2025-01-31 02:30:16
On December 31, a Ukrainian naval drone destroyed a Russian Mi-8 helicopter for the first time using missiles launched from the unmanned craft. Two days later, Ukraine managed to destroy another helicopter and damage a third using the same Magura V5 vessel.
It was first reported in May that Ukraine was adding late 1980s Soviet anti-aircraft missiles to drones. This is part of the sustained burst of drone innovation since the war began three years ago, including anti-trench thermite drones, shotgun-equipped anti-drone UAVs, fiber-optic drones designed to counter electronic warfare and AI-enabled drones for targeting assistance.
Most recently, the Ukrainian Navy launched a series of deep strikes behind enemy lines, employing innovative tactics underlining drone warfare’s rapid evolution. On January 5, Ukrainian unmanned surface vessels (USVs) deployed kamikaze drones from the Black Sea to target Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense systems in Kherson Oblast, valued at $15m–$20m a unit.
The strikes, which hit Russian positions near Pryvillya, represent one of Ukraine’s most imaginative operations in recent times, highlighting its ability to challenge Russian defenses far from the frontlines and to strike targets from unexpected directions.
These USVs have evolved beyond their early use as kamikaze sea boats; they have now evolved into mobile drone-launch platforms. Recent upgrades allow them to carry and deploy aerial drones, as Ukraine showed in December when it heavily damaged Russian-controlled gas platforms in the Black Sea. The strikes also add to the Ukrainian navy’s growing arsenal of land strike capabilities. Russian military bloggers have also commented that Ukraine is using unmanned surface vessels (USVs) to launch one-way drones in attacks on targets around the Black Sea.
“If the Russian military fails to develop effective countermeasures against such launches, many of its military systems, bases, and installations could now fall within striking range of Ukraine’s sea-based USV assets,” said Samuel Bendett, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security think tank.
Furthermore, this gives Ukraine the opportunity to more freely roam the Black Sea as Russia can no longer assume its aircraft are free to operate against drones. It also means that Ukraine will continue to further target Crimea to systematically weaken Russia’s advanced military assets. Aware that Crimea is politically indispensable to Moscow, Ukraine has been targeting Russian S-400 air defense systems around the Black Sea, forcing Russia to continually replace them. “With constant advancements in [attack] drone ranges on both sides, a Ukrainian USV launch could take place miles from shore, beyond the reach of Russian air, sea, or shore-based surveillance,” Bendett said.
The Kerch Bridge, a vital symbolic link for Putin as it connects Crimea with Russia, has been largely rendered ineffective for heavy cargo transport. By keeping pressure on the bridge with periodic cruise missile and drone strikes, Ukraine ensures that Russia is forced to divert air defense systems to protect it, stretching those assets thin and leaving other fronts vulnerable.
Serhii Kuzan, chair of the think tank Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center and former adviser to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, noted that: “It is in Ukraine’s interest to disrupt Russia’s military logistics via the Kerch Bridge, as it has already done with logistics involving naval ferries and landing ships, either damaging or completely destroying them.”
Ukraine is also seemingly achieving local superiority over Russian helicopters, which will increase its ability to harass and destroy Russian ships in the Black Sea at least in the short-term. Any vessel transporting military equipment is now a target. “For a time, enemy helicopters restricted our operations at sea. Ukrainian naval drones were detected early, intercepted by helicopters, and relatively quickly destroyed. Reaching Kerch was extremely difficult, given the distance of the route,” Kuzan said.
“The development of air defense systems on unmanned surface vessels (USVs) is once again shifting the situation in Ukraine’s favor, as manned helicopters and aircraft are far more expensive and valuable than boats,” he added.
Ukraine’s naval victories against a much larger power are not without historical precedent. In 1905, Japan also inflicted a humiliating naval defeat on Russia even though it too was a much smaller power. In this case, Ukraine with almost no navy, has stripped Russia of its control of the Black Sea.
