible releases without revealing sensitive information.
NATO’s Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOCs) at Uedem and Torrejón could manage a standing 24-hour release protocol so each violation produces a documented response and, if necessary, a controlled intercept.
The logical question is why these steps are not already standard. The answer lies in legal limits, aviation safety rules, and strict evidentiary requirements that make governments cautious.
Drone countermeasures must be cleared for use near airports, maritime detentions must follow international law, and every action must produce evidence strong enough for use in court. For these proposals to become routine practice, they need firm legal mandates, agreed operating procedures, and resources to document and review each action quickly.
Will Russia retaliate? Very possibly, but the risk can be mitigated by acting strictly within the law and emphasizing safety: no broad jamming near airports, no interdictions that violate the law of the sea, and no covert launches from allied territory.
By keeping actions legal and transparent, NATO members deny Russia an escalation narrative while still imposing real costs on its shadow campaigns.
Europe faces a contest of nerves and law. Once backed by legal authority and standardized procedures, the five measures are immediate, defensible, and reversible if Russia ends its campaign. Used together, they can raise costs today and build lasting deterrence tomorrow.
George Janjalia is the Operations Director for a security risk management company in Ukraine, with a focus on fortifying business continuity and organizing security programs tailored for high-risk areas. Previously, he was a special forces and military intelligence officer in the Georgian military.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Taking place October 8-9, 2025.
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2025-10-07 22:35:17
Today, we assume that regulation is rooted in the European psyche, builds on European values, and speaks to the role that Europe sees itself taking on the world stage.
If we focus on the last two decades, the rush to regulate seems accurate. As European rules on tech antitrust, digital privacy, and many other policies spread around the globe, Columbia University Law Professor Anu Bradford coined the term the Brussels Effect.
Widen the aperture, though, and the picture changes. Rewind to 1994 and 1995. Europe was early out the door in realizing that the Internet would, in fact, change the world.
The defining policy position of that time was the 1994/5 Bangemann report, named after Internal Market Commissioner Martin Bangermann. He recruited experts from European industry, academia, and politics to promote a European Internet policy that sounds alien to anyone who has been saturated in the last two decades of European regulatory discourse.
“Given its history, we can be sure that Europe will take the opportunity,” the report begins. It is worth reading that phrase again: “Given its history.” Historically, indeed, from the invention of the steam engine to the development of the revolutionary COVID-19 vaccine, Europe welcomed technological progress.
This view of Europe as pro-regulation and anti-tech is a recent mind shift. Europeans can decide to shift into exploiting and using new technologies in ways that create durable competitive advantages. It is possible to see the recent regulatory push as temporary and return to the technological optimism that saturated the 1995 political climate.
Europe then was ahead of the US. The first real US policy report about the Internet came only in 1998, authored by then-Vice President Al Gore. If Europe was ahead of the curve, there is nothing that says that we cannot be ahead of the next technological wave.
For Europeans to become tech optimists again, they need to stop accepting ideas such as “the Brussels Effect.” It is a pernicious and destructive meme that suggests Europe should lean into regulation as its main export. Accepting and defending the idea that regulation is more of a priority than innovation, or that Europe relies on the safety-first precautionary principle for all new technologies, locks the continent into a self-limiting image as old, slow, and fearful.
The Bangemann report acknowledged the Internet’s risks — not that the new World Wide Web was dangerous, but that some Europeans would create a two-tier society of haves and have-nots, in which only a part of the population has access to the new technology. “The information revolution prompts profound changes in the way we view our societies and also in their organisation and structure,” the report reads. “This presents us with a major challenge: either we grasp the opportunities before us and master the risks, or we bow to them, together with all the uncertainties this may entail.”
What’s changed since 1995? Tech has become big and disruptive, as predicted, and Europe appears to have lost the ambition to compete on growth with the US. From 1995 to 2010, Europe focused on economic growth. It embraced digital. In 2000, the EU adopted an e-commerce directive that offered digital platforms extensive liability protection, similar to the US’s Section 230 of the Communications Act. The continent only turned to regulation around 2010 when it lost confidence in its own abilities to innovate.
