2026-01-31 03:08:47
The latest fracture in Georgia’s elite came on January 12, when former primed minister Irakli Garibashvili was jailed for five years after pleading guilty to money-laundering. Garibashvili, who only left office in 2024, has long been seen as one of the closest aides to Bidzina Ivanishvili, the billionaire founder of the ruling Georgian Dream party, and the country’s de facto ruler.
Garibashvili’s fall follows the detention of a former defense minister, several deputy ministers, and the former head of the State Security Service in a broader purge at the top of the party. While Ivanishvili’s motives remain unclear, his actions signal a willingness to cannibalize those closest to him.
In doing so, he has eroded a foundational rule of post-Soviet kleptocracies: that loyalty guarantees protection. By rendering senior figures expendable, Georgian Dream has left its remaining apparatchiks looking over their shoulders.
At the same time, Ivanishvili has intensified the crackdown on opposition to his party’s rule. Last week, Georgian courts issued the first administrative detentions to demonstrators for rallying on sidewalks, using recent amendments to the law requiring prior authorization for protests that “impede movement.”
These measures built on legislative changes which expanded criminal liability and increased fines for direct action, such as blocking roads. The European Union said the new rules were part of a systematic campaign to silence dissent and undermine the rule of law. Meanwhile, political prisoners, including prominent journalist Mzia Amaglobeli, remain jailed.
On January 27, Georgian Dream announced unprecedented legislative amendments that expand state control over foreign funding and criminalize a broad range of grant-related activities for NGOs and media outlets. Set to be adopted when parliament reconvenes in February — its legitimacy still challenged by opponents — the measures mark a significant escalation in the regime’s efforts to all but eliminate the civic space and insulate itself from external scrutiny.
The shake-up, and the uncertainty that comes with it, presents a timely opportunity for Europe to reclaim regional influence. Coordinated, targeted financial sanctions on the ruling elite, their families, and their enforcement networks could sever access to European banking, property, and institutions, so undermining the foundations of regime power.
Europe wields extensive financial power that it can deploy with real effect. No small country in the region — and no ruling elite — can function if cut off from the European banking system. This is particularly true of Georgia, which is deeply integrated into Western financial networks.
Europe also holds powerful leverage over Georgia’s ruling elite because it is one of the few places where their spoils can be safely converted into travel, healthcare, and education for their children.
With little political protection abroad, and diminishing protection at home, these individuals have few alternatives. Russia offers neither credibility nor appeal as a substitute, and increasingly lacks the capacity to serve as a reliable protector. From Syria to Venezuela, the Kremlin has proved a mere spectator to events, and even in the South Caucasus it has been sidelined in the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, where the US has taken the lead.
These shifts create a rare strategic opportunity for Europe to help Georgia move forward.
EU states may need to act without unanimity to bypass the gridlock repeatedly caused by countries like Hungary and Slovakia. If a core group of leading European states took the initiative through a coalition of the willing, action could be swift and decisive — demonstrating both a commitment to democratic values and the capacity to shape outcomes in Europe’s immediate neighborhood.
For sanctions to be effective, they need to go beyond targeting the top of the regime, and should disrupt the full chain that enables repression — from police and courts to officials who coerce state employees and crony businesses sustained by public funds. While Ivanishvili and the highest echelon may absorb sanctions to retain power, repression is carried out by mid- and lower-level implementers whose loyalty is more transactional.
Extending sanctions to these individuals and their families, through financial restrictions, visa bans, and asset freezes, would fundamentally alter their cost-benefit calculations. Crucially, such pressure must be paired with credible off-ramps, including relief for those who refuse illegal orders or disengage from repressive practices.
Once compliance with the regime threatens basic financial security and access to Europe, and disengagement offers a viable exit, the machinery of repression will begin to fracture.
Establishing a systematic enforcement mechanism, through which individuals are identified domestically, referred to European authorities, and subjected to swift financial and travel sanctions, would create an enforcement crisis for the regime. Sustained European pressure would gradually deprive it of willing operatives.
This approach must be matched by continued support for civic activists, independent media, and democratic forces on the ground.
European action could also help revive momentum in Washington. By taking the first step and engaging directly with Congress, Europe could advance its own sanctions framework and catalyze renewed consideration of US legislative measures targeting the Georgian regime under the MEGOBARI Act.
