2025-03-08 05:42:06
In November 2024, India’s Asian News International (ANI) filed a lawsuit alleging the unauthorized use of its copyrighted content to train OpenAI’s large language model. OpenAI’s ChatGPT produced identical or substantially similar outputs to its original content, ANI alleged. The news agency is also requesting OpenAI to delete its stored data.
It is the first major test case of unauthorized use of copyright content to train AI models in the Global South and will set a significant precedent. India’s hybrid model for copyright protection blends restrictive protections for creators with liberal exceptions for research and public welfare. While the Indian Copyright law’s Section 52 specifies activities that do not require a license from the copyright holder, it does not explicitly permit the reproduction of materials for training AI models.
If any country in the Global South is poised for swift development and adoption of AI technologies, it is India. The country has made significant progress in adopting AI technologies in sectors such as healthcare and financial services. A study even suggests that India’s maturity and readiness for AI adoption equals China’s. Projections estimate India’s AI market could reach $17 billion by 2027. India is ChatGPT’s second-largest market, accounting for 11.1% of its 200 million weekly active users. OpenAI’s CEO Sam Altman visited India in February and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi co-chaired the 2025 AI Action Summit in Paris, highlighting India’s increasing influence in AI development, adoption, and policy discussions.
As AI continues to reshape industries, the outcome of the Indian AI lawsuit will be crucial for creators, tech companies, and global legal systems. The lawsuit filed in India resembles similar cases in the US, where the New York Times and others are suing OpenAI. In its lawsuit, the New York Times alleges that OpenAI scraped data without permission behind its paywall. ANI asserts that its publicly available content was used to train AI models without its consent, and it has asked the court to prevent OpenAI from scraping and mining its publicly available content.
OpenAI defends its actions, arguing that training on public data is fair use and transformative. ANI has already blocked OpenAI’s crawlers from accessing its website. In return, OpenAI has added ANI to an internal blocklist, preventing its web crawlers from collecting ANI’s data.
India lacks jurisdiction over the issue because it has no servers in India nor are any of its offices located in the country, OpenAI argued in the Delhi High Court. OpenAI said it cannot delete ANI’s data because US law requires that all training data be stored during the pending US litigation.
At the upcoming hearing in Delhi High Court, ANI must demonstrate concrete harm such as direct market losses or reputational damage due to copyright infringement. To date, OpenAI argues that ANI has failed to produce any specific evidence of harm.
If the court rules in favor of OpenAI, it will shield AI firms from future infringement claims with regard to the use of data for training AI models and enable rapid AI innovation. But if the court rules against OpenAI, AI developers will face numerous lawsuits and will be required to license training data, leading to significant costs and thereby stifling innovation.
The Indian government has alternated between a hands-off approach and a more direct, interventionist role in regulating AI. AI companies must get permission from copyright holders for commercial use unless it falls under fair use exceptions, insists the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Varying opinions divide government agencies regarding the level of required AI regulation ranging from minimal oversight to calls for strict measures.
At the same time, India remains committed to unlocking AI’s full potential, a sentiment echoed in the G20 Ministerial Declaration during India’s presidency. In a statement to the Indian Parliament in 2023, the government promised not to consider “bringing a law or regulating the growth of AI in the country.”
In India, new legislation, not judicial intervention, addresses most technological advancements. But given the current lack of consensus within the government, Indian courts will be crucial in shaping India’s AI future.
Dyuti Pandya is an analyst at the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE). Her work focuses on the nexus between trade, technology, and law. Before joining ECIPE, she interned with the Cato Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies. She holds a master’s degree in law, specializing in international trade law, from Gujarat Maritime University and a dual bachelor’s degree in legal sciences and law (BLS LL.B.) from the University of Mumbai.
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
How the US and Europe Can Come Together
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2025-03-08 03:11:43
Poland is nearing a crossroads. It has been there before and it didn’t end well.
All of Europe confronts the very real possibility of a US retreat from its traditional security role — a scenario further complicated by a Trump-era administration whose policies now appear to bolster or even support Russian ambitions. For Poles, that makes the issue existential.
The Polish nightmare is being left alone to fight alone. It does not yet face that stark reminder of its 18th or 20th-century history when it was partitioned and butchered by jealous neighbors. For now, it retains the guarantee of European NATO and especially a democratic Germany.