This battle mirrors a dynamic chess match of sorts: Russia deploys its navy, Ukraine counters with USVs; Russia uses helicopters, Ukraine responds with anti-aircraft-equipped USVs. For now, Ukraine has seized the upper hand, compelling Russia to consider its next move.
What might happen when drones are used by the biggest powers, like the US and China? Both will need to carefully consider the issue. “The war in the Black Sea demonstrates that an asymmetrical approach can upend the balance of power. Ukraine, with virtually no fleet, is destroying Russia’s navy with limited resources and forcing its remnants to hide,” said Kuzan.
No one weapons system can win a war, but unmanned vehicles are very clearly now a big part of modern warfare. After the war, Ukraine will be a market leader as demand will likely soar for these battle-tested and cost-effective systems that crippled Russia’s once-proud fleet and sent its remnants scuttling for protection in ports far from where they are needed.
David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. He can be found on X/Twitter @DVKirichenko.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
A Security Strategy for Ukraine
The post Ukraine’s Marauding Sea Drones Bewilder Russia appeared first on CEPA.
2025-01-30 23:14:28
The transatlantic partners are closer in their assessments of the China Challenge today than they were four years ago. When Donald Trump attended his first NATO summit, China was nothing more than an afterthought. NATO leaders now agree that Beijing challenges “our interests, security and values” and “present[s] systemic challenges to the rules-based international order.”
Yet transatlantic efforts to meet the China Challenge have proven ineffective. Neither party is prepared to match the money Beijing is throwing behind its own agenda. Neither has been willing or able to harness the full combined potential of their deeply integrated $8.7 trillion economy to ensure they remain global rule-makers rather than become rule-takers.
The transatlantic partners approach Beijing from different strategic positions, with different tools, and with different senses of urgency. Priorities are often mismatched. European countries remain wedded to global trade rules. US Democrats and Republicans alike are concerned that China has abused those rules and wants to weaken them.
The two sides have found it difficult to align their export controls and investment screening efforts. And while the United States has reduced its dependence on imports of Chinese manufactured goods over the past five years, the European Union (EU) has become more reliant on China. Key industrial sectors in countries like Germany, Spain, and Hungary are doubling down on China.
Although Washington and Brussels each address challenges coming from China, their own relations are beset by competitive impulses, underlying questions of trust, and mutual doubts about relative commitment and capacity. Americans think Europeans have brought clubs to a gunfight; Europeans think Americans have brought guns to a fistfight.
In the US, Republicans and Democrats differ little in their diagnoses of the China Challenge, even though they may diverge on the remedies. They agree that China is a world-class peer competitor to the US and its allies. Consensus exists that China’s leaders seek to reshape the international system by reducing their reliance on the rest of the world and increasing others’ reliance on China. Beijing aims to match and eventually exceed Western and Indo-Pacific powers’ economic and technological preeminence; force American military power out of the Western Pacific; and create new, China-centered international institutions.
Although European countries do not always agree on how to deal with China, they have become increasingly hawkish. They are furious about China’s support of Moscow’s war economy and concerned about China’s violations of human rights and its challenges to Taiwan, to other Asian countries, and to such fundamental principles as freedom of navigation and freedom of information. Chinese investments in European infrastructure and technologies, including strategic ports, telecoms, power grids, and defense-related supply chains, jeopardize European security. Fears are growing that Beijing could blackmail Europe by exploiting China’s control over critical materials. Chinese industrial overcapacity could generate a wave of cheap, state-subsidized imports that threaten EU domestic producers.
The European Commission team that took office in early December 2024 has signaled a tough approach. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen believes Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s “clear goal is a systemic change of the international order with China at its center.” She has threatened the “full use of our trade defense instruments” if Beijing keeps flooding Europe with subsidized exports that could harm European companies. The EU’s new commissioner for trade and economic security, Maroš Šefčovič, says the EU must sharpen its tools to ensure it does not suffer from “China’s state-driven economic model and industrial policy, as well as the overcapacities that are distorting global markets and supply chains.” The EU’s new foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, has decried China’s unfair competition, arguing that Beijing needs to “feel costs” over its support for Russia’s war against Ukraine.”