Although the legislation passed the House, it stalled in the Senate and was stripped from the 2025 defense authorization cycle. However, a coordinated European move might help revive the bill’s momentum in 2026.
For more than a year, protests have continued in Georgia despite arrests, violence, and intimidation. External pressure therefore matters not as a substitute for civic resistance, but as a multiplier.
Europe would affirm that those defending democratic principles on the streets of Tbilisi are not alone, and that persistence, rather than submission, is the rational choice.
At a time when Europe is often reduced to a bystander in major geopolitical developments, spearheading support for democratic processes in Georgia would signal its ability to exercise autonomous geopolitical power in a region where Moscow is eager to fill the vacuum.
Georgia offers a rare opportunity for Europe to help steer an increasingly pro-Western country in its own neighborhood away from the Russian orbit and toward democratic transformation.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned in his speech at Davos that, “Europe loves to discuss the future, but avoids taking action today, action that defines what kind of future we will have.” For once, Europe holds the decisive cards in a geopolitical contest that has strategic implications — if it can muster the will to act.
Irina Arabidze is a Non-resident Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at CEPA and a visiting lecturer at the Caucasus University in Tbilisi. A Fulbright scholar, she holds a master’s degree in International Affairs from the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and a graduate degree in International Relations and European Studies from the Central European University.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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2026-01-31 03:06:36
When Iranians revolted, their government cut them off from the world. Mobile networks degraded first. Fixed-line disruptions followed. Instead of cutting cables, the authorities interfered with routing and key protocols. As Iran shut down the Internet, Revolutionary Guards crushed the protests, killing thousands.
It’s not an isolated story. Internet shutdowns are rising fast. In 2016, digital rights groups documented some 75 shutdowns. By 2024, that figure had increased to 296 across 54 countries. Like in Iran, governments rely on a range of tools, including protocol blocking, cable disruptions, and platform bans. In many cases, authorities allow domestic services to continue, while clamping down on international traffic.
Both autocracies and democracies are increasing their grip. China has its Great Firewall, which keeps out foreign services. Russia blocks or restricts WhatsApp and YouTube, while maintaining a censored domestic network. Russia’s parliament recently granted its main domestic security and intelligence agency explicit authority to suspend mobile and fixed-line internet.
Unlike autocracies, which impose permanent controls, democracies prefer temporary shutdowns. Bangladesh cuts mobile access during elections. Pakistan blocks platforms during political unrest. India leads globally in imposing shutdowns during protests and elections.
The US and Europe do not shut down the internet to suppress criticism. Yet both do allow government access to personal data. Under the US CLOUD Act, Washington can compel platforms to hand over personal customer data even if stored abroad. In Europe, national security laws give individual governments large access to data.
Although both the US and Europe support cross-border data flows, they also impose rules that encourage data localization. Countries block health data from being stored outside their borders. Financial supervision requirements make it difficult to take bank information outside of the country. Sovereign cloud certifications often regard a vendor as “trusted” if it stores data locally.
Keeping data “at home” does not stop hacking, leaks, or abuse. Localization is sold as security, yet it mainly builds state control while doing little to prevent breaches or misuse. Storing data within national borders just makes it easier for domestic authorities to compel companies to hand over data or restrict services, often with few checks and little public scrutiny. Authorities no longer need to chase a provider across borders or wait for foreign legal help. They can go to a domestic telecom or local data center, issue one order, and force compliance. Governments can order phone companies to switch off mobile data in a city, slow connections to a crawl, or block specific apps and websites at the network level.
Internet restrictions cause economic losses. Data-localization rules hit small firms hardest because they force companies to duplicate storage and compliance country by country – costs the Paris-based OECD estimates can raise data-management expenses by 15% to 55%.
Iran’s network shutdown represented the culmination of a decade-long campaign. The authorities have been blocking websites since 2005, including Facebook and Instagram. Authorities limit the number of gateways to funnel internet traffic. Internet service providers must comply with shutdown orders without judicial review – or risk losing their operating licenses and facing criminal penalties. In June, during the 12-day war with Israel, it imposed a near-total shutdown. But the current blackout is the longest and most extensive.
During unrest, this system allows Tehran to keep domestic services running while shutting the country off from the global internet. Government services, banking systems, and approved domestic platforms remain reachable. Services located outside Iran became unreachable, limiting information about the protests.