But the geopolitical landscape has shifted alarmingly. Ukraine is under pressure from the US to accept a peace deal and make concessions while its Russian invader is required to do nothing. Its security hangs by a thread.
As the entire European security architecture wobbles from the US change, Poland’s political class —both the right and the left — remains trapped in an outdated mindset, clinging to past assumptions and old grudges dating back to the age of Solidarity. In reality, the world is facing more profound questions. Poland has to adapt.
The country’s strategic assets remain significant. It has embarked on an enormous multi-billion military modernization program, investing in South Korean tanks and howitzers and US jet fighters and enhancing its domestic cybersecurity capabilities.
In theory, these efforts position Poland as NATO’s eastern linchpin. Yet behind these headline figures lies a chronic lack of a coherent foreign policy strategy. For decades, Poland’s parties of all colors have viewed the US as a distant and paternal figure—the ultimate guarantor of independence. The bitter echoes of World War II, of a France that once refused to sacrifice for Gdańsk, and of an England that allowed Russia to re-enslave it under Stalin, have all left indelible marks on public opinion.
This, coupled with the end-of-history and Pax Americana narratives, lulled policymakers into the false security that buying US equipment and sending troops to US-led conflicts was sufficient to ensure national sovereignty. It wasn’t, as Poles are now discovering.
This outdated strategic thinking persisted even after Russia’s 2014 Crimea annexation. Despite being among the few to sound the alarm over a resurgent Russian irredentism, Polish policymakers made few substantive adjustments to their doctrine. During the first (2005–2007) and second (2015–2023) periods of right-wing PiS rule, the prevailing idea was simple: remain loyal to the US and exhibit unwavering discipline as its protégé. In the subsequent years under the liberal Civic Platform, the same mindset endured, although the government also strived for better relations with Western Europe.
Polish politicians continue to relish compliments from US officials lauding Poland as NATO’s role model as it devotes nearly 5% of national wealth for defense spending—a figure largely spent on off-the-shelf US systems. Yet a significant portion of the current defense budget is earmarked for 96 Apache combat helicopters, even as Japan cancelled and South Korea reconsiders similar orders in light of hard-won lessons from Ukraine regarding the rise of drone-based warfare. Another major weakness is Poland’s limited satellite capabilities, which suffer from underdeveloped indigenous space infrastructure, reliance on foreign partnerships, and a lack of ground-based tracking and cybersecurity capabilities.
Behind the international image of a rising military power, Poland’s impressive defense budget remains largely unspent. A backlog of orders and an ineffective domestic military-industrial complex highlight persistent issues: incompetent management, an incoherent procurement strategy, nepotism, poor inter-institutional communication, and coordination. Successive defense ministers have taken pride in showcasing new contracts—often for equipment that has not been fully vetted and without the essential offset packages that would secure long-term benefits.
Beneath the veneer, the Polish military is in crisis. Poor staffing decisions, a shortage of professional commanders, and chaotic procurement processes have weakened the armed forces. The army has suffered from incompetent leadership and improper promotions, while a lack of coherent strategic planning has further eroded operational effectiveness.
Critical structures, such as the non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps, have deteriorated, leaving a shortage of experienced personnel. Experienced NCOs are scarce, and although units like the Territorial Defense Forces (WOT) have seen numerical increases, a lack of resources and skills continues to undermine true combat capability. Seasoned military leaders were purged for political reasons under the PiS government. A downward demographic spiral plagues Poland (and other) regional armies and makes its plan to bring its professional corps to 300,000 a pipe dream. Despite this, Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced on March 7 that this target will now rise to 500,000, including 200,000 reservists. He also wants male and female volunteers among the civilian population to undergo military training.
The military and bureaucratic malaise stands in stark contrast to Poland’s booming economy — a phenomenon driven by generations of industrious, wealth-building citizens. Yet, even as the nation prospers, its ruling class displays striking incompetence. It recently made the de facto admission that talent within government was lacking when Tusk appointed the head of one of Poland’s most successful firms to spearhead the reform effort.