When one listens to politicians today, it seems the biggest risk they are concerned with is that Europeans actually may have access to and use new technologies. Nothing in European history suggests such a fear. The Brussels Effect may be quite un-European.
Nicklas Lundblad is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis. He has spent more than 20 years analyzing, shaping, and debating technology policy, most recently leading Google’s AI subsidiary DeepMind’s work on public policy. His writings can be found at unpredictablepatterns.substack.com.
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Thursday, October 9, 2025 at 2:30 PM ET
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2025-10-07 21:57:53
The night was sleepless as a constant barrage of drones and missiles pounded Kyiv. Outside my window, streaks of fire from air defense lit up the sky, chasing Russian drones as they whistled overhead. Then my building shook from a nearby strike.
By morning, I checked in with friends while grabbing coffee, as Ukrainians do. Each admitted they hadn’t slept a minute. This has become the norm for Ukrainians as the Kremlin seeks to break the resolve of the Ukrainian people.
On September 28, Russia launched nearly 500 drones and more than 40 missiles across Ukraine. The barrage killed at least four people and wounded more than 70 in Kyiv, while over 40 were injured in Zaporizhzhia.
Since 2022, Kyiv alone has endured more than 1,800 air raid alarms lasting over 2,200 hours — increasingly during daylight, forcing schools, businesses, and cultural events into shelters for hours at a time. The Russian strategy to force an exhausted population to lose heart is not new, but it is prosecuted with vigor.
What was once Ukraine’s problem is now Europe’s too. As Russia struggles on the battlefield, it is resorting to increasingly ruthless tactics to raise pressure on the Ukrainian people — and now northern Europe — using cheap drones to harass NATO airspace and critical infrastructure.
Lacking supplies of traditional air defense, which cannot scalably be used against drones, Ukraine is racing to develop and scale drone interceptors, while European states rush to buy systems of their own from Kyiv.
However, interceptors take time to produce and operators to train. “Russia can build hundreds of various types of drones per day,” said Heiner Philipp, an engineer with Technology United for Ukraine, adding that the decoys cost roughly $2,000–$10,000 each, while Shaheds with 60 kg (130lb) warheads run to $30,000–60,000 apiece. The cheap cost of decoys makes them effective in overwhelming air defense.
As the New York Times noted: “While Ukraine has been able to shoot down about 80% of the drones launched by Russia, the weapons are cheap to manufacture and Moscow has relied on large volleys that can still kill people and damage infrastructure.”
Moscow is also adapting with countermeasures. Russian forces are now fielding “supercam” drones fitted with radio detectors, enabling them to sense approaching interceptors and trigger automatic evasive maneuvers. “This war is as much about adaptability and iteration as it is about any single technology,” said Deborah Fairlamb, a founding partner at Green Flag Ventures, a US fund investing in Ukrainian-founded companies. “Both Ukraine and Russia adapt constantly.”
Lasers remain a potential solution, but while work is underway, they have not yet been deployed en masse. “In late 2024, Ukraine tested a domestic laser system called Trident. It can destroy drones, bombs, and missiles at up to 3km [1.9 miles] and blind targets at up to 10km,” said Serhii Kuzan, a former adviser to the Ministry of Defense, adding that further details remain classified.
Yet no single technology can decide the war. Survival depends on constant innovation and adaptation.
“Innovation will lead to a strategy of sustained resistance in conditions of, if not constant war, then constant hostility. This will allow us to survive, adapt, and win without illusions, making war operationally meaningless for Russia,” wrote General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine’s former commander-in-chief. “But for this to happen, it is crucial to retake and maintain the technological initiative, forcing Russia to adapt, withstand pressure, and defend itself.”
For Vitaliy Goncharuk, the former chairman of Ukraine’s Artificial Intelligence Committee, the real contest is less about dazzling breakthroughs and more about repetition and scale. “The real competition today is in scaling — the ability to produce more. And specifically, to mass-produce a very limited set of innovations that deliver a systematic advantage,” he told this author.
Russia, he warned, has been quicker to absorb this lesson. “They don’t chase innovations that can’t be scaled, nor do they pursue them for PR, publicity, or flashy headlines in Western media,” Goncharuk said.