The allies allow their own bilateral squabbles to get in the way of a robust transatlantic effort to meet the China Challenge. During the Biden administration, contentious bilateral disputes over aircraft subsidies and agricultural support schemes, market access, sanitary concerns, and government procurement were shelved but not resolved. Tensions fester over digital privacy, digital taxes, tech regulations, and competition laws. Negotiations have languished on a Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum and a critical minerals agreement. The US is concerned about the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, corporate responsibility directive, and deforestation regulation. Europeans remain worried about the discriminatory provisions contained in the US Inflation Reduction Act.
These simmering problems could boil over in 2025. French President Emmanuel Macron argues that Europe should prepare for “a world of tariff wars.” President Trump has threatened blanket 10-20% tariffs on European countries and 60%+ tariffs on China. That could cut 1% or more off the EU gross domestic product (GDP). Germany could lose 1.4% of its GDP by 2028 (more than $134 billion over the four-year period).
A tariff war could escalate. Trump trade advisor Peter Navarro promotes “reciprocal tariffs,” which means that Washington could mirror the tariff rates foreign countries impose on US exporters with equivalent duties on foreign importers. For example, Washington could decide to match the 10% tariff rate Brussels imposes on US cars entering the EU by raising to 10% from the present 2.5% of the US tariff on EU car exports to the United States.
A confrontation on digital services taxes could follow. The incoming Trump administration and the Republican-majority Congress oppose the multilateral tax reform convention supported by the Biden administration and most countries around the world. US rejection of the deal could prompt many countries, including Canada, the United Kingdom (UK), France, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and other European states, to impose digital service taxes that target US tech companies. The first Trump administration and the Biden administration threatened to retaliate with punitive tariffs, something a second Trump administration is also likely to do.
Additional clashes loom. The Trump administration is likely to abandon the Biden administration’s “small yard, high fence” policy of limiting specific technology transfers to China, in favor of broader restrictions. As Washington constricts its own trade with China, it is likely to pressure Europe to do the same — otherwise, Europeans will be seen as taking advantage of their American ally by selling restricted goods and technologies to China and by allowing Chinese companies to evade US controls by selling their products in European markets.Europeans, in turn, are concerned that if China is blocked further from the North American market it will redirect cheap, heavily subsidized exports to Europe.
Should the Trump administration impose tariffs, the EU is likely to target politically sensitive US exports, as it has in the past. Some European commentators recommend matching blanket US tariffs on European exporters with equivalent duties on US exporters. Brussels could choose to deploy its new Anti-Coercion Instrument, which allows trade controls, customs duties, and other measures against companies or countries determined to be engaged in coercive behavior. So far, the EU has trained this so-called “bazooka” on China. Should relations deteriorate, Brussels could turn its sights to Washington.
Given that the US-EU commercial relationship is by far the largest in the world, such actions would be costly for both sides. Neither party has an interest in being caught in the escalatory spiral of a tit-for-tat trade war that would put a brake on European defense spending, hamper efforts to face down Russia over Ukraine, and destroy any chance that the two parties would align their approaches to the China Challenge.
The fundamental unanswered question is whether the Trump administration and European leaders believe their own bilateral disputes are more or less important than the need to adopt joint or complementary approaches to China. Does the Trump administration believe it can and should fight predatory Chinese economic practices on its own, or forge a broad coalition of countries that could impose far greater costs on China than individual efforts ever would? Are Europeans willing and able to bridge their own considerable differences over both China and Trump’s America to help lead such a coalition, or do they prefer to stand apart?