What information did leave the country come from Starlink? Iran outlaws the satellite network, but an estimated 50,000 terminals have been smuggled into Iran, allowing protesters to bypass the Internet shutdown and send photos abroad. After the protests erupted, the US company reportedly made the service free.
The authorities have responded ferociously. They used Russian-supplied, military-grade GPS jamming technology to disrupt signals. Security forces raided suspected hideouts and announced the seizure of 108 Starlink terminals. Even without this repression, access to Starlink remained constrained: terminals are scarce, detectable, and vulnerable.
The outlook remains unclear. Recent reports suggest a partial reopening of the Internet, though government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani has indicated to media activists that international online services would not be restored before the Persian festival of Nowruz, on March 20.
The government looks set to continue to impose draconian controls on the internet. It can flick the system on and off at will. Even when open, access to the global Internet could be limited to those with security, according to the Internet monitor Filterwatch.
The founders of the Internet aimed to create a seamless global communications tool. But as the era of globalization fades, so does that dream.
Dr.Anda Bologa is a Senior Researcher with the Tech Policy Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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2026-01-30 02:14:55
Russia’s winter wave of strikes on Kyiv and other cities has left swathes of Ukraine without power as temperatures plunge, and the attacks are also taking out the water supply by cutting electricity for pumping stations, bursting pipes, and triggering floods. Some people have resorted to melting snow to meet their needs.
Repairing a country under attack is a Sisyphean task. Foreign investors are hesitant to begin infrastructure projects until the war stabilizes, and the Ukrainian government is reluctant to divert funds from the military. This means civil society has cracks to fill, using cheaper, portable solutions like water filters and pumps.
Simple mechanical filters provide access to drinking water when a community has lost its supply, and can be installed in barrels or buckets, using gravity to filter bacteria at a rate of one liter (1.75 pints) a minute. The Ukrainian Water Association, headquartered in Kyiv, acts as a distribution hub for emergency water supplies, sourcing filters from manufacturers, working with grass-roots charities to deliver them, and liaising with government bodies.
Sasha Slezinger, an engineer at Washington-based water company Xylem who helps provide emergency equipment to Ukraine, said access to drinking water has become a class issue. Speaking in a personal capacity, he said shortages hit Ukraine’s elderly and vulnerable the hardest.
“Water access isn’t too much of an issue if you’re financially stable,” he said, adding that most people buy bottled water. “But for older folks who might have no income or are unable to leave villages near the frontline, it can be another worry.”
It is clear that graft scandals in the energy sector have also shaken confidence. The Ukrainian Water Association lists “the elimination of corruption” as one of its major goals.
Alexandre Starinsky, director of international partnerships at the Ukrainian Water Association, said mismanagement and bureaucracy are major hurdles for the industry. The public sector lacks a unified water body, with the Ministry of Agriculture controlling irrigation, the Ministry of Environment controlling wastewater, and the Ministry of Development of Territories controlling water supply.
Starinsky hopes the creation of a European-style water “cluster,” in which the public and private sectors cooperate, will improve transparency and make Ukraine’s water market more appealing to local and foreign investors. Some existing European clusters have offered to help, he said.
Ukraine’s water woes predated Vladimir Putin’s attempt to destroy civilian life in the country. Soviet-era infrastructure and the presence of toxic metals meant tap water was not widely drinkable, especially in industrial and post-industrial regions.
In 2021, the World Bank ranked Ukraine just 125th out of 180 countries in terms of per-capita access to drinking water — on a par with Chad and Sudan. Modernization already lagged other sectors before bombs added to pollution, Russian drones destroyed infrastructure, and defending soldiers damaged pipelines to stall enemy advances.
And the bill rises with each day that fighting continues.
Paul Hughes, a Canadian based in Kharkiv since 2022, delivers emergency water supplies via his network HUGS. He said limited resources have led to innovative solutions to tackle water shortages in eastern Ukraine.
\“The water infrastructure is like an old banger of a car that somehow keeps going despite being patched up many times,” he said. “You see people making very imaginative repairs.”
His network, which responds to demand, has also sent emergency water filters to at least two Ukrainian frontline units.