Generations of Polish policymakers have gradually relinquished the ambition of crafting an independent foreign policy, overvaluing Poland’s geographic significance as a tool for regional control. In the ruthless realm of international politics, nature abhors a vacuum. Unless Poland clearly asserts its own vision and positions itself as an active rather than a passive object, it risks being marginalized in a game where adaptability and decisive action are the only currencies of power.
The upcoming Polish presidential elections offer little hope for a strategic pivot. One leading candidate, emerging from the government camp, is infamous for shifting positions as the political winds change, while the other conditioned his support for Ukraine to resolving historical “civilizational issues” between the two countries dating back to mid 20th-century. The outgoing incumbent, President Duda, despite being one of the few international leaders lauded by President Donald Trump, has notably never been invited to Mar-a-Lago. He flew across the Atlantic on February 23 but got only 10 minutes of the president’s time.
For Poland, the stakes are enormous. A US-brokered peace deal that forces Ukraine into territorial concessions without binding security guarantees would be a strategic disaster. It would embolden Moscow, destabilize Central and Eastern Europe, and upend Poland’s long-held objective of keeping Russia at bay.
Inspiration for Poland’s contemporary leaders should stem from a not-so-distant past. In the interwar period, its strategy was based on the concept of Intermarium—a vision of a bloc of sovereign Central and Eastern European states acting as a buffer against imperial ambitions, whether emanating from Russia or Germany. This idea, championed by interwar leader Józef Piłsudski, remains relevant as post-Cold War Atlanticism fades.
Poland must now decide whether to reduce overreliance on the transatlantic security framework and what an alternative might look like. This involves some tough decisions — there remains considerable distrust of Germany, the giant neighbor to the West, which is currently reawakening from its decades-long geopolitical lethargy.
This recalibration calls for forging stronger ties with regional partners such as the Baltic-Nordic Eight group of nations, Ukraine, and Turkey, as well as rethinking alliances with the United Kingdom and France.
Warsaw can no longer afford to pretend. A great reshuffling of the international order is underway, and Poland must seize the moment. It would be nice, reassuring even, to see Poland’s political leadership come together and agree on this at least.
Maciej Bukowski is a Non-Resident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He is a climate diplomacy and energy security expert, and a PhD candidate at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
CEPA’s International Leadership Council outlines key ideas for US and European policymakers to consider as new leadership starts to shape policy for Ukraine and beyond.
The post Ghosts Haunt Poland’s Future appeared first on CEPA.
2025-03-07 01:48:16
Like a frog on a bicycle, the sight of European leaders locked in emergency conclave to agree on enormous additional sums for defense is dreamlike. And yet here we are — within days, the hitherto security-blasé continent is likely to have agreed well over $1 trillion in new funding.
The sums involved are staggering. Taken together, they amount to at least eight times the $130bn or so in US and European military aid to Ukraine since Russia’s all-out invasion three years ago.
The mood was encapsulated by the Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen on March 6. “Spend, spend, spend on defense and deterrence — that is the most important message,” she said
European defense firm valuations are soaring, old Brexit divisions are healing in plain sight, and debt-laden European states are suddenly finding new sources of money. Europe, often described as the old continent, slow and set in its ways, is moving at a blistering pace. The loss of faith in US military support and the realization that Putin’s imperial appetite is far from satisfied have proved powerful motivators.
The European Union (EU) emergency summit in Brussels on March 6 discussed the creation of €150bn ($162bn) in defense loans and up to a further €650bn over four years from easing EU national debt rules on arms spending. The meeting followed the March 5 announcement by Germany’s two biggest parties that they planned to largely remove lending rules for defense outlays. If agreed by the Bundestag, this would allow perhaps an extra $500bn or so in defense spending over the coming years.
“In view of the threats to our freedom and peace on our continent, the rule for our defense now has to be ‘whatever it takes,’” said Germany’s probable next chancellor, Friedrich Merz. The same day, the French President told his nation that the naivete of the post-1989 years was over: “I want to believe that the United States will stand by us. But we have to be ready if that is not the case. Given the Russian threat . . . European states must be able to defend themselves.”
The UK’s statements on defense spending have been notably less ambitious. The government has raided the overseas aid budget to provide another £6bn ($7bn) annually by 2027 and says its £28bn national wealth fund will now be allowed to invest in defense projects. These fall short of anything close to the European effort.