“Instead, they’ve shown a stronger ability to forecast opponents’ technological trends and adapt quickly. A clear example is the Shahed drone: by adding jet engines and increasing their flight altitude, they were able to bypass many of the counter-drone systems Ukraine had relied on,” he said.
“Early in the war, FPVs chased tanks; now every FPV is chasing people,” said Oleksandra Ustinova, a Ukrainian lawmaker from the Holos party. “Their range has expanded from 1–1.5km to up to 40km.” On the front, soldiers have increasingly resorted to putting nets on the roads to try and protect against drone strikes. Now there is a shortage of netting at the front.
“In the east, we’re already putting nets over roads to protect logistics. Within a year, we may face the same in cities, with drones targeting civilians,” added Ustinova. In Kherson, Russia has turned this fear into reality, carrying out what has been described as a “human safari.” Drone strikes have stepped up against bridges, roads, and civilian areas too, as Moscow seeks to split the city in two.
Unable to defend everywhere, Ukraine has also gone on the offensive against the source of the threat. Summer attacks on Shahed production and storage sites paid off. According to the Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi, launches in August fell by a third, down to 4,132 from 6,303 a month earlier. Russia’s peak swarms, once 700 strong, shrank to around 100–120, and on some days, only a few dozen.
But to achieve greater impact, powerful missiles are needed. Europe can provide these, but it mostly still lacks the political will. Time will tell what role the domestically-produced Flamingo missile will play (its solid rocket fuel will be manufactured in Denmark).
The danger of Russian drones buzzing over urban areas and key infrastructure like major airports is no longer confined to Ukraine. The same swarms of drones that darken Kyiv’s skies are already beginning to menace European cities. As Ukraine attests, things can get much worse.
David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. He can be found on X/Twitter @DVKirichenko.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Taking place October 8-9, 2025.
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2025-10-07 21:43:31
The Russia-Ukraine conflict has radically changed the understanding of modern warfare. Aviation no longer has absolute control of the air, and advanced tanks and armored vehicles have had their vulnerability exposed by relatively inexpensive unmanned systems.
And over three-and-a-half years of war, the Ukrainian army, inferior to the Russians in terms of mobilization and resources, has had to embrace asymmetric solutions, flexibility, and ingenuity, in particular by using drones in the air and at sea. That has required the establishment of drone labs and workshops close to the fighting forces.
Today, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) on both sides have led to the creation of “kill zones” — areas of 10km-20km (6-12 miles) where equipment or personnel are regularly destroyed. It is clear that a big part of future warfare involves drones.
After the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian units independently researched and perfected new ways of using UAVs in combat conditions, moving from simple observation to delivering ammunition and refining fire.
“We adjusted artillery strikes with a drone, while our other soldiers used maps. Then we compared the results, and the difference was very significant,” says Ivan, deputy commander of 59 Separate Assault Brigade of the Unmanned Systems Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. “That was our first serious experience with drones in 2022. Later, we started using them to drop ammunition.”
Since then, innovation has driven the development of military technology, and the cycle for creating new models, or modernizing existing ones, has been cut to three to four months or even less.
A vital role in the process is played by front-line drone workshop-laboratories, where UAVs are tested, repaired, improved, and sometimes created in accordance with the needs of the front line.
“We are the first to identify problems and understand what the front line needs. We are also the first to test new ideas and find solutions,” says Platon, head of the workshop of the Brigade’s 1 Battalion. “The main purpose is to ensure combat readiness.”
Such drone laboratories have proved their effectiveness, which is why virtually every Ukrainian unit now has its own frontline version so drone crews can concentrate on combat rather than maintenance and adaptation of UAVs.
“The larger the unit, the more specialized workshops it can afford,” says Andriy Khoma, commander of the special-purpose unmanned systems unit. “In particular, one unit may have a workshop that specializes exclusively in First-Person View [FPV], Mavic reconnaissance drones, or heavy bombers.”
The workshop-laboratories shorten the repair and renewal cycle, allowing rapid testing and implementation of tactical innovations without long delays in supply. And their proximity to combat operations means they can better serve the ever-changing demands of the war.