While stopgap fixes to water infrastructure keep Ukrainians alive, there are harder questions about long-term reconstruction.
The total cost of rebuilding Ukraine was estimated last year at $1 trillion over the following 14 years. Water systems need lesser but still significant funds.
Ukraine’s latest budget brought sobering if unsurprising news for civilians. Whilst spending on education and healthcare rose, funding for the State Agency for Reconstruction and Development of Infrastructure was cut from 45 billion to 28 billion hryvnias ($667m). With Ukraine still fighting for survival, funds will continue to be spent on the military, and it’s likely that civilian infrastructure will continue to be destroyed.
While question marks remain over support from the US administration — direct support has been very significantly reduced — Europe will need to guarantee Ukraine’s future water security.
As well as securing supplies for Ukraine’s people, investing in clean, safe water would provide environmental and economic benefits for Europe. Ecological disasters like Moscow’s destruction of the Kakhovka dam not only devastated a vital freshwater supply but also swept sewage into the Dnipro River and the Black Sea, threatening marine and coastal life in all the littoral states.
Ukraine is an agrarian country that needs a reliable water supply and unpoisoned soil to farm, if it is to rebuild its economy, trade with its neighbors, and repay its debts.
International organizations have already been working with the Ukrainian Water Association, and a land reclamation project was launched in January with US support. Those involved hope that providing Ukrainian farmers with modern irrigation equipment and restoring land to its prewar state will increase Ukraine’s usable farmland by as much as 1 million hectares. But this is only one element of the massive task of restoring water security.
Civil society has links to communities on the ground, and in many cases has already identified areas for private sector involvement. When the time comes to rebuild Ukraine and restore clean water to everyone, civil society should remain at the heart of the work.
Pippa Crawford is a journalist who formerly worked in business intelligence and as a conflict analyst and translator for the BBC. She holds an MA in Political Analysis of Russia and Eastern Europe from UCL’s School of Slavonic and East European Studies, and has contributed war reporting and cultural reviews to a range of UK and international outlets.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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2026-01-30 01:00:14
Washington, DC, January 28, 2026 – Today, the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) is pleased to announce that Jeff Hull and Matthew Kaminski have joined the organization as members of its Board of Directors.
Jeff Hull and Matthew Kaminski join CEPA’s Board in a period of critical importance for CEPA’s mission to ensure a secure, democratic, and prosperous transatlantic alliance. Together, Hull and Kaminski bring decades of experience, as well as deep expertise on the most urgent issues facing the alliance.
Jeff Hull is the President and CEO of Highlander Partners, where he leads the day-to-day operations and management of the investment professionals and marketing strategies for the firm. He also heads the firm’s management and investment committee. Prior to Highlander, he most recently served as Vice-Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of Strategic Equipment and Supply Corporation (SESC), one of the largest providers in the United States of design services, equipment and supplies for the foodservice industry. Prior to SESC, he was Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of Atrium Companies Inc., one of the largest building product manufacturers in the United States. Prior to Atrium, Jeff held management positions with AmVestors Financial Corporation and Deloitte & Touche.
Matthew Kaminski is a journalist and media executive, and Editorial Chair of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks. Over nearly a decade as Editor-in-Chief of POLITICO, he built the publication into a dominant force in Europe, co-founding the joint venture in Brussels in 2014 and from 2018 on, leading the newsroom in Washington. Matt is currently also Editor-at-Large of The Arsenal, a new publication focused on defense tech, and is a senior advisor at New Vista Capital and Evident AI Insights. He is a member of CEPA’s International Leadership Council, a high-level group of global thought leaders and decision-makers who share CEPA’s core mission. Earlier in his career, Matt worked at The Financial Times and The Wall Street Journal as a foreign correspondent, opinion writer, and editor in Kyiv, Brussels, Paris, and New York. He won an Overseas Press Club Prize and was a Pulitzer Prize finalist for his coverage of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014, and received the German Marshall Fund’s Peter Weitz Prize for exemplary reporting on the European Union. He also serves on the boards of Partners Group (Asia) and World.Minds.
Chairman of CEPA’s Board of Directors, Larry Hirsch, said: “It is an honor to have two leaders with immense experience join CEPA’s Board of Directors. Jeff and Matthew embody CEPA’s commitment to transatlantic principles and mission to foster a robust and resilient transatlantic community.”