Even so, Prime Minister Keir Starmer is taking a leading role in talks with the US and Europe and has said the security situation creates a “generational challenge.” More UK funding is expected, probably from welfare cuts and extra borrowing, or a proposed Rearmament Bank, dubbed the “Bomb Bank.”
Will the European public accept a mix of higher borrowing and social expenditure reductions?
It’s hard to be sure, but there are intriguing signs that ultranationalist politicians are uneasy about events and how to respond. The favorite for the next French presidential vote, Marine Le Pen, who in 2014 accepted about $10m in funding from a Kremlin-linked bank, was notably cautious when asked about the Trump administration’s decision to halt arms supplies to Ukraine. She described it as brutal and argued the Kyiv government should have been given more time to react.
Meanwhile, the hard-right Reform UK leader Nigel Farage squirmed in the House of Commons as Starmer accused him of “fawning” to Putin. He is no doubt aware his voters dislike the Russian leader and have recently turned against President Trump.
Reform UK backers’ support for the president has transformed from +38 to -8 in the two weeks to March 5 as his Ukraine policy has emerged. Some 69% of British voters want Ukraine to defeat its invader, 80% have an unfavorable view of Trump, while 79% see Putin as a threat to peace.
Europeans remain very largely pro-NATO even as they question the US commitment. Germans say they would support more spending even if it meant other budget cuts (by 62%-32%) and 62% of British voters would back cuts or additional borrowing.
Whether the current urgency among European governments and voters, or their backing for Ukraine, will survive the inevitable cries of pain as the defense burden rises is another matter.
But for now, Europe looks more united and purposeful than it has for many years.
Francis Harris is Managing Editor at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and oversees Europe’s Edge. He was a foreign correspondent with the Daily Telegraph and served in Prague, London, New York, and Washington.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
CEPA’s International Leadership Council outlines key ideas for US and European policymakers to consider as new leadership starts to shape policy for Ukraine and beyond.
The post A Firehose of Money — Panicked Europe Races to Mend Defenses appeared first on CEPA.
2025-03-06 05:34:51
Before his Oval Office meeting with President Zelenskyy on February 28, President Donald Trump declared, “I hope I’m going to be remembered as a peacemaker.”
After the meeting, the US President made his definition of peace abundantly clear: “I want immediate peace. [Zelenskyy] wants to keep fighting, we’re not doing that . . . We’re going to get this done or let them go [on their own] and then see what happens . . . Without us, he doesn’t win.”
On March 3, the administration said it would freeze all military aid to Kyiv and it emerged on March 5 that it had “paused” much of its intelligence sharing. Not only did Washington halt the supply of American weapons under previously approved aid programs, but it is also weighing a full freeze on arms shipments from its stockpiles.
There’s not enough champagne in the Kremlin for the celebrations of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime.
The decisions weren’t the result of the public disagreement in the Oval Office, as Ukraine was, and still is, prepared to sign a resource-extraction deal. That televised spat was just one act of a bigger play for yet another “reset” with Russia, something the administration has made clear it seeks.
Reports suggest that Nord Stream 2, the Russian gas pipeline to Europe, may yet rise from the dead. Kremlin insiders and Trump allies are said to be in secret talks to revive the link, while the German government is mulling how to disrupt any agreement.
The deal, if realized, could see US investors stake a claim in its operations — paving the way for Russian gas to flow if sanctions are eased following a Ukraine ceasefire. It would be a stark reversal for Trump, who once led efforts to kill the project, and it could hand Washington leverage over Germany’s energy market.
Sanctions relief is now a clear possibility. The White House has directed the State and Treasury departments to draft a list of measures that could be eased, and an options paper suggests select Russian entities and oligarchs which could benefit as part of broader talks to reset diplomatic and economic ties with Moscow, Reuters reported.
This has happened before. And it never ends well.
For decades, Washington has had an urge to “reset” relations with Moscow. But every time the reset button has been pressed, it has delivered the same predictable result — Russia has seen Western goodwill as weakness and exploited it.
Under George HW Bush, optimism flourished with agreements like START I and the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, but at the same time Russia launched a war in Transnistria and the first Chechen war soon afterwards.
Bill Clinton’s administration agreed changes to START II and NATO-Russia initiatives. Russia became a member of the G8 and the Council of Europe, yet the Second Chechen war erupted.