Initial answers are likely to come in the early days of the Trump administration, particularly if the president makes good on his pledge to impose tariffs. A second test comes in March, when an important transatlantic tariff truce on European steel and aluminum will lapse. The Biden administration continued to suspend the tariffs. In return, the EU and the UK each agreed to postpone their respective retaliatory tariffs on over €4.8 billion of US imports, including 50% on bourbon whiskey, Harley-Davidson motorcycles, and motorboats.
The choice is clear. The allies could continue their truce. They could work to finalize a deal to impose common transatlantic tariffs on nonmarket (read: Chinese) producers of aluminum and steel. Or they could charge into a destructive conflict that will benefit China.
Daniel S. Hamilton chaired CEPA’s yearlong series of workshops examining the transatlantic response to the China Challenge. He is a senior non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution and senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
How the US and Europe Can Come Together
The post Coming Together or Falling Apart Over China? appeared first on CEPA.
2025-01-30 22:38:02
Private sector technology has significantly impacted military behavior on the battlefield, from satellite imagery to GPS interference, while at the same time the decisions made by corporations are playing a key role in great power space competition.
This new space economy represents a historic shift away from national agency-led activities, to a wider playing field featuring powerful commercial interests that develop and operate critical space infrastructure.
Corporations supplying NASA and other public sector clients, such as the European Space Agency (ESA), are nothing new. What distinguishes this era is the extent to which research and development is funded, and agendas set, by shareholders and CEOs.
The line between private and public activity in space has also been blurred by the leading role in the new US administration for Elon Musk, whose SpaceX dominates the provision of rockets for NASA. While the company is still a private entity, its CEO has unrivalled access to the ear of President Donald Trump on US government space policy.
In the near term, private space companies are poised to compete, rather than merely cooperate, with public endeavors. Low Earth Orbit (LEO) is a primary area of interest, as efforts align to replace the International Space Station (ISS) following its scheduled decommissioning in 2030.
Players alongside SpaceX include Vast, Axiom Space, Blue Origin and Starlab (a Transatlantic partnership between Voyager Space, Northrop Grumman and Airbus). While some of these projects are partially NASA-funded, private equity and venture capital predominate. Axiom Space raised close to $500m, while SpaceX is the world’s most valuable private company.
Beyond LEO, national agencies are focused on the Moon and Mars, specifically through the NASA-led Artemis mission and Gateway — intended as humanity’s first space station orbiting the Moon. The next space race is on, and Russia and China have recruited several other countries, including Egypt, South Africa, Thailand and Pakistan, to their project.
Russia has also withdrawn from the ISS, in the aftermath of the Ukraine invasion, and plans to launch a new national space station by 2030. India, alongside its lunar ambitions, is also aiming to launch its own station by 2035.
Amid all this activity, the weaponization of space is a fact. Examples include Russia’s space-based anti-satellite nuclear weapon and China’s anti-satellite missiles, jammers and Shijian-series satellites, some of which have robotic arms that could be used to grapple with enemy space hardware.
Relying strictly on state sponsorship to counter such endeavors would put the West at a clear geopolitical disadvantage as great powers jockey for dominance in orbit and hot wars threaten international security on Earth.
Public-private partnership offers the West better and more inventive options than the largely state-driven efforts of authoritarian powers. It is vital for a number of reasons.
First, the competition for commercial space dominance is not only a quest for a return on investment, but also for strategic positioning against global competitors. At stake is both preparedness for warfare in multiple theaters and the innovation associated with technological “spin offs” from the pursuit of space exploration.
The original space race brought technological leaps in miniaturization and electronics, with profound returns on Earth that impact everyday life — from wireless headphones and digital cameras to navigation and solar energy.
These economy-boosting innovations are a compelling reason to strategically invest in space R&D, even in peacetime. Competition over the control of critical technologies, like semiconductors, further strengthens the argument.
The new space economy is also fueling innovation in dual-use technology. As humanity prepares a return to the Moon, we must anticipate more extreme hazards associated with spacecraft of longer life making journeys a greater distance from Earth.