Vice Chair of CEPA’s Board of Directors, George Casey said: “I am pleased to welcome Jeff and Matt to CEPA’s Board of Directors. Jeff’s business acumen and Matt’s media industry acumen and longtime support and involvement with CEPA’s work will ensure continued growth and success.”
CEPA’s President and CEO, Dr. Alina Polyakova said: “Jeff and Matt bring a diversity of expertise and experience to CEPA at a time of rapid change in the international security environment. I am confident that with their added leadership and strategic vision, CEPA will continue to grow and deliver on its mission in new and innovative ways.”
Jeff Hull said: “I appreciate the trust placed in me by CEPA and am thrilled to contribute to its vital role in shaping policy and analysis for the transatlantic community.”
Matthew Kaminski said: “I’ve admired CEPA from its birth in 2005 for the work it has done, the people it has brought together, and above all for the impact it has had. It is an honor and a privilege to support the organization and its stellar team. As is clear every day from the news, this is a pivotal moment for the United States and Europe. The stakes and battle lines couldn’t be clearer. Nor has what CEPA does and stands for been more urgently needed.”
For media inquiries, please contact [email protected].
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2026-01-29 02:10:10
Even since the end of the Cold War, Western Europe and the United States have had conflicting geopolitical ambitions and values.
But something profound has now changed. Canada’s Mark Carney calls it a “rupture,” and that doesn’t seem too far from the truth.
The current American administration says it hopes to save Europe from itself, from the risk that mass immigration will cause “civilizational erasure.” Its initial intention was to support MAGA-inclined parties across Europe, but that idea may not survive the current political weather — President Trump’s nationalism, seen in statements suggesting European NATO troops had “stayed a little back from the front lines” in Afghanistan, clashes with the populist right’s need to appear patriotic, and has caused a significant backlash.
An alternative perspective, which now seems to be gathering impetus on both sides of the Atlantic, is that Europe must disentangle much of its security apparatus from America’s. The current administration no longer sees Europe as a value-adding contributors to its diplomatic and military power. It will now leave Europe mostly to fend for itself (some key enablers will remain) while maneuvering to take European territories. The continent needs to wake up.
The Greenland crisis is a historic opportunity to align European foreign policy into a coherent, hard-power-backed new alliance. All major parties in the West, including the right-wing parties in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, find themselves at odds with America’s ambitions.
A new defensive alliance is needed, anchored by the eight countries that sent troops to Greenland, and grounded in common Western European values that are increasingly at odds with their great geopolitical neighbors. Some might hope that the European Union can provide this defense, but it cannot — its slowness and vulnerability to political sabotage by small nations exploiting its byzantine rulebook have proved time and again that a fresh approach is needed.
The outlines of a common European defense alliance are fairly clear. The Greenland eight (that is, France, Germany, the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and Finland) would be joined by Poland, Iceland, and the three Baltic states. Canada, Belgium, and Luxembourg might also join for a total of 16 nations out of NATO’s 32. Given the geography (and Canada notwithstanding), the new alliance might reasonably be termed the North-East Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NEATO for short.
Other alliance members would feel a magnetic pull, though a number might resist. Some Central and Eastern European states still hope the currently Russophilic US will ultimately provide support against Russian invasion or bullying, but would countries with such recent experience of invasion and national erasure really bet their futures on this? The response of populist right-wing governments in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia would be fascinating weather vanes for this push-pull dynamic.
Likewise, Italy, Spain, and NATO’s other southern members would need to make difficult decisions. In different ways, many are less hostile to Russia and more dubious about the benefits of a new grouping that’s likely to be more hardline on the Kremlin. But they may fear the risks of standing alone, particularly given their exposure and interests in a volatile North Africa and the Middle East.
It’s likely that in time these countries would seek to align themselves with this new power block, since NEATO will share interests in resisting Russia’s hostility and a secure Mediterranean. Europe will then have a cohesive defensive alliance to protect its interests in the world, a liberal democratic counterweight to China and Russia, and far more powerful than its nearby neighbors.
It’s doubtful that such a development would assist US interests. Washington would face a more assertive and capable Europe, which is free to make decisions that a US administration would dislike. Donald Trump was infuriated by the deployment of European NATO troops to Greenland, assessing it was a response to his threats of possible military action (although the administration has also demanded greater NATO involvement in the High North). Denmark’s government reportedly issued its troops with live ammunition and ordered them to fight any attempt to seize the island, though this may have been posturing rather than a genuine belief that this was likely or imminent.