“Being close to the front-line forces us to constantly improve our technology. Since the contact line is dynamic, radio frequencies change quickly: some are working today, but tomorrow the enemy starts jamming them,” Khoma says. “The front-line workshop allows us to quickly reconfigure the drones and maintain their combat capability in such conditions.”
And they have had a dramatic impact on combat. Before the workshops were established, the effectiveness of FPV missions for Khoma’s units was around 30%, but after they were set up, that figure reached 70%.
Ukrainian units have also been helped by the decentralization of procurement introduced by the government last year. Unit commanders can now quickly and independently order the necessary equipment — from drones and ground-based robotic systems to electronic warfare equipment and motor vehicles — to match the needs of their units.
European Union (EU) and NATO capitals have already expressed interest in this unique Ukrainian approach, according to Colonel Pavlo Palisa, who is responsible for implementing the program as deputy head of the Office of the President of Ukraine.
The program has enabled defense manufacturers to adapt to front-line needs, as commanders promptly relay information to producers, who then design drones or electronic warfare systems according to their requirements or innovations.
Small front-line workshops are also able to adapt and integrate new ideas faster than larger enterprises, giving Ukraine a better chance of keeping ahead of an enemy also constantly updating its weapons systems and looking for new technological solutions.
But technology is not all that matters; it is people who transform the advantage into operational effectiveness. Unmanned systems units are currently very popular among those wishing to join Ukraine’s Armed Forces.
And since most people who apply to join the Unmanned Systems Forces have to learn everything from scratch, the main requirements for recruits are motivation, a desire for self-improvement, and discipline.
“Technology is a tool of power, but the key solution always depends on a human being,” says Major Olga Melyoshina, spokesperson for the Unmanned Systems Forces Command. “It is the analyst-reconnaissance officer, commander, and operator who completes the cycle of detection — decision, strike, adaptation to electronic warfare, terrain, and weather conditions, and takes into account the risks for civilians.”
In modern warfare, unmanned systems and anti-drone weapons shape new combat tactics, create kill zones, and change the balance of power. The Ukrainian army has accumulated unique practical experience in high-tech warfare through technical solutions, rapid testing and implementation cycles, frontline workshops, and decentralized procurement.
For NATO, and the US in particular, it is an opportunity not only to take an interest in certain “models,” but also to cooperate with the Ukrainian military, learn from their experience, and study their operational logic.
The Kremlin is already dialing up its use of unmanned systems in an accelerated campaign of hybrid aggression against European countries that began in September, so exchanging tactics and joint programs with Ukraine would be smart.
Serhii Kuzan is a military and political expert and chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center (USCC,) having served as an adviser to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (2022-2023) and to the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (2014).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Taking place October 8-9, 2025.
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2025-10-07 04:44:54
The start of what Denmark’s prime minister has termed a Kremlin hybrid war, began on September 9 with an attack by more than 20 Russian military drones on Poland.
CEPA research shows that since then, northern European NATO member states have registered at least another 38 incidents from Norway to Denmark, and Belgium to the Baltic states. Not all these incidents can be traced back to Russia (and some initially appear innocuous), but many appear considered and malign. The incursions are now occurring almost daily and include swarms of drones flying in formation.
The most concentrated elements of the campaign are aimed at those countries foremost in supporting Ukraine, sharply increasing defense spending, and demanding robust NATO action against the Kremlin — Poland, Germany, Denmark, and Norway.
This list also covers incidents in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden.
The list is based on publicly available information and is not exhaustive. Reports of drone sightings are not in themselves evidence of hostile activity, and police in several countries note that such observations are often unrelated to security concerns.
However, recent observations have drawn increased attention from NATO countries, as they appear to follow a pattern of disrupting airports, approaching military facilities, and critical infrastructure.
As Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz said on September 29: “Let me put it in a sentence that may be a little shocking at first glance… we are not at war, but we are no longer at peace [with Russia] either.”
Heine Sandvik Brekke is an Editorial Intern at CEPA. He is currently studying at the American University in Washington, DC. Heine is pursuing a degree in journalism and has worked in a variety of editorial roles, including at the daily newspaper Aftenposten. He also served in the Norwegian Army as a conscript in Northern Norway.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Taking place October 8-9, 2025.
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