Of particular concern for such missions is the development of effective countermeasures against space radiation. The healthcare solutions that satisfy these requirements to make human space travel safe will be portable, low power, and suitable for use in isolated environments. In an era of conflict and climate change, and the looming threat of nuclear war, such innovations have immediate applicability on the ground.
To return to the Moon, and someday become an interplanetary species, will require transdisciplinary, international collaboration beyond the scale of anything humanity has yet achieved. The need to create complex cross-border cooperation is paramount, especially at a moment when isolationism and protectionism are on the rise.
Space has traditionally been an arena where humanity can reach beyond borders to accomplish common goals (though it is also a deeply competitive field.) To create a peaceful and prosperous future benefiting the US, its allies and others, we must imagine new ways to handle technical and administrative complexity, perhaps through new legal or regulatory structures on both sides of the Atlantic. This benefits those taking part but will also demonstrate that democratic countries are pursuing legal mechanisms and agreement in contrast to the reckless behavior of countries including Russia.
While private industry can move quickly, national agencies hold generations of institutional knowledge, are accountable through elected governments and serve the public interest. To leverage the strengths of both, we must create a new playbook for space that will expedite public-private cooperation, while maintaining transparency and security.
While Western governments are the guarantors for Transatlantic security, Western private companies also play a significant role in advancing the geostrategic stance by doing what they do best: delivering the world’s best innovation at a rapid rate, in sync with a noble mission.
Dalia Bankauskaitė is a Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis with CEPA’s Democratic Resilience Program, Professor at the Vilnius University, and an Expert at the Swedish Defence University. An interdisciplinary expert in security policy, strategic communication, and political advisory, she focuses on advancing the understanding of total defense and strat comms campaigns for high-visibility issues.
Dominykas (Dom) Milasius is a deep tech entrepreneur and investor, with a decade of previous experience in strategic and geopolitical risk advisory across EMEA. He is a co-founder of Delta biosciences, the founder of Unit 370 and works with BSV Ventures, is an alumnus of the Paris Institute of Political Studies and a member of LitBAN and EBAN.
Kate Ludicrum is an infrastructure and technology specialist from Los Angeles, California. She has delivered projects in the US, EU, Afghanistan and Taiwan. Kate has also implemented innovation programs for aerospace and healthcare.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
A Security Strategy for Ukraine
The post Ukraine Shows Power of Public-Private Space Cooperation appeared first on CEPA.
2025-01-30 05:52:55
Assassinations, even as part of broader military operations, do not sit comfortably with Western politicians or audiences.
They’re also an awkward issue for strategic thinkers, where there’s a very necessary debate about the efficiency of actions that might seem underhanded or immoral and can result in civilian casualties or vicious reprisals.
Writing here, my colleague Francis Harris has pinpointed the greatest concern with high-level assassination efforts is that “the consequences are unknowable.”
War is a Pandora’s Box: once opened, no belligerent can make any guarantees of the outcome. Assassination campaigns during war are a microcosm of that unpredictability, as the elimination of “devils we know” must by implication promise devils unknown.
That does not necessarily remove the tactical and morale gains that can be achieved by belligerents engaging in such campaigns. If we accept that the targets of assassination are valid in other kinetic military operations (Russia’s Lt Gen Igor Kirillov might as easily have been killed on the battlefield as assassinated by Ukraine in December), the question must be asked why it is unjustifiable to conduct these operations?
The strategic justification of reaching far beyond the battlefield to eliminate enemy personnel is married by necessity to the moral justification. Targets of exceptionally high value far from the active frontline or rear echelons, and thus outside of the reach of more conventional military tactics, do not suddenly lose their value.
Ukrainian intelligence killed Russian Kirillov and his aide de camp because of his role in Russian chemical weapon attacks against Ukraine. The US and allies like France and the UK have conducted targeted killings of Islamist terrorists. Israel has killed hundreds of senior commanders of terrorist and militia groups and has assassinated Iranian scientists in the last decade for their involvement in that country’s nuclear program and to prevent the ayatollahs from gaining weapons that could destroy the Jewish State.