Taken as a whole, the events of the last year, and especially the last month, have fostered a sad realization for European countries. After 80 years of unprecedented peace and prosperity, the greatest period of the West’s so-called Great Enrichment, there is now a credible threat that European territory may again be invaded by a hostile power.
The new NEATO should focus its forces on the continent and shift all relevant and available military assets to the region to support deterrence. It should regard the United States as a possible, and hopefully a likely friend, but must also understand that this is an era of rivalry and a pursuit of the national interest. That means Washington will make decisions counter to Europe’s interests. Similarly, China’s growing cyber espionage, unbalanced trading behavior, and expanding hard power pose a serious threat requiring continental unity.
It must understand Russia’s military and shadow warfare threat, and robustly counter them. NEATO’s members must commit to much higher defense spending by 2030, which means in particular that laggards like the UK and France will have to embrace the serious political pain and possible social disorder that will inevitably result from cuts to welfare spending.
The Greenland crisis is a historic opportunity for Europe to accelerate its journey as its own power bloc, independent from cajoling in an increasingly fractured world. It is the logical continuation of the German Zeitenwende and would indicate that a great continent has learned the lessons of its past.
Surely 1938 was sufficient to show that appeasement and disarmament do not work. Is it necessary to learn that lesson again?
Nathan Decety is a macroeconomic and geopolitics strategist and a Captain in the US Army Reserves, with extensive experience in financial management roles and in military deployments. He advises clients on global affairs, macroeconomic conditions, labor markets, and growth strategy. His research focuses on war outcomes and military effectiveness.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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2026-01-29 01:59:41
Bankruptcy, says a character in a Hemingway novel, happened to him in two ways: gradually, and then suddenly. The same is true of the implosion of the post-1945 Western security alliance, which has been approaching since November 2024, when Donald Trump won a second term in the White House, and which now seems to have happened very suddenly indeed, in the space of a few days.
The immediate trigger has, of course, been the White House’s determination to possess Greenland, a territory belonging to another NATO member, and its threats to invade if not allowed to take it peacefully. A connected pledge to impose punitive tariffs on other allies opposing this act of aggression then further undermined the alliance.
Under pressure from these allies and the markets, the administration backed down; this has provided a respite in the crisis, but has not resolved the issue. A collective security alliance cannot survive when the principal member threatens military and other action against its treaty allies. As President Trump said when characterizing his initial demand, there’s “no going back.”
There’s a case to be made that NATO has anyway been in sharp, and arguably terminal, decline since the start of the second Trump administration. There are multiple reasons for this that extend well beyond the president’s vocal resentment of the alliance and his repeated references to NATO as if the US were not a member.
The threats to Greenland and Canada began almost as soon as Trump took office. As Vice President Vance made clear at the 2025 Munich Security Conference, and as the National Security Strategy and many other statements have underlined, the administration sees Europe as a problem, not an ally, as a region with which they do not share values or interests, including security interests. Economically, Europe is seen as a competitor; on security, it is seen as a burden.
At the same time, the administration has transformed the relationship with Russia — Europe’s main threat — from one of hostility to something that looks remarkably close to alignment. Signs of this have included the dramatic reversal of the US’s previous support for Ukraine; the rolling out of the red carpet for Putin at the Alaska Summit; and the 28 point “peace plan” for Ukraine which included commitments on economic cooperation with Russia (including in the Arctic) and which pushed to see Russia “reintegrated into the global economy” and readmitted into the G7.
Last year, policymakers and many analysts in Europe appeared reluctant to acknowledge the scale and the implications of the transformation in Washington’s view of NATO and of Europe. The Greenland crisis appears to have pushed some governments into a more public recognition of it.
At Davos, Mark Carney talked of “a rupture, not a transition” in the world order and economic integration with [unnamed] great powers becoming “the source of . . . subordination”. Beyond the conference hall, European states are moving and reconsidering their stance on nuclear weaponry, with once skeptical countries like Sweden now in early talks with France and the UK about protection from their armories.