George W Bush initially sought another reset of relations, emphasizing cooperation in the fight against terrorism and pursuing dialog through the NATO-Russia Council and the G20, but Russia began to openly resist Western influence, culminating in Putin’s 2007 Munich speech and the 2008 war in Georgia.
Barack Obama’s “reset” in 2009 temporarily revived dialog, with the New START Treaty and collaboration on blocking Iran’s nuclear program, but Russia’s hybrid warfare, election interference, and military interventions in Ukraine and Syria once again revealed Moscow’s true colors.
The weak and ineffective sanctions imposed after the 2014 annexation of Crimea then demonstrated that the West had chosen to turn a blind eye to Russia’s imperialism.
Donald Trump also sought rapprochement, though his first presidency was marked by growing concerns over Russia’s cyber warfare, disinformation campaigns, and election meddling. The war in Ukraine, begun in 2014, dragged on with no sustainable peace in sight.
All that culminated in the 2022 full-scale invasion. Joe Biden’s response, with stronger sanctions and military support for Ukraine, led to a “below zero” level of cooperation with Russia. Had sanctions come earlier, and military aid faster with no restrictions, many Ukrainians believe the war could have been over by now with Kyiv as the winner.
Every Western reset has inadvertently strengthened the Russian economy and its military power, which has fueled both domestic repression and external aggression. The US has already helped China to rise and challenge its global dominance, and it now risks enabling another rival. If it continues down this road, it’s unlikely to be just Ukraine paying the price.
The administration may be clinging to a new illusion — that it can drive a wedge between Russia and China, but that partnership isn’t going anywhere.
Part of the fault lies with the US school of Russian studies, which has long been shaped by myths spun by the KGB, leaving generations of policymakers with a romantic view of their adversary. Eastern European scholars who understand Russia are dismissed as paranoid Cassandras, leading to a vicious cycle of repeatedly falling into the same trap.
If the self-harming inclinations of the Western world are not healed, Russia and China will ultimately celebrate the ultimate victory.
Elena Davlikanova is a Democracy Fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.) Her work is focused on Ukraine and Russia’s domestic issues and their effects on global peace. She is an experienced researcher, who in 2022 conducted the studies ‘The Work of the Ukrainian Parliament in Wartime’ and ‘The War of Narratives: The Image of Ukraine in Media.’
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
CEPA’s International Leadership Council outlines key ideas for US and European policymakers to consider as new leadership starts to shape policy for Ukraine and beyond.
The post The Road to Hell Is Paved With Russian Resets appeared first on CEPA.
2025-03-06 03:57:42
American lawmakers have failed to agree on how AI companies should compensate content creators for the massive amounts of data — often scraped, licensed, or inputted from the web. In the legislative vacuum, a flurry of lawsuits and tentative voluntary industry measures have surfaced, leaving the courts to interpret existing laws.
Rightsholders are looking for damages and seeking clarity. Courts have yet to deliver a definitive verdict on whether AI companies’ use of data qualifies as “fair use” or if creators must be compensated. The uncertainty hurts both copyright holders and AI developers.
While US law prohibits copying, exceptions exist for fair use. Courts assess fair use by considering four key factors: the purpose and character of the use (favoring nonprofit, educational, or transformative uses), the nature of the copyrighted work (with factual works more likely to qualify than creative ones), the amount and substantiality of the portion used (weighing both quantity and quality), and the effect of the use on the potential market for the original work. Courts rule on fair use on a case-specific basis.
The AI industry claims that copyrighted materials used for AI training is “transformative” and meets the first factor of fair use. It is not “expressive” since the process produces “a useful generative AI system” instead of replicating the original works. The third fair use factor also supports this view, as the materials are not used to compete or make public but serve only for training, or as some say, “learning.”
Legal precedent for “transformative” fair use arguably comes from The Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc. In 2013, a court ruled that Google could copy entire books to build a searchable database. The search company only displayed excerpts, which judges declared to be fair use.
Currently, most prominent AI cases in front of US courts target large language models. They pit some of the country’s most famed content creators against the biggest names in tech. In The New York Times v. OpenAI, the newspaper accuses OpenAI of using its copyrighted material to train ChatGPT without permission. In Silverman v. Open AI and Alter v. OpenAI, authors also allege that their works were used without consent. In re Google Generative AI Copyright Litigation, Google faces accusations of scraping copyrighted content to develop Gemini AI.