The strategic case for dispatching these targets is easy to make. They contributed to the enemy war effort, and in Kirillov’s case, were uniformed members of a military aggressor and accused of war crimes.
High-level deaths cause disruption and deterrence. Reaching out through the chaos of battle to eliminate a senior enemy has appeal at any level, especially with the advent of the marksman and long-range accurate small-arms fire. Precision weapons and now unmanned systems (and all-source intelligence resources) enable militaries to strike headquarters and eradicate enemy commanders.
Covert operations beyond the battlefield take this further, killing high-value targets in enemy capitals and elsewhere. This is just an extension of the war effort itself, and when conducted with adherence to other laws of war, such as avoiding unnecessary collateral damage or the use of banned substances such as chemical or biological weapons, the ethical dilemma shrinks.
The idea of “one shot to end the war” is alluring for any military strategist, even though this is harder to achieve than it sounds. Even the sudden death of Vladimir Putin or Ayatollah Khamenei wouldn’t totally derail Russian or Iranian aggression, even though it would create chaos in Moscow and Tehran.
Equally obviously, Kirillov’s death won’t permanently disrupt Russia’s chemical, biological, and nuclear defense units. The military succession structure will kick in, and he will be replaced.
Iran’s nuclear program will be hard hit by the loss of top scientists, but the Islamic Republic will not simply end its efforts to train nuclear physicists and others to continue the program, as recent events have demonstrated.
The longer-term aim of assassination is to add deterrence to the disruption. Accepting a senior position that opened only because the previous occupant was blown up on his morning commute hardly provokes confidence on the career ladder. New individuals will certainly step forward, driven by their own patriotism or careerism, and even a steady campaign of eliminating such targets is unlikely to utterly collapse adversarial state agencies on its own.
At the same time, the threat of assassinations striking so deeply makes security-obsessed states look inward, obsessing about treason and the unseen enemy, rather than projecting power outward. Like all aspects of military strategy, it’s a tool to help win wars, but not a tool that wins wars alone.
The far greater issue is not whether these sorts of men deserve to die, or if there’s a value to speeding up their meetings with their makers, but the consequences that follow. As Harris argued, the assassination of SS general and Holocaust joint architect Reinhard Heydrich makes the point. Few men were more deserving of the lingering, painful death that he suffered, but his removal made no difference whatsoever to the execution of the Final Solution. Indeed, the massive reprisals against Czechoslovak civilians did not seem like a success.
These concerns are incredibly important, but prudence is only one element for any strategy. It is not the heart of the moral dilemma.
The nature of the state targeted by assassination efforts matters. Considering the increasing totalitarianism of Russia, Iran, and others, horrific retaliation must be expected. Russia adores the opportunity to justify its newest volley of missiles fired at Kyiv or other civilian targets. Iran’s capability to strike Israel directly has been limited by that country’s highly developed air defenses, but the retaliation was still attempted.
That’s because murderous regimes will murder. It’s in their nature. Caution about striking back, including with assassination operations, cannot hang on the fear of violence from violent people.
The argument for and against such operations must be evaluated primarily on whether they effectively reduce the capacity of these regimes to enact violence.
Michael C. DiCianna is a research fellow at the Center for Intermarium Studies at the Institute for World Politics, and a non-resident research assistant at the Yorktown Institute. He is a candidate for an Executive Master of Arts in National Security Affairs at the Institute for World Politics.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
A Security Strategy for Ukraine
The post Assassination Makes Sense. Sometimes appeared first on CEPA.
2025-01-30 05:38:02
The crisis in the small region of Transnistria, which has made daily life miserable for those the Kremlin claims to protect, should be an object lesson in Putin realpolitik. When Russia runs things, your country or region becomes a geopolitical plaything where your interests will always come second. At best.