The significant increases in defense spending commitments by other NATO states increasingly seem driven less by a desire to placate the US than to be more independent of it, though the primary driver remains the threat from Russia. Mark Rutte’s assertion that Europe cannot defend itself without the US — a diplomatically necessary claim from the NATO Secretary General — has been publicly rejected by the French government and scathingly described by a former French ambassador to NATO as a failed policy of “brandishing European weakness to tie down the US guarantee.”
Some observers still suggest that the relationship between the US and the rest of NATO is only strained not broken; that wiser and more Europe-friendly figures in and around the administration will restrain its excesses; and that Europe and Canada just need to wait for normality to return after the next election.
However tempting, these arguments don’t work. One reason is that the chaos and hostility of the Trump administration’s approach to NATO and to Europe as a political-economic-cultural space, the damage done to Ukraine, and the quasi-alignment with Russia show that the restraining effect pro-Europeans in Washington might be having on the White House is minimal. The argument that things would be much worse without them is not reassuring.
The idea that Europe and Canada just need to wait for a new administration in 2029 is unwise for several reasons. One is that the US may become bogged down in a post-electoral morass where a democratic transition is challenged. The other members of NATO must anticipate this possibility.
The second reason is that although the Trump administration is alienated from early 21st-century Europe and the North Atlantic alliance, this isn’t a new suspicion about Europe. There is an older and wider strain of American opinion that is skeptical of relations with Europe, and of the idea that the transatlantic alliance provides the US with meaningful benefits. The Trump administration is the first in living memory to embrace this tradition to this extent, but there is no reason to think that it will be the last.
Finally, the downgrading of Europe as a strategic priority long precedes Trump and will outlast him. Since the turn of the century, successive Presidents have tried to pivot to the Asia-Pacific, above all, China. The Trump administration’s recent National Defense Strategy may be an anomaly in its 19th-century-style preoccupation with a sphere of influence in the Americas, but the longer-term focus of the US is likely to be Asia. Even if later presidencies try to repair the damage done by this one, it is hard to see them refocusing on Europe as a priority.
For all these reasons, the rest of NATO cannot base its security on guarantees of support from the US. In the short-, and perhaps medium-term, there is an obvious requirement to work pragmatically with Washington, but they will need — and there are signs that they are — beginning to decouple from the US on intelligence, procurement, and defense planning. For Western Europe and Canada, this is a more profound shift in their security environment than the one brought about by the end of the Cold War. And of course, it is deeply alarming.
But the end of the security partnership with the US won’t mean the end of collective security in Europe or, indeed, the end of a transatlantic alliance. European states are too conscious of both the threats of the present and future, and the lessons of the continent’s past, to abandon it. The alternatives of faith in a badly wounded alliance, of drift, and of a growing vulnerability to outside powers are unthinkable.
Europe’s security structures and the European Union have the capacity to remain some of the most powerful global actors.
To do this, Europe needs to think about itself as an idea and a set of structures that extends beyond its current boundaries. Just as the “West” has included states not in the geographic West (think of Japan and Australia), and NATO has members nowhere near the North Atlantic, so the idea of “Europe” needs extend beyond the borders of the continent and the current membership of its institutions.
A new West, grounded in a security alliance, economic ties, and shared values, can include both non-European ally Canada and the EU and NATO’s eastern partners in Moldova and Ukraine. These two states have defended themselves against hybrid attacks on democracy and, in Ukraine’s case, against full-scale invasion; that experience is likely to be vital for the rest of Europe and Canada. Partnerships with states such as Australia and New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea are also likely to be important.
For more than 80 years, the US was the pre-eminent ally of Europe. The end of that alliance has seemed unthinkable, but it has nevertheless arrived, and wishing that things were different will not bring the alliance back to life.
A future US administration may seek to mend the relationship with Europe and Canada, but NATO, as it has existed to date, is unlikely to be recoverable. The center of gravity of the West, as a community bound by shared security and political values, has moved away from the US to a wider Europe. The end of the old US-led West has been approaching gradually for months; now, suddenly, it is here.
Dr. Ruth Deyermond joined the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London, after completing a PhD in Government and an MA in International Relations at the University of Essex. Before this, she worked in HM Treasury in areas including UK policy towards the international financial institutions and the development of the Private Finance Initiative. She is currently the program director for the MA in International Relations.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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