Lawsuits over visual AI models are also proliferating. In Getty Images v. Stability AI, Getty claims Stability AI used its photos without permission. Legal challenges extend to the music industry. In Concord Music Group v. Anthropic, AI’s use of copyrighted lyrics is contested.
Legal experts anticipate conflicting rulings in lower courts, which could require the Supreme Court to provide a definitive resolution. The economic implications are significant; a ruling against the fair use of copyrighted works could hinder innovation and impact the burgeoning AI sector. This potential outcome may influence the Court to interpret laws cautiously to avoid stifling technological advancement.
A clear federal framework remains out of reach, stymied by deep ideological divisions in Congress. During the past two years, US legislators held four hearings: one on AI and intellectual property, a second on Artificial Intelligence and IP, a third on AI-assisted Inventions and Creative Works, and an Oversight Hearing, where Copyright Office head Shira Perlmutter called for increased transparency and clarity on fair use in AI training.
Some federal legislation has been introduced. The Generative AI Copyright Disclosure Act of 2024 would force AI developers to disclose the copyrighted works used to train their models. The proposed AI Foundation Model Transparency Act would direct the Federal Trade Commission to create standards for public access to AI training data and algorithms. But none of these proposals are close to becoming law.
The US Copyright Office has been active. In 2023, it hosted listening sessions on AI’s impact across creative fields, webinars on registering AI-generated content, and a roundtable discussing global perspectives on AI and copyright. In March 2024, it released a report on AI’s impact on copyright, focusing on AI-generated works and using copyrighted materials in training.
Although the copyright office took no definitive stance on the key fair use issue, it ruled on the broader, related issue of who owns a right to the output of a large language model — the AI companies. “Works created solely by AI without human authorship do not qualify for copyright protection under US law,” the Copyright Office says.
With no federal legislation, states could fill in the gap. They have not. Despite more than 700 bills introduced on AI, none address copyright. Most focus instead on transparency and accountability, like California’s AI Transparency Act and Washington state’s copycat legislation HB 1168.
As lawsuits proliferate, media organizations and platforms are striking licensing deals. OpenAI has partnered with organizations like The Atlantic, Shutterstock, Axel Springer, Condé Nast, and Wiley, securing access to high-quality content ranging from journalism to images and academic papers. The Atlantic deal ensures proper attribution and links back to its content within OpenAI’s products, while Shutterstock provides images for training AI’s visual generation capabilities. Although media conglomerates are finding new revenue streams through AI partnerships, the deals do not clarify whether such use is “fair” or a copyright violation.
Google’s collaborations with The Associated Press and Reddit illustrate a growing awareness of the value of licensing for AI development. AP provides real-time news updates to enhance Google’s Gemini chatbot, marking a precedent for news agencies. Reddit has licensed its user-generated content to Google, acknowledging the importance of leveraging social media data for training purposes.
Licensing agreements represent a promising step toward reducing friction between content creators and AI developers. By fostering partnerships, such agreements offer a practical alternative to drawn-out courtroom battles, paving the way for innovation while respecting intellectual property rights.
But licensing deals provide only a temporary fix: the fundamental issues of fair use and creator compensation remain unresolved. Legal battles will shape the future of American AI development, challenging both rightsholder rights and the principles and promises of innovation. If the US wishes to maintain its technological lead, courts will be responsible for introducing clear rules.
Hillary Brill is a non-resident Senior Fellow with the Tech Policy Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Brill served as interim Executive Director of the Georgetown Law Institute for Technology Law & Policy and teaches Copyright Law and a new Technology Policy Practice. Previously, Brill was the IP Practitioner-in-Residence at the American University Washington College of Law. Brill received her BA from Harvard University and her JD from Georgetown.
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
How the US and Europe Can Come Together
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2025-03-05 23:26:56
Italy has become a primary target of Russia’s hybrid warfare due to its steadfast support for Ukraine and its alignment with NATO and the transatlantic relationship. This has placed Italy in Moscow’s crosshairs, leading to a multi-pronged Russian strategy to undermine Rome’s interests through information warfare, cyberattacks, political subversion, and strategic maneuvering in Africa.