So about 350,000 Transnistrians are now shivering in the dark for long periods at the height of winter because the Kremlin cut off its free energy supply. This wasn’t a forced decision, it was a choice.
Why? Because Russia hopes the misery inflicted on Moldova (to which Transnistria belongs and to which it’s intimately connected) will increase poverty and misery and cause voters to blame its pro-Western government. This autumn parliamentary elections will give them the chance to decide who to blame for their suffering.
Russia has for many years supplied gas to the Transnistrian region, for no payment, where it’s used to generate energy for consumption in Moldova, at a price. But since Moscow turned off the taps at the new year, the roles have been reversed. Moldova buys supplies on the markets, especially from neighboring Romania, while the Transnistrian region struggles to stay warm.
There’s a cost to all this. Moldova has to pay more for alternative supplies. And that’s really the point (Russia’s claims of unpaid debt are grossly over-inflated.) As of 10 January, electricity prices have risen by around 70%. This has increased the economic burden of the population where rising prices are the main concern. It disproportionately affects low-income households. While the government has implemented a compensation system, around 30% of the population live in poverty.
The gas switch-off is not the first time Russia has tried to browbeat Moldova and its people (in 2022, Moscow reduced gas deliveries to Moldova by more than half), but it may be the last. Moldova was once reliant on Russian-supplied gas but has learnt its lesson and largely decoupled from Kremlin energy supplies. Regardless of the current crisis, Moldova’s contract with Gazprom expires in September 2026 and if pro-European parties remain in power, they will probably terminate the deal.
Moldova now relies heavily on daily electricity imports from Romania, complemented by limited local generation and a growing contribution from renewable energy sources (10%-15%.) This shift has helped avoid a crisis.
The situation is far worse in Transnistria. With no gas supply, the MGRES power plant has switched to coal, which is projected to last for the next few days. To conserve resources public institutions have been disconnected from heating systems, rolling blackouts have been implemented, public services, including transport and hospitals, operate in reduced mode, and schools have extended holidays. Imports to the region have decreased by 43%, and exports have dropped by 60%, as production was either halted or cut.
Transnistrian leader Vadim Krasnoselsky announced Russia’s intention to supply sufficient humanitarian gas for the region’s consumption. Nothing has so far resulted and an unwilling Transnistria now accepted an offer of help from the European Union (EU) that includes $31m for both Moldova and Transnistria for the period 1-10 February, and a loan of 3 million cubic meters of gas provided to Transnistria by Moldovan authorities.
The EU support will be used to buy gas for the Transnistrian region, including MGRES, and in exchange MGRES will supply free electricity to Moldova — leading to a decrease of prices. This short-term solution will bridge the gap for Transnistria, yet a long term sustainable solution is still to be presented.
The crisis only highlights the unsustainable nature of Transnistria’s economy, which is reliant on free Russian gas and therefore Kremlin goodwill.
A failure to aid Transnistria from its Putin-induced mess has other implications. If the energy crisis worsened, there could be an influx of Transnistrian residents to Moldova, creating a humanitarian crisis. More than 90% of Transnistria residents are Moldovan citizens. This would stretch the country’s resources.
Russia’s energy blackmailing is part of its broader geopolitical strategy to destabilize Moldova and influence both its domestic and foreign policy. Since launching its full-scale war in Ukraine, Moscow has intensified hybrid warfare against Moldova through its FSB spy agency and including multi-million dollar disinformation campaigns, interference in presidential elections, and attempts to undermine the EU referendum.
It seems likely that pro-Russian candidates will leverage the crisis by promising lower energy costs if elected, exploiting voters’ economic vulnerabilities while seeking to encourage Transnistrian electors to use their votes in the Moldovan ballot.
It is crucial for Moldova to prioritize energy diversification, enhance security, and foster regional cooperation. At the same time, the crisis offers an opportunity for Moldova to reframe its relationship with Transnistria, preparing for future reintegration in a way that is both strategic and sustainable, including a vision on energy policy that includes Transnistria and minimizes Russia’s influence.