However, there is no sign that Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is buckling. Italy supported Ukraine as a “a people fighting for their freedom against an unjust aggression,” she told the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Washington, DC on February 23.
Russia has directly targeted Italian institutions and the President of the Republic Sergio Mattarella for his firm Euro-Atlantic stance through disinformation campaigns, diplomatic confrontations, and cyberattacks aimed at undermining his credibility and destabilizing Italy’s political landscape. The Kremlin reacted strongly to his February 5 remarks, interpreting them as a comparison between Russia and the Third Reich.
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova denounced them as “blasphemous inventions” on February 14 and warned of unspecified “consequences” on February 17. The following day, Mattarella reaffirmed Italy’s position, urging Russia to respect the sovereignty of all nations.
Russian narratives portray the Meloni government as subservient to Washington in a bid to exploit political divisions in Italy. State-sponsored media and social campaigns amplify opposition voices critical of its Ukraine stance, spreading disinformation to erode public trust and fuel skepticism toward Italy’s NATO and EU alignment. Pro-Russian hacker groups have attacked Italian websites, including government portals and major firms.
The aim is to make Meloni’s pro-Ukrainian stance more difficult in a country where pro-Ukrainian sentiment is lower than in other large EU members. Meloni has stuck to her guns on the issue, although she is also pursuing the difficult task of staying close to President Trump’s increasingly hostile policies toward Ukraine. The two are known to get on well.
The Kremlin’s approach is to adjust its messaging, according to the audience. It emphasizes promoting peace to the left and sovereignty to the right. This dual approach maximizes its influence within Italy’s political landscape. Economic leverage remains a key factor, as Italy’s historical dependence on Russian energy continues to shape political debates and public opinion on the country’s role in the conflict.
Beyond hybrid attacks in Europe, Russia similarly challenges Italian interests in Africa, particularly in the Mediterranean, Horn of Africa, Red Sea, and Sahel regions. Through the mercenary units of the Afrika Corps and other hard and soft power influence networks, Moscow is strengthening its presence in areas of traditional Italian engagement. Russian-backed militias have facilitated human trafficking routes, exacerbating migration flows to Italy, a tactic that is part of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy.
Moscow is also working to undermine Italian energy agreements with key African partners, attempting to disrupt Rome’s diversification efforts. The Kremlin’s approach in Africa contrasts sharply with Italy’s vision under the Mattei Plan, which is based on equal cooperation and sustainable development.
While Russia pursues a transactional strategy, offering military and political backing to elites in exchange for resource access and geopolitical leverage, Italy promotes partnerships centered on mutual growth and long-term stability. By securing a military presence in strategic locations, Moscow seeks to enhance its bargaining power with Western powers and consolidate its foothold in a region critical to Italian energy security.
Italy is a primary target of Russia’s hybrid warfare in Europe and the Mediterranean due to its strategic location, firm NATO commitments, and efforts to counter Russian influence in Africa. The combination of propaganda, cyber operations, political subversion signals that the Kremlin sees Rome as a key player to undermine.
Expanding strategic engagement in Africa through accelerating the Mattei Plan and strengthening partnerships with key African nations will be crucial in countering Russian influence. Additionally, Italy should capitalize on its central position in grand-strategy connectivity projects such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and the Three Seas Initiative to reinforce its geopolitical relevance in Mediterranean and Eastern Europe.
Enhanced coordination with NATO and the EU is necessary to formulate a collective response to hybrid threats emanating from Russia. Italy faces an increasingly complex security environment in which Moscow seeks to weaken its stability and international standing.
The Kremlin’s campaign specifically targets Meloni’s leadership, which actively seeks to support Ukraine and ensure Italian energy security. At a time of deep geopolitical uncertainty, it is critical that Italy’s allies support Rome’s firm stance against Putin’s aggression.
Emanuele Rossi is a senior analyst at Formiche and Decode39, specializing in international politics with a focus on the Indo-Mediterranean region.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
CEPA’s International Leadership Council outlines key ideas for US and European policymakers to consider as new leadership starts to shape policy for Ukraine and beyond.
The post From Russia to Italy: That’s Not Amore appeared first on CEPA.