Anastasia Pociumban is a Research Fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), where she leads the Think Tank Network on the Eastern Partnership. Her work focuses on EU enlargement and the EU’s relations with its eastern neighbors. She is a former Denton Fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.)
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
A Security Strategy for Ukraine
The post Transnistria Suffers Russia’s Tough Love appeared first on CEPA.
2025-01-30 04:12:59
During the Biden administration’s closing days, the Commerce Department issued sweeping technology export controls, placing new limits on the export of advanced AI chips.
The rules divided countries into three tiers. The top rung, Tier 1, allows a select group of 18 US allies and partners broad latitude to import and deploy advanced AI chips. Tier 2 countries — the vast majority of the world’s nations – face much more stringent restrictions. Tier 3 — including China, Russia, and other arms embargoed countries — are effectively banned from buying cutting-edge US-made AI chips.
The Biden administration placed 17 of the 27 European Union members in Tier 2, including Poland and the Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — seemingly overlooking those countries’ deep alignment with U.S. strategic and economic goals. Warsaw and the Baltics, among others, are deeply concerned — and, some would say, furious.
President Donald Trump faces a choice. He can do away with this regulation — as some US firms and members of Congress have advocated — or leverage it to strengthen key relationships, channel allied defense spending, and protect US AI commercial interests. If President Trump keeps the rule, his administration should use the upcoming Munich Security Conference to announce Poland and the Baltics’ elevation to Tier 1 status.
Tier 1 matters. It allows streamlined access to high-performance AI chips with relatively few restrictions. License applications from these countries enjoy a presumption of approval. In essence, Tier 1 helps ensure that a country maintains reliable access to the advanced computing power needed for AI development and deployment.
It’s a no-brainer to include Poland and the Baltics in Tier 1. During his first term, President Trump found considerable common cause with them. Poland championed a vision for a robust, self-reliant Europe that invests heavily in its own defense. Leading American tech companies, from Microsoft to Google, have invested billions into Polish data centers and R&D. Microsoft and Google are expanding their support for AI innovation in the Baltics, a region already known for its advanced digital governance (Estonia), strong IT service sectors (Latvia and Lithuania), and pro-American orientation.
From a national security perspective, Poland and the Baltic states are key front-line states. They are members of key US export control systems, enjoy strong ties with US national security initiatives, and have made commitments to preventing technology diversion. Estonia leads key NATO cybersecurity and defense technology initiatives. Poland makes robust investments in defense-related AI innovation. The region’s unified stance against technology transfer to demonstrate their reliability. If these countries are placed in Tier 1, they could increase AI-driven national security spending, responding to President Trump’s repeated calls for European allies to step up on defense.
If genuine security or compliance matters exist, these should be articulated publicly and addressed cooperatively. The Trump team could work with Poland and the Baltic states to articulate security baselines that must be met to reach Tier 1.
The bottom line is that adding these nations to Tier 1 would strengthen, not weaken, the rule’s effectiveness. As the US assesses its technology relationship with Europe, Poland and the Baltic states operating could be strong partners in addressing the administration’s concerns about EU regulation of American tech companies.
At the upcoming Munich Security Conference, President Trump’s team will have a prime stage to announce that Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have joined Tier 1. The move would underline a strong transatlantic high-tech alliance that privileges loyal allies, encourages them to bolster defense outlays, and keeps the door open for American AI firms seeking to expand in markets primed for tech innovation. President Trump should take the opportunity to affirm America’s leadership in global AI development — and do so alongside important allies.
Pablo Chavez is an Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Center for a New American Security’s Technology and National Security Program and a technology policy expert. He has held public policy leadership positions at Google, LinkedIn, and Microsoft and has served as a senior staffer in the US Senate.
Matthew Eitel is the Chief of Staff at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